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1. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has prepared the Deparlmelll of Energy Programmlllic 
Spent Nuclear FlU.'1 Mal1l1gemellf amI Idaho National Engineering ulbomtory Ellrironmeflwl 
Restoration amI Waste Mllllagemem Programs Em';rollmelllal Impact SWlemelll (SNF and INEL EIS ) 
to assist it s management in making two decisions. The first decision. which is programmatic. is to 
de termine the management program for DOE spent nuclear fuel. The second decision is on the future 
direction of environmental restoration. waste management . and spent nuclear fuel management 
acti vities at the Idaho Nat ional Engineering Laboratory. 
Volume I of the EIS. which suppon s the programmatic decision. considers the effects of spent 
nuclear fuel management on the quality of the human and natural environment for planning years 1995 
through 2035. DOE has derived the information and analysis results in Volume I from several site-
specific appendixes. Volume 2 of the EIS . which supports Ihe INEL-speci fic decision. describes 
envi ronmental impacts for various environmental restoration. waste management. and spent nuclear 
fuel management alternatives for planning years 1995 Ihrough 2005. 
This Appendix B to Volume I considers the impacts on the INEL environment of the 
implementation of various DOE-wide ~ pent nuclear fuel management alternatives. The Naval Nuclear 
Propul sion Program. which is a joint NavylDOE program. is responsible for spent naval nuclear fuel 
examination at the INEL. For this appendix. naval fu el that has been examined at the Naval Reactors 
Faci lity and turned over to DOE for storage is tenned naval-type fuel. This appendix evaluates the 
management of DOE spent nuclear fuel including naval-type fuel. Naval spent nuclear fuel 
examination is addressed in Appendix D: Section 5. 16 of this appendix includes relevant 
envi ronmental consequences from Appendix D. 
In addition to this introduction. Appendix B contains the foll owing chapters: 
Chapter 2 - Background: Describes INEL spent nuclear fuel fac ilities. the regulatory 
framework for spent nuclear fuel management at the INEL. and the INEL spent nuclear fuel 
management program. 
Chapter 3 - Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Alternatives: Describes the DOE-wide spcnt 
nuclear fuel management alternat ives as the INEL would implement them. and pro\,ides a 
I- I VOLUME 1. APPENDIX B 
summary comparison of potential environmental consequences for each alternative, as 
described in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 4 - Affected Environment : Describes the INEL site and the surrounding 
environment that DOE spent nuclear fuel management actions could affect. 
Chapter 5 - Environmental Consequences : Provides the results of environmental 
consequence analyses for each spent nuclear fuel management alternative. 
Chapter 6 - References 
Volume I COnlains a list of acronyms and abbreviations and a glcssary Ihat is applicable to this 
appendix. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
This chapter conlains an overview of the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) facilities 
and historic events related to spent nuclear fuel, a descriplion of the regulatory framework for the 
actions evaluated in this document. and an overview of the current spent nuclear fuel management 
program at the INEL. 
2.1 Overview 
The following sections provide a general overview of the INEL including its history. current 
activities, and mission as they relate to spent nuclear fuel management and future decisions. 
2.1.1 History 01 Spent Nuclear Fuel Activities 
The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. a predecessor of the U.S . Department of Energy (DOE). 
established the INEL. formerly the National Reactor Testing Station. to build, test, and operate various 
types of nuclear reactors, support plants, and associated equipment. Since its establishment in 1949 
(see Table 2-1), DOE and its predecessor agencies have built 52 reactors at the lNEL. The major 
DOE programs at the site have included test irradiation services, uranium recovery from highly 
enriched spent fuel s, calcination of liquid radioactive waste. light-water-cooled reactor safety testing 
and research, operation of research reactors. environmental restoration. and storage and surveillanc:e of 
solid transuranic wastes. In support of the DOE reactor research program and as part of the spent 
nuclear fuel reprocessing program. the INEL has received spent nuclear fuel from more than 30 offsi te 
sources, including naval reactors. university reactors. commercial reactors, and DOE research reactors, 
as well as fuels fabricated in the United States and irradiated in foreign reactors (DOE 1993). 
The Experimental Breeder Reactor-I , now a National Historic Landmark, maintains a key place 
in the history of nuclear power in the United States. In December 1951 , th is reactor generated the first 
usable electrici ty from a nuclear reactor. The Experimenlal Breeder Reactor-I also demonstrated that a 
nuclear reactor could ac tually produce more fuel than it consumes. 
Of special significance to spent nuclear fuel is the history of the Idaho Chemical Processing 
Plant. From 1953 to 1992. this plant recovered usable uranium from spent nuclear fuel from Uniled 
States government reactors. The plant operated for 39 years as a fu ll -scale production facility. But in 
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Table 2·1 . INEL 'pent nuclear fuel history . 
Year 
1949 
195 1 
1953 
1953 
1957 
1965 
1974 
1980 
1992 
1992 
1993 
Event 
National Reactor Testing Station established 
Site reactor first to generate electrici ty from nuclear fission 
ICPP' began operation 
Test of first submarine nuclear reactor 
Expended Core Faci lity constructed 
DOE contract with Public Service Company of Colorado (Fort 
St. Vrain) 
Site became Idaho National Engineering Laboratory 
DOE contracted to receive Public Service Company of Colorado 
(Fort St. Vrain) spent nuclear fuel 
Decision to discontinue reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel at ICPP' 
announced 
DOE creates Office of Spent Fuel Management 
Court order of June 28. 1993 issued 
a. ICPP _ Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. 
April 1992. DOE decided to phase out reprocessing for material recovery. resulting in the shutdown of 
the reprocessing operation . 
Spent naval nuclear fuel handling at the Naval Reac tors Facility originated in 1957 with the 
construction of the Expended Core Facility. The original building contained a water pit and shielded 
cells. which a'l! connected to the water pit by transfer tunnels. The Expended Core Facility examines 
spent nuclear fue l from operating naval ships and from prototype naval reactors. The examinations 
support research and development for naval fuel quality improvement. Over the years. the Navy made 
additions and improvements at the Naval Reactors Facility site. including the construction and 
operation of three prototype reactors and facilities for training naval nuclear powerplant operators. 
The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program is placing the prototype reactors. which have rcached the ends 
of their useful lives. in layup. All training is expected to end before DOE issues the Record of 
Decision for this Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). Expended Core Facility activities are 
continuing. Appendix 0 describes the Naval Reactors F,c ility in more detai l. 
In 1965 the United States entered into a contract wi th Public Service Company of Colorado. with 
which the United States agreed to lease special nuclear material to Public Service Company of 
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Colorado fo r fuel at the Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Power Plant. In 1980. the United States and Public 
Service Company of Colorado modified the 1965 contrac t. requiring DOE to accept returned Fort St. 
Vrain spent nuclear fuel at the INEL. From 1980 to 1986. Public Service Company of Colorado made 
approx imately 120 shipments of Fort St. Vrain spent nuclear fuel to the INEL. 
In 1974 the National Reactor Testing Station became the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. 
The INEL mission broadened to include research and engineering for nonnuclear programs and 
environmental resloralion and waste management activities, 
In the early 1980s. pursuant to the West Valley Demonstration Project Act (42 USC 2021 a) and 
a coun order, DOE agreed to accept 125 special case commercial reactor spent nuclear fuel assemblies 
located at the state·owned Western New York Nuclear Service Center. DOE began a project to 
demonstrate the viobility of a transportable spent nuclear fuel storage cask. with the intenti!)n of 
shipping the fuel to the INEL. Based on this. New York State Energy Research and Development 
Authority. which has jurisdiction over the cenler. has allowed continued storage until DOE obtained 
U.S . Nuclear Regulatory Comm i' sion Certificates of Compliance, which have been issued. The fuel 
remains at West Valley awaiting the Record of Decision for this EIS, 
In addition to the naval and INEL·generated fuel on the site. some speclal·case spent nuclear 
fuel . such as fuel from university reactors. has been shipped direc tly to the Idaho Chemical Processing 
Plant for storage. Damaged fuel from the 1979 Three Mile Island accident was shipped directly to 
Test Area Nonh for examinalion and storage as pan of a research mission. 
In 1990. DOE issued an Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact for 
Public Service Company of Colorado shipments of Fort St. Vrain spent nuclear fuel to the INEL. The 
State of Idaho challenged the adequacy of the E .. vironmental Assessment and. in June 1993. the 
United States District Court for the District of Idaho found for the State and ordered DOE to prepare 
this EIS. A DOE appeal of the order resulted in a December 1993 amendment that governs the DOE 
schedule and obligation for preparing the EIS. 
2.1.2 Current Activities at Spent Nuclear Fuel·Related Facilities 
Six major faci lity areas at the INEL (Figure 2· 1) store spent nuclear fue l: Argonne National 
Laboratory· West. Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. Naval Reactors Faci lity. Power Burst Faci lity. 
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INEL Major Facility Areas 
26 To Blackfoot 
64 km (40 mi)" 
'Miles from Central Facilities Area 
Legend: 
ARA 
ANL·W 
CFA 
EBR· l 
ICPP 
NRF 
PBF 
AWMC 
TAN 
TRA 
Auxiliary Reactor Area 
Argonne National Laboratory-West 
Central Facilities Area 
Experimental Breeder Reactor· I 
Idaho Chemical Processing Plant 
Naval Reactors Facility 
Power Burst Facility 
Radioactive Waste Management Complex 
Test Area North 
Test Reactor Area 
~ORTH 
To Rexburg 
132 km (82 mil' 
To Idaho Falls 
BO km (50mi)" 
Miles 
Kilometers 
4 6 8 
, , 
12 
PJ20-' 
Figu re 2.1. Major faci lity areas located at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory si te . 
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Test Area North. and Test Reactor Area. Spent fuel at the INEL is kept in a variety of rlry and wet 
configurat ions. The total amount of spent nuclear fuel at the INEL accounts for about 10 percen! (by 
weight of heavy metal) of the spent nuclear fuel in the DOE complex (DOE 1993). 
Table 2·2 lists the primary INEL spent nuclear fuel storage faci lities. the types of fuel in storage. 
and the storage configurations. Figure 2·2 indicates the relative proportion of fuel at these facil ities. 
The number and variety of wet and dry storage configurations currently in use at the INEL is largely 
the resuh of the different purposes for the facilities (e.g .. at·reactor slOrage. storage research and 
development. reprocessing. and fuel research and development). The condition of the spent nuclear 
fuel in storage is generally good with the notable exception of the fuel in the Underwater Fuel Storage 
Facility (CPP·603). The following paragraphs briefly describe each primary facility area that manages 
spent nuclear fuel . 
The Argonne National Laboratory· West generates spent nuclear fuel as a resuh of research and 
development act ivities related to advanced reactor design. DOE has brought small quantities of spent 
nuclear fuel from other reactors to this facility to support these activities. Reactors at Argonne 
National Laboratory· West are the Experimental Breeder Reactor II. the Transient Reactor Test 
Faci lity. the Zero Power Physics Reactor. and the Neutron Radiography Reaclor. Storage facilities 
include both wet (including molten sodium) and dry configurations. 
The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant historically received spent nuclear fuel from many on site 
and offsite reactors for reprocessing (i.e .. the recovery of uranium for reuse). However. DOE decided 
to phase out reprocessing activities in 1992. The new mission for this facility area is receipt and 
storage. plus research and development of technologies in support of the disposition of spent nuclear 
fuel. The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant stores virtually all types of spent nuclear fuel except 
production reactor fuel [i.e .. fuel from Hanford Site and Savannah River Site (SRS) production 
reactors]. It stores nonproduction aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel. This facility uses both wet and 
dry storage configurations. 
The Naval Reactors Facility includes the Expended Core Faci lity. which receives and examines 
naval spent nuclear fuel to support fuel development and performance analyses. In addition. the 
Expended Core Facility removes structural support material from fuel assemblies before the transfer of 
the fuel portion to the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant for interim storage. 
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Table 2-2_ Major INEL spent nuclear fuel storage facilities. 
Facilitya 
Argonne National Laboratory· West 
E~pcrimcntal Breeder Reactor II 
Hot Fuel Examination Facility 
Neutron Radiography RcaClQf 
Radioacti ve Scrap and Was Ie Facility 
Transient Reac tor Test Facility 
Idaho Chemical Processing Plant 
Underwater Fuel Storage Facilityd 
Irradiated Fuel Storage Faci lity 
Fucl Storage ArealAuorinel Dissolution 
Process Cell 
Underground Storage Facili ty 
Naval Reactors Facility 
Expended Core Facility 
Expended Core Facility Rail Siding 
Power Burst Facility 
Power Burst Facility Storage Canal 
Test Reactor Area 
Materials Test Reactor Canal 
Advanced Reactivity Measurement 
Faci lity 
Coupled Fast Reactivity Measurement 
Facility 
Advanced Test Reactor Canal 
Test Area North 
Test Area North Pool 
Test Area North Pad 
Storage Typeb 
Liquid sodium 
Dry 
Wet 
Dry 
Dry 
Wet 
Dry 
Wet 
Dry 
Wet 
Dry 
Wet 
Wet 
Wet 
Wet 
Wet 
Wet 
Dry 
Fuel Type' 
3456a666c 
a. This table lists the major spent fuel storage faci lities. Other facilities (e .g .. laboratories) might periodically 
contain small quantities of spent nuclear fuel. 
b. Wet storage involves water-filled pools. Dry storage involves a variety of configurations (e.g .. casks. wells. 
buildings). 
c. The spent fuel types arc as follows: 
1. Naval-type fuel 
2. Savannah Ri ve r Site production fuels and other aluminum-clad fuels 
3. Hanford Site production fuels 
4. Graphite fuels 
S. Special case commercial fuel s 
6a. Experimental reactors - stainless steel-clad fuels 
6b. Experimental reactors - zirconium-clad fuels 
6c . Experimental reactors - other fucl configurations 
d . Spent nuclear fuel storage at thi s facility will cease by December 31 . 2000. as pan of an agreement between 
DOE and the State nf Idaho. 
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(0.2%) 
Power Burst 
Facility 
(47.0%) 
Test Area North 
Note: Percentages represent metric Ions 01 heavy metal 01 spent nuclear luel 
Figure 2-2_ Existing (1995) distribution of INEL SNF. 
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PJ20-2 
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The Power Burst Facility reactor was placed in operational standby in 1992. A limited amount 
of spent nuclear fuel from this facility remains in wet storage. in a storage pool that is in good 
condition. but it is small and uneconomical to use. DOE plans to remove the fuel from this facility by 
1996. 
DOE has used Test Area North for commercial reactor fuel research. The large Test Area North 
Hot Shop and Hot Cells have supported the Loss of Fluid Test and commercial nuclear fuel testing. 
including dry cask storage demonstration. Test Area North stores special case commercial fuel 
(including Three Mile Island Unit 2 core debris) and DOE experimental fuel similar to commercial 
nuclear fuel. 
Test Reactor Area has historically operated a number of test reactors. but the Advanced Test 
Reactor and its associated Critical Facility are the only reactors now operating. Most spent nuclear 
fuel at this area is associated with the Test Reactor Area reactors, which utilized aluminum-based 
fuels. In addition. DOE stores small amounts of special case commercial, foreign, and Power Burst 
Facility spent nuclear fuel at Test Reactor Area in the Materials Test Reactor basin. All spent nuclear 
fuel in storage at the Test Reactor Area is in water-filled pools (DOE 1993). 
2.1.3 Spent Nuclear Fuel Mission 
The INEL spent nuclear fuel mission is to manage DOE-owned spent fuel cost-effectively and in 
a way that protects the safety of INEL workers, the public, and the environment. As the lead 
laboratory for the DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel Program, the INEL provides support to the Office of Spent 
Fuel Management and coordinates the development of an integrated program for DOE. 
The main focus of near-lenn activities is the accurate quantification and characterizalion of 
DOE-owned spent nuclear fuel , identification of spent nuclear f~el management faci lities and their 
conditions, identification of safe interim storage for existing and new spent nuclear fuel . and 
identification of technologies and requirements to place DOE spent nuclear fuel in safe interim storage. 
Long-term activities include the development of final waste acceptance criteria requirements and 
stabilization technologies for altemate fuel disposition, construction of facilities to stabilize fuel to 
meet waste disposal requirements, processing of the fuel to a final waste form, and transportation of 
the waste form for dispoSition. 
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2,2 Regulatory Framework for Spent Nuclear Fuel Management 
This section summarizes State of Idaho laws and regulations that apply to spent nuclear fuel 
management at the INEL. Volume I. Section 7.2, provides summary information for Federal laws and 
regulations. Executive Orders, and DOE Orders. Volume 2, Chapter 2. provides information on 
National Environmental Policy Act reviews related to site-specific decisions that have potential 
environmental impacts. Volume 2, Chapter 7, provides information on regulatory permits that the 
INEL holds or for which it has applied. 
The Idaho Environmental Protection and Health Act (Idaho Code, Title 39, Chapter 101 et seq.) 
establishes general provisions for the protection of the environment and public health. The Act created 
the Idaho Departnent of Health and Welfare and its Division of Environmental Quality, thereby 
consolidating all state public health and environmental protection activities in one department. The 
Act authorizes the Department to promulgate standards, rules, and regulations related to water and air 
quality, noise reduction, and solid waste disposal; and grants authority to issue required permits, 
collect fees , establish compliance schedules, and review plans for the construction of sewage and 
public water treatment and disposal facilities. 
The Idaho Water Pollution Control Act (Idaho Code, Title 39, Chapter 36) authorizes the 
Department of Health and Welfare to protect the waters of Idaho. This law contains general language 
on the prevention of water pollution and the provision of financial assistance to municipalities. 
The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare is also responsible for the enforcement and 
implemEntation of the Hazardous Waste Management Act of 1983, as amended (Idaho Code, Title 39, 
Chapter 44), which provides for the protection of health and the environment from the effects of 
improper or unsafe management of hazardous wastes and for the establishment of a tracking or 
manifesting system for these wastes. This program is intended to be consistent with. and not more 
stringent than, the Federal regulations established under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA). At this time, Idaho has primacy over hazardous and mixed w'.ste regulations promulgated 
through July I, 1990, by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. !'he Hazardous Waste 
Management Act sets forth requirements for the development of plans that address the identification of 
hazardous wastes: unauthorized treatment. storage. release. use, or disposal of Ihese wastes: and pennit 
requirements for hazardous waste facilities . Under the authority of this Act, the Idaho Department of 
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Heahh and Welfare has promulgated rules and regulations on the transportation. monitoring. reporting. 
and record keeping of hazardous wastes. 
Several INEL facilities have air quality permits from the State. and operate in compliance with 
pennit conditions. Pennit applications are currently pending with the State for proposed new or 
modified emission sources. [n April 199 1 DOE submitted an inventory of all potential INEL 
radioactive and cri teria pollutant emission sources to the State. The inventory conlains the infonnation 
necessary for the State to issue the INEL a Permit to Operate. 
The Idaho Department of Heahh and Welfare. Division of Environmental Quality. Air Quality 
Bureau. conducts annual inspections of the INEL to determine if the operating portions of the site are 
in compliance with the Rules for the Control of Air Pollution in Idaho. The most recent inspections 
were in January 1994. In addition, pursuant to 40 CFR Part 61.94(H), DOE submits to the State an 
annual report documenting compliance with National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants 
at the INEL. 
2.3 Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Program at the INEL 
In 1992 the Secretary of Energy directed the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Restoration 
and Waste Management to develop an integrated, long-term spent nuclear fuel management program. 
[n response to this request. DOE created the Office of Spent Fuel Management (EM-37). This office, 
which has strategic programmatic responsibilities, has designated the [NEL as the program support 
organization for the DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel Program. [n this role. the INEL provides technical 
support to the Office of Spent Fuel Management and develops site communication and integration for 
the national program. 
As identi fied in the Spent Fllel Working Grollp Report on Srorage of rhe Department 's Spent 
Nuclea r Fuel and Other Reactor Irradiated Nuclear Materials and Their Environmental. Safety and 
Health Vllinerabili ries. Volume [ (DOE 1993). some of the cUlTent storage facilities at the INEL are 
inadequate for extended interim storage. and additional storage facilities or modifications might be 
necessary. In February 1994. DOE issued. Plan of Action to Resolve Spent Nllclear Fllel 
Vll inerabilities. Phase I (DOE 1994a), followed by a Phase II Plan in April 1994 (DOE 1994b) and a 
Phase III Plan in October 1994 (DOE 1994c). which identified specific cOlTective actions to address 
the spent nuclear fuel vulnerabilities. At the INEL. many of the cOlTective actions have been 
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completed or are cUlTently underway. The spent nuclear fuel storage pools at Test Area North. Power 
Burst Facility. and the Underwater Fuel Storage Facility do not comply with new facility regulatory 
requirements. The INEL plans to move spent nuclear fuel from the CPP·603 Underwater Fuel Storage 
Facility by December 31. 2000. To stabilize this fuel for storage. the INEL also plans to install 
canning equipment in the IlTadiated Fuel Storage Facility hot cell. This equipment is scheduled for 
operation by late 1995. To the extent of its existing capability. DOE could consolidate spent nuclear 
fuel at the Power Burst Facility. the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. and the Test Area North at the 
Idaho Chemical Processing Plant as a resuh of implementing the management alternatives described in 
Chapter 3. These activities and other planned actions for which National Environmental Policy Act 
review will be completed before the Record of Decision of this E[S were analyzed under the No-
Action Ahemative (see Chapter 3). 
Each of the specific INEL spent nuclear fuel Plan of Action projects could result in emissions. 
worker exposures, and ocher potential environ menial impacts. The potential environmental impacts 
that could result fiom each project or corrective action item were not analyzed individually but were 
collectively enveloped by the spent nuclear fuel management activities reported and analyzed for each 
altern~tive . SIJccessful completion of the corrective actions would significantly reduce the near-term 
environmental. safety. and heahh risks associated with spent fuel storage at INEL. 
The INEL has provided support in the development of dry at-reactor storage of special case 
commercial spent nuclear fuel in accordance with the requirements of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 
1982 and its 1987 amendments. Dry-storage cemonstrations and research at the [NEL contributed to 
the granting of NRC licenses to several utilities for tho construction and operation of dry-storage 
facilities at reactor sites. Research at these facilities is demonstrating the technical feasibility and the 
economics of adding dry storage capacity in metal or concrete spent fuel storage casks at reactor sites. 
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3. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL MANAGEMENT ALTERNATIVES 
Chapter 3 describes the alternatives for spent nuclear fuel management as they relate to the Idaho 
National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) and summarizes and compares potential environmental 
consequences for each alternative. Chapter 5 contains full descriptions of the consequences of 
implementing the alternatives. 
3.1 Description of Alternatives 
DOE has identified five spent nuclear fuel management alternatives: 
Alternative 1 - No Action 
Alternative 2 - Decentralization (2a, 2b, and 2c) 
Alternative 3 - 199211993 Planning Basis 
Alternative 4 - Regionalization (4a and 4b) 
Alternative 5 - Centralization t5a and 5b) 
Table 3-1 summarizes the actions that would result from the implementation of these alternatives 
at the INEL. For each alternative, this table summarizes the proposed transportation, stabilization. 
storage. research and development, and naval-type fuel examination activities. For alternatives 2. 4. 
and 5. it identifies a number of options. 
The analysis of each alternative considers, as appropriate, existing and projected spent nuclear 
fuel inventories, existing spent nuclear fuel wet and dry storage facilities. the construction of storage 
facilities and associated stabilization facilities to achieve interim management objectives. and the 
relocation of the spent nuclear fuel as appropriate to proposed interim storage facilities . 
Table 2-2 lists existing spent nuclear fuel storage facilities with associated type(s) of storage and 
fuel. Table 3-2 lists the potential facilities and projects required for specific alternatives. DOE has 
based the potential environmental consequences for each alternative on the existing and proposed 
facilities and projects listed in Tables 2-2 and 3-2. respectively . 
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Table 3·t. Summary of spent nuclear fuel management alternatives at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory .' 
I. 
3. 
,\ ilernall \'!: De<<: nptlon 
1II,n1mum a<:l1un, 
nt' ary for cont inued 
,alc"e<:ure management 
ofSNF 
De.:entralozal1 on SNF "' ould be stored 
close to existing locations 
v. ilh limited shipments to 
DOE facliolles. 
19'1211 99.l 
Planning B~ is 
DOE 1992, 1993 planning 
basis for DOE and 
naval ·typ.: SNF 
management. 
Transponal1on 
'0 shipmenl 10 or from Ihe 
INEL arter transition 
penod. 
Onsite Iranspon of SNF 
limited 10 that required for 
safe storage 
Receipt of naval ·type SNF 
during transition period. 
Same as Ailernative : plu : 
Receipt of non· DOE 
dome tic and foreign 
research S F 
Receipi of naval ·lyp.: 
fuel s for examinatIon 
and reshi pment 
(oplion 2c) 
Onsite SNF [ran fer for 
consolidation 
Receipt of some foreign, 
Fon 51. Vrain , West 
Valley. and non· DOE 
domestic research SNF. 
Onsile tran fer. 
Receipt of naval ·type 
SNF for examinalion at 
the ECF and Iran. fer to 
tbe ICPP for IOlerim 
storage. 
Stabilization 
Limited to those 
,"lOlmum actions 
required to store Si"F 
safely 
Same :1.< Ailcrnalive I 
Stabilization :1.< 
planned: new canning 
and characterization 
facility required. 
15 
Minimum facil ity 
upgrade/replacement 10 
uppon safe storage. 
Replacement dry storage 
faCIlity for Test Area 
Nonh siorage poo l. 
Same as Alternative I 
Replacement dry storage 
facility for Test Area 
Nonh storage pool 
New dry fucl storage 
facilit y and increased rJck 
capacily in storage pools. 
Research and 
Development 
Existing R&D activities 
for SNF management 
would contin ue 
Treatment technology 
and R&D activitie for 
DOE SNF management 
and di sposal p.:nnincd . 
Same :I., Allcmative 2 
plus: 
Electromctallurgical 
Process 
Demonstralion 
Project at A L· W 
Naval· Typ.: 
Fuel Examinat :on 
Shipment to INEL 
and examinalions 
after a tranSitIon 
period would be 
phased out 
Three oplions: 
Options 2a and 
2b are tbe same 
as for 
Allemative 
Option 2c 
wou ld enable 
the continued 
receipt of naval -
type fue ls for 
inspection at tbe 
ECF and a 
return to 
originaling 
shipyards. The 
ECF Dry Cell 
Conslruclion 
projeci wou Id 
be compleled. 
ECF continues 
operalion as 
planned. The ECF 
Dry Cell 
Conslruclion would 
be completed. 
Table 3-1. (continued). 
Allernativc Description 
4a. Regionalization Existing and new SNF 
by Fuel Type redistribution based on 
similarity of fuel type. 
All SNF in DOE complex 
would be managed at 
Hanford Site. INEl. or 
Savannah River Site. 
4b(I) . Regionalization Existing and projected 
by Geography Western DOE and naval· 
( INEl) type SNF would be 
managed at the INEL. 
v.> 
I 
v.> 
41>(2). Regionali?.;!tion Existing and projected 
by Geography Western DOE and naval· 
(Elsewhere) type.: SNF would be 
managed at Hanford Site 
or Nevada Test Site. 
< 5a. CentraliLation al Existing and projecled 
0 Olher DOE DOE and naval -type SNF , 
s: Si tes would he managed at 
m Hanford Sile. Savannah 
River Site. Oak Ridge. or 
}> Nevada Test Sile. 
" " m 
Z 
S2 
X 
al 
Transportation Stabilization 
Distribute existing and SNF to be retained at 
projected SNF to the INEl the INEl would be 
based primarily on fuel stabilized as planned; 
type. for SNF to be shipped 
to regional sites. any 
stabi li7.ation beyond 
that requ ired for 
transportation would 
be perfonned at the 
regional site. 
Shipment of all Western Sites shipping SNF to 
SNF in DOE complex tu INEl would stabilize 
the INEL. for purpose of 
transportation; any 
further stabilization 
would be performed at 
the INEL. 
Existing INEl SNF shipped SNF at the INEl 
offsite to selected Western would be stabili7.ed at 
Regionalization site. a canning. 
characterization. and 
shipping facility prior 
to shipment offsite ; 
other SNF would be 
stabi lized as required 
at the selected 
Region:1lization site. 
Exisling INEl SNF shipped SNF at the INEl 
offsite to selected would be stabilized at 
ccnlralization si te . a canning. 
characterization. and 
shipping facili ty prior 
10 shipment offsile ; 
other SNF would be 
stabilized as required 
at the selected 
Centralization site . 
/~ 
Storage 
Same as Alternative J 
Construction of new 
facilities for SNF storage. 
Phaseou t of all SNF 
storage facilities . 
Phaseout of :11 1 SNF 
storage facilit ies . 
Research and 
Development 
Same as Allernative J 
Same as Allernative 3 
Phaseout of all R&D 
activities at the INEl 
except the 
Eleclrometallurgical 
Process Demonstration 
Project at ANl-W. 
Phaseout of all R&O 
activities at the INEl 
except the 
ElectrometaJlurgical 
Process Demonstration 
Project OIl ANl-W. 
Naval Type 
Fuel Examination 
Same as 
Allernative 3 
Same as 
Allernative 3 
Same as 
Alternative I 
Same as 
Alternative I 
< o 
r 
c: 
s: 
m 
Table 3-1. (continued). 
5h 
AIt~rnatlvc I><:s~ription 
Ccntralilation at 
the INEL 
EXisting and pmjccted 
DOE and naval ·type SNF 
would he managed at the 
INEL 
Transponation 
Shipment of all SNF in 
DOE complex to the INEL. 
Stahili7.ation 
Sites shipping SNF to 
INEL would stabilize 
for purpose of 
transponation ; any 
funher stabilization 
would be performed at 
the INEL. 
Storage 
Construction of new 
facilities for SNF storage. 
Research and 
Development 
Same as Alternative 3 
Naval Type 
Fuel Examination 
Same as 
Alternative :I 
a. ANL·W = Argonne Nallonal Laboratories· West; DOE = U.S. Depanment of Energy; ECF = Expended Core Facility; ICPP = Idaho Chemical Processing Plant ; INEL = Idaho National Engineering 
Laboratory; R&D = resear~h and development ; SNF = spent nuclear fuel. 
17 
. ....., 
I 
\J1 
< 
0 
.. 
:s: 
rn 
-
» 
" 
" rn z 
0 
x 
c:: 
Table 3-2. Potential spent nuclear fuel projects required for each altemativea. 
FacilitylProject Name 
Test Area North Pool Fuel Transfer 
Increased Rack Capacity for CPP-666 
Additional Increased Rack Capacity 
(CPP-666) 
Dry Fuels Storage Facility 
EBR-II Blanket Treatment 
Expendcd Core Fac ility Dry Cell 
Construction 
Fort SI. Vrain Spent Fuel Shipment and 
Storage 
Spent Fuel Processing 
Elcc trometallurgical Process 
Demonstration Project at ANL-W FCFf 
I. 
No Action 
2. 
Decentralization 
.c 
3. 
1992/1993 
Planning Basis 
Alternatiycs 
4.b 
Regi onalization 
'-l . Appendix C of Volume 2 contains detailed descriptions of the spent nuclear fuel projects identified in this table . 
Sa. 
Centralization at 
Other DOE Sites 
5b. 
Centralization 
at the INEL 
b. 
c. 
Projec t act ions listed are for option 4a only. For purpose of analysis. option 4b( I) is the same as Alternative 5b. Option 4b(2) is the same as Alternative Sa. 
Includes canning. characterization. and shipping only. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
Expanded scope. 
The Expended Core Facility Dry Cell Construction under Alternat ive 2 would occur for option 2c only . 
Argonne National Laboratories-West Fuel Cycle Faci lity . 
I~ 
The alternatives involving the interim storage of naval spent nuclear fuel at sites other than the 
INEL include a transit ion period. which would start on June I. 1995. and continue for approximately 
3 years. During this period. approximately 80 shipments of naval spent nuclear fuel would occur to 
the Expended Core Facili ty for examination and subsequent shipmen. to the Idaho Chemical 
Processing Plant for storage. After th is transition period. DOE would phase out the Expended Core 
Fac il ity such that the worker total at the faci lity would decl ine to about 10 by 200 1. Appendix 0 
describes th is transition period. 
3.1.1 Alternative 1: No Action 
Table 3- 1 lists the basic actions expected under this alternative. This alternative would be 
restricted to the mi nimum actions necessary for the continued safe and secure management of spent 
nuclear fuel. Table 3-3 lists the existing inventory of spent nuclear fue l at the INEL. This alternative 
is not a status quo condition in tenns of spent nuclear fue l rece ipts (unlike Alternative 3. under which 
operations would cont inue in accordance with the 199211993 planning basis). Rather. DOE would 
mainta in spent nuclear fuel close to defueling or current storage locations with minimal faci lity 
upgrades or replacements. 
DOE would continue the operation of the following existing spent nuclear fu el-related fac il ities: 
the Fuel Storage AreaIFluorinel Dissolut ion Process Cell ; CPP-603 Underwater Fuel Storage Faci lity 
(until 2000); Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility: Underground Storage Facility: Power Burst Fac il ity 
storage canal: Advanced Test Reactor canal: Advanced Reactivi ty Measurement Fac il ity: Coupled Fast 
Reactivi ty Measurement Facil ity: Materials Test Reactor canal: Test Area North Pool and Test Pad ; 
Argonne National Laboratory - West Hot Fuel Examination Facility. Radioactive Scrap and Waste 
Faci lity. Transient Reactor Test Facility. Zero Power Physics Reactor. and Neutron Radiography 
Reac tor pool. Table 2-2 lists the type(s) of storage and spent nuclear fue ls associated with each 
facility . 
3.1.1.1 Transportation. Under this alternative. the INEL would neither receive nor ship spent 
nuclear fue l except for naval spent fue l du ring a transit ion period. DOE would continue to transfer the 
Advanced Test Reactor canal spent nuclear fuel to the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. In addit ion. 
DOE could transfer other spent nuclear fuel at the INEL site (e .g .. Test Reactor Area, Test Area North 
Pad. Power Burst Facility storage canal. Experimental Breeder Reactor-II . and Naval Nuclear 
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T able 3-3. Spent nuclear fuel inventory for each alternative by 2035 (metric tons of heavy metal).,-b., 
3. ~b( I)( S'-
199!1 1993 h RegionOlliz:lI ion Cenlra lil.:uion ,. 
No , Planning Region:ll izalion by Geography :uOIh.:r C(nlralizaaion 
Fud Type A': lion,j [k.:entralilalion Basis by Fuel Type (lNEL) OOE Sit(s :1I 1~ INEl 
Na\·al.,)pe IO.!J NIC' +~5 .00 +55.00 +55.00 -10.23 +~5 .00 
Alumi num·..: l:ld 2.9 1 11.02 + 12 .09 -2.9 1 +5.85 -2.9 1 +21 0.18 
Hanfo rd None None None Nooe +2. 103.17 Nooe +2. IOJ.11 
Graphite 11 .60 N/C + 16.00 + 16.0 1 +16.0 1 · 11.60 +16.0 1 
S~dal ~'ase 1'!2 .88 +0.03 +26.69 +JJ.63 +2 .30 -122.88 33.63 
commercial 
St.li nlcss-stccl- 77AJ + 1.08 + 1.1 9 + 19.08 + 12.69 ·77.4] + 19 .08 
dad 
Zircaloy-cbd ~9 .09 +0.67 -+0.670 +28.90 + 15.75 --'9.09 +28.90 
Ot~r 0.Qi +0.82 +0.82 + 1.69 +0.28 -0.0 1 + 1.69 
Net increase (+)/ + 1] .62 + 112A1 +1 51.4 1 +2.2 11.05 · 274. 1~ +2.-161.66 
decreast t·) 
TOTAL Z7~. 1 4 287.76 386.61 425.55 2.485. 19 2.1~ 1.80 
a. Source: Wichmann (1995). 
b. To convert metric Ions 10 tons. multiply by 1.10. Heavy metals are uranium. plutonium. and thori um. 
c_ The values may not sum exactl y due to rounding. 
d. The No-Action Alternative represents the present inventory and projections and serves as the bas is for 
determini ng the nel increase or decrease for each type of spcnl nuclear fuel for each of the other alternatives. 
e . Regionali zalion 4b(2). Regionali zalion by Geography (Elsewhere). assumes all spent nuclear fuel invenlOries 
at the INEL go to the Nevada Test Site or Hanford Site. Inventories for 4b(2) would equal Ihose listed for 
Alternative Sa. 
Nle :;; No change from the No-Action Alternative. 
Propulsion Program prototype reactors at the Naval Reactors Facili ty) to the Idaho Chemical 
Processing Plant to the extent of its storage capability. 
3.1.1.2 Stabilization. Due to the deteriorated condition of some of the fuel in the CPP-603 
Underwater Fuel Storage Faci lity. additional canni ng and characterization capabilities would be 
necessary to stabilize this fue l for safe transport and subsequent storage. DOE has scheduled the 
installation and operation of new fue l canning and characterizat ion equipment in the Irradiated Fuel 
Storage Fac ili ty. which could provide these capabili ties. by late 1995. (The installation of such 
equipmenl would be a minor upgrade and would have a smaller extent than sim ilar actions described 
under Alternati ves 3. 4. and 5.) DOE could perform other required stabilization of spent nuclear fue l 
at the INEL in ei the r the Remote Analytical Laboratory or the Fluorine l Dissolution Process Hot Cell. 
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3.1.1.3 Storage. DOE has identified the CPP·603 Underwater Fuel Storage Facil ity as one of 
five complex·wide :,:pcnl nuclear fuel storage facilities that exhibit the greatest vulnerabilities according 
to ,eiect<d criteria and. therefore. has selected this fac ility for priority anent ion (DOE 1993b). A, pan 
of the August 9. 1993. agreement between the Secretaries of the D<partment of Energy and the 
Department of the Na\'y and Ihe Govcmor of Idaho to phase out storage operations in the 45-year old 
CPP-603 facility . one goal of this and the other allematives would be lO remove spent nuclear fuel 
from underwater slOrage in the North and Middle Basins of the CPP·603 fac ility by the end of 1996 
and from the South Basin of this fac ility by the end of 2000 (DOE 1993a). DOE would relocate th is 
material to the Fuel SlOrage Area at the Idaho Chemical Processing F-Iant. 
At the Argonne National Laboratory-West. the spent nuclear fuel stored at the Hot Fuel 
Examination Facili ty and the Radioactive Scrap and Waste Facility. primari ly Experimental Breeder 
Reactor- II fuel and blanket elements. would remain in dry storage until its potential processing in the 
Fuel Cycle Facility. At the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II , ite. DOE would use dry storage wi th the 
exception of the Neutron Rad iography Reactor pool fuel . The Test Area North Pool Fuel Transfer 
project wou ld continue. resulting in the relocation of Test Area North spent pool contents into dry cask 
storage at the Idaho Chemical Process ing Plant by 1998. The dry cask storage required for this project 
is not related to the Dry Fuels Storage Facility. 
DOE would stan no OC\,"" projects to increase spent nuclear fue l storage capacity because there is 
sufficient storage capacity to meet No· Action storage needs. The planning of !: pent nuclear fuel 
storage projects such as the Dry Fuels Storage Facility and Addit ional Increased Rack Capacity for the 
Fuel Storage Area would stop. 
3.1.1.4 Research and Development. There would be only limited spent nuclear fuel 
research and development. Existing spent nuclear fue l management research and development projects 
wou ld conti nue. Existing faci lit ies such as the Process Improvement Faci lity. the Remote Analyt ical 
Laboratory. and the Pilot Plant Facility would support continuing researc h and development work. 
3.1.1.5 Naval-Type Fuel Examination. After a trans ition period. DOE would cease 
shipments of naval spent nuclear fue l to the INEL and would phase out the Expended Core Facility. 
DOE would make onsi te shipments of the ·· Iibrary fuer· (a representative sampling of different fue l 
types maintained for reference purposes) and the spent nuclear fuel that originated at the prototype 
sites at the :"\av31 Reactors Faci lity to the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. 
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3.1.2 Alternative 2: Decentralization 
Under this alrernative. DOE could transport fuel for safety or research and development 
i.lctivities. In addition. DOE cou ld undertake actions for safety il deemed desirable. though not 
essential. and could perform spent nuclear fuel treatment and research and development. As listed in 
T'lble 3-3. the anticipated spent nuclear fuel inventory for this ahemative would be slightly greater 
than the inventory for Alternative I. with Ihe increase consisting primarily of aluminum-clad and 
stainless·stcel·clad spent nuclear fuel from university and foreign research and experimental reactors. 
3.1.2.1 Transportation. This ahemative assumes that the INEL would accept primarily 
limited shipments of spent nuclear fuel from offsite sources into the Fuel Storage Area (e.g., DOE or 
university reactors) after the Record of Decision for this EIS (1995). Onsite transfers could occur 
from the Fuel Storage Area to the Storage Facility or the Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility. DOE would 
consolidate the spent nuclear fuel in the Advanced Test Reactor and in the Materials Test Reactor and 
Power Burst Facility canals at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant for canning. characterization. and 
storage. 
As in Ihe No-Action Alternati ve. there would be a transition period during which the Naval 
Nuclear Propulsion Program would ship naval spent nuclear fuels to the Expended Core Facility fo r 
examination and subsequent shipment to the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant for storage. 
Section 3.1.2.5 describes the transportation of naval spent fuel s that would occur after the transition 
period. 
3.1.2.2 Stabilization. DOE would use the canning and charac terization equipment identified 
in Section 3.1.1.2 to stab il ize spent nuclear fuel removed from the CPP-603 Underwater Fuel Storage 
Faci lity for interim underwater storage . 
3.1.2.3 Storage. As in Ahemmive I. DOE wou ld transfer the spent nuclear fuel in the 
CPP·603 Underwater Fuel Storage Faci lity to the Fuel Storage Area by 2000. DOE would continue to 
use the Underground Storage Facili ty and the Irradiated Fuel Storage Faci lity for existing spent nuclear 
fuel inventory and transfers of other spent nuclear fuel based on safety analyses. DOE would upgrade 
or inc rease fuel storage capacity at the INEL as required. 
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The Test Area North Pool Fuel Transfer project would result in the relocation of the contents of 
T<st Area North spent nuclear fuel into dry storage at a pad at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. 
3.1.2.4 Research and Development. The development of technology for the disposition of 
spent nuclear fuel would continue. Research and development activities would include laboratory and 
pilot plant testing. continued repository performance assessments and waste acceptance criteria 
development. and the characterization of spent nuclear fuel. Shipments of samples or selected spent 
nuclear fuel assemblies to offsite DOE facilities would be neces!"ary. 
3.1.2.5 Naval-Type Fuel Examination. DOE would consider three options for naval reactor 
spent Mclear fuel receipt and shipment. Under options 2a and 2b. DOE would stop shipments of 
naval spent nuclear fuel to the INEL and would shut down the Expended Core Facility. Option 2c 
would enable the continued receipt of naval-type fuel for examination at the Expended Core Facility 
and its return to the originating shipyards for storage in transport casks. Chapter 3 of Appendix 0 
further describes Ihese options. As with Alternative I. each option would require approximately a 
3-year transition period. During this period. DOE would transport spent nuclear fuel in shipping 
containers to the Expended Core Fac ility. unload the containers. and use them to support additional 
refuelings and defuelin g. 
3.1.3 AltErnative 3: 199211993 Planning Basis 
This alternat ive is consistent wi th DOE plans at the INEL before the injunction that stopped 
spent nuclear fuel shipment to the lNEL: it assumes a 40-year planning horizon for the continued 
transportation. receipt. stabilization. and storage of spent nuclear fuel. As with Alternative I. DOE 
would continue the maintenance and operation of existing spent nuclear fuel-related facilitie s: however. 
some consolidation of I ~ EL facilities could occur. DOE would send newly generated spent nuclear 
fuel to either the INEL or the Savannah River Site . DOE would assess the construction of new 
faci lities to accommodate current and projected spent nuclear fuel management requirements. 
The amount ,J f !" pent nuclear fuel at the INEL under this alternative would be greater than that 
for ei ther Alte rnati ve I or 2 (see Table 3-3) because this altemative assumes that the INEL would 
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manage. before stabilization and disposal. its present invenlory (see Alternative I) plus additional 
receip" of DOE spent nuclear fuel. including the following: 
Naval-type spent nuclear fuel 
Approximately half of the aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel from uni versity and foreign 
research and experimental reactors 
All Training Reactor Isotopics General Atomics (TRIGA) spent nuclear fuels from the 
Hanford Site and approximately half of that from foreign. DOE. and uni versity reactors 
Fort SI. Vrain spent nuclear fuel from Public Service of Colorado 
Special case commercial pressurized waler reactor and boiling water reactor spen( nuclear 
fuel from the DOE facility in West Valley, New York 
Miscellaneous spent nuclear fuel types from such DOE sites as Los Alamos. New Mexico. 
and Oak Ridge. Tennessee. and from univers ity reactors and other locations 
3.1.3.1 Transportation. DOE would consolidate the spent nuclear fuel in the Test Reactor 
Area (Advanced Test Reactor canal. Materials Test Reactor canal. and Coupled Fast Reactivi ty 
Measurements Facility and Advanced Reactivity Measurement Facility canal) and the Power Burst 
Facility at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant for canning and dry storage. 
The INEL would receive and temporarily store new spent nuclear fuel s in the Fue l Storage Area. 
Transfers cou l I occur from the Fue l Storage Area to the Underground Storage Facili ty or the Irradiated 
Fuel Storage Facili ty or. when avai lable. the dry storage vau lts at the proposed Dry Fuels Storage 
Facility. 
A~ present , DOE is transferring spent nuc lear fuel from the Advanced Test Reactor Canal to the 
Idaho Chemical Processing Plant . DOE wou ld maintain thi s canal for the storage and management of 
its recyclable fuel assemblies until the reactor no longer had a mission. The Experimental Breeder 
Reactor· ll spent nuclear fuel in storage would remain at Argonne National Laboratory· \VesL As with 
Alternative 2. the Test Area North Pool Fuel Transfer project wou ld result in the relocation of the 
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contents of the Test Area North spent nuclear fue l pool to dry storage at a pad at the Idaho Chemical 
Processing Plant. 
3.1.3.2 Stabilization. DOE would complete a new Canning and Characterization Facility with 
appropriate inspection. stabilization. and packag.ing equipment 10 \\tabilize new receipts of ~pent 
nuclear fuel and to prepare fuel currently in unden,vuter storage for dry storage. Tnis facility would be 
an integral part of the Dry Fue ls Stordge Facility that DOE would complete under this alte rnati ve. 
Until the Dry Fuels Storage Facility is in se rvice. DOE wou ld usc the canning and characterization 
equipment described under Alternati ve I to stabi lize spent nuclear fuel removed from the CPP-603 
Underwater Fuel Storage Facility for interim underwater storage . 
3.1.3.3 Storage. As with Alternati ve 2. DOE would upgrade or increase dry fuel storage 
capacity at the INEL as requi red. DOE would complete the Fuel Storage Area increased Rack 
Capacity project in 1997 . Coupled with stringent fuel management and . if necessary. temporary 
storage of some aluminum fue l in stainle s steel racks. this project would allow the Fuel Storage Area 
to accept all of the project spent nuclear fuel receipts until the Adait ional Increased Rack Capacity 
project would be completed in 200 1. The Additional Increased Rack Capaci ty project would allow the 
Fuel Storage Area to accept the projected spent nuclear fuel receipts until the Dry Fuels Storage 
Facil ity projec t would become avai lable in 2005 . The INEL would receive the Fort St. Vrain spent 
nuclear fuel in the Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility on a space-avdi lable basis or in the new vault 
storage in the Dry Fuels Storage Facility. Modifications to the Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility cask 
handling equipment would be necessary to accept the new Fort St. Vrai n shippi ng casks. 
DOE would continue to use the Underground Storage Facility and the Irradiated Fue l Storage 
Faci lity for current inventory and for transfers of other fuel inventories based on safety analyses. 
Based on these safety analysC'. upgrades would be limited to those required for facility safety 
improvements and for making transfers lia fely. 
3.1.3.4 Research and Development. Spent nuclear fuel research and development would 
continue as planned. wi th the con' truCllon of a Technology Development Facility. The 
Electrometallu rgical Proce'S Demonstrati on Project at Argonne National Laboratory - West Fuel Cycle 
Faci lity would cont inue. In addi ti on. Argonne National Laboratory would implement the EBR- II 
Blanket Proce_ ,i ng projec t under thi s alternat ive. The Dry Fuels Storage Facility would develop and 
demonstrate technology for he dry storage of se lected DOE highly enriched uranium fuels_ 
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3.1.3.5 Naval-Type Fuel Examination. The practice of transporting spent nuclear fu el from 
naval r."ctors to the Expended Core Facil ity at the INEL wou ld resume. After an examination. DOE 
would transfer such fuel to the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant for interim storage pending fin al 
disposition . Under this alternative. the Naval Nuc lear Propulsion Program wou ld complete the 
Expended Core Faci lity Dry Cell Construction project. 
3.1.4 Alternativ24: Regionalization 
This alternative assumes that DOE would base the spent nuclear fuels shipped between DOE 
sites and the receipt of fuels from other locations primarily on either geography or fu el type. 
A lternative 4 offers two options for the redistribution of existing and new spent nuclear fuel : 
Option 4a assumes that DOE would base the spent nuclear fuels shipped between DOE sites 
and the receipt of fuels from other locations at the INEL. Hanford Site. or the Savannah 
River Site primari ly on fuel type_ 
Opt ion 4b assumes that DOE would base the spent nuclear fuels shipped between DOE si tes 
and the receipt of fuels on geography. There would be a single western si te at ei ther the 
Hanford S ite. INEL or Nevada Test Site . Option 4b(l) in which the INEL is the western 
regional site is essentia lly the same as Alternative 5b. Option 4b(2) in which INEL ships all 
SNF to another weslern regional site is the same as Alternative 5a. 
3.1.4.1 Transportation. Under option 4a. the INEL would receive all Zircaloy- and 
stainless-steel-clad spent nuclear fuel. This redistribut ion would optimize DOE spent nuclear fu el 
management . 
The spent nuc lear fuel inventory involved under option 4a would be greater than those for 
Alternative I. 2. or 3 because this a lternative assumes that the INEL would manage its present 
inventory plus the fo llowing addi tional spent nuclear fuels (see Table 3-3) prior to stabi lization and 
disposal: 
Naval-type spent nuclear fuel 
All spent nuclear fuel except aluminum-clad fu el and Hanford spent nuclear fuel 
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All Training Reactor Isotopics General Atomics spent nuclear fue ls from the Hanford Site 
Fort SI. Vrain spent nuclear fue l from Public Service of Colorado 
Special case commercial pressuri zed water reactor and boiling water reactor spent nuclear 
fue l from the DOE faci li ty in West Valley. New York 
Under option 4b( I ). DOE would regionalize all western DOE SNF at the INEL. DOE would 
transport all spent nuclear fuel at other western sites to the IN EL. Because the fuel inventory for this 
alternative would be wi thin 15 percent of that for Alternative 5b. analyses for this option 
conservatively assume that envi ronmental impac ts would be the same as those for as Ahem ati ve 5b -
Centralizat ion at INEL. 
Under option 4b(2). DOE would regionalize all western DOE SNF at ei ther the Nevada Test Si te 
or Hanford Site. DOE would transport spent nuclear fuel at the INEL to the se lected western si te. As 
such. this option would be the same as Alternati ve Sa • Centralization at Other DOE Sites. 
3.1.4.2 Stabilization. DOE would stabilize the spent nuclear fuel s it would retain at the INEL 
as planned for Alte rnative 3. with the construction of such new facilities as a canning and 
characte ri zation fac il ity and the Dry Fuels Storage Fac ility. Options 4a and 4b(l ) would require such 
a facility for the receipt and storage of spent nuclear fuel. while option 4b(2) would require 
stabilization capabilities for shipping spent nuclear fue l. For spent nuclear fuel that the INEL would 
ship to other regional sites. the receiving site would perform any stabil ization beyond that requi red for 
transportation. 
3.1.4.3 Storage. Under option 4a. DOE would increase dry storage capacity and undertake 
fac ility upgrades similar to those described for Alternative 3. with replacements and addit ions as 
appropriate . Under option 4b( I ). DOE wou ld increase dry storage capacity and undertake fac il ity 
upgrades similar to those described for Alte rnative 5b. wi th replacements and additions as appropriate. 
Option 4b(2) would not require increased storage capac ity and. therefore. there would be no fac ility 
upgrades. 
3.1.4.4 Research and Development. As with Alternative 3. th is olternative would include 
the contlnualion of ac tivities related to the treatment of spent nuclear fuel. including research and 
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devl!lopment (e.g .. Electrometallurgical Process Demonstration Project). and the construction of the 
Dry Fuels Storage Fac il ity. DOE would initiate pilot programs as needed to support future decisions 
on spent nuclear fuel management and disposit ion. DOE would use historic data on spent nuclear fuel 
to provide the bounding case for a determinat ion of the impac ts associated wi th potential pilot program 
activit ies. 
3.1.4.5 Naval· Type Fuel Examination. Under options 4a and 4b( I). the transportation of 
spent nuclear fuel from naval reactors to the Expended Core Facility at the INEL would resume. As 
with Alternati ve I . under option 4b(2) DOE would phase out shipments of naval · type spent nuclear 
fuel to the INEL and would phase out the Expended Core Fac ility. 
3.1.5 Alternative 5: Centralization 
Under this alternative. DOE would send a ll current and future spent nuclear fuel inventories from 
both DOE and the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program to one DOE site for interim storage until final 
dispos ition. 
The two options under Alternative 5 encompass the extreme .anges of spent nuclear fuel 
inventories that DOE could store at the INEL (i.e., all or none of the inventory ). Under option Sa. 
DOE would ship the INEL spent nuclear fuel inventory off the site to the Hanford S ite. the Savannah 
River S ite, the Nevada Test Site. or the Oak Ridge Reservation. Under option 5b. DOE would ship all 
ex isting spent nuclear fuel to the INEL. 
This ahernative would bound the maximum number of spent nuclear fuel-related ac tions that 
DOE could reasonably undertake at any site. DOE would have to build new fac il it ies at the selected 
site to accommodate the increased inventories. Shipments of spent nuclear fue l to the sites not 
selected as the centralized destination wou ld conti nue as an interim action pending the construction of 
necessary storage and examination faci lities at the selected si te. DOE would then transfer all spent 
nuclear fue l to the selected site. and the other sites would close their spent nuclear fuel faci lities. 
Before DOE would shi p spent nuclear fuel from the originating site. it wou ld charac terize and can all 
spent nuclear fue l as necessary. 
The locations from which spent nuclear fuel wou ld originate. in add it ion to the Hanford Site .md 
Savannah River Si te. wou ld inc lude Argonne National Laboratory· East. Babcock and Wi lcox. 
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Brookhaven National Laboratory. General Atomics. Los Alamos National Laboratory. Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory. Sandia National Laboratories. West Valley . and Fort St. Vrain . Thi s a lternat ive 
would also include fuel that might be returned to the United States following irradiation or test ing. 
This alternative would include activities related to the treatment of spent nuclear fuel. including 
research and deve lopment and pilot programs to support future decisions on its disposition. DOE 
would use historic data on spent nuclear fue l to provide a foundati on case for dClennining the impacts 
associated with potential pilot program activities. 
3.1.5.1 Alternative Sa - Centralization at Other DOE Sites. 
3.1.5.1.1 Transportation - This option assumes that the INEL would consolidate and 
prepare all existing and projected onsite spent nuclear fuel for shipment to another DOE facility : the 
Hanford Site. the Savannah River Site, the Nevada Test Site. or Oak Ridge. 
3.1.5.1.2 Stabilization - The DOE would construct a canning and characterization facility 
at the Idaho Chemical Processing Piant to accept the different types of INEL spent nuclear fuel in 
various shipping casks and storage containers. and to stabilize these fuel types before their shipment to 
the selected DOE facility . 
3.1.5.1.3 Storage - As in Alternative 1. DOE would complete the CPP-603 Underwater 
Fue l Storage Facility pool inventory transfer to existing dry storage facilities by 2000. DOE would 
not build the Dry Fuels Storage Facility . DOE would then close all spent nuclear fuel-related ~dci lities 
at the INEL with the exception of those in direct support of operating reac tors. such as the Advanced 
Test Reactor canal or the Argonne National Laboratory-West Hot Fuel Examination Facility anJ fuel 
Cycle Fac ility. This closure would require the establishment of a major surveillance and maintenance 
operation unti l DOE determined the disposition of these faci lities. The timeframe for closure would 
depend on the fo llowing factors: 
The time necessary to stabilize the spent nuc lear fue l in the CPP-603 Underwater Fuel 
Storage Facility 
The time necessary for the selec ted DOE site to prepare faci lities qualified to accept the 
spent nuclear fue l 
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The time necessary for the procurement and licenSing of shipping containers that wou ld be 
compatible with the selected receiving DOE s ite 
The spent nuclear fuel inventory that DOE would export off the INEL site for Alternative Sa is 
the same quantity listed fo r Alternative I (see Table 3-3) . 
3.1.5.1.4 Research and Development - Under this option there would be a phaseout of 
all research and development activities. although the Electrometallurgical Process Demonstration 
Project would continue at the Argonne National Laboratory - West Fuel Cycle Facility (but would 
stabilize only spent nuclear fuel currently on the si te) . 
3.1.5.1.5 Naval-Type Fuel Examination - As with Alternative I. DOE would phase out 
shipments of naval· type spent nuclear fuel to the INEL and would phase out the Expended Core 
Facility . 
3.1.5.2 Alternative Sb • Centralization at the INEL. 
3.1.5.2.1 Transportation. This option assumes that the INEL would receive all DOE and 
naval-type spent nuclear fuel (see Table 3-3). 
3.1.5.2.2 Stabilization - The Hanfo rd Si te . the Savannah River Site . and other DOE 
fac ilities would stabi li"" as necessary. spent nuc lear fuel for safe transpo rtation to the Idaho Chemical 
Processing Plant. The Hanfo rd Site . the Savannah River Site. and o ther DOE fac ilities would procure 
an undetermined number o f additional casks and insta ll cask handling equipment as necessa ry . DOE 
would complete an expanded Dry Fuels Storage FaCility at the INEL. which would include a new 
Canning and Characterization Facili ty s imi lar to that described for Alternative 3 . This facility would . 
if needed. repackage the spent nuc lear fuel into compatible canister. for dry sto rage . Other new 
facility projects would be the same as those desc ribed for Alternative 3 . In addition. DOE would begin 
stabilizing for safe storage all complex·wide spem nuclear fue l. as necessa ry. in existing facili ti es at the 
Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. Upgrades and new facili ti es would be necessa ry to support long-
te rm fue l stabi lization for ultimate disposi tion: this would address critica li ty (unplanned and 
uncontro lled nuclear fi ssion) concerns about the disposal of spent nuclear fuel in a potential Federal 
reposito ry . 
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3.1.5.2.3 Storage - Projects and ac tivities for storage of spent nuclear fue l would be 
!Oimilar to those desc ribed for Alternati ve 3. except that accelerated schedules for the Increased Rack 
Capacity <.Iod Addi tional Increased Rack Capac ity projects would be necessary to accommodate the 
increased fue l receipts. In addit ion. the schedu le for the Dry Fuel Storage Fac ility project wou ld have 
to be accele rated and it s scope expanded . For example. the Increased Rack Capacit y project may have 
to be completed in late 1996. the Additional Increased Rack Capac ity project may have to be 
completed in late 1998. and the Expanded Dry Fuels Storage Facility project may have to be 
completed in 2002 . If the Expanded Dry Fuels Storage Facili ty would become available even earlier. 
it could e liminate the need for the Additional Increased Rack Capacity project. 
3.1.5.2.4 Research and Development - DOE would conduct maximum spent nuclear 
fuel research and development under thi s option. As with Ahemative 4 . the Etectrometallurgical 
Process Demonstrat ion Project would continue at the Argonne National Laboratory - West. 
3.1.5.2.5 Naval-Type Fuel Examination - Similar to Alternative 3. the practice of 
transponing spent nuclear fuel from naval r~actors to the Expended Core Facility at the INEL would 
resume. 
3.2 Comparison of Alternatives 
Chapler 5 analyzes the environmental consequences of the alternatives. Tables 3-<1 through 3-6 
summarize and compare the potential impacts associated wi th each alternative fr~m the infonnation in 
Chapter 5 for construction. nonnal operations. and accidents. respectively. 
A review of the impacts of the alternatives. as presented in Chapter 5. indicates that impacts 
would be minimal or negligible i!l most areas. Further. most areas with measurable impacts would 
have no appreciable differences among alternatives. 
In general. the levels of potent ia l impacts associated with Alternatives I through 4 (option 4a) 
would be similar because the amounts of spent nuclear fu el that DOE wou ld manage at the INEL 
under the<e alte rnat ives would be on the same order of magnitude (e.g .. 300 to 450 MTHM ) and 
activities would exte nd throughout the fu ll 40-year management period. The lowest level of overall 
potential impact at the INEL would occur under Alternati ve 4b(2) - Regionalization by Geography 
(Elsewhere ) and Alternative 5a - Centrali zation at Other DOE Si tes because DOE would ship INEL 
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spent nuclear fuel off the site well before the management period ended in 2035. Alternative 5b and 
Alternative 4b( I). under which DOE would ship all or nearly all spent nuclear fue l to the INEL. would 
result in the greatest potential onsile impacts. 
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Table 3·4. Comparison of impacts from construction . 
< J. 4a.· Sa. 5b. 0 1. 2. 199211993 Regionalization hy Centralization at Centrali7.ation r 
c: i\ rea of Impact No Action Decentralization Planning Basis Fuel Type Other DOE Sites at the INEL 
~ 
m 
Land Use No adverse impacts; Same as o-Action No adverse impacts; Same as Alternative 3 Same as o-Action No adverse impacts; 
> construction on 0.8 Alternative construction on 19.3 Alternative construct ion on 30.8 
" 
acre" in previously acres in previously acres in previously 
" m disturbed area. di sturbed area. disturbed area. Z Q 
X Socioeconomics No impacts; no nct Same as No-Acti on Temporary positive Same as Alternative 3 Temporary posi tive Same as Alternative 3 
:c change in Alternative impact on employment impact on 
employment. with the creation of employment with the 
approximately 375 jobs creation of 
(pea!. ). approxImately 50 jobs 
(peak). 
Cultural Resources No adverse impacts; Same as No-Action Potential impacts to Same as Alternative 3 Same as No-Action Same as Alternative 3 
area has been Alternative historic structure; would Alternative 
surveyed. be mitigated as 
appropriate. 
Aesthetic and Scenic No adverse impacts; Same as No-Action Same as No-Action Same as No-Action Same as No-Action Same as No-Action 
w Resou rces previously disturbed Alternative Alternative Alternative Alternative Alternative I 
IV areas. 0 
Geologic Resources Minor localized Same as No-Action Minor localized impacts; Same as Alternative 3 Same as No-Action Minor localized 
impacts; Alternative consumption of Alternative impacts; consumption 
consumption of approximately of approximately 
approximately 392.000 cubic meters of 1.772.000 cubic 
15R.000 cubic aggregate onsite. meter of aggregate 
meters~ of aggregate onsite. 
onsite. 
< 0 
r 
c: 
s: 
m 
> 
-0 
-0 
m 
z 
2 
X 
OJ 
Table 3-4. (continued). 
Area of Impact 
Air Quality 
Water Quality 
Ecological Resources 
oise 
I. 
No Action 
Nonradiological: 
Temporary and 
i ntermillent 
increases in fugitive 
airborne dust and in 
exhaust emissions 
from suppon 
equipment. 
Estimated ai r 
quality impacts 
would be well 
below established 
Federal and state 
standards. 
Radiological : No 
radiological impacts 
from construction 
activities. 
No adverse offsite 
impacts to either 
surface water or 
groundwater. 
3. 
2. 199211993 
Decentralization Planning Basis 
Same as No-Action Same as No-Action 
Alternative Alternative 
Same as No-Action Same as No-Action 
Alternative Alternative 
Same as No-Action Same as No-Action 
Alternative Alternative 
Temporary minor Same as No-Action Same as No-Action 
impacts: Alternative Alternative 
construction 
confined to 
previously disturbed 
areas. 
Potential temporary 
increase in ambient 
noise levels in 
construction areas: 
no change in traffic 
noise levels. 
Same as No-Action Potential temporary 
Alternative increase in ambient 
noise levels in 
construction areas: small 
change in traffic noise 
levels but no change in 
community reaction to 
noise. 
4a." 
Regionalization by 
Fuel Type 
Same as No-Action 
Alternative 
Same as No-Action 
Alternative 
Same as No-Action 
Alternative 
Same as No-Action 
Alternative 
Same as Alternative 3 
Sa. 
Centralization at 
Other DOE Sites 
Same as No-Action 
Alternative 
Same as No-Action 
Alternative 
Same as No-Action 
Alternative 
No impacts 
5b. 
Centralization 
at the INEL 
Same as No-Action 
Alternative 
Same as No-Action 
Alternative 
Same as No-Action 
Alternative 
Minimal impacts: 
construction activities 
would temporarily 
disturb wildlife. 
Same as Alternative 3 Same as Alternative 3 
< 
o 
r 
» 
"0 
"0 
m 
z 
o 
x 
::0 
'.;J 
. 
N 
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Table 3-4. (continued). 
Area or Impacl 
Traffi. alll! 
Tran~pon :lli(ln 
Occupalional and Public 
Heall h alll! Safely 
I EL Servic.;s 
~lalcrials and Wasle 
Managemcnl 
I. 
u Acliun 
On'up:llional: 
Small occup:llional 
radial ion exposures 
wilhin I EL 
guidance. 
Puhlic: No impacl. 
3. 4a.· 
2. 199211993 Regionalizalion by 
D.:cenlralilal ion Planning Basis Fuel T ype 
Same as o-Aclion Same as No-Aclion Same as No-Aclion 
Allemaliv.: Allemalive Allemalive 
Same as O-Aclion Same as No-Aclion Same as Allemalive 3 
Allem:llive Allemalive excepl 
Same as O-Aclion 
Allemalive 
23 pOlenlial injuries! 
illnesses for conslruclion 
workers. 
Same as No-Aclion 
Allemalive 
Same as No-Aclion 
Allemalive 
Sa. 
Cenlralizalion al 
Olher DOE Siles 
Same as No-Aclion 
Allemalive 
Same as No-Aclion 
Allemalive excepl 3 
pOlenlial injuries/ 
illnesses for 
conslruclion workers. 
Same as No-Aclion 
Allemalive 
No adverse impacls: Same as O-Aclion Same as No-Aclion Same as No-Aclion 
Allemalive 
Same as No-Aclion 
Allemalive modesl changes lhal Allemalive Allcmalive 
would be easily 
accommodaled . 
9 cubic melersb of 
indu lrial and 
commercial solid 
waSle rroru 1995 
lhrough 1996. 
Same as No-Aclion Cumulalive IOlal of 620 Same as Allemalive 3 Cumulalive IOlal of 
Allemalive cubic melers of 50 cubic melers of 
i nduslrial and 
commercial solid waSle. 
1.500 cubic melers of 
low-level wasle would 
be generaled from 1995 
lhrough 1999. 
induslrial and 
commercial solid 
waSle. 
Sb. 
Cenlralizalion 
al lhe INEL 
Same as No-Aclion 
Allemalive 
Same as No-Aclion 
Allemalive eltCepl 
23 pOlenlial 
injuries/illnesses for 
conslruclion workers. 
Same as No-Aclion 
Allemalive 
Same as No-Aclion 
Allem:llive 
Cumulalive 10lal of 
3.800 cubic melers of 
induslrial and 
commercial solid 
waSle and I.S00 cuhic 
melers of low-level 
wasle would be 
generaled from 1995 
lhrough 2008. 
a. The dala provided are for Allemalive 4a. Allemalive 4b( I) dala arc lhe same as lhose for Allemalive Sb. Allemaliw 4b(2) dala arc lhe same as lhose for Allemalive Sa. 
b. To conven cubic melers 10 cubic feel. mulliply by 3S.3. 
c. Tn conven acre_ 10 . quare kilomelers. mulliply by O.OOt 
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Table 3-5. Compari son of impacts from normal operations. 
AIr Qual" y 
Walcr Qualil Y 
Ecological Resources 
No ""pacl. no nel ch:mgc 
III cmploymenl . 
No nradlo logica l: 
Polcnll al conlrihulion 10 
amhlenl conn'nlralion, 
would h.: h.: low 
applicahle , landanls and 
regulalions. 
Radiological : Worker 
doscs. dose. 10 Ihe 
maximally expo. cd 
individual. and 
pnpu/alion dosc would be 
neg li gible . 
No adverse offsile 
impacls 10 eilher surface 
waler or groundwaler. 
Ncgligi !l1c impacls, 
primarily due 10 
conlinued exclusion of 
planls and animals from 
exisling faci lilY areas. 
Small change in ambienl 
noise levels in 
opcralional arc:l.~; no 
change in lraffic noise 
le vel. 
2. 
Ikc~nlrJl i /.aliun 
Sam\! as u-Acliun 
Ahernalivc 
Samc a.~ No-Aclion 
Ahernalivc 
Same :I.~ No·Aclio n 
Ahcmalive 
Same as No-Aclion 
Ahcmalivc 
Same as No-Aclion 
Ahemali vc 
Same ... , No-Aclion 
Ahernalive 
3. 
I 9921 I 9'J:\ 
Plannmg B~ is 
Same :I.~ No-Aclion 
Ahernalive 
Same as No- Aclion 
Allernalive 
Same as No-Ac lion 
Ahernalive 
Same as No-Aclion 
Allcrnalive 
Same as No-Aclion 
Allernalive 
4a.' 
Regionalizalion by Fucl 
Typc 
Same as No·Aclion 
Allernalive 
Same as No-Aclion 
Allernalive 
Same as No-Aclion 
Ahernalive 
Same as No-Aclio n 
Ahcrnalive 
Same :1.5 No-Aclio n 
Allernali ve 
Small change in ambienl Same as Alle mali ve :\ 
noise leve ls in operalional 
areas; smal l change in 
lraffic noise levels bUl no 
change in communily 
reaclion 10 noi se. 
5a. 
Cenlra /izalion al Olher 
DOE Si les 
Same as No-Acliun 
Allernalive 
Same as No-AClion 
Ahcrnalivc 
Same as No-Aclion 
Ahernalive 
Same as No-Aclion 
Allernali ve 
Same as No-Aclion 
Ahemalive 
Same :1.5 Allemalive :\ 
5b. 
Cenlralizalion 
al lhe INEL 
SaIne as No-Aclion 
Allernalive 
Same as No-Aclion 
Allernalive 
Same as No-Aclion 
Allernali ve 
Samc as No-Aclion 
Alle rnalive 
Minimal impacts due 10 
generally increased level 
of operalional aClivilY. 
Same as Allernalive 3 
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Table 3-5. (continued). 
Tram..- and 
Transpunallon 
(k..-upational and Puhlk 
Heallh and Safety 
INEL Savices 
O ...... up:ltional radiallon 
illlp"'t : 
1.4x J(r' LCFs" over 40 
years . 
Puhlic radiation impact : 
.lAx 10 < LCFs ovcr 
.10 years . 
Occupational radiation 
impact : 
.Ix J(). LCFs ovcr 
40 years. 
Publ,,; radiation impact: 
2xI0" LCFs over 
40 years . 
Less than 0.1 percent 
increase in electricity 
demand and 
approximately 
0.25 percent increase in 
fucl oil consumption. No 
increases in water 
consumption or 
wastewater generation. 
2. 
Ikccntralization 
Sallie 3.< No· Act ion 
Allemative 
Same as No· Action 
Allernallvc 
Occupational radiation 
impact : 
4x I 0'· LCFs uvcr 
4() years. 
Public radiation impact: 
2x 10" LCFs over 40 
year.; . 
Same as No·Action 
Alternative 
. 1. 
199211993 
Planning Basis 
Same as No·Action 
Allcrnativc 
Same as No· Action 
Allemative 
Occupational radiation 
impact: 
8xlO·l LCFs over 40 
years . 
Public radiation impacl: 
4xI0'" LCFs over 
40 years. 
Approximately I percent 
increase in clcctri.ity 
demand lnd 3 percent 
increase in fuel oil 
consumption. which are 
well within current 
system capacities or 
usage limits. No increase 
in water consumption or 
wastewater generation . 
37 
4a.' 
Regionalization by Fucl 
Type 
Same as No·Action 
Altemativc 
Same as No·Action 
Allernative 
Same as Alternative J 
Public radiation impact: 
4x I 0'" LCFs over 40 
ycars. 
ame as Allernative 3 
5a. 
Centralization at Other 
DOE Sites 
Same as No· Action 
Alternative 
Same as No· Action 
Alternat ive 
Occupational radiation 
impar t: 
4x10·l LCFs over 40 
years . 
Public radiation iml.act : 
2x 10.3 LCFs over 40 
years 
Approximately 1.0 percent 
increase in electricity 
demand and ':'.7 percent 
increa.<e in fuel oil 
consumption . which are 
well within current system 
capacities or usage limits . 
No increase in water 
consumption or 
wastewater gen~ration . 
5b . 
Centralization 
at the INEL 
Same as No·Action 
Alternativc 
Sa.ne as No-Action 
Alternative 
Occupational radiation 
impact: 
8xI0'\ LCFs over 
40 years. 
Public radiation impaCI: 
8xlO'" LCFs over 
40 years. 
Approximately 5.3 
percent incn:ase in 
electricity demand. 
0.7 percent increase in 
water consumption. 
negligible increase in 
wastewater generation. 
and 9.7 percent incn:ase 
in fuel oil consumption. 
which are well within 
current system c3p:lcitics 
or usage limits. 
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Table 3-5. (continued). 
Area of hnpaci 
Malerials and Wa. le 
Managemenl 
o A':lion 
No : ncr~ase i'l waSle 
r.encralion. 
2. 
IJecenlraliwlion 
Same as No-Aclion 
Allernallve 
3. 
199211993 
Planning Basis 
Wasle generation would 
increase annually a., 
fo llows: Indu Irial and 
commercial sol id wasle . 
600 cubic meters' from 
1996 Ihrough 2035. 
Low·level waste · 
200 cubic meters from 
1996 Ihrough 2035. 
High . leve l waste · 
3 cubic meters froio' 1996 
through 2024. 
Mixed low. level waste -
<I cubic meters from 
1996 through 2024. 
Tr~nsuranic wa.~te -
32 cubic meters from 
1996 through 2024. 
4 a." 
Rcgl onah7.alion hy Fuel 
Type 
Same as Alternative .' 
5a. 
Centralization at Olher 
DOE Sites 
Waste general ion would 
incrc'1._c annually as 
follows: Industrial and 
commercial solid w'1.ste -
210 ccbic meters from 
1996 through 2024. 
Low·level w"-~te -
83 cuhic meters from 
1996 through 2024. 
High-level w"-~te. mixed 
low-level waste. and 
transuranic W'1.,tc . same 
as Alternalive 3. 
5b. 
Centralization 
at Ihe INEL 
Wa.,te generation would 
incrc'1.se annually as 
follows : Induslrial and 
commer.:ial solid waste· 
2.600 cubic rncters from 
1996 through 2035. 
Low'(c\'c l wa.~le • 
410 cubic meters from 
1996 throug h 2035. 
High ·level waste -
120 cubic meters from 
1996 through 2034. 
Milled low-level w,,-sie 
and transuranic wa.~te -
same as Allernative 3. 
a . The dala provided arc for Altelnaliv'! 4a. Allernative 4b( I) dala are the same :l! those for Alternative 5b. Allernalive 4b(2) data are the same as Ihose for Allemalive 5a. 
b. To conven cubic melers to cubic feet. multiply by 35 .3. 
c. LCFs = Latent Cancer Fatalities 
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Table 3-6. Comparison of impacts from accidents . 
3. 4a.' 5a. 5b. 
I. 2. 199211993 Regionalil;ltion by Centralization at Other Centralization 
Area uf Impa.: t Nu Action lkcentralilation Planning Basis Fuel Type DOE Sites at the INEL 
Facility '\ ':':Idents Individu:11 Worker Same as No· Action S:lmc as NO-Action Same a.~ NO-Action Same as No-Action J .6x I 0" LCFslycar 
(Ma.,illlum n'asonably Radiological Riskh: Alternative Alternative Alternative Alternative 
foreseeable a.:.:iden t' ) I.Xx I 0. 111 LCFsJ/ycar 
Puhlic (Population) Same as No-Action Samc as No·Action Same a.~ No-Action Same as No-Action Same a.~ No-Action 
Radiological Risk' : Alternative Alternative Alternative Alternative Alternative 
7.0x Ill" LCFslyear 
TranspOr1ation Accident Public (Population) Same as No-Action Same a.~ No-Action Same as No-Action Samc as No-Action Same a.~ No-Action 
(Maximum n:asonahly Rad iological Risk: Alternative Alternative Altcrnativc Alternative Alternative 
fon:seeahk accident) 1.1 x \O.~ LCFslyear" 
Occupational Traffic Same as No-Action Same as No-Action Same as No-Action Same as No-Action Same as No-Action 
Fatalities over 40 years: Alternal ive Alternative Alternativl! Altcrnative Alternative 
7. lxIO·· 
Puhlic Traffic Fatalities Same as No-Action Same as No-Action Same as No-Action Sarne as No-Action Same as No-Action 
over 40 years : 25x 1O·1 Alternative Alternativc Alternative Alternative Alternative 
a. The d:lt:l provided :Ire for Altcrn:ltivc 4:1. Alternative 4b(l) data an:: the same as those for Alternative 5b. Alternative 4b(2) data are the same as those for Alternative 5a. 
h . Risk is the product of accident prob:lbility :lnd consequences (latent c:lncers f:llalities) . 
c . This accident represents the maximum rcasoMbly forslleable accident analyzed with the largest consequences 10 the n:ccptor. 
d . LCFs = Latent Cancer Fat:llitics . 
e . Include noninvolvcd I EL worker population downwind of the :lccidcnt; INEL workers an:: a small por1ion of the affected population. 
4. AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT 
4.1 Overview 
Chapter 4 describes the existing environment at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory 
(INEL) site and the surrounding region. It emphasizes areas that the proposed spent nuclear fue l 
management alternatives could affect. The infonnation in this chapter provides the existing 
environmental conditions against which the Department of Energy (DOE) can measure the potenti al 
environmental effects of the allematives. It supports the assessment of the potential environmental 
consequences that Chapter 5 discusses. DOE used the discussion of the Affected Environment in 
Volume 2 of this EIS as input for this chapter. 
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4.2 Land Use 
The INEL site encompasses 570.91 4 acres (2.3 10.4 square kilometers) in BUlle. Bingham. 
Jeffe rson. Bonneville. and Clark Counties. Idaho. This section describes existing land uses at the 
INEL and in the surrounding region. and land use plans and policies applicable to the surrounding 
area. 
4.2.1 Existing and Planned Land Uses at the INEL 
Categories of land use at the INEL include fac ili ty operations. grazing. general open space. and 
infrastructure such as roads. Facility operations include industrial and support operations associated 
with energy research and waste management activities (DOE also conducts such activities at its Idaho 
Falls faci lities). In addition. DOE uses INEL land for recreation and envi ronmental research 
associated with Ihe designation of the INEL as a National Environmental Research Park . 
Much of the INEL is open space that DOE has not designated for specific uses. Some of this 
open space serves as a buffer zone between INEL facilities and other land uses. Facilities and 
operations use about 2 percent of the 100ai INEL site area (11.400 acres or 46 square kilometers). 
Public access to most focility areas is restric ted. Approximotely 6 percent of the INEL. or 
32.985 acres ( 133.5 square kilometers). is devoted to public roads and uti lity rights-of-way that cross 
the site. Recreational uses include public tours of general facility areas and the Experimental Breeder 
Reactor-I (a National Historic Landmark). and controlled hunting. which is generally restricted to 
0 .5 mile (0.8 kilometer) inside the INEL boundory. 
Call ie and sheep grazing occupies between 300.000 and 350.000 acres ( 1.200 and t .4oo square 
ki lometers). The U.S. Sheep Experiment Station uses a 9OO-ocre (3.6-square-kilometer) portion of th is 
lond. at the junction of Idaho State Highways 28 and 33. for a winter feed lot for approximalely 6.500 
sheep. Grazing is not a llowed within 2 mi les (3.2 kilometers) of any nuclear faci lity and. to avoid the 
possibil ity of mi lk contomination by long- lived radionuclides. dairy callie are not permilled on the site. 
The Depanment of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management grants and administers rights-of-way 
and grazing permits. Figure 4.2- 1 shows selected land uses at the INEL and in the surrounding region. 
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Figure 4.2-1. Selected land uses at the INEL and in the surrounding region. 
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Tht' INEL ~ i h..· i ~ within tht.' ~kdlcmt' Lodge: Resource Area (approx im:.nc:ly I.JOA 15 acres or 
568 .. ~ square: kilonlt.'!t.'P· in tht.' eastern and :-outhem port l o n ~ of the: INEL site) and the Big Butte 
Resource Arc:a ( .. 0 0A99 al.: re~ or 1.7-'2 !>quare ki lometers in the cenl r .. d and westc: m portions): the! 
Burc::m of Land Manage! me!nt adm in i ~tc: r~ both of thl! sc areas. Under Resource ~'lanagemc:m Plans. the 
Bureau manages portions of these Resource Arc:a~ for grazing and wildli fe habitat. No minera l 
c: .xploration or devdopmc:nt is allowed on IN EL land . 
DOE land use! plans and policies applicable to the INEL include the INEL Institutional Phm -
Fiscal I'ear 199-1 . 1999 (DOE- ID 1993c) and the INEL Techllical Site Ill/ormlllioll Report (DOE- ID 
1993a). The brstitutional Plan provides a general overview of INEL faci lities. outlines strategic 
program direc tions and major construction projects. and identifies specific technical programs and 
capital equipment needs. The Technical Site In/ormation Report presents a 20-year master plan for 
development ac tivities at the site. Under the scope of these planning documents. energy research and 
waste management act ivities would continue in existing facility areas and. in some instances. expand 
into currently undeveloped si te areas. These documents also describe environmental reslOration. waste 
management. and spent nuclear fuel activities. Projected land use scenarios for the next 25 to 50 years 
include the outgrowth of current functi onal areas and the possible development of waterfowl 
production ponds in existing grazing areas. 
No on site land use restrictions due to Native American treaty rights would exist for any of the 
alternatives described in this EIS. The INEL does not lie within any of the land boundaries 
established by the Fon Bridger Treaty. and the entire INEL site is land occ"pied by the 
U.S . Depanment of Energy. Therefore. the provisions in the Fon Bridger Treaty that allows the 
Shoshone-Bannock Indians to hunt on unoccupied lands of the United States do not apply to the INEL 
site. 
4.2.2 Existing and Planned Land Use in Surrounding Areas 
The Federa l government. the State of Idaho. and private pan ies own the lands surround ing the INEL 
site . Land uses on Federally owned land consist of graz ing. wi ldli fe management . range land. mineral 
and energy produc tion. and recreational uses. State-owned lands are used for graz ing. wildlife 
management. and rec rc:ational purposes. Pri vate ly owned lands are used primari ly for grazing. crop 
production. and range land . 
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Small communilies and lowns near Ihe INEL boundaries include Mud Lake 10 Ihe eaSI: Arco. 
Buue CiIY. and Howe 10 Ihe weSI: and AlOmic CilY 10 Ihe soulh . The larger communi lies of Idaho 
Fa lls. Rexburg. Blackfoot. and Pocale llo and Chubbock are 10 Ihe easl and soulheasl of Ihe INEL sile . 
The Fon Hall Indian Reservalion is 10 Ihe soulheasl of Ihe INEL. Recrealion and lourisl auraclions in 
Ihe region around Ihe INEL include Ihe Cralers of Ihe Moon Nalional Monument. Hell 's Half Acre 
Wilderness Sludy Area. Black Canyon Wilderness Sludy Area. Camas Nal ional Wildlife Refuge. 
Markel Lake Slale Wildlife Management Area. Nonh Lake Slale Wildlife Managemenl Area. 
YellowslOne Nalional Park . Grand Telon Nalional Park . Jackson Hole Recrealion Complex. Targhee 
and Challis Nalional Foresls. and Ihe Snake River . 
Lands surrounding Ihe INEL si le are subjecllo Federal and slale planning laws and regulalions , 
Federal rules and regulations thaI require public involvement in their implementation govern planning 
for and use of Federal lands and Iheir resources . Land use planning in Ihe Slale of Idaho is derived 
from Ihe Local Planning ACI of 1975 (Slale of Idaho Code 1975), Because Ihe Slale currently has no 
land use planning agency. Ihe Idaho legislature requires each county 10 adopl ils own land use planning 
and zoning guidel ines. County plans Ihal are applicable 10 lands bordering Ihe INEL sile include Ihe 
Clark CounlY Planning and Zoning Ordinance and Interim Land Use Plan (Clark County 1994): 
Bonnevi lle County Comprehensive Plan (Bonneville County 1976): Bingham County Zoning Ordinance 
and Planning Handbook (Bingham County 1986): Jefferson County Comprehensive Plan (Jefferson 
County 1988): and Buue County Comprehensive Plan (Buue County 1992). Land use planning for 
INEL facililies wilhin Ihe Idaho Falls cilY limils is subjecllo Idaho Falls planning and zoning 
reslriclions (CilY of Idaho Falls 1989. 1992) , 
All county plans and policies accepl developmenl adjacent 10 previously developed areas 10 
minimize the need to extend infrastructure improvements and to avoid urban sprawl. Because the 
INEL is remole from mosl developed areas. INEL lands and adjacent areas are nOI likely 10 experience 
residential and commercial development : no new development is planned near Ihe IN EL sile , 
However. DOE expects recreational and agricultural uses 10 increase in the surrounding area in 
response 10 grealer demand for recrealional areas and Ihe conversion of range land 10 crop land . 
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4.3 Socioeconomics 
Thi s s~ l..·t i o n prest!nts a brief ov~rview of current socioeconomic conditions within a region of 
influence where approximalely 97 percenl of Ihe INEL workforce lived in 199 1 (DOE-ID 199 1). The 
INEL r~g ion of influence is a seven-county area comprised of Bingham. Bonneville. Butte. Clark. 
Jefferson. Bannock. and Madison Counties. The region of influt!nce also includes the Fort Hall Indian 
ReserVaiion and Trusl Lands (home of Ihe Shoshone-Bannock Tribes) in Bannock. Bingham. Caribou. 
and Power Counties. 
4.3.1 Employment 
Historically. Ihe regional economy has re lied predominantly on natural resource use and 
extraction. Today. fanni ng. ranching. and mining remain imponant components of the regional 
economy. Idaho Falls is the retail and service center for the region of influence. and Pocatello has 
evolved into an imponant processing and distribution cenler and site of higher education institut ions. 
4.3.1.1 Region. The labor force in the region of influence increased from 92. 159 in 1980 10 
104.654 in 1991. an average annual growlh rale of approximalely 1.2 percent. In 199 1 the region of 
innuence accounled for approxi malely 18 percenl of the total slate labor force of 504.000 
(lSDE 1992), As lisled in Table 4.3- 1. the projecled labor force in the region of influence wi ll reach 
108.667 by 1995 , 
Unemployment rates varied considerably among the counties of the region of influence in 1991. 
ranging from 2,6 percenl in Clark County to 6.3 percenl in Bannock and Bingham Counties. Since 
1980 Ihe average annual unemploymenl rale for Ihe region has ranged from 5.3 percent in 1989 10 
8.3 percent in 1983. In 199 1 Ihe average annual unempl"ymenl rale for Ihe region of innuence was 
5.5 percenl compared 10 the slalewide average of 6,2 percent (lSDE 1992). 
Employme nt in the region of innuence increased from 86.26 1 in 1980 to 98.898 in 199 1. an 
average annual growlh rale of approx imalely 1,3 percent. As listed in Table 4,3- 1. employment is 
projecled 10 increase 10 101.450 by 1995 . 
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Table 4.3-\. Projecled labor force. employmenl . and populalion for Ihe INEL region of innuence. 
1995-2004. 
t99~ 1'/9. 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 200< 
Labor For~1! IOR.667 109.607 t 10.5-17 111.-187 112.427 11 ) .367 11 ·1.301~ 115.248 116, 11'18 117.128 
Ernplo)'mc:nt 10 1.450 I02J28 103.205 I (}.J,08) 1().J.960 105.838 106.7 16 107.593 I08A7 1 109,3"8 
Popul:lIion 2J 7.990 251.518 255.096 258.726 262.-'06 266. 140 268.667 271.21 9 273.795 276.395 
Source: ISDE (1992); SA IC ( 1994) : ISDE (1991); ISDE ( 1986). 
4.3.1.2 Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. INEL plays a substanlia l role in Ihe 
regional economy. During Fiscal Year 1990. INEL direclly employed approximalely 
11.1 00 personnel. accounting for almost 12 percenl of lOlal regional employment. The eSlimaled 
populalion direclly supported by INEL employment was approximalely 38,000 persons, or 17 percent 
of Ihe lOlal regional populalion. The major employers al INEL are DOE-ID, DOE-ID conlrdclors, 
Argonne Nalional Laboralory-Wesl, and Ihe Naval Reaclors Facilily (see Figure 4.3-1). In 1992, Ihe 
lOla l direcI INEL employmenl was approximalely 11 ,600 jobs (DOE-ID 1994). Projeclions as of 
Jar.uary 1995 indicale Ihal Ihe lOlal number of jobs al INEL will decrease 1o approximalely 8,620 in 
Fiscal Year 1995 and 1o approximalely 7,250 in Fiscal Year 2004 (Tellez 1995). Projecled decreases 
in lNEL employment are primarily re lated to contractor consolidat ;on. which accounts for 64 percent 
of Ihe projecled losses belween Fiscal Year 1994 and Fi sc.1 Year 2004, and 1o reduced aClivilies al Ihe 
Naval ReaClors Facility, which accounts for 33 percent of the projected job losses. ConlracI changes 
at DOE-rD resulted in the consolidation of several contracts under one contract. The consolidation 
eliminated redundant administrative ac tivities previously perfonned by each individual contractor and 
offered early reliremenl or other 0Plions to impacted INEL contractor employees. 
4.3.2 Population and Housing 
4.3.2.1 Population. From 1960 to 1990, populalion growlh in Ihe region of innuence 
mirrored statewide growth. During this period. the region 's population increased at an average annual 
rale of approximate ly 1.3 percenl , while Ihe growth rale for the Slale was 1.4 percent. Belween 1980 
and 1990, populalion growlh in Ihe region of innuence approx imalely equaled Ihat of the Stale with an 
average growlh rate of 0.6 percenl per year. The region of innuence had a 1990 populalion of 
2 19.713. which comprised 22 percenl of Ihe lota l Slale populalion of 1,006,749. Based on populat ion 
and employment trends. Ihe population in Ihe region of innuence wi ll reach approximalely 
248,000 persons by 1995 (Table 4.3-1). 
VOL ME 1. APPENDIX B 4 .3-2 
'" 
'" ~ 
a. 
E 
'" 
'0 
il 
E 
:J 
Z 
12000 
tOOOO 
8000 
6000 
Souroe: Tellez (19951; DOE·ID (19941 
Contractors 
Department of Energy-Idaho 
I,AfI,nrlnA National Laboratory-West 
Naval Reactors Facility 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Fiscal Year SAAooeo 
PJ20·3 
Figure 4.3-1. Historic and projecled baseline e mploymenl al Ihe Idaho Nalio nal Eng ineering 
Laboralory , 1990-2004. 
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l·rT BEST COPY AVAILABLE 
In 1990. the most populous counties were Bannock and Bonneville. which together contained 
over 60 percent of the seven-county total (Figure 4.3-2). Butte and Clark were the least populous of 
the counties in the region of influence. The largest cities in the region of influence are Pccatello and 
Idaho Falls. with 1990 populations of approximately 46,000 and 44,000, respectively. In 1990, the 
Fort Hall Indian Reservation and Trust Lands contained 5. 113 residents, most of whom (52 percent) 
resided in Bingham County . 
4.3.2.2 Housing. Bonneville and Bannock Counties (which respectively include the cities of 
Idaho Falls and Pocatello) provided 67 percent of the 73,230 year-round housing units in the region of 
influence in 1990 (see Table 4.3-2). Of this number, approximately 70 percent were single-family 
units, 17 percent were multifamily units , and 13 percent were mobile homes. Most of the multifamily 
units (75 percent) were in Bonneville and Bannock Counties. About 29 percent of the occupied 
housing units in the region were rental units and 71 percent were homeowner units (USBC 1992). 
The median value of owner-occupied housing units ranged from $37,300 in Clark County to 
$68,700 in Madison County, and median monthly rents ranged from $243 in Butte County to $366 in 
Bonneville County . In 1990, there were 1,510 occupied housing units on the Fort Hall Indian 
Reservation and Trust Lands (USBC 1992) and a vacancy rate of 14 percent. 
4.3.3 Community Services 
This assessment considers the following selected community services in the region of influence: 
public schools. law enforcement, fire protection, hospital services. and solid waste disposal. 
Table 4.3-3 summarizes peninent characteristics of these services for the region of influence. 
Seventeen public school districts and three nonpublic schools provide educational services for 
about 58,000 children in the region of influence. Of these students, . bout 6,500 were dependents of 
INEL-related employees. During the 1990- 199 1 academic year, most public school districts spent an 
average of $3,000 to $4,000 per student annually . Higher education in the region is provided by the 
University of Idaho. Idaho State University, Brigham Young Universit} . Ricks College, and the 
Eastern Idaho Technical College. 
Seven county sheriffs offices. 12 city pol ice departments. and the Idaho State Police provide law 
enforcement services in the region. There was a total of 479 sworn officers and 100 Gther law 
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Table 4.3-2. Number of housing units. vacancy rates . median house value. and median monthly rent 
by county and region of influence.a 
Homeowner housing units Rental units 
Mcdian 
Number of Median value umber monthly rent 
County units Vacancy ratcs ($) of units Vacancy rates (S) 
Bannock 16.<W7 2.4 53.300 7.467 10.3 29~ 
Bingham 9.010 2.0 50.700 2.955 9 .2 284 
Bonnevi lle 17.707 1.9 63.700 7.375 6.2 366 
BUlle 780 4.6 ~1.4oo 302 16.2 243 
Clark 177 1.7 37.300 114 9 .6 281 
Jefferson 4.000 2.0 54.300 992 4.1 314 
Madison 3.522 1.3 68.700 2.392 2.8 299 
Region of 
influence 51.674 2.1 21.556 4.6 
a. Source: USBC (1992). 
enforcement personnel in 1991. more than 59 percent of whom served Bannock and Bonneville 
Counties. 
Eighteen fire districts in the region of influence operate 30 fire stations taffed by 180 paid and 
approximately 300 volunteer firefighters. Bingham. Bonneville. Butte, Clark, and Jefferson Counties. 
which surround the lNEL. have developed emergency plans to be implemented in the event of a 
radiological or hazardous materials emergency . Each emergency plan identifies facilities with 
extremely hazardous substances and defines transportation routes for these substances. The emergency 
plans also include procedures for notification and response, listings of emergency equipment and 
facilities, evacuation routes. and training programs. 
Eight hospitals serve the region of influence with more than 900 licensed beds and a capacity of 
nearly 128,000 patient-days per year. Occupancy rates range from 22.0 to 61.7 percent in the region 
(IDHW 1990). County governments and the Blackfoot, Dubois, Idaho Falls, and Pocatello fire 
departments provide regional ambulance services. A private ambulance company serves residents in 
Butte County. Four quick-response units, two medical helicopters, and two clinics specializing in 
emergency medical services also serve the region of infiuence (Hardinger 1990: U.S. West Directories 
1992). 
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Table 4.3-3. Summary of public services available in the region of influence.a 
County 
Public Ser' ice Bannock Bingham Bonneville Butte Clark Jefferson Madison 
Schools 
Number of public school districts 2 5 3 3 2 
Total enrollment 15,455 11.3 11 17.896 765 166 5.339 5.967 
Number of INEL-related students (excluding 485 1.532 4.040 301 5 134 47 
military) 
Health Care Delivery 
Number of hospitals 3 2 0 0 
Number of licensed beds 309 238 311 4 52 
Law Enforcement 
Number of sworn law enforcement officers 151 65 143 4 2 18 43 
~ Total personnel per 1000 population 2.5 2.0 2.2 \.3 6.3 1.6 1.9 w 
I 
-I 
Fire Protection 
Number of fire stations 9 7 6 2 4 
Number of firefighters 166 96 121 15 7 63 24 
Number of firefighting vehicles 37 25 24 3 I II 6 
Municipal Solid Waste Disposal 
Number of landfills meeting EPAb regulations Ie 3d Ie 2 Of I Of 
Expected lifespan in years 30 3-6 50 30 2 
< 0 a. Source: IDE (1991); IDHW (1990); IDLE (1991) ; Kouris (1992a); and Kouris (I992b). r 
c b. EPA = U.S. Environmental Protection Agency . 3: 
tTl c . Fort Hall Mine Landfill is being redesigned to meet EPA standards. 
=- d. Aberdeen Landfill may close due to noncompliance with EPA standards. :> 
" e. A new landfill is replacing Bonneville County Landfill. 
" tTl Z f. Madison and Clark Counties are evaluating a regional landfill for use after 1993. Q 
x 
co 
51 
Municipal solid waste generated in the region of inOuence is transported to county landfi lls. In 
1992, twelve landfills served the region of inOuence. Four landfill s (one each in Bannock. Clark. 
Jefferson, and Madison Counties) will close without replacement before reaching their planned 
capacity due to noncompliance with new Environmental Protec tion Agency standards (CFR 199 1 a). 
4.3.4 Public Finance 
In Fiscal Year 199 1. total county revenues for the region of influence amounted to approximately 
$90 million (see Table 4.3-4). County governments receive most of their revenues from taxes and 
intergovernmental transfers. In 199 j the total assessed value of taxable property in the region of 
influence was about $4.5 billion. In addition to property tax revenues, local governments (ci ties and 
counties) also receive revenue from sales tax disbursements and revenue·sharing programs. These two 
sources provide approximately 60 to 85 percent of the total revenues received by each county. 
Table 4,3-4, Total revenues and expenditures by county, Fiscal Year 1991.' 
Total Total 
County revenues ($) expenditures ($) 
Bannock 16,232,274 14,216,708 
Bingham 11 ,434,200 10,708,011 
Bonnevilleb 50,186,650 51,850,100 
Butte 1,417,684 1,397,012 
Clark 1,236,849 1,086,379 
Jefferson 4,408,236 4,566,074 
Madison 5,249,432 5,662,080 
Seven-county region 90,165,325 89,486,364 
a. Sources: Ghan (1992): Bingham County (ci rca 1992); McFadden (circa 1992); Swager & Swager 
( 1992a): Swager & Swager (l992b); Draney, Searle, and Associates ( 1992); Schwendiman & 
Sutton ( 1992). 
b. Bonnevi lle County's financial statements and total revenue data include special accounts for 
schools. cities. cemeteries. fire distric ts. ambulance districts. and other special accounts not found in 
other county budgets. The majority of intergovernmental revenue is used to fund these accounts. 
Although DOE as a Federal agency is exempt from paying state or local taxes, INEL employees 
and contractors are not. In 1992. lNEL employees paid an estimated $60 million in Federal 
withholding tax and $24 million in state withholding tax. 
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In 199 1 the major categories of county government expenditures were general government 
services. 27 percent : road maintenance, 18 percent: public safety. 16 percent : health and welfare 
programs. 16 percent : sanitation and public works. 9 percent debt service. 3 percent ; trust remittances. 
2 percent : and other expenditures, 9 percent. 
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4.4 Cultural Resources 
This sec tion discusses cultural resources at the INEL. including prehistoric and historic 
archeological sites and historic siles and structures. and tradit ional resources that are of cultural or 
religious imponance (Q local Native Americans. It also discusses paleontological localities on the 
INEl sile. 
4.4.1 Archeological Sites and Historic Structures 
As summarized in Ihe INEl Draft Managemenl Plan for Cuhural Resources (Miller 1992). Ihe 
INEL contains a rich and varied inventory of cultural resources. This includes foss il localities that 
provide an imponant paleontological context for the region and the many prehistoric archeological 
sites that are preserved within it. These lauer sites. including campsites. lithic workshops, ·cairns. and 
hunling blinds. among olhers. are also an importanl part of Ihe INEl invenlory because Ihey provide 
information about the activities of aboriginal hunting and gathering groups who inhabited the area for 
approximately 12.000 years. In addition. archeological sites. pictogmphs. caves. and many other 
features of the INEL landscape are also important to contemporary Native American groups for 
hisroric. religious. and traditional reasons. Historic sites. including Ihe abandoned town of 
Powe lllPioneer. a northern spur of .he Oregon Trai l known as Goodale 's CUloff. many small 
homesteads. irrigation canals. sheep and cattle camps. and stage and wagon trails. document the use of 
Ihe area during Ihe lale 1800s and ea rl y 1900s. Finally. Ihe many scienlific and lechnical facililies 
inside the INEL boundaries have preserved important infOnnation on the historic development of 
nuclear science in America. 
To date. more than 100 cultural resource surveys have been conducted over approximately 
4 percent of the area on the INEL site. These surveys. most of which have occurred near major 
faci lity areas. have ident ified 1.506 archeological resources. including 688 prehistoric sites. 38 historic 
siles. 753 prehisloric isolales. and 27 hisloric isolales (Miller 1992: Gi lbert and Ringe 1993). These 
nu mbers do not include architectural properties associated with the creation and operation of the INEL. 
Unt il formal significance evaluations (archeological testing and historic records searches) have been 
completed. all cu ltural sites in th is inventory are considered to be potentially eligible for nomination to 
Ihe Nalional Regisler of Hisloric Places. However. all Ihe isolales have been calegorized as unlikely 
10 meel eligibi lilY requiremenls (Yohe 1993). 
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Due 10 Ihe re lalively high densilY of prehisloric si les on Ihe INEl and Ihe need 10 consider Ihese 
resources during FederJI undertakings. DOE has sponsored a pre liminary study. which resulted in the 
de \'c lopmt!nt of a predictive model. to identify areas where densities of sites are highest and where the 
potential impacts to significant archeological resources. as well as costs of compliance. would increase 
correspondingly (Ringe 1993). This informalion provides guidance for INEl projecl managers in Ihe 
selection of appropriate areas for new construction . However. it does not take the place of inventories 
that are required by the National Historic Preservation Act before ground-disturbing projects can slart 
(NHPA 1966 as amended). 
The predictive model. conslrucled using a mullivariate statistical technique on environmental 
variables associated Yo jch areas with and without siles. indicales that prehistoric cultural resources 
appear 10 be concentrated in association with certain definable physical features of the land. In this 
conlexl. very high densilies of resources are likely 10 occur along Ihe Big lost River and Birch Creek. 
atop buttes. and within craters and caves. The Lemhi Mountains. the Lake Terreton basin. and a 1.75-
mile- (2.800·meler-) wide zone along Ihe edge of local iava fields probably con lain a fairly high 
densi lY of siles. Wilhin Ihe eXlensive flows of basahic lava and along Ihe low foolhills of Ihe Lemhi 
Mountains. site density is classified as moderate. and the lowest density of prehistoric resources 
probably occurs in Ihe floodplain of Ihe Big losl River and Ihe alluvial fans emerging from Ihe Birch 
Creek Valley. in the sinks. and in the recent Cerro Grande lava flow. However. a classification of low 
or medium density does not eliminate the possibility that significant resources exist in those areas. 
Ahhough Ihe prediclive model has nOI been lesled. il is useful as a planning guide for defining areas 
most likely to contain archeological resources based on past surveys. 
Although there has been no systematic inventory of historically significant facilities associated 
wilh Ihe crealion and operalion of Ihe !NEl. a preliminary sludy indicaled Ihal all INEl facililies will 
require evaluation (Braun et al. 1993). The Experimental Breeder Reactor-I is a National Historic 
landmark lisled in Ihe Nalional Regisler of Hisloric Places. To dale. however. few of Ihe olher 
properties have been formally evalualed for eligibililY 10 Ihe Nalional Regisler. Memoranda of 
Agreemenl belween DOE. Ihe Idaho Slale Hisloric Preservalion Office. and Ihe Nalional Advisory 
Council on Hisloric Preservalion eSlablish Ihal certain sl ruclures al Tesl Area North (DOE 1993b) and 
Auxiliary Reaclor Area (DOE 1993a) are e ligible for nominalion. and oUlline specific lechniques for 
preserving the historic va lue of the areas in conformance with the requirements of the Historic 
American Building Survey and the Historic American Engineering Record. Other fac ilities on the 
INEl sile are like ly 10 requi re similar efforts if DOE schedules Ihem for major modificalion. 
demolition. or abandonment. 
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4.4.2 Native American Cultural Resources 
Because Native American people believe the land is sacred. the entire INEL reserve is cultura lly 
important to them. Cu ltural resources. to the Shoshone- Bannock peoples. include all fonns of 
trad it ional lifeways and usage of all natural resources. This includes not only prehistoric archeological 
sites. which are important in a religious or cultural he ritage context, but also features of the n!.llural 
landscape. ai r. plant, water. or animal resources that might have special significance. These resm.:rces 
may be affec ted by changes in Ihe visual environment (construction. ground disturbance. or 
introduction of a foreign element into the setting). dust particles. or by contamination. Geographically. 
the lNEl is included with in a large territory once inhabited by and sti ll of importance to the 
Shoshone-Bannock Tribes. Plant resources used by the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes that are located on 
or near the INEl site are listed in Table 4.4-1 . Areas significant to the tribes would include the 
bunes. wetlands. sinks. grasslands. juniper woodlands. Birch Creek. and the Big l ost River. 
Five Federal laws prompt consultation between Federal agencies and Indian Tribes: the National 
Envi ronmental Policy Act (NEPA 1969), the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA t966 as 
amended)_ the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (A1RFA 1978). the Archeological Resources 
Protection Act (ARPA 1979). and the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act 
(NAGPRA 1990). In accordance with these directives and in consideration of its Native American 
Policy (DOE I 990a and DOE 1992a). DOE is developing procedures at the lNEl for consultation and 
coordination with the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation. DOE has commined to 
additional interaction and exchange of infonnation with the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes. and has 
outlined this relationship in a formal Working Agreement with these tribes (DOE I 992c). In addition. 
the Cu llUral Resources Management Plan for the INEl (Miller t992) and the curation agreement for 
pennanent storage of archaeological materials wi ll be completed by June t996. The Cultural 
Resources Management Plan will defi ne procedures fo r involving the tribes during the planning stages 
of project development and the curation agreement will provide for the repalrialion of burial goods in 
accordance with NAGPRA . 
4.4.3 Paleontological Resources 
There are 3 1 known fossil localities at the lNEl site. Avai lable infonnation suggests that the 
region has re latively abundant and \·aried paleontological resources. Preliminary analyses suggest that 
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Table ~.4-1. Plants used by the Shoshone-Bannock tribes that are located on or near the INEL. 
PI:mt F.:unlly Type o f Usc Location Abun\.!:mce 
Dcscn Parsley medicine. food scallered o n:r site common 
Mllk"·ced food. tools roadsides scanered. uncommon 
Sagebrush ml.-dicine. tools throughout the site common. abundant 
Balsamroot food. medici ne around butles common but scallere\.! 
Thistl e food scallercd throughout site common but scattered 
Gu mwced medicine disturbed areas common 
Sunnower mOOicine. food roadside 
Dandelion food. medicine throughout site common 
Beggar· s Ticks food disturb<xl areas throughout site common. abundant 
Tansy mustard food. medicine disturbed areas common 
Cactus food throughout the site common. abundant 
Honeysuck le food. tools Big Southern Bune common on butte 
Goose foot food throughout site common. abundant 
Russian Thist le food disturbed areas throughout site common. abundant 
Dogwood food. medicine. tools Webb Springs. Bi rch Creek common where found 
Juniper medicine. food. tools throughout site common to abundant 
Gooseberry food scattered throughout site common 
Mtlllha an·"ns;s ml.-dicine Big Lost Rh·er uncommon 
Wild onion food. medici ne. d)'e throughout site 
CafotllOrtlf$ spp. food bunes common 
Fi reweed food throughout site 
Pi ne food. toois. medicine Big Southern Bune common on bune 
Douglas Fir medicine Big Southern Bune com mon on bulle 
Plantain medicine. food throughout site uncommon 
Wildrye food. tools throughout si te common. abundant 
Indi an Ricegrass food throughout site common. abundant 
Bluegrass food. medic ine throughout site common. abundant 
Serviceberry rood. tools. medici ne buttes common whcre found 
Chokeberry rood. medicine . tools. fuel bullcS common whc:rc: found 
Wood 's Rose food. smoking . medicine. Big Lost Ri vc r. Big common. abundant 
ri tual Southern BUlle 
Red Ras pberry food. medicine Big Souther.'! Bulte um:ommon 
Willow medicine throughout site 10 moist areas common 
Coyote Tobacco smoking. medicine Big Lost River. Webb Spnngs uocommon 
Cattail food. tools si nks. oUlnow from faclliti co; 
Source: AndC:fSen et al. ( 1995). 
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these materials are most likely to occur in association with archeological sites: in areas of basalt flows: 
in deposits of the Big Lost River. Little Lost River. and Birch Creek: in depC'sits of Lake Terreton and 
playas: in orne wind and sand deposits: and in sedimentary interbeds or lava tubes within local lava 
flows (Miller 1992). 
4.4-5 VOL ME I. APPE DIX B 
4.5 Aesthetic and Scenic Resources 
4.5.1 Visual Character of the INEL Site 
The Bitterroot . lemhi . and lost River mountain ranges border the INEl site on the north and 
west. Persons can see volcanic buttes near the southern boundary of the INEL from most locations on 
the site and from the Fort Hall Reservation. Most of the INEl site consists of open undeveloped land. 
covered predominantly by large sagebrush and grasslands (see Section 4.9). Pasture and irrigated 
farmland border much of the INEl site (see Section 4.2). 
Although the INEl has a master plan. it has not established specific visual resource standards. 
The nine facili ty areas on the INEl site are generally of low densi ty. look like commercial or 
industrial complexes, and are spread across the site. Structures in the facility areas range in height 
from 10 feet to approximate ly 100 feet (3 to 30 meters) . About 90 miles (145 kilometers) of paved 
public highway run through the lNEl site (see Section 4.11 ). Although many INEl fac ilities are 
visible from these highways. most facilities are located more than 0.5 mile (0.8 kilometer) from public 
roads. 
4.5.2 Scenic Areas 
The Craters of the Moon National Monument is about 15 miles (24 kilometers) southwest of the 
INEl sites western boundary. The Monument is located in a designated Wilderness Area. which 
must maintain C lass I l very high) air quality standards or minimal degradation. as defin ed by the 
C lean Air Act (CAA 1990: CFR 1990: CFR 199Ib). Under Section 169a of the Clean Air Act. air 
quality includes visibility and scenic view considerations. 
lands adjacent to the INEl under Bureau of land Manageme nt jurisdiction are Visual Resource 
Management Class II areas (BlM 1984: BlM 1986). which urge preservation and retention of the 
existing character of the landscape. lands inside the lNEl boundaries are Class III and IV areas. the 
most lenient classes in terms of modification . The Bureau of Land Management is considering the 
Black Canyon Wilderness Study Area. which is adjacen t to the INEl . for a Wilderness Area 
designation (BlM 1986): if approved. this would result in an upgrade from Visual Resource 
Management Class II to a Class l. 
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Featu",s of the natural landscape have special significance to the Shoshone-Bannock tribes. The 
visua l envi ronment of the INEL site is wi thin the visual range of Fort Hall Reservation. 
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4.6 Geology 
This section describes the geology of the INEL and the surrounding areJ. Section 4 .6. 1 
characterizes the general geology. while section 4.6.2 describes the natural resources of the area. 
Sections 4.6.3 and 4.6.4 describe seismic and volcanic hazards. respectively. 
4.6.1 General Geology 
The site is on the Eastern Snake River Plain (Figure 4 .6-1). The Plain forms a broad northeast-
trending. crescent-shaped trough wi th low re lief composed primarily of surface basaltic lava flows 
formed 1.2 million to 2. 100 years ago. The Plain featu res thin. discontinuous. and interbedded 
deposits of wind-blown loess and sand; water-borne alluvial fan. lacustrine. and floodplain alluvial 
sediments; and rhyolitic domes formed 1.200.00u to 300.000 years ago (Kuntz et al. 1990) 
(Figure 4.6-2). Mountains and valleys of the Bas in and Range Province. which trend north to 
northwest and consist of folded and faulted rocks that are more than 70 million years old. bound the 
Plain on the north and south. The Yellowstone Plateau bounds the Plain on the northeast. The major 
episode of Basin and Range faulting began 20 to 30 million years ago and continues today. most 
recently associated with the October 28. 1983. Borah Peak earthquake [moment magnitude 6.9. 
magnitude 7.3 on the Richter scale with a resulting peak ground acceleration of 0 .022 to 0.078 at the 
INEL (Jackson 1985)J. which occurred along the Lost River fault. approxi mately 100 kilometers 
(62 miles) from si te fac ilities and the 1959 Hebgen Lake Earthquake. moment magnitude 7.5. 
approximately 150 ki lometers (93 miles) from the INEL (Figure 4.6- 1). 
The northeast-trending volcanic terrain of the Plain has a markedly different geologic history and 
tectonic patte rn than the folded and faulted terrain of the northwest-trending Basin and R"nge. The 
Basin and Range faulls have not been observed on or across the Plain. Four nonhwesHrending 
volcanic rift zones, att ributed to basaltic eruptions that occurred 4 million to 2. 100 years ago. lie 
across the Plai n at the INEL (Bowman 1995; Hackett and Smith 1992; Kuntz et al. 1990). 
The seismic charac teri stics of the Eastern Snake River Plain and the adjacent Bas in and Range 
Province are also different. Earthquakes and ac ti ve faulting are associated with the Basi n and Range 
tectonic activity . The Plain has historica lly experienced few and small earthquakes (King et al. 1987; 
Pelton et al. 1990; wee 1992; Jackson et al. 1993). 
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4.6.2 Natural Resources 
In 1979 the INEL drilled a geothermal exploralion well to 3. 159 meters ( 10.365 fee t). 
Researchers measured a temperature of 142°e (288°F) but identified no commercial quant ities of 
geothermal fluids (IDWR 1980). Mineral resources include several quarries or pits inside the INEL 
boundary that supply sand. gravel. pumice. silt . clay. and aggregate for road construction and 
maintenance. new faci lity construction and maintenance. waste burial activit ies. and ornamental 
landscaping cinders. During excavations. DOE might study the gravel pits to characterize the local 
surficial geology of the site. Outs ide the site boundary. mineral resources include sand. gravel. 
pumice. phosphate. and base and precious metals (Strowd et al. 198 1; Mitchell et al. 198 1). The 
geologic history of the Plain makes the potential for petroleum production at the INEL very low. 
4.6.3 Seismic Hazards 
The distribution of earthquakes at and near the INEL from 1884 to 1989 clearly shows that the 
Plain has a remarkably low rate of seismici ty. whereas the surrounding Basin and Range has a fairly 
high rate (Figure 4.6-3, wee 1992). The mechanism for faulting and generation of earthquakes in the 
Basin and Range is attributed to northeast-southwest directed crustal extension. 
Several investigators have suggested hypotheses for the low rate of seismic activ ity within the 
Plain compared to the activ ity in both the Centennial Tectonic Belt and Ihe Intennountain Seismic 
Belt: 
Smith and Sbar (1974) and Brol! et al. (198 1) suggest that high crustal temperatures beneath 
the Plain and adjacent region inside the seismic parabola (Figure 4.6- 1) result in ductile 
defonnation (aseismic creep). in contrast to the bri ttle defonnation (rock fracture) that occurs 
in the Basin and Range. 
Anders et al. ( 1989) suggest that the Plain and the adjacent region inside the seismic 
parabola (Figure 4.6- 1) have increased in tegrated lithospheric strength. They propose that 
the presence of mid-crustal basic intrusive rock strengthens the crust 'iO that it is too strong 
to fracture (see also Smith and Arabasz 1991,. 
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Parsons and Thompson (1991) propose tha' magma dike injec,ion suppresses normal raulting 
and associated seismicity by altering the local tectonic stress field. As dikes are injected in 
volcanic rift zones, they push apan the surrounding rocks and decrease differential stress. 
thereby prevenling earthquakes rrom occurring. 
Anders and Sleep (1992) propose that the introduction or man' Ie-derived magma into 'he 
midcrust benoath the Plain has decreased raulting and earthquakes by lowering the rate or 
defonnation . 
The markedly dirreren, tec,onic and seismic histories or the Plain and Basin and Range provinces 
reflect the dissimilar defonnational processes acting in each region. Both regions are subjected to the 
same extensional stress field (Weaver et al. 1979; Zoback and Zoback 1989; Pierce and Morgan 1992; 
Jackson et al. 1993); however. crustal derormation occurs 'hrough dike injection in 'he Plain and 
'hrough large-scale normal raulting in 'he Basin and Range (Rodgers et al. 1990; Parsons and 
Thompson 1991: Hackett and Smith 1992). 
Major seismic hazards include the errects rrom ground shaking and surface derormation (raulting. 
'ilting). Other potential seismic hazards (e.g .. avalanches, landslides, mudslides. soil settlemen,. and 
soil liqueraclion) are no' likely '0 occur at 'he INEL because 'he local geologic condi,ions are not 
conducive 10 them, Based on the seismic history and the geologic conditions. earthquakes greater than 
moment magnitude 5.5 (and associated Slrong ground shaking and surface rault rup,ure) are not likely 
to occur in the Plain. However, moderate to strong ground shaking from earthquakes in the Basin and 
Range can arrect 'he INEL. Researchers use patterns or seismicity and locations or mapped raults to 
assess potential sources of future earthquakes and to est imate levels of ground motion at the site . The 
sources and maximum magnitudes of earthquakes that could produce the maximum levels of ground 
motions at all INEL racilities include 'he rollowing (Wee 1990; wee 1992); 
A momen' magnilUde 7.0 earthquake a' 'he southern end or 'he Lemhi rault along Ihe Howe 
and Fallen Springs segmenlS 
A moment magnitude 7.0 earthquake at 'he sou,hern end or the LoS! River rault along 'he 
Areo segment 
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A moment magnitude 5 5 eanhquake associated with dike inject ion in ei ther the Arco or 
Lava Ridge-HeWs Half Acre Volcanic Rif. Zone and .he Axial Volcanic Zone 
A "random" momem magni.ude 5.5 eanhquake occurring in .he EaS!em Snake Ri ver Plain 
Figure 4.6-4 shows a facili'y-specific example of .he rela.ionship of .he peak ground accelera.ion 
on the INEL to the annual frequency of occurrence of seismic events on various seismic sources in the 
reg ion. including .he four evenlS described above (WCFS 1993). The curves refer specifically '0 .he 
si.e of .he Idaho Chemical Processing Plan. in .he sou.h-cenICal INEL and might no' apply direclly '0 
other INEL areas. Ground motion contributions from seismic sources not shown on Figure 4.6-4 
( i.e .. In.ennoun.ain seismic bel. and YeliowSlone Region) are s i ~nificamly smaller because of .hei r 
distant locations or lower eSlimated maximum magnitudes. The INEL Natural Phenomena Committee 
de.ennines INEL seismic design-basis evenlS based on studies such as .hose perfonned by Woodward 
Clyde ConSU llanlS (1990) and Woodward Clyde Federal Services (1993). 
A maximum horizonlal ground surface accelera.ion of 0.248 a •• he Idaho Na.ional Engineering 
Labora.ory is es. ima.ed '0 resul . from an eanhquake .ha. could occur once every 2.000 years (DOE 
1994). The seismic hazard infonna.ion presemed in .his EIS is for general seismic hazard 
comparisons across DOE sites . Potent ial seismic hazards for existing and new facilities should be 
evaluated on a facility-specific basis. consistent with DOE orders. standards. and site-specific 
procedures. Section 5.15 describes the potential impacts of postulated seismic events. 
4.6.4 Volcanic Hazards 
Volcanic hazards at the INEL can come from sources inside or outside Plain boundaries. These 
hazards include .he effeclS of lava nows. ground defonna.ion (fissures. uplif •• subsidence). volcanic 
eanhquakes (assoc iated with magmatic processes as dist inct from eanhquakes associated with 
.ec.onics). and ash nows or airborne ash deposilS (Bowman 1995). Mos. of the basalt volcanic 
ac.ivi.y occurred from 4 million.o 2.100 years ago in .he INEL area. The moS! recem and closeSl 
volcanic erup.ion occurred 2.100 years ago a •• he Cra.ers of .he Moon. 25 kilome.ers (15 miles) 
sou.hweS! of .he INEL (Kun'z e. al. 1992). The rhyoli .e domes along .he Axial Volcanic Zone fonned 
be.ween 1.2 million and 300.000 years ago and have a recurrence imerval of about 200.000 years. 
Therefore . • he probabili.y of fu.ure dome fonna. ion affec.ing fNEL facili.ies is very low. 
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Catastrophic Yellowstone erupt ions have occurred three limes in the past 2 million years. but the 
INEL is more Ihan 160 kilomelers (70 miles) from Ihe YellowSlone Caldera rim and high-ahilude 
winds would nOI disperse Yellowslone ash in Ihe direClion of INEL. Due 10 Ihe infrequency. greal 
distance. and unfavorable dispersal. pyroc las tic flows or ash fallout from future Yellowstone eruptions 
should nOI impaci Ihe INEL. 
Basaltic lava flows and erupt ions from fi ssures or vents might occur. Based on a probability 
analysis of Ihe volcanic hiSlory in Ihe Big SOUlhem Bune area (Volcanism Working Group 1990). Ihe 
condil ional probabilily Ihal basahic volcanism would affeci a soulh-ceOlral INEL local ion is less Ihan 
2.5 x 10" per year (once per 40.000 years or longer). where Ihe risk associaled wilh Axial Volcanic 
Zone volcanism is greatest. The estimated probability of volcanic impact on INEL faci lities farther 
north . where bo.h silicic and basahic volcanism have been older and less frequenl. is less Ihan 10'· per 
year (once every million years or longer). The sialislics of 116 measured INEL-area lava flow lenglhs 
and areas were used 10 define Ihe Iwo lava flow hazard zones (Figure 4.6-5). The hazard for a 
panicular site with in or ncar a volcanic zone is much lower. typically by an order of magnitude or 
more. and must be assessed on a site-specific basis (Bowman 1995). 
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4.7 Air Quality 
This section describes the air resources of the INEL site and the surrounding area. The 
discu sion includes the climatology and meteorology of the region , descriptions of nonradiological and 
radiological air contaminant emissions. and a characterization of existing and projected levels of air 
pollutants. The analysis includes both existing facilities and those that were expected (at the time the 
analysis was performed) to be operational before June 1. 1995. Additional detail and background 
information on the material presented in this section is presented in Appendix F. Section F-3. of 
Volume 2. 
4.7.1 Climatology and Meteorology 
The Eastern Snake River Plain climate exhibits low relative humidity, wide daily temperature 
swings, and large variations in annual precipitation . Average sea onal temperatures measured on the 
INEL site range from -7.3°C (18.8°F) in winter to 18.2°C (64.8°F) in summer. with an annual average 
temperature of about 5.6°C (42°F). Temperature extremes range from a ummertime maximum of 
39.4°C (103°F) to a wintertime minimum of -45°C (-49°F). The annual average relative humidity i 
50 percent. with monthly average maximum values ranging from 59 percent in July to 89 percent in 
February and December. and with monthly average minimum values ranging from 16 percent in June 
and July to 47 percent in January (Clawson et a\. 1989). 
Annual precipitation is light. averaging 221.2 millimeter (8 .71 inches). with monthly extreme 
of zero to 127 millimeter (5 inches). The maximum 24-hour precipitation rate is 46 millimeter 
( 1.8 inches). The greate t short-term precipitation rates are attributable primarily to thunder torms. 
which occur approximately two or three day per month during the summer. The average annual 
snowfall i 701 millimeters (27.6 inches), with a maximum of 1.5 16 millimeter (59.7 inche ) and a 
min imum of 173 millimeter (6.8 inche ) (Clawson et al. 1989). 
The lNEL ite is in the belt of prevailing westerlies; however. the mountain ranges bordering the 
Ea tern Snake River Plain normally channel these winds into a southwe t wind. Most off ite locations 
experience the predominant south we t-northeast wind flow of the Ea tern Snake River Plain. although 
ubtle terrain features near ome location cause con iderable variations from thi flow regime. The 
annual average wind speed measured at the 6. I-meter (20-foot) level at the Central Facilitie Area 
Weather Station i 3.4 meter per second (7.5 mile per hour). Monthly average values range from 
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2.3 meters per second (5 .1 miles per hour) in December to 4.2 meters per second (9.3 miles per hour) 
in April and May (Clawson el al. 1989). The higheS! hourly average near-ground wind speed 
measured onsite is 22.8 meters per second (5 1 miles per hour) from the west-south west, with a 
maximum inSlanlaneous guSl of 34.9 melers per second (78 miles per hour) (Clawson el al. 1989). 
Figure 4.7- 1 presenls Ihe frequency of wind speed and wind direclion al Ihree meleorological 
moniloring siles on Ihe INEL sile from 1988 10 1992. The wind direclions presenled in Ihe figure are 
the direction from which the wind blows. The three wi nd-roses demonstrate the effects of terrain on 
predominant wind directions and wind speed. The winds at the Test Area North monitoring station arc 
predominantly from the north-northwest. whereas the winds from the other stations are predominantly 
from the southwest 
Air pollutant dispersion is a result of the processes of transport and diffusion of airborne 
contaminants in the atmosphere. Transport is the movement of a pollutant in the wind field, while 
diffusion refers 10 Ihe process whereby lurbulenl eddies dilule a pollulanl plume . The lemperalUre 
gradient of the atmosphere (Le., the change in temperature with altitude) can restrict or enhance the 
vert ir:tl di ffusion of pollutants. Lapse rate conditions. which tend to enhance vertical diffusion, occur 
slight ly less than 50 percent of the time. Conversely. thermal stratification or inversion conditions, 
which inhibil venical di ffusion. occur slighlly more Ihan 50 percenl of Ihe lime. The heighl 10 which 
Ihe poliulanlS can freely diffuse is Ihe miXing deplh. while Ihe layer of air from Ihe ground 10 Ihe 
mixing deplh is Ihe mixed layer. ESl imales of Ihe monlhly average deplh of Ihe mi xed layer range 
from 400 melers (1.3 12 fee!) in Dece mber 10 3,000 melers (9,843 fee!) in July. Wilh calm winds and 
mostly clear skies. nocturnal inversions begin forming after sunset and dissipate about I to 2 hours 
after sunrise. These inversions are often ground-based. meaning the atmospheric temperature increases 
wilh heighl from Ihe ground (Clawson el a l. 1989). 
Other than thunderstorms. severe weather is uncommon. Five funnel clouds (tornadoes not 
louching Ihe ground) and no lomadocs were reponed on Ihe sile belween 1950 and 1988. Visibilily in 
the region is good because of the low moisture content of the air and minimal sources of visibility-
reducing pollutants. From Craters of the Moon National Monument . the seasonal visual range is from 
13010 155 kilomelers (8 11097 miles) (Nolar 1993). 
4.7.2 Air Quality 
4.7.2.1 Nonradl%gica/ Air Quality, The INEL is in Ihe EaSlem Idaho Inlraslale Air 
QualilY Conlrol Region (AQCR 61). Neilher Ihe INEL nor any of Ihe surrounding counlies is 
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designated as a nonatlainment area (CFR 1992b) for the National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
(CFR 199 Ib). Ambient air quality data monitored in the vicinity of the INEL indicate that the site is 
in compliance with applicable air quality standards (DOE 1991 a) . 
The Clean Air Act (CAA 1990) contains requirements to prevent the deterioration of air quality 
in areas designated to be in attainment with the ambienc air quality standards. These requirements are 
admini stered through a program that limits the increase in specific air pollutants above the levds that 
existed in what has been termed a baseline (or staning) year. which is 1977. The requirements specify 
maximum allowable ambient pollutant concentration increases or increments. They specify increment 
limits for pollutant leve l increases for the nation as a whole (Class II areas) and pres-::ribe more 
stringent increment limits (as well as ceilings) for designated national resources. such as national 
forests. parks. and monuments (Class I areas). Three areas in the INEL vicinity are Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration Class I ambient air quality areas : Craters of the Moon Wilderness Area. 
approxi,nately 53 kilometers (33 miles) to the west->outhwest: Yellowstone National Park. 
approximately 143 kilometers (89 miles) to the nonheast; and Grand Teton National Park. 
approximately 145 kilometers (90 miles) to the east-nonheast. 
DOE evaluates proposed new and modified source.; of emissions at [NEL to determine the net 
emissions increase of all pollutants. The rNEL is considered a major source. because facility-wide 
e i<:; sions of spec ific regulated air contaminants exceed 227 metric tons (250 tons) per year. 
Therefore. a Prevention of Significant Deteriorati on analys is must be performed for all signi ficant 
emission increase- of specified regulated pollutants. Levels of significance for net emission increases 
range from very small quantities (less than I pound) for heryllium up to 91 metric tons (100 tons) per 
year for carbon monoxide. Their significance is dependent on the toxicity of the substance. For 
radionuclides. significance means any increase in emissions that would result in an offsite dose of 0.1 
millirem per year or greater. 
Ambient ai r qual ity standards for Idaho are the same as the National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards but include total suspended paniculates and Ouorides. The Idaho Depanment of Health and 
Welfare (IDHW) also has ambient concent ration limits for hazardous and toxic air pollutants. 
Table 4 .7-1 li sts emission rates of cri teria and hazardous and toxic air pollutants. 
The types and amo JO ts of nonradiological emissions from INEL facilities and activities are 
similar to those fro m other industria l complexes that are the same sizes as the lNEL. Combustion 
sources such as boilers and emergency generators emit both criteri a and toxic pollutants. Other 
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Table 4.7-1. Baseline annual average and maximum hourly emission rates of nonradiological air 
pollutants at the INEL. ' 
Pollutant Annual average (kg/yr)'" Maximum hourly (kgihr)' 
Criteria pollutants 
Carbon monox ide (CO) 301.000 177 
Lead (Pb) II 0.085 
Nitrogen dioxide (NO,) 744.000 545 
Paniculate mailer (PM 10)' 302.000 230 
Sulfur dioxide (SO,) 202.000 136 
Hazardous/toxic air pollutants' 
Acetaldehyde 31 0.39 
Ammonia 1.600 3.4 
Arsenic 4.2 9.0 x 10" 
Benzene 370 16 
1.3-Butadiene 220 0 .8 
Carbon tetrachloride 28 0.08 
Chloroform 1.9 5.5 x 10" 
Chromium - trivalent 3.1 2.5 x 10" 
Chromium - hexavalent 0.4 6.2 x 10" 
Cyclopentano 350 0.58 
Dichloromethane 620 0.29 
Formaldehyde 960 8.9 
Hydrazine 8.3 9.5 x 10" 
Hydroe hloric acid 1.500 0.34 
Mercury 200 0.023 
Napthalene 16 22 
Nickel 270 0.057 
Nitric ac id 1.500 1.7 
Phosphorous 56 0.024 
Potass ium hydroxide 990 0.24 
Propionaldehyde 62 0 .24 
Styrene 4 .7 0 .74 
Tetrachlore thylene 980 0 .11 
Toluene 580 56 
Trichloroethylene 4.7 0.01 3 
Trimethylbenzene 87 12 
a. Source: Volume 2. Table 4.7-2. 
b. To conven kilograms to pounds. mult iply by 2.2. 
c. Annual average values include actual emiSSIOns plus projected increases from facilities that will 
become open lOnal after the baseline year. 
d . It is conservati vely assumed that all paniculate mailer is PM ,. (less than 10 microns in diameter). 
e. Hazardous/tox IC air pollutants that are listed in State of Idaho regulat ions and are emitted in leve ls 
that exceed screening criteria. 
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sources include chcmical process ing operations. transportation. wastc management activities. and 
research laboratories. 
Table 4 .7-2 compares the INEL contribution to air quality to applicable standards and guidelines. 
This assessment modelled the INEL air emissions inventory for 1990 using the methodology approved 
by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to predict the maximum ground-leve l concent ration that 
would occur at or beyond the site boundary for each regulated pollu tant (EPA I 993b). The Industrial 
Source Complex-2 mode l primarily assessed cri teria pollutants, and the SCREEN model assessed toxic 
ai r pollutants. The SCREEN model incorporates meteorological data that tend to overestimate impacts, 
and is useful for identi fying cases that require additional. more refined assessments. The baseline 
concentrations listed in Table 4.7-2 are the sums of the following factors: the concentrations result ing 
from potential impacts from current operations and the concentrations resulting from the construction 
or operation of planned upgrades or modifications before the implementation of the proposed ac tions 
described in Section 5.7. Background concentrations have not been included because (a) reliable data 
on background levels in the INEL environs are not avai lable for most pollutants and (b) background 
levels are low and are more than offset by the use of the maximum (as opposed to actual) baseline. 
The baseline concentrations represent the maximum calculatl!d concentration occurring at public access 
locations (s ite boundary . public roads. and Craters of the Moon Wilderness Area). A comparison of 
the baseline concentrations to applicable Federal and state criteria pollutant and hazardous/toxic air 
pollutant guidelines and regulations shows that ai r quality at INEL is in compliance with thos~ 
guide lines and regulations. The 24-hour tota l suspended particulate background concentration is listed 
as 40 micrograms per cubic meter. which is the !':J.me as the annual geometric mean value. The annual 
sources include chemical processing operations, transportation. waste management activi ties. and 
research laboratories. 
4.7.2.2 Radiological Air Quality_ . The major source of radiation exposure in the E3$tern 
Snake River Plain is from natural background radiation sources such as cosmic rays; radioactivity 
naturally present in soil. rocks. and the human body; and ai rborne radionuclides of natural origin (such 
as radon). Sources of radioacti vity related to INEL operations include research and training reactors, 
spent nuclear fuel testing and stabi lization. irradiated material and fu el examinat ion, nuclear waste 
treatment and storage. and depleted uranium annor producli n. 
Radioactive emissions from INEL faci lities include the noble gases (argon, krypton, and xenon) 
and iodi ne: part iculate fi ss ion products such as rubidium. strontium. and cesium; radionuclides fonned 
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Table 4 .7-2. Comparison of baseline ambient air concentrations with most stringent applicable 
regulations and guidelines at the INEL. 
Most stringent Max imum 
regulation or baseline Percent 
Averag ing guideline concentration of 
Pollutant time (pglm3)a.b.c (pg/m3) standard 
Criteria pollutants 
Carbon monox ide (CO) 8-hour 10,000 280 2.8 
I-hour 40.000 610 1.5 
Lead (Pb) Calendar 1.5 0 .001 <0.1 
Quarter 
Nitrogen dioxide (NO,) Annual 100 4 4 
Particulate mailer (PM IO) Annual 50 5 10 
24-hour 150 80 53 
Sulfur dioxide (SO,) Annual 80 6 7.5 
24-hour 365 140 37 
3-hour 1.300 580 45 
Hazardous/toxic air pollutants 
Acetaldehyde Annual 4 .5 x lO. t 1.1 x 10·' 2 
Ammonia Annual 1.8 x 10' 6.0 x 100 
Arse:nic Annual 2.3 x 10-' 9.0 x 10·' 39 
Benzene Annual 1. 2 x lO. t 2 .9 x 10" 24 
Butadiene Annual 3.6 x 10-3 1.0 x 10-3 28 
Carbon Tetrachloride Annual 6.7 x 10-' 6.0 X 10.3 9 
C~loroform Annual 4 .3 x 10·' 4 .0 X 10·' < I 
Chromium - hexavalent Annual 8.3 x 10·' 6.0 x 10·' 72 
Chromium · trivalent Annual 5.0 x 10° 3.6 X 10·' < I 
Cylclopentane Annu al 1.7 x 10' 2.7 x 10.0 < I 
Formaldehyde Annual 7.7 x 10·' 1.2 X 10·' 16 
Hydrazine Annual 3.4 x 10.4 1.0 X 10·· < I 
Hydrochloric acid Annual 7.5 x 10° 9 .8 X 10· ' 13 
Mercury Annual 1.0 x 10° 4 .2 X 10·' 4 
Methylene Chloride Annual 2.4 x lO. t 6 .0 x 10-3 
Napthalene Annual 5.0 x 10' 1.8 X lOt 4 
Nicke l Annual 4 .2 x 10.3 2.7 x 10·) 65 
Nitric Acid Annual 5.0 x lOt 6.4 X 10· ' 
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Table 4.7-2. (continued). 
Most stringent Maximum 
regulation or baseline Percent 
Averaging guideline concentration of 
Pollutant time (pglm3) •. b.c (pglm3) standard 
Perchloroethylene Annual 2.1 x 10° 1. 1 X 10" 
Phosphorous Annual 1.0 x 10° 3.0 X 10" 30 
Potassium hydroxide A.nnual 2.0 x 10' 2.0 X 10" 
Proprionaldehyde Annual 4.3 x 10° 3.0 X 10" 
Styrene Annual 1.0 x 103 1.3 x 10° < I 
Toluene Annual 3.8 x 103 3.7 x 102 10 
Trichloroethylene Annual 7.7 x 10.2 9 .7 x 10" 
Trimethylbenzene Annual 1.2 x 103 1.0 x 102 8 
a. CFR (199Ib). 
b. IDHW ( 1994): the ambient standards for the criteria pollutants are the same as the NAAQS . 
c. Standards cited for hazardous/toxic air pollutants are for all new sources constructed or modified 
since May I. 1994. under State of Idaho Regulations for the Control of Air Pollution in the State of 
Idaho (IDHW 1994). 
Source: Volume 2. Section 4.7. 
by neutron ac tiva tion such as tritium (hydrogen-3). carbon·14. and cobait-60; and very small quantities 
(less than 6 x 10 .. 1 curies per year) of heavy elements such as uranium. thorium, plutonium. and their 
decay products. Historically. the radionuclide with the highest emission rate is the noble gas 
krypton-85. which is released primarily by the chemical reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel at the Idaho 
Chemical Processing Plant. Fuel reprocessing also releases small amounts (less than 0.1 curie per 
year) of iodine- 129. which is of concern because of its long half-life ( i 6 million years) and biological 
properties (iodine isotopes tend to accumulate in the human thyroid). Reactor operations release noble 
gas isotopes with short half-lives. including argon-4 1 and isotopes of xenon (primarily xenon- 133. 
- 135. and - 138). Other ac tivities at the INEL. including waste management operations. result in very 
low levels of airborne radionucl ide emissions (less than I x 10" curie per year). Table 4.7-3 
summarizes airborne rad ionuclide emissions from INEL facility areas. plus estimated emissions from 
projects expected. at the time of the analysis was performed. to become operational before June I. 
1995 . 
Radioacti vi ty released to the atmosphere can result in human exposure through a number of 
pathways. including inhalation. external exposure. and ingestion. DOE conducts physical 
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Table 4.7-3. Summary of airborne radionuclide emissions from INEL facility areas (curies per year).~ 
Mi xed 
fission and 
Tritium! Noble activation 
Fac ility carbon-14 Iodine, gases products' UmrrRU' 
Argonne National 1.0 x 10' _d 1.3 x 10' 8.1 x 10" 1.8 x 10" 
Laboratory-West 
Central Fac ilities Area 2.6 x 10· 5.0 X 10" 1.9 x 10" 9.6 X 10" 
Idaho Chemical Processing 4.3 x 10\ 6.4 x 10" 1.0 x 10' 3.6 x 10" 9.4 x 10" 
Plant 
Naval Reactors Facility 1.9 x 10'\ 6.3 X 10" 5.7 X 10' \ 5 .6 x 10" 
Power Burst 4.9 x 10\ 1.3 x 10· 9.8 X 10" 
FacilitylWas te 
Experimental Reduction 
Faci lity 
Radioactive Waste 2.6 x \0" 4.2 X 10" 
Management Complex 
Test Area North 1.2 x 10'\ 5.6 X 10" 1.5 x 10" 
Test Reactor Area 1.6 x 10' 1.6 x 10" 3.3 X 10' 3.0 x 10· 1.8 X 10" 
INEL total 2. 1 x la' 1.1 x 10'\ 1.2 x 10' 5.6 x 10· 1.0 x 10" 
a. With the exception of the Idaho Chemical Processing Pl ant. emissions estimates are based on 1991 
c~e ration s. Idaho Chemical Processing Plant emissions are based on 1993 emissions but are scaled 
upward to reflect operation of the New Waste Calcining Facility at maximum permitted levels. 
Anticipated projects in the baseline include the Waste Experimental Reduction Facility (compacting 
and sizing operations but not incineration). Argonne National Laboratory-West Fuel Cycle Facility. 
and Portable Water Treatment Unit . as described in Appendix F of Volume 2. 
b. Mixed fi ssion and activation products that are primarily paniculate in nature (for example. 
cobalt-60. strontium-90. and cesium-1 37). 
c . UmfTRU = Radioisotopes of uranium. thorium. or transuranic elements such as plutonium. 
americium. and neptunium. 
d. A dash (- ) indicates that the emissions for this group are neg ligibly small or zero. 
Source: Volume 2. Table 4.7-1. 
measurements (ambient air monitoring) and uses calculation techniques (atmospheric di spersion 
modeling) to assess existing levels of radiation (both cosmic and manmade) in and near the site. and to 
assess doses to workers and the surrounding population. 
The off!;; ite population can receive a radiation dose as a result of radi ological conditions directly 
auributable to ex isting INEL operations. DOE assesses such a dose fo r a max imally exposed 
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individual and for the population as a whole. The maximally exposed individual is a hypothetical 
person whose habits :md proximity to the site are such that the person would receive the highest dose 
projected to result from Silcwide radioactive emissions. The calculated annual dose to this individual 
as a result of current and anticipated site wide emissions is 0.05 millirem (Section 4 .7 to Volume 2). 
Thi s value is a small fraction of both the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Po llutants 
dose li mit of 10 millirem per year (CFR 1992a) and the dose received from natural background 
sources of 35 1 milli rem per year (Section 4.7 to Volume 2). Figure 4.7-2 compares these dose rates. 
The collective annual dose to the surrounding population. determined using 1990 U.S . Census 
Bureau data for the tota l population residing within an 80-kilometer (50-mile ) rad ius from each faci lity 
on the site. is about 0.3 person-rem (Section 4.7 to Volume 2). This value is small in comparison to 
the annual dose received by the same pcpulation from background sources. which is more than 
40.000 person-rem (Sec tion 4.7 to Volume 2). 
Workers at each major lNEL facili ty can receive radiation exposures. DOE has based its 
assessmenr of the dose to these workers on contributions from sources at each facility and those 
expected to become operat ional before June I . 1995. The results of thi s assessment indicate that the 
maximum dose received by a worker at any onsile area is about 4.3 millirem per year (Seclion 4.7 to 
Volume 2). well below the National Emissions Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants dose limit of 
10 millirem per year The standard applies to the highest exposed member of the public. and is not 
applicable to workers. However. it is the most restrictive limit for ai rborne releases and provides a 
useful comparison. This dose value of 4 .3 mill irem per year includes the maximum projected 
operation of the Portable Water Treatment Unit at the Power Burst Facility Area. However. that 
operation would be temporary ( I to 2 years) and is not representative of a permanent increase in the 
base line. If th IS facility were not included. the baseline dose to the worker would be about 
0 .2 mi ll irem per year. 
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4.8 Water Resources 
This section describes existing regional and site hydrologic conditions and discusses the quality 
of surface and subsurface water and water u e and rights. The subsurface water section also describes 
the vadose zone (or unsaturated zone and perched water bodies) located between the land surface and 
the water table. 
4.8.1 Surface Water 
Other than surface-water bodies formed from accumulated runoff during snowmelt or heavy 
precipitation and manmade infiltration and evaporation ponds. there is little surface water at the site. 
The following sections discuss regional drainage conditions. local runoff. floodplains. and 
surface-water quality . Figure 4.8-1 supports discussions in this section. 
4.8.1.1 Regional Drainage. The INEL is in the Pioneer Basin. a closed drainage basin that 
includes three main surface-water bodies--the Big and Little Lost Rivers and Birch Creek. These 
water bodies drain mountain watersheds directly west and north of the site. However. most of the 
surface-water flow is diverted for irrigation before it reaches site boundaries (Barraclough et a!. 1981). 
resulting in little or no flow for several years inside the site boundaries (Pittman et a!. 1988). 
The Big Lost Piver drains approximately 3.755 square kilometers (1,450 square miles) of land 
before reaching the site. Approximately 48 kilometers (30 miles) upstream of Areo. Idaho. Mackay 
Dam controls and regulates the flow of the river. whieh continues southeast past the towns of Moore 
and Arco and onto the Eastern Snake River Plain. The river channel then crosses the southwestern 
boundary of the site. where the INEL Diversion Dam controls surface-water flow. During heavy 
runoff events. the dam diverts surface water to a series of natural depressions. designated as spreadi ng 
areas . The Big Lost River continues northeasterly across the site to an area of natural infiltration 
basins (playas or sinks) near Test Area North. In dry years. surface water does not usually reach the 
western boundary of the site. and because the INEL is located in a closed drainage basin. surface 
water never flows off the site . 
Birch Creek drains an area of approximately 1.943 square kilometers (750 square miles). In the 
summer. upstream of the site. surface water from Birch Creek is diverted to provide irrigation and 
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to produce hydropower. In the winter. water flow cros 'es the northwest comer of the site. entering a 
manmade channel 6,-l kilometers (-+ miles) north of Test Area North. where it then infiltrates into 
channel gravels . 
The Liule Lost River drains an area of approximately 1.826 square kilometers (705 'quare 
miles). Streamflow is diverted for irrigation north of Howe. Idahc Surface water from the Liule Lost 
River has not reached the site in recent years: however. during high stream flow years. water will 
reach the site and infiltrate into the subsurface (EG&G 1984). 
4.8.1.2 Local Runoff. Surface water generated from local precipitation will flow into 
topographic depressions (lower elevations than the surrounding terrain) on the site . This surface water 
ei ther evaporates or infiltrates into the ground, increasing subsurface saturation and enhancing 
subsurface migration (Wi lhelmson et al. 1993). 
Localized flooding can occur at the site when the ground is frozen and melting snow combines 
with heavy spring rains. Test Area North was flooded in 1969 (Koslow and Van Haaften 1986) . In 
1969 extensive flooding caused by snowmelt occurred in the lower Birch Creek Valley (Koslow 1984) . 
Studies have shown that both the 25- and 100-year. 24-hour rainfalVsnowmelt stonn event could cau e 
flooding within the Radioactive Waste Management Complex (Dames & Moore 1992). The drainage 
system. including dikes and erosion prevention features designed to mitigate potential surface water 
flooding , are being upgraded. 
4.8.1.3 Floodplains. Intemliuent surface-water flow and the INEL Diversion Dam (built in 
1958 and enlarged in 1984) have effec ti vely prevented flooding from the Big Lost River onto the site. 
However. onsite flooding from the river could occur if high water in the Mackay Dam or the Big Lost 
River were coupled with a dam failure . Koslow and Van Haaften (1986) examined the con equences 
of structural failure of the Mackay Dam due to a seismic event, coupled with a probable maximum 
flood (the largest flood assumed possible in an area) . This cenario predict flood waters overtopping 
the INEL Diversion Dam and spreading at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. Naval Reactors 
Fac ility. and the Test Area North Loss-of-Fluid Te t Facil;ty (Figure 4 .8-1). In the event of a 
combined Mackay Dam failure and a 100-year flood (flood that occurs on an average of every 
100 years) . flooding along the Big Lo t River wou ld al 0 occur. with low ve locities and wate r depths 
on the INEL (KoJow and Van Haaften 1986). The area inundated under the Mackay Dam failure 
scenarios probably wou ld u e more than the 100- or 500-year floodplains for the Big Lost River at the 
INEL. A 100-year floodplain study for the INEL is in progre ·s. 
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4.8.1.4 Surface-Water Quality. Waler qualilY in Ihe Big and Linle Lost Rivers and Birch 
Creek is similar and has not varied a great deal over the period of record. Measured physical. 
chemical. and radioJclivc parameters have not exccc:ded applicable: drinking waler quality standards. 
Chemical composi!ion is dl! lcrmined primaril y by the mineral composit ion of the rocks in the 
mountain ranges nonhwest of the site and by the chemical composition of irrigation waler in contact 
wilh Ihe surface waler (Robertson el al. 1974: Bennen 1990). 
Site activities do not directly affect the quality of surface water outside the site because 
discharges fro m sile facil it ies are to manmade seepage and evaporation basins or storm wate r injec tion 
wells. Effluents are not discharged to natural surface waters. In addition. surface water does not fl ow 
directly off Ihe sile (Hoff el al. 1990). However. waler from Ihe Big Losl River. as we ll as seepage 
from evaporation basins and stormwater injection wells. does infiltrate the Snake River Plain Aquifer 
(Robertson el al. 1974: Wood and Low 1988: Bennen 1990). These areas are inspecled. monilored. 
and sampled as slipu laled in Ihe INEL Slonnwaler Pollulion Prevenlion Program (DOE· ID 1993b). 
4.8.2 Subsurface Water 
Subsurface water at the si te occurs in the Snake River Plain Aquifer and the vadose zone. This 
section describes regional and local hydrogeologic condit ions. vadose zone hydrology. perched water. 
and subsurface·water quali ty. Generally. the teon "groundwater" refers to usable quantities of water 
that enter freely into wells under l:onfined and unconfined conditions within an aquifer (Driscoll 1989). 
4.8.2.1 Regional Hydrogeology. The INEL overlies Ihe Snake River Plain Aquifer. the 
largesl aquifer in Idaho (Figure 4.8-2). This aquifer underlies Ihe Easlem Snake River Plain and 
covers an area of approxi mate ly 24.900 square kilometers (9.6 11 square miles). Groundwater in the 
aquifer generally flows south and southwestward across the Snake River Pla in . The estimated water 
storage in the aquifer is 2.5 x 1011 cubic meters (2 billion acre· feel . which is about the same as the 
volume of waler conlained in Lake Erie) (Robertson el al. 1974). A Iypica l irrigalion well can yield as 
much as 13.9 x 10' cubic melers <3.7 x 10' ga llons) per year of waler if pumped every day 
(Garabedian 1989). The Snake River Plain Aquifer is among Ihe mosl produclive aquifers in Ihe 
nalion. 
The drainage basin recharging the Snake Ri ver Plain Aquifer covers an area of approximately 
90.643 square kilomelers <35.000 square miles). The aquife. r is recharged by infiltralion of irrigation 
VOLU~lE l. APPENDIX B 4.8·4 
~5 
Legend: 
IDAHO 
• Boise 
SnakoAlver 
Hagerman 
Springs 
Approximate boundary of 
Snake River Plain Aquifer 
Generalized groundwater 
lIow line 
Source: Barraclough et al. (198 1) 
~OAffl 
Miles 0 30 
H-H 
Kilometers 0 48 
PJ20·1 
Fi~ure 4.8·2. Localion of Ihe INEL. Snake Il,ver Plain. and genera lized groundwale r flow direclion of 
Ihe Snake River Plain Aquifer. 
4 .8-5 VOLUME 1 API'ENDIX U 
~ t.p BEST COpy AVAILABLE 
water. seepage from stream channels and canals, underflow from tributary stream valleys extending 
into the watershed. and direct infiltration from prec ipitation (Garabedian 1989). Most recharge occurs 
in surface water-i rrigated areas and along the northeastern margins of the plain . Groundwater 
discharges primarily from the aquifer through springs that flow into th Snake River and from 
pumping for irrigation. Major springs and seepages that flow from the aquifer are located near the 
American Falls Reservoir (southwest of Pocatello) and the Thousand Springs area between Milner 
Dam and King Hill (near Twin Falls). 
4.8.2.2 Local Hydrogeology. The INEL site covers 2,305 square kilometers (890 square 
miles) of the north-central portion of the Snake River Plain Aquifer. Depth to groundwater from the 
land surface at the site ranges from approximately 61 meters (200 feet) in the north to over 274 meters 
(900 feet) in the south (Pittman et al. 1988) (see Figure 4.8-3). Groundwater flow is generally toward 
the south-southwest, and the upper surface is primarily unconfined (not overlain by impermeable soil 
or bedrock). However, the aquifer behaves as if it were partially confined because of localized 
geologic conditions. The occurrence and movement of groundwater in the aquifer depends on the 
geologic setting and the recharge and discharge of water within that setting. Most of the aquifer 
consists primarily of numerous relatively thin, basaltic lava flows with interbedded sediments 
extending to depths of 1,067 meters (3 ,500 feet) below the land surface (Irving 1993). Most of the 
groundwater migrates horizontally through fractured , basaltic interflow zones (broken and rubble 
zones) that occur at various depths. Water also migrates vertically along joints and the interfingering 
edges of interflow zones (Garabedian 1986). Sedimentary interbeds restrict the vertical movement of 
groundwater. The variability in how the aquifer stores and transmits water increase the difficulty in 
aquifer investigations and modeling. 
The rate at which water moves through the ground depends on the hydraulic gradient (change in 
elevation and pressure with distance in a given direction) of the aquifer, the effective porosity 
(percentage of void spaces). and hydraulic conductivity (capacity of a porous media to transport water) 
of the soil and bedrock. Because aquifer porosity and hydraulic conducti vi ty decrease with depth. 
most of the water in the aquifer moves through the upper 61 to 152 meters (200 to 500 fee t) of the 
basalts. Estimated flow rates within the aquifer range from 1.5 to 6.1 meters (5 to 20 fee t) per day 
(Barraclough et al. 1981). 
The aquifer's ability to transmit water (transmi ss ivity), and its ability to store water (storativity) 
are important physical properties of the aquifer. In general, the hydraul ic characteri stics of the aqui fe r 
enable the easy transmission of water, particularly in the upper portions. 
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Recharge to the aquifer originates off the site from precipitation in the mountains to the west and 
nonh . Most of the innow to the aquifcr results from the underflow of groundwater along 
alluvial-fi lled valh:ys adjacent to the Eastl!m Snake River Plain and adjacent surface-water drainages 
(i.e .. Big and Little Lost Rivers and Birch Creek). In addition. recharge at the si te is related to the 
amount of precipitation. particularly snowfall . for a given year (Barraclough et a l. 1981). 
4.8.2.3 Vadose Zone Hydrology. The vadose (unsaturated) zone extends from the land 
surface down to the water table. Within the vadosc zone, water and air occupy openings in the 
geologic materials. Subsurface water in the vadose zone is referred to as vadose water. At the site 
this complex zone consists of surface sediments (primari ly clay and silt . with some sand and gravel) 
and many relatively thin basaltic lava flows. with some sedimentary interbeds. Thick surficial deposits 
occur in the northern part of the site, which thin to the south where basalt is exposed at the surface. 
The vadose zone protects the groundwater by filtering many contaminants through adsorption. 
buffering dissolved chemical wastes. and slowing the transport of contaminated liquids to the aquifer. 
The vadose zone also protects the aquifer by storing large volumes of liquid or dissolved contaminants 
released to the environment through spills or migration from disposal pits or ponds. allowing natural 
decay processes to occur. 
Travel times for water through the vadose zone are important for an understanding of 
contaminant movement. The now rates in the vadose zone depend directly on the extent of fracturing, 
the percentage of sediments versus basalt. and the moisture content of vadose zone material. Flow 
increases under wetter conditions and slows under dryer condit ions. 
4.8.2.4 Perched Water. Locally. saturated conditions that exist above the water table are 
called perched water. Perched water occurs when water migrates vertically and laterally from the 
surface until it reaches an impermeable layer (Irving 1993). As perched water spreads laterally. 
sometimes for hundreds of meters. it moves over the edges of the impermeable layer and continues 
downward. Several perched water bodies can form between the land surface and the water table . 
In general. perched water bodies slow the downward migration of fluids that infiltrate into the 
vadose zone from the surface because the downward fl ow is not continuous. The occurrence of 
perched water at the si te is related to the presence of disposal ponds or other surface-water bodies. 
which studies have detected at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. Test Reactor Area. and Test Area 
North. For example. a 1986 field study at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant showed that perched 
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water occurs in three areas at possibly three depth zones, ranging from approximately 9 meters 
(30 feet) to 98 meters (322 feet) below the ground surface and extending laterally as much as 
1.097 meters (3.600 feet) . In general. the chemical concentrations. shape. and size of these bodies 
have fluctuated over time in response to the volume of water discharged to the infiltration ponds 
(Irving 1993). 
4.8.2.5 Subsurface Water Quality. Natural water chemistry and contaminants originating at 
the site affect subsurface water quality. The INEL Groundwater Protection Management Program 
conducts monitoring programs. This program collects samples from surface water, perched water. and 
aquifer wells to identify contaminants and contaminant migration to and with in the aquifer. 
4.8.2.5.1 Natural Water Chemistry - Several factors determine the natural groundwater 
chemistry of the Snake River Plain Aquifer beneath the site. These factors include the weathering 
reactions that occur as water interacts with minerals in the aquifer and the chemical composition of 
(I) groundwater originating outside the site; (2) precipitation falling directly on the land surface; and 
(3) streams, rivers, and runoff infiltrating the aquifer (Wood and Low 1986, 1988). The chemistry of 
the groundwater is different, depending on the source areas. For example. groundwater from the 
northwest contains calcium. magnesium, and bicarbonate leached from sedimentary rocks, and 
groundwater from the east contains sodium, fluorine. and si licate resulting from contact with volcanic 
rocks (Robertson et al. 1974). 
Although the natural chemical composition of groundwater beneath the site does not exceed the 
Environmental Protection Agency drinking water standards for any component. the natural chemistry 
affects the mobi li ty of contaminants introduced into the subsurface from INEL activities. Many 
dissolved contaminants adsorb (or attach) to the surface of rocks and minerals in the subsurface. 
thereby retarding the movement of contaminants in the aquifer and inhibiting further migration of 
contamination. However. many naturally occurring chemicals compete with contaminants for 
adsorption sites on the rocks and minerals or react with contaminants to reduce their attraction to rock 
and mineral surfacc!\. 
4.8.2.5.2 Groundwater Quality - Prev ious waste disc harges to unlined ponds and deep 
well s havc introduced radionuclides. nonradioactive metals. inorganic sa lt s. and organic compounds to 
the subsurfacc. Table 4.8-1 summarizes the t'lighcst detected concentrations of contaminants observed 
in the aquifer between 1987 and 1992. concentraticns near the site boundary, Environmental Protection 
Agency maximum contaminant levels. and DOE Derived Concentration Guides. The following 
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Table -I . 8~ l. Highest de tected contaminant concent rations in groundwater at the Idaho Natiunal 
Engineering Laboralory (1 987 10 1992 ). 
HI~he~1 dch.'l-leJ n:~l' nt Denn'J 
con.;enl~tlOn~ Cum:nt rll:a.., imum concenl~llIIn 
P3J"3nl("Ier (year! Re';l"nt houndary conduion tyc:u-) COn\amin::ant !e\"d j:uiJe 
Kad ionudidrs (picocu rics pcr liln) 
Arncn'; iUlIl-:!-I 1 O'H ~ , 1t)<)(1) < J clCCllon 110111' ( I ,}88 ) J 5~·r .lOr 
Cesium- In 2.05{t ( IYIIK) < dcteclion limite ( I,}IJ6) 200' Hm 
CobaJt-60 !l9if ( 1<J87) < dCh:ction limit' ( 19117) 100' 10.0001 
Iod ine- I 29 .16~ t 1':ol87) 00008_1.b::a~ kgroundh ( 1992) I ' ,00' 
Pl utonlum-2.l11 1 . :!8~ ( 1990) < detection lim.te ( 19811 ) 15<lc 4'" 
Pl ulomunl-2.lW:!-IO I .OS"'I9'XJ) < delectlOn limi!'" (1 91$11) 15<l.r 30' 
Slronl ium·9tl 6-10" (1 992) < Jeteclion limil' ( 1988) a
"
" 1.000' 
Tn!iu m -U.ood' (1988) b;)l,: k~round' (1 988 ) 20.000' 2.000.000' 
Nonradioaclivt mctab (milligrams per liln ) 
CadmIum 00073~ (1992) bx:kgrountf ( 1988) O.OO51J n~ ::applicat-o le 
Chromium (lolal) O .2 1 ~ ( 1<J88) b::ackgrountf (1 988) O.J IJ noc ::apphc::abJe 
l c ::ad 0.009" ( 1987) backgrountf (1 987) 0.0 15,·1\ nOl applic::able 
Mercury o .(JO().l~ (1 987) background'" ( 1987) 0.OO21J nOiapphc::able 
Inorganic salts (m illigrams pn liler) 
Chlonde 2oc! (1991) 25(11 nOC applicable 
Ntl r.lIe 5 .~b(:l5 NO)) (1988) background! (1 988) 10(35 N )" noc applicable 
Sulfa' ': l.ur ( 1985) background' (1 985) 250" not ::apphcable 
O rgan ic compounds (mill lRrams per II lcr ) 
C:ubo" lelr.lchlomk 00066" (1993) «kleclion limill ( 1988) 0 .005" nOI ::applicable 
Chloroform 0951 (1988) <d':leClion limi!1 ( 1988) 0 .1 ... 111 nOI apphc::able 
1.1 -dlchloroclhylcnc o ocd' ( 1989) <detection limil ' ( 1989) 0.007" nOl applicable 
CIS- I.2- _\9" (1992) <deleclion limit' ( 1988) O.Or' nol apphcable 
dichlorOl!!hylcn.: 
Tr.ltIs-l.2- 2 6b ( 19881 <deleclion limil' ( 1988) 0.14 not applil:able 
dlchlotoelhykne 
Telt:KhlorOl!thykne 005 1" ( 1992) <de!eclion limill ( 1988) 0.00513 nol apphcable 
I.I. I-tnchlof<x!h::ane 00 12b (1989) <dC:leclion limil ' ( 1988) 0.21J nOi applic::able 
Tn chlorOl!lhylcn.: ~ .6" ( 1992) <deleclion Ii mil! ( 1989) 0.005" nOl::applicable 
Vinyl chlonde 0 .027' (19891 <detection li mit' (1 989) 0.00211 nOl ::apphcablc 
::a Concentrallons arc gener.llly for 1987 10 1992. I b Golder ASSOCl;ues ( 1 99~ I. 
c Orr and Cecil (199 1). 
I 
d Ma:umum conl;unin::ant Icyd Y::a.lues taken from EPA ( 1993::a). 
e M:a..t;imum conlamin::an! I.:\·els have not ~en est::abhshed for plu!onium-238. plulOnium-239, plutonium-NO_ and ::amcricium·24I. 
How.:v.:r. IheS': ~dionuclides h::ayc nOI bee n delecled ::abo"e Ihe eSI::abiishcd limits for gross alpha p3l1icle ::aclivity (EPA 1993::a1 or the 
proposed .:KIJusled gross ::a.Ipha ::acllvity max imum contamin ::a nl !c\'d for drinking waler CFR 199 1a l. 
f DCGs for r;l(h onuclides taken from OOE Order 5400 5. Radi::a lion Protecllon of lhe Public and lhe En\'ironmcnl t OOE 199Ob). 
M:Ulmum cont¥nm::anl le\'d \'::a.Iu(S l::aken from CCFR 1991c). 
M:IIln ( 199-1) 
i M:lnn and Cecil 11990) 
Robenson el al 11974): Ed~::ards e! 31 (1990) 
Pmm::an ':1 aJ ( 1988) 
I ~'f:llln (1 990) ::and l lsze~ sk l and Mann (1 993) 
m V::aluc= IS for lotal lnhllomcthanes. ~hich IS the sum of lhe concen!r:u ions of bromodichlommclh31le. dibromochloromclh::ane. 
tnbromomelhanl! (bromofonnl. and Inchloromclh::ane Ichlorofonnl 
I n lead action le\'d o Calcul::alcd \'aJuc b::ascd on tolal body or org31l dose of -I mllhr.:m ~r yC:lI". 
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C\ \ 
paragraphs discuss each category of contaminants and comparisons of observed concent rations to 
maximum contaminant levels. 
Radionuclides - In general. radionu: lide concenlralions in Ihe Snake River Plain Aquifer benealh 
the site have decreased since the mid- 1980s because of changes in disposal prac tices. radioactive 
decay. adsorpl ion of radionuclides 10 rocks and minerals. and di lulion by nalural surface waler and 
groundwater enlering Ihe aquifer (Pillman el al. 1988: Orr and Cecil 199 1: Bargelt el al. 1992). 
Radionucl ides released and observed in Ihe soil and groundwaler include lrilium. stronlium-90. 
iodine- I 29. cobalt-60. cesium- 137. plulonium-238. plulonium-239/240. and americlUm-241 (Golder 
Associates 1994). Most of Ihese radionuclides have been observed al Ihe Idaho Chemical Processing 
Plant and Test Reac tor Area faci lity areas. However. radionuclides have also been observed in the 
Tesl Area Nonh disposal well . 
Concentrations of radionuclides in the aquifer have decreased over time_ This decrease is attributed 
to reduced discharges. adsorption. radioactive decay, and improved waste management practices. As 
of 1992. concentralions of iodine- I 29. coball-60. Iri lium. stronlium-90. and cesium-I 37 had exceeded 
the EPA maximum contaminant levels for radionuclides in drinking water in localized areas inside the 
INEL boundary . Currenlly. Ihere are no individual maximum conlaminant levels for plulonium-238. 
plulonium-239. plulonium-240. and americium-241. However. Ihese radionuclides have not been 
delecled above Ihe established limi ts for gross radioaclivilY or Ihe proposed adjusted gross alpha 
aClivilY maximum conlaminanl level for drinking waler (Gold.r Associales 1994: Mann el al. 1988: 
Orr and Ceci l 199 1). 
Extremely low concentrations of iodine~ 129 and tritium have migrated outside sile boundaries. In 
1992, iodine-1 29 concent rations were wel1 below the maxi mum contaminant levels in two wells 
approxi malely 6 and 13 kilomelers (4 and 8 miles) sOUlh of Ihe sile boundary (Mann 1994). Trilium 
concentrations were much below maxi mum contaminant levels just south of the site boundary in 1985. 
By 1988 Ihe lrilium plume encompassed by Ihe 500 picocurie per liler conlour was back inside Ihe sile 
boundary. and its size has conlinued 10 decrease (Pi llman el a l. 1988: Orr and Cecil 1991 : Orr el al. 
1991). Cobalt-60. stronl ium-90. cesium- I37. plulonium-238. plulonium-240/24 1. and americium-241 
have not been detected outside the site boundaries. 
Nonradioactive Metals - The INEL has released sodiu m. chromium. lead. and mercury on Ihe 
sile and inlo Ihe subsurface Ihrough unl ined ponds and deep wells. Of Ihese melals. Ihe INEL released 
sodium in the greatest quantity from waste treatment processes: however, sodium is not tox ic and does 
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not have an established maximum contaminant level. In 1988 chromium concentrations exceeding the 
maximum contaminant level were measured near the Test Reactor Area. Lead and mercury have 
occurred at concentrations below the maximum contaminant level near the Idaho Chemical Processillg 
Plant (Orr and Cecil 1991). 
Inorganic Salts - Human activities at the site have released chloride. sulfate. and nitrate into 
the subsurface . Although chloride and sulfate releases have occurred. only nitrate has exceeded 
m .. imum contaminant levels (near the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant in 1981). Disposal of nitrates 
to the injection well and infiltration ponds at the Idaho Chemi~al Processing Plant account for the 
elevated nitrate levels in the central portion of the site. By 1988 the levels of nitrate decreased to 
below the maximum contaminant level. Irrigation in the Mud Lake area might be causing these 
contaminants to enter the northeastern portion of the site in concenlralions comparable 10 those in 
nearby irrigated areas (Orr et al. 1991 ; Robertson et al. 1974; Edwards et al. 1990). 
OrganiC Compounds - Concentrations of volatile organic compounds have been detected in 
the aquifer beneath the site. However. many of these compounds were detected at amounts below the 
detection limit (0.002 milligram per liter). or two pans per billion . which is the lowest concentration at 
which a specific analytical method can detect a contaminant. However. concentrations of the 
following compounds exceeding the maximum contaminant levels have occurred in and near the Test 
Area North disposal well : carbon tetrachloride, chloroform. 1.2-cis-dichloroethylene, 
I. I-dichloroethylene. 1.2-trans-dichloroethylene. trichloroethylene. tetrachloroethylene. and vinyl 
chloride (Leenheer and Bagby 1982; Mann and Knobel 1987; Mann 1990; Liszewski and Mann 1992). 
4.8.2.5.3 Perched Water Quality - Wastewater discharges from INEL operations have 
infiltrated into the vadose zone and created most of the perched water beneath the site. Studies have 
detected elevated concentrations of the following contaminants in samples: tritium. cesium- I3? 
cobalt-60. chromium. and sulfate concentrations in deep perched water near the Test Reactor Area. and 
strontium-90 in perched water near the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant and at Test Area North 
(I rving 1993; Schafer-Perini 1993). DOE has not yet measured potential concentrations of 
contaminants in all INEL perched water bodies. In general , the chemical concentrations. shape. and 
size of these bodies have fluctuated over time in response to the volume of water discharged to the 
infiltration ponds. 
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4.8.3 Water Use and Rights 
The INEL does not withdraw or use surface water for site operations. nor does it discharge 
efnuents to natural surface water. However. the three surface-water bodies at or near the site (Big and 
Little Lost Rivers and Birch Creek) have the following designated uses: agricultural water supply. 
cold-water biota. salmonid spawning, and primary and secondary contact recreation. In addition, 
waters in the Big Lost River and Birch Creek have been designated for domestic water supply and as 
special resource waters. 
Groundwater use on the Snake River Plain includes irrigation, food processing and aquaculture. 
and domestic. rural , public, and livestock supply. Water use for the upper Snake River drainage basin 
and the Snake Ri ver Plain Aquifer was 16.4 billion cubic meters (4.3 trillion gallons) per year in t985, 
which was more than 50 percent of the water used in Idaho and approximately 7 percent of 
agricultural withdrawals in the nation. Most of the water withdrawn from the Eastern Snake River 
Plain [1 .8 billion cubic meters (0.47 trillion gallons) per year] is for agriculture. The aquifer is the 
source of all water used at the INEL. Site activities withdraw water at an average rate of 7.4 million 
cubic meters (1.9 billion gallons) per year (DOE-ID 1993e). However. the baseline annual withdrawal 
rate dropped to 6.5 million cubic meters (1.7 billion gallons) in 1995. The average annual withdrawal 
is equal to approximately 0.4 percent of the water consumed from the Eastern Snake River Plain 
Aquifer. or 53 percent of the maximum annual yield of a typical irrigation well. Of the quantity of 
water pumped from the aquifer. a substantial portion is discharged to the surface or subsurface and 
eventually returned (0 it (DOE-ID I 993d,e). 
A sole-source aquifer. as designated by the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA 1974) is one that 
supplies 50 percent of the drinking water consumed in the area overlying the aquifer. Sole-source 
aquifer areas have no alternative source or combination of sources that could physically. legally. and 
economically supply all those who obtain their drinking water from the aquifer. Because groundwater 
supplies 100 percent of the drinking water consumed within the Eastern Snake River Plain (Gaia 
Northwest 1988) and an alternative drinking water source or combination of sources is not available, 
the Environmental Protection Agency designated the Snake River Plain Aquifer a sole-source aquifer 
in 199 1 (FR 199 Ib) . 
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DOE holds a Federal Reserved Water Right for the IN EL. which permits a water pumping 
capacity of 2.3 cubic melers (80 cubic feel) per second and a maximum water consumption of 
43 million cubic meters (11.4 billion gallons) per year for drinking. process water. and noncontac t 
cooling. Because it is a Federal Water RighI. the site's priority on water rights dates back 10 the 
establishment of the INEL. 
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4.9 Ecological Resources 
This section describes the biotic resources - flora. faulla. threatened and endangered species. 
and wetlands - on the INEL site. which are typical of the Great Basin and Columbia Plateau. 
Because the proposed ac tions are most likely to affect areas near existing major fac ilit ies. this section 
emphasizes the biotic resources iii those areas. However. because the proposed actions could affect 
other resources outside such areas (e .g .. more mobile species like pronghorn. AlIliiocapra americana). 
it also describes biotic resources for the entire INEL site . 
4.9.1 Flora 
Vegetation on the INEL site is primarily of the shrub-steppe type and is a small fraction of the 
45.000 square kilometers (111.2 million acres) of this vegetation type in the Intermountain West. The 
15 vegetation associations on the INEL site range from primarily shadscale-steppe vegetation at lower 
altitudes through sagebrush- and grass-dominated communities to juniper woodlands along the foothills 
of the nearby mountains and bUlles (Rope et al. 1993: Kramber et al . 1992: An~erson 1991). These 
associations can be grouped into six basic types: juniper woodland. grassland. shrub-steppe (which 
consists of "sagebrush-steppe" and "salt desert shrubs"). lava, bareground-disturbed. and wetland 
vegetation . Shrub-steppe vegetation. which is dominated by big sagebrush (Arlem isia tridentala) . 
saltbush (Atriplex spp.). and rabbitbrush (Clrrysotlramllus spp.) covers more than 90 percent of the 
INEL. Grasses include cheatgrass (Bromlts leclorwn) , Indian ricegrass (Oryzopsis h)'melloides) . 
wheatgrasses. (A gropyroll spp.). and squirreltail (Sitatrioll Irysterix). Herbaceous plants include phlox 
(Plrlox spp.). wild onion (A lliulII spp.). milkvetch (Astragalus spp.). Russian thistle (Salsola kali ). and 
various mustards. Work being conducted by Idaho State University will provide additional 
information on INEL plant communities and the status of sensiti ve plant species. 
Fac ility and human-disturbed (grazing not included) areas cover only about 2 percent of the 
INEL. Introduced annual s. including Russian thistle and cheatgrass. frequently dominate disturbed 
areas. These species usually are less des irable to wildlife as food and cover. and compete wi th more 
des irable perennial nati ve species. These disturbed areas serve as a seed source. increasing the 
potential for the establishment of Russian thist le and cheatgrass in surrounding less-disturbed areas. 
Vegetation inside fac ility boundaries is generally di sturbed or landscaped . Species richness on the 
INEL is comparable 10 that of like-sized areas with similar terrain in other parts of the Intermountain 
West. Plant diversity is typically lower in disturbed and modified areas. 
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4.9.2 Fauna 
The INEL site supports animal communities characteristic of shrub-steppe vegetation and 
habitats. More than 270 vertebrate species occur, including 46 mammal. 204 bird. 10 reptile. 2 
amphibian. and 9 fish species (Arthur et al. 1984: Reynolds et al. 1986). Common small-mammal 
genera include mice (Reilhrodolllom:·;s spp. and PeromysClis spp.). chipmunks (Tal1lias spp.). 
jackrabbits (Lepus spp.), and cottontails (Sylvilagus spp.). 
Songbirds and passerines commonly observed at the INEL include the American robin (Tunllls 
migralorills). homed lark (Eremophila alpestris). black-billed magpie (Pica pica). sage thrasher 
(Oreoscoples monlalllls) , Brewer's sparrow (Spi::.el/a bre\\"eri). sage sparrow (S. belli). and western 
meadowlark (StlIrnella neglecta), whi le resident upland gamebirds include the sage grouse 
(Cellfrocerclis IIrophasialllls), chukar (Alectoris clllIkar) , and grey partridge (Perdix perdix). Common 
migratory bird species, which use the INEL for part of the year. include a variety of waterfowl 
[e.g., mallard (Anas platyrhynchos), northern pintail (Alias aCllla), and Canada goose (Brallla 
canadensis)] and rap tors [e.g., Swainson's hawk (BlIleo sll"aillsoni), rough-legged hawk (B. lagoplIs). 
and American kestrel (Falco sparverius)]. 
The most abundant big-game species that occurs on the INEL is the pronghorn, but mule deer 
(Odocoileus hermonills). moose (A Ices alces), and elk (Cervll~ elaplllls) are pre ent in mall numbers 
as transients. Other large mammals observed on the INEL include the coyote (Canis latralls) , which is 
common across the site, and the badger (Taxidea laXIIS) and bobcat (Felis m!lIs) , both of which are 
present across the site but are much less abundant. Fi h. including kokanee salmon (OllcorhYllchos 
nerka), rainbow trout (Oncorhynchos mykiss), and mountain whitefish (Prosopilll1l \\·illial/lsolli). occur 
on the lNEL only when the Big Lost River flows onto the site (as a result of heavy rain- or snowfall 
in the mountains to the northwest): they are not full-time residents. 
A number of researchers have tudied effects of radiation exposure from contaminated areas at 
INEL on small mammals and birds, and have concluded that subtle sublethal effects (e.g .. reduced 
growth rates and life expectancies) can occur in individual animals as a result of radiation exposure . 
However. they can attribute no populat ion or community-level impacts to such ex posures (Halford and 
Markham 1978; Evenson 1981 ; Arthur et al. 1986: Millard et. al 1990). 
The monitoring of radionuclide levels outside the boundaries of the various INEL facilitie ' and 
off the INEL site has detected radionuclide concentration above background levels in individual plants 
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and animals (Markham 1974: Craig et al. 1979: Markham et al. 1982: Morris 1993). but these limited 
data suggest that populations of exposed animals (e.g .. mice and rabbits) as well as animals that feed 
on these exposed animals (e .g .. eagles and hawks) are not at risk . 
4.9.3 Threatened, Endangered, and Sensitive Species 
State and Federal regulatory agency lists (Lobdell 1992. 1995). the Idaho Department of Fish and 
Game Conservation Data Center list. and information from site surveys provided the information to 
identify Federal- and state-protected. candidate, and sensitive species that potentially occur on the 
INEL. This information identified two Federal endangered (bald eagle, and peregrine falcon) and nine 
Federal Category 2 candidate (white-faced ibis. northern goshawk, ferruginous hawk, burrowing owl, 
long-eared myotis. small-footed myotis. pygmy rabbit, Townsend's western big-eared bat, and Idaho 
pointheaded grasshopper) species as animals that potentially occur on the INEL site (Table 4.9-1). 
Five animal species listed by the state as Species of Special Concern occur on the site. No frequent 
observations of the Federal- or state-listed animal species have occurred near any of the facilities 
where proposed actions would occur. This analysis did not identify any Federal- or state-listed plant 
species as potemially occurring on the INEL site. Eight plant species identified by other Federal 
agencies 'md the Idaho Native PI am Society as sensitive, rare. or unique occur on the site (Chowlewa 
and Henderson 1984). 
4.9.4 Wetlands 
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service National Wetlands Inventory has identified more than 130 
areas inside the boundaries of the INEL that might posse s orne wetlands characteristics. Surveys 
conducted in the fall of 1992 indicate that these poss ible wetlands cover about 1.4 percent (33 square 
kilometers or 8,206 acres) of the INEL site (Hampton et al. 1993). Approximately 70 percent of these 
possible wetlands areas occur near the Big Lost River and its spreading areas and playas, near the 
Birch Creek Playa, and in an area north of and in the general vicinity of Argonne National 
Laboratory-West. Limited riparian (riverbank) communities with mature trees along the Big Lost 
River (Reynolds 1993) reflect the intermittent flow in the river (1986 and 1993 were the last two years 
with flow reported on the site). The remainder of the possible wetlands are scattered throughout the 
INEL site . In 1994, INEL began evaluating these tential wetlands to determine if they meet the 
Corps of Engineers definition of jurisdictional wetlands (COE 1987). Approximate ly 20 wetlands are 
near facilities and are mostly manmade (e.g .. industrial waste and sewage treatment ponds. borrow 
pits. and gravel pits) . 
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6 Table 4.9-1. Threatened and endangered spec ies, special species of concern , and sensitive species that may be found on the INEL. 
~ 'arne Status' Comments ~------------------------~~------------------~==--------------------~~~=-----------------
('T1 BIRDS Northern goshawk (Accipitl'r gefllilis) C2. SSC. FS. BLM The rerruginous hawk nests on and migrates th rough the INEL. Thi s 
» 
" 
" ('T1 Z 
o 
x 
c::I 
MA MMALS 
PLANTS 
INSECTS 
a. K..: y: ('2 
. k 
E 
SSC 
Burrowing owl (A tlll' lI e clmiclI/aria) C2. BLM species is found th roughout the INEL but is observed more frequently 
Ferruginous hawk (Bllleo regalis) C2, SSC. BLM in juni per woodlands. The peregrine falcon has been observed rarely 
Swai nson's hawk (BllIeo slI'aill.w lli ) BLM in wi nta. but has not been observed during other seasons. The last 
Great egret (Caslll erodi lls alblls) SSC sighting was in 1993 (Morris 1993). It is not known to nest on the 
Merl in ( Falen cal l1lllharills) SSC. BLM INEL and is not commonly observed near facilities (Reynolds 1993a). 
Peregrine falco n ( Falco peregri lllls) E The bald eagle is a winter resident and is locally common in the far 
Gyrfa lcon (Falco rIIsticollls) BLM north end and on the western edge of the INEL near Howe (Reynolds 
Common loon (Gm'ia illllll l! r ) SSC. FS 1993a). It is not known to nest on the INEL and is not commonly 
Bald cagle (Haliaeellls lellcoceplUl /lIs) E observed near fac il ities (Reynolds 1993). The white-faced ibis. which 
Long-billed curlew (NlIIlI l!lIills alllericc/ll/ls) SPS, BLM uses aquatic and ri pari an habitats, is an uncommon migrant at the 
American white pelican (Pelecalllls ,.,-ythmrhYllchos) SSC INEL. The long-billed curlew is known to nest on the north end of 
White-faced ihis (Plegadis chihi) C2 the INEL near agricultural lands. The northern goshawk is a casual 
Merriam's shrew (Sorex merriami) 
Pygmy rabbit (Brachylaglls (Sy/vila/: lIs) idahoensis) 
California myotis (Myotis cal i/am iCl/s) 
Fri nged myotis (Myntis thysall odes) 
Western pi pistrelle (Pil'iJlre l/lls hesp l'rlls) 
Townsend' s western big-cared bat (P/ecotlls towllselldi i ) 
Long-cared myotis (MyOl is evotis) 
Small -footed myotis (MyOlis slIbll/CIIIIS) 
Lemhi milkvetch (Astra/:IJ /IIs aqlli lollills) 
SPS 
C2. BLM. SSC 
sse 
ssc 
sse. BLM 
C2, SSe. FS. BLM 
C2 
es 
migrant through the INEL. 
The p}gmy rabbit is common on the INEL. but its di stribution is 
patchy (Reynolds et al. 1986). Roosts and hi bernation caves for 
Townsend's western big-eared bat occur on the INEL. All are over 
7 kilometers (3 miles) from faci lit ies. Brood caves might exist on the 
site but have not been located. 
Painted milk vetc h (Astraga lll.f ceralll icus var. alms) 
Winged-seed evening primrose (Camissonia pterosperma) 
BLM, FS. INPS 
3c. INPS-M 
BLM,INPS-S 
INPS-M 
BLM, INPS-2 
INPS-M 
The 8 plant species ident ifi ed as sensitive. rare, or unique that are 
known to occur on the INEL occur primari ly at a di stance from INEL 
facili ties and are uncommon on the INEL because they require unique 
microhabitat conditions. ipple cactus (CoryplulIltha missollriellsis) 
Spreading gili a (/f'olllol'sis (Gi/ia) po/yc/adoll) 
King' s hl adderpod (u~sqllerel/a kil/gii var. cobreflsis) 
Tree-like oxytheca (Oxythem del/droidea ) 
Sepal-tooth dodder (CIISCllla del/tiCltlata) 
INPS-S 
INPS- I 
Idaho point headed grasshopper (Acrolnplzitlls plllchel/lIs) C2, BLM Occurs just north of the IN EL. 
Federal Category 2 species. 
No longer considered fo r Federal listi ng. 
Fcderal and state endangered species. 
Sta te species of special concern. 
BLM 
FS 
INEL 
SPS 
Bureau of Land Management monitored. 
U.S. Forest Service moni tored . 
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. 
State protected species. 
qq 
INPS-S 
INPS-M 
INPS- l 
INPS-2 
Idaho Nati ve Plant Society sensitive. 
= Idaho Native Plant. 
Idaho Native Plant Society State Priority I. 
Idaho Native Plant Society State Priority 2. 
4.10 Noise 
The major noise sources at the INEL occur primarily in developed operational areas. These 
sources include faci lit ies: equ ipment and machines (e.g .. cooling towers. transfonners. engines. pumps, 
boilers. steam vents, pag ing systems. construction equipment, and materials-handling equipment ); 
aircraft: and bus. car. truck. and rai lroad traffic. At the INEL boundary. which is more than 
3 ki lometers (2 miles) from any faci lity. noise from most sources is barely d istinguishable from 
background noise levels. Some disturbance of wildlife acti vities cou ld occur at the INEL as a result of 
noise from operational and construction activ ities. The State of Idaho and the counties in which the 
INEL is located have not established any regulations that specify acceptable community noise levels. 
with the exception of prohibitions on nuisance noise. 
Existing lNEL-related noises of public significance are from the transportation of people and 
materials to and from the si te and in-town fac ilit ies via buses, trucks. private vehicles. helicopters. and 
freight trains. During the normal workweek. most of the 4.000 to 5.000 employees who work on the 
site (as opposed to those working in Idaho Falls) travel daily by buses from surrounding communities 
(see Section 4.3). In addition. 300 to 500 private vehicles travel to the INEL site from surrounding 
communities each day (see Section 4.11 ). Noise measurements along U.S. Highway 20 about 
15 meters (50 fee t) from the roadway indicate that the sound level from traffic ranges from 64 to 86 
decibels. A-weighl<d (dBA) (Abbo!! et al. 1990). and that the primary source is buses (7 1 to 8 1 dBA). 
While few people reside within 15 meters (50 foet) of the roadway. the results indicate that INEL 
traffic noise mIght be objectionable to members of the public residing near principal highways or busy 
bus routes. The acoustic environment along the INEL site boundary in rural areas and at nearby areas 
away from traffic noise is typical of a rural location. with the day-night sound level (DNL) in the 
range of 35 to 50 dBA (EPA 1974) . 
Public exposure to aircraft noise is due in part to INEL-related activ it ies. Air cargo and business 
travel of INEL personnel via commercial air transport is a significant fract ion of all such travel in and 
out of regional airpons. Onsite INEL security patrol and survei llance fli ghts do not adversely affect 
individuals off the site because of the INEL's remoteness. For INEL helicopter flights that originate 
or terminate in Idaho Falls. members of the public are exposed to the unique noises produced by these 
aircraft. Because the number of flights per day is limited and most flig hts occur during nonsleeping 
hours. publ ic exposure to aircraft nuisance noise is not great. 
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Normally only one train per day serves the INEL. via the Scoville spur. Noise sources related to 
rail transport include those from diese l engines. wheel-track contact, and whistle warnings at rail 
crossings. Even with only one or two exposures to these sources per day, indiv iduals residing near the 
railroad tracks might find the noises mildly objectionable. 
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4.11 Traffic and Transportation 
Roads are the primal)' access to and from the INEL si te. Commercial shipments arc transported 
via truck and plane. some bulk materials are transported via rail. and waste is transported by road and 
rail. This section discusses the existing traffic volumes. transportation rollles. transportation acc idents, 
and waste and materials transportat ion. including base line radiological ex.posures from was te and 
mate rials transportation. This section summarizes the infonnation in Lehto (1993). 
4.11 .1 Roadways 
4.11.1.1 Infrastructure Regional and Site Systems. figure 4. 11 -1 shows Ihe ex isling 
regional highway syslem. Two inlerslale highways serve Ihe regional area. Inlerslale 15 (1- 15). a 
north-south route that connects several cities along the Snake River, is approximately 40 ki lometers 
(25 miles) easl of Ihe INEl si le . 1-86 inlerseCIS 1-15 approximalely 64 kilomelers (40 miles) soulh of 
Ihe INEl sile. and provides a primary linkage from 1-15 10 poinls weSI. 1- 15 and US 91 are Ihe 
primary access rou tes to the Shoshone-Bannock reservation. US 20 and US 26 are the main access 
roules 10 the soulhern portion of Ihe INEl sile. Idaho Siale Roules 22, 28, and 33 pass Ihrough Ihe 
northern portion of the INEL: State Route 33 provides access to the northern INEL si te facilities . 
Table 4. 1 I-I lisls Ihe baseline (1991) traffic for several of Ihese access roules. The level of service of 
these segments is current ly designated "free fl ow," which is defined as "operation of vehicles is 
vi rtually unaffected by the presence of other vehicles." 
The INEl has developed an onsile road syslem of approximale ly 140 kilomelers (87 miles) of 
paved surface. inc luding aboul 29 kilomelers ( 18 miles) of serv ice roads Ihal are closed 10 Ihe public. 
Most of the roads are adequate for the current level of normal transportation activity and could handle 
some increased traffic volume. DOE plans to reconst ruct several deteriorating INEL roads built in the 
1950s that have been and wi ll continue to be used to transport heavier-than-nonnal loads. 
4.11.1.2 Infrastructure Idaho Falls. Approximale ly 4.000 DOE and conlraclor personne l 
adminisler and support INEl work al offices in Idaho Falls. DOE shunle vans provide hourly 
transport be tween in-town fac ilities. O ne of the busiest intersections is Science Center Drive and 
Fremonl Avenue. which serves Willow Creek Building. Engineering Research Office Building. INEl 
4. 11 - 1 VOLUME I. APPENDIX B 
Figure 4.11-1 . Transportation routes in the vicinity of the INEL . 
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Table 4.11-1. Baseline traffic for se lected highway segments.' 
Route Average daily traffic Peak hourly traffic' 
U.S. High way 20-ldaho Falls to INEL 2.290 344 
U.S. Highway 20/26-INEL to Arco 1.500 225 
U.S. Highway 26-Blackfoot to INEL 1.190 179 
State Route 33 west from Mud Lake 5:;0 80 
Interstate 15-Blackfoot to Idaho Falls 9. 180 1.380 
a. Source: Lehto (1993). 
b. Estimated as 15 percent of average dai ly traffic. 
Electronic Technology Center. and DOE Office Buildings. This intersection is congested during peak 
weekday hours. but it is designed for the current traffic . 
4.11.1.3 Transit Modes. Four major modes of transit use the regional highways, community 
streets, and [NEL site roads to transport people and commodities: DOE buses and shuule vans, DOE 
motor pool vehicles, commercial trucks, and personal vehicles. Table 4 .11-2 summarizes the baseline 
miles for lNEL-related traffic . 
Table 4.11-2. Baseline annual vehicle miles traveled for Idaho National Engineering Laboratory-
related lraffic .~ 
Mode of travel and transportation 
DOE buses 
Other DOE vehic les 
Commercial trucks 
Personal ve hic les on highways to INEL 
TOTAL 
a. Source: Lehto ( 1993). 
b. To convert from miles to ki lometers, muiliply by 1.61 . 
4. 11-3 
Vehicle miles traveled' 
6,068,200 
9,183,100 
56,000 
7,500,000 
22,807,300 
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4.11 .2 Railroads 
Figure 4. 11 -1 shows the Union Pacific Railroad lines in southeastern Idaho. Idaho Falls receives 
rai lroad frei ght service from Buue, Montana, to the north , and from Pocatello and Salt Lake City to 
the south. The Union Pacific Railroad' s BlackfooHo-Arco branch, which crosses the southern port ion 
of the INEL. provides rail service to the site for the shipment of spent nuclear fuel and other waste, 
bu lk commodities. and radioacli ve materials. This branch connects with a DOE-owned spur line al 
Scoville Siding, then links with developed INEL areas. Table 4 .11-3 lists rail shipments for Fiscal 
Years 1988 through 1992. 
Table 4,11-3. Loaded rail shipments to and from the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (1988-
1992).' 
Fiscal Year Inbound Outbound 
1988 63 44 
1989 43 19 
1990 34 
199 1 18 0 
1992 23 0 
a. Sources: DOE Shipment Mobility/Accountabi lity Collection System database: Auachment A to 
Appendix 0 of Volume I of this EIS. 
4.11 .3 Airports and Air Traffic 
Commercial airlines provide Idaho Falls with jet aircraft passenger and cargo service. as well as 
commuter service to both the Idaho Falls and Pocatello airports. In addi tion , local charter service is 
available in Idaho Falls. and private aircraft use the major airport and many other fields in the area. 
Total landi ngs at the Idaho Fa!:s airport for 199 1 and 1992 were 5,367 and 5.598. respecti vely. The 
Idaho Falls and Pocatello ai rports collec tively record nearly 7,500 landings annually. 
Non-DOE air traffic over the INEL site is limited to ailitudes greater than 305 meters 
(1.000 feet) over buildings and populated areas, and non-DOE ai rcraft are not permiued to use the site. 
The primary air traffic at the INEL site is DOE helicopters. which are used for security and emerge ncy 
purposes. These helicopters have specifi c operations stations and duties. 
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4.11 .4 Accidents 
From 1987 through 1992. the average motor vehicle accident rate was 0.94 accident per million 
kilometers (1.5 acc idents per million miles) for INEL vehic les. which compoues wi th an acc ident rate 
of 1.5 accidents per million kilometers (2.4 acc idents per million miles) for all DOE complex vehicles 
and 8 accidents per million kilometers ( 12.8 accidents per million miles) nationwide for all motor 
vehicles (Lehto 1993). There are no recorded rai l or ai r accidents associated with the INEL and. 10 
date. no fatal ai r traffic accidents have involved flights through either the Idaho Falls or Pocatello 
airports. 
4.11 .S Transportation of Waste, Materials, and Spent Nuclear Fuel 
Hazardous. radioacti ve. industrial commercial. and recyclable wastes are transported oh the INEL 
site. Federal and State regulations and requirements govern the transportation of hazardous and 
radioacti ve materials (Lehto 1993). Hazardous materials include commercial chemical products and 
hazardous wastes that are nonradioactive: they are regulated and controlled based on their chemical 
toxicity. Onsite spent nuclear fue l comes from Argonne National Laboratory - West the Naval 
Reactors Facil ity. and the Advanced Test Reactor: it is transponed by truck to various onsi le storage 
and research and development faci lities. 
This assessment used six years of data ( 1987 through 1992) to establish a baseline of radiological 
doses from incident-free. onsile total nonnaval spent nuclear fuel transponation at the INEL. 
Table 4. 11 -4 lists the results in terms of cumulative doses ( 1995-2035) and health effects. These doses 
do not include onsite naval shipments. which are assessed in Attachment A to Appendix D of 
Volume I of this EIS. The baseline includes no offs ite shipments. which are addressed ill 
Appendixes D and I. 
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Table 4.11-4. Cumulative doses and cancer fatalities from incident-free onsite shipments of nonnaval 
spent nuclear fuel at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory for 1995 through 2035··b 
Occupational 
General population 
a . Source : Maheras ( 1993) . 
Estimated collective 
dose 
(person-rem) 
3.4 
0 .087 
Estimated 
cancer 
fatalities 
0 .OOt4 
0 .000044 
b. Onsite naval shipment doses are addressed in AuachInent A to Appendix D of Volume I of this 
EIS . 
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4.12 Occupational and Public Health and Safety 
4.12.1 Radiological Health and Safety 
DOE Order 5480.11. "Radiation Protection for Occupational Workers" (DOE 1992b). limits the 
radiation dose that INEL workers can receive to 5 rem per year; administrative controls further limit a 
worker dose to 2 rem per year. except under unusual circumstances. In addition. DOE has established 
a comprehensive program. known as ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable). to ensure the 
reduction of occupational doses to the extent practicable. 
The largest fraction of the occupational dose received by rNEL workers ;s from external 
radiation. Internal radiation doses conslitute a small fraction of the occupational dose. Personnel who 
could recei ve annual external radiation exposures with measured doses greater than 0.1 rem receive a 
thennoluminescent dosimeter thai. they must wear at all times during work on the site. DOE used 
recorded doses for 1987 to 1991 as a baseline for routine site operations for this ErS. During this 
period. the INEL monitored about 6.000 workers annually for radiation exposure. About 32 percent of 
those individuals received measurable radiation doses. Monitoring reports indicate Ihat, from 1987 to 
1991 . 20 bdividuals (most of whom were maintenance and construction workers employed by 
M·K Ferguson at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant) received annual doses larger than 2 rem 
(4 indi viduals in 1987. I in 1989. and 15 in 1990). 
From 1987 to 1991. the average occupational dose to individuals who had received measurable 
doses was O. I 56 rem per year. resulting in an average collective dose (the number of monitored 
workers receiving measurable doses was about 32 percent or 1.920) of aboul 300 person-rem. The 
resulting number of expecled excess latent cancer fatalities would be less than I for each year of 
opera tion. 
This analysis based Ihe doses to the max imally exposed individual and offsite population on 
base line radioactive conce ntralions associated with normal operations. The base line dose to the 
maximall y exposed ind ividual IS 5.6 x 10.2 millirem. which corresponds to a latent fatal cancer 
probabi lity of 2.8 x 10'. The base line popu lalion dose is 7.0 x 10" person· rem which. corresponds 10 
a latent fata l cancer incidence of less than I (4 x 10') annually and less than I ( I x 10" ) over 
40 years. 
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4.12.2 Nonradiological Exposure and Health Effects 
DOE used th<! air quality data in Tabl!! 4 .7-2 to evaluate health impacts assoc iated with potential 
exposure to two compound classes: crit<!ria pollutant and (Oxic. This anal ysis has based health effec ts 
on air emissions only. and not water pathways. because none of the altemativ<!s would involve the 
di scharge of pollutants to surface waters or the subsurface. Table 4.7-2 lists 5 criteria pollutant and 
26 tox.ic compounds. The classification of two of the toxic compounds (benzene and foonaldehydd as 
carcinogens was consistent with EPA designations published in the Integrated Risk Infoonation System 
(IRIS) data base (DOE 199Ib). However. th is data l Ise does not include sufficient data to perform a 
quantilati ve inhalation cancer ri sk assessment. 
To obtain a hazard index. this analysis evaluated toxic and criteria pollutant compound health 
effects by adding hazard quotients for each compound. The EPA Risk Assessment Guidance for 
Superfund (EPA 1989) describes this approach. The hazard quotient is the ratio of compound 
concentration or dose to a Refe rence Concentration (RfC) or Dose (Rffi). For compounds \t,,' ithout 
listed Reference Concentration or Dose values. the analysis used appropriate State of Idaho standards. 
The use of the noncancer hazard index assumes a level of exposure (standard) below which adverse 
health effects would be unlikely. The hazard index is not a statistical probability ; the refore. it cannot 
be in terpreted as such. 
This analysis based toxic and criteria pollutant compound hazard indc" values for the maximally 
exposed individual on the maximum concentrations for the compounds at the INEL site boundary. 
public access roads inside the INEL site boundary. and the Craters of the Moon \Vildemcss Area. 
Because the hazard index for criteria pollutants is less Ihan 1. no adverse health effects would be likel y 
from routine operations for e ither workers or the maximally exposed individual. Because the hazard 
index for toxic pollutants exceeds I. the potentia l for carcinogenic health ri sks could ex ist. Howe\·a . 
varying spacial and temporJI distributions of the concentrations of individual air pollut3nts make it 
unlike ly that any indi vidual would b!! exposed to all the pollutants all the time. Since individual 
hazard indices for the tox ic compounds are less than I. adverse health effects are not e;(~cted . 
4.12.3 Occupational Health and Safety 
Total injury ;,md illness incidence rates at the INEL varicd from an annual a\'erage of 1.8 to 
4.9 per 200.000 work hours from 1987 to 199 1. During this time. total lost \\'orkday ca~es ranged 
fro m a low of I pcr 200.000 work hOllr. in 1988 and 1989 to a high of 2.6 per 200.000 work hour. in 
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1991 . The rates appear higher for 1991 because of a 1990 change in reporting requirements for 
injuries and illnesses. INEl rates for 1987 to 1989 are below overall DOE rates (2.9 total injury and 
illness incidence and 1.4 total lost workday cases per 200.000 work hours) and Bureau of labor 
Statistic rates (8.5 total injury and illness incidence and 4.0 total 10 t workday cases per 200.000 work 
hours) . For 1990 and 1991. INEl rates are slightly above overall DOE rates, but below Bureau )f 
labor Statistics rate. 
There were 1.337 total recordable injury and illne s cases at the INEl from 1987 to 1991. for an 
average of 8.385 employees working 79,654,000 hours. Of these cases. 11 4 (8.5 percent) were 
occupational illnesses, of which 48 percent were repeated trauma disorder and 30 percent were 
classified as skin diseases or disorders. One fatality occurred at the INEl between 1987 and 1991 
when an employee was truck and killed by a fo rklift. 
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4.13 Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Services 
Thi!i' :-;cc tion discusses water. electricity . fuel capaci ties and consumption. wastcw;.IIcr disposal. 
and security and emergency protection at INEL fac il ities. 
4.13.1 Water Consumption 
A system of about JO wells. with pumps and storage tanks. provides the water supply for the 
INEL site. Because of the distance between site f<Jci lity areas. the water supply system for each 
fac il ity is independent . The site uses no natural surface waler. The City of Idaho Falls water supply 
system. which includes about 16 wells. provides waler to DOE and contractor faci li ties in the city. 
A Water Rights Agreement between DOE and the State of Idaho regulates groundwater use al 
the INEL site. Under ' his agreement. INEL has claim to 2.300 liters per second (36.000 gallons per 
minute) of groundwater. not to exceed 43 bill ion liters ( I I billion ga llons) per year (Tee1 1993). DOE 
has not measured the total pumping rate from the aqui fer. which wou ld depend on the number of 
pumps operating. There is a slight possibility that the si te could exceed the regulated pumping rate for 
very short periods. such as during recovery from an extended power outage when many pumps wou ld 
run to refill depleted storage tanks. 
The average [NEL site water consumption from 1987 through 199 1 was 7.4 bill ion liters 
( 1.9 bi llion gallons) per year. based on the cumu lative volumes of water withdrawn from the we lJ !\ 
(Teel 1993). The projected baseline usage for 1995 wi ll be about 6.5 bill ion liters (1.7 bill ion 
ga llons). The estimated average water consumption of Idaho Fall s fac ilit ies is 300 mill ion li ters 
(80 million ga llons) per year. 
4.13.2 Electricity Cons umption 
The Antelope substation supplies commercial electric power to the INEL site through two feeders 
10 the Federall y owned Scoville SUbslaiion, The Scoville sub~tation supplies elec tric power directl y to 
the INEL e lectric power distribution ' »tem (Teel 1993 ). The contrac t with Idaho Power Company to 
supply electric power to the INEL site provide ' "up to 45.000 kilowatts monthly" at 13 .8 kilovolts 
OPC/DOE 1986). Hydro<lectric generators along the Snake River in southern Idaho and the Bridger 
and Valmy coal ~ fired thennal elec tric generation plants in southwe l\tern Wyoming and northern 
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Nevada. respectively. generate the elec tric power supplied by Idaho Power. The Experimental Breeder 
Reactor~ 1I can also provide approximately 12 to 15 megavo lt~amperes of capacity for the elec tric 
power loop (Teel 1993). 
The rated capacity of the INEL site power transmission loop line is 124 megavolt-amperes. The 
peak demand on the system from 1990 through 1993 was about 40 megavolt-amperes. and the average 
usage was slightly less than 217.000 megawatt-hours per year (Teel 1993). This usage rate should 
decrease by about 4 percent by 1995 . 
The INEL fac ilities in Idaho Falls receive electric power from the City of Idaho Falls. which 
operJtes four hydroelectric power generation plants on the Snake River along with substation and 
distribut ion faci lities. The Bonnevi lle Power Administration. which operates hydroelectric plants on 
the Culumbia River system. supplies supplemental power to the City of Idaho Falls. In 1993. Idaho 
Falls faci lities used 31.500 megawatt · hours of electrici ty (Teel 1993) . 
4.13.3 Fuel Consumption 
Fuels consumed at the INEL site include several liquid petroleum fuels. coal. and propane. All 
fuels arc transported to the site for storage and use. Natural gas is the only reported fuel consumed at 
the INEL Idaho Fall , fac ilities: the Intermountain Gas Company provides th is fuel th rough a system of 
underground lines (Teel 1993) . 
The average annual fuel consumption at the INEL si te from 1990 th rough 1993 was as fo llows: 
fue l oil. 10.578.000 liters (2.795.000 gallons): diesel fuel. 5.690.000 li ters ( 1.500.000 gallons): and 
propane gas. 568.000 lite rs {I 50.000 gallons). The INEL also uses about 8.200 metric tons 
(9.000 ton~) of coal. Fuel storage is provided at each facil ity and inventories are restocked as 
necessary . No fossil fuel shortage has ever occurred at the INEL site (Teel 1993). 
I 4.13.4 Wastewater Disposal 
Sanitary wastewater systems at the smaller onsile facility areas consist primarily of septic t~' n k s 
and drain fi elds. The I:lfger arcas. such as Central Faci lities Area. Idaho Chemical Processing Plan' .. 
and Test Rl!actor Art!a. have wastewater treatment faci lities. The City of Idaho Falls wastewater 
treatment I\y~ tem serves the Idaho Falls facilities (Teel 1993 ). 
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The average annual wastewater discharge volume at the INEL site from 1989 through 199 1 was 
537 million li ters (142 million gallons). The wastewater fro m DOE and contrac tor-operated facilities 
in Idaho Falls is not metered but is estimated to be 300 million liters (80 million gallons) per year. 
The pr:mary causes of the difference between waler pumped and estimated wastewater discharge are 
evapor.1tion .from ponds and cooling towers. irrigation of landscaped areas. and discharge of unmetered 
wastewater (Teel 1993). Some industrial wastewater. such as steam condensate. is also discharged to 
evaporation ponds and injection wells. 
4.1 3.5 Security and Emergency Protection 
This sec tion describes the fire protec tion and prevention. security. and emergency preparedness 
resources for the INEL site and the surrounding areas. This discussion includes the INEL Fire 
Department. DOE and INEL Emergency Preparedness. and DOE and INEL Security. DOE established 
an Emergency Management System that incorporates all applicable requirements for emergency 
planning. preparedness. and response at the INEL. Each INEL faci lity must prepare an Emergency 
Plan that contains detai led contingency plans and emergency procedures. 
4.13.5.1 DOE Fire Department. The contractor-operated Fire Department staffs and operates 
three fi re stations on the INEL that support the entire site. Each station has the equipment and 
expert ise to respond to explosions. fires. spills. and medical emergencies. These stations are on the 
north end at Test Area North. at Argonne National Laboratory-West. and at the Central Facilities Area . 
Each station has a minimum of one engine company capable of supporting any fire emergency in its 
assigned area. The Fire Department has a staff of 44 firefighters and II support personnel and 
operates with a minimum critical staff of 7 firefighters at any time. In addition to providing 
firefight ing serv ices. the Fire Department provides the INEL ambulance. emergency medical technician 
(EMD. and hazardous material response services. The Fire Department has mutual aid agreements 
with other firefighting organizat ions. such as the Bureau of Land Management and the Cities of Idaho 
Falls. Blackfoot. and Arco. Through these agreements. the Idaho Falls Fire Department serves DOE 
faci lities in the City of Idaho Falls. 
4.13.5.2 DOE and INEL Emergency Preparedness. Each DOE INEL contrac tor 
administers and staffs its own emergency preparedness program under the direction and supervision of 
DOE. All contractor programs for emergency control and response are compatible. The Warning 
Communication Center is in the DOE Headquarters building and staffed by the INEL prime contractor 
wi th DOE oversight : it is the communication and overall control center for support to onscenc 
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commanders in charge of an emergency response. The DOE emergency preparedness system includes 
mutual aid agreements wi 'h all regional county and major city fire departments. police. and medical 
facilities. Through the agreements. the Idaho Fall s emergency preparedness organizations serve DOE 
facilities in the City of Idaho Falls. 
4.13.5.3 DOE and INEL Security. DOE has oversight responsibility for safeguard s and 
security at the INEL. The security program has three categories: security operations. personnel 
security. and safeguards . The security operations division provides asset protection (classified matter. 
special nuclear material, facilities. and personnel) and technical securily (computer and information). 
Under this category. DOE administers the INEL protec ti ve force . which is supplied by contract. The 
personnel security staff processes personnel security clearances. The safeguards department is 
responsible for Ihe management and accountability of sp~cial nuclear materials. The INEL protec tive 
force. consisting of 200 armed guards and 350 support personnel, provides the onsite personnel who 
administer the programs. Each INEL contractor has a safeguards and security staff, divided in a 
similar manner, to manage the security associated with its facilities. Contractor safeguards and 
security staffs range from about 5 to 60 persons. depending on the size and complexity of the 
associated fac ilit ies. Each staff works with the INEL protec tive forces. 
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4.14 Materials and Waste Management 
This section summarizes the management of materi als and wastes (high-level. transuranic. mixed 
low- leve l. low-level. hazardous. industrial and commerc ial solid was tes and hazardous materials) at the 
INEL and Idaho Fa lls faci lities. and pr~se n ts an overview of the current status of the various waste 
types generated. stored. and disposed at the INEL. 
The total amount of waste generated and disposed has been reduced through waste minimization 
and treatment. The INEL attains was te minimization by reducing or eliminating waste generation. by 
recycling. and by reducing the volume. tox icity. or mobility of waste before storage or disposal. In 
addi tion. the sile has achieved volume reduction of radioactive wastes through morc intensive 
surveying. was te segregation. and use of administrative and engineering controls. 
The quantitative data present ~d in this section are from Volume 2 of this EIS. unless otherwise 
noted. 
4.14.1 High-level Waste 
At present . about 11.900 cubic meters (4.970 cubic yards calcine solid and 2. 140.000 gallons 
liquid) of high-level waste are in storage at the INEL Idaho C hemical Processing Plant (see Figure 2-1 
for locations of major waste management facilities). This facility blends liquid waste. consisting of 
aluminum and zirconium wastes from past spent nuclear fuel reprocessing. and sodium-beari ng wastes. 
and processes them through calcination to produce a granular calcine solid. Because of the 
tennination of reprocess ing. the si te no longer generates liquid high-level waste. with the exception of 
high-level was te residues. Liquid high-level wastes generated by prior reprocessing activities are 
solidified at the si te. At present. the si te generates liquid waste that is not directly the result of 
reprocessing. The si te manages this liquid as high-level waste. The site will calcine the liquid 
high-level was te that does not contain sodium. and as much SOdium-bearing high-level waste as 
practicable by January I. 1998. in accordance with the Amended Order Modifying Order of Jllne 28. 
1993. United States District Coun for the Dist rict of Idaho. December 22. 1993. The projected 1995 
basel ine for high-level waste generation is 750 cubic meters (980 cubic yards) annually (EG&G 1993). 
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4.14.2 Transuranic Waste 
About 65 .000 cubic ml!ters (85 .000 cubic yards) of transuranic and alpha-contaminated low-level 
wastes are ret rievably stored and 62.000 cubic meters (8 1.000 cubic ya rds) of transuranic wilste 
(Mon on and Hendrickson (995 ) have been buried at the Radioacti \'c \Vaste Management Complex at 
the INEL. At present. no fac ilities can dispose of transuranic waste: however. DOE ultimately intends 
to retrit:\·I!. repackage. cenify. and ship stored transuran ic wastes at the INEL to a potent ia l Federal 
repository for final di sposition. DOE has nO( detennined the disposition of alpha-contaminated low-
le\'<1 wastc and buried waste. Since the October 1988 ban by the State of Idaho prohibiting shipments 
of transuranic waste to the INEL. DOE has shipped only minor amounts of transuranic waste 
generated on the site to the INEL Radioactive \Vaste Management Complex for interim storage. At 
present . there are no treatment faci lities for transuranic wastes at the INEL. The projected 1995 
baseline for transuranic waste genera tion is 6 cubic meters (8 cubic yards) annually (EG&G (993). 
4.14.3 Mixed low·level Waste 
At present . DOE accepts only mi xed low-level waste generated at the INEL for treatment and 
disposal at the INEL. DOE stores mixed low- level was te generated at the INEL at interim storage 
facilit ies until treatment systems become available or operational. A total of 1.800 cubic meters 
(2.-'00 cubic ya rds) of mixed low-level waste interim storage capaci ty is available at the INEL. 
CurR nt mixed low- level waste interim storage is approximately 1.1 00 cubic meters ( 1.400 cubic 
ya rds) . Treatment technologies exist for much of the mixed low-level waste generated at the INEL. 
and waste minimization eliminates potential sources of mixed low-leve l waste before generat ion. The 
projected 1995 base line for mi xed low-level waste is 525 cub ic meters (687 cubic yards) annually 
(EG&G 1993). 
4.14.4 low·level Waste 
Through 1991. DOE disposed of 145.000 cubic meters ( 190.000 cubic yards) of 10w-le\'el waste 
at the Radioact ive \Vaste Management Complex . In 199 1. the total <.Ivai lab le low-level waste disposal 
capac ity at the complex was 37.000 cubic meters (-t8.000 cubic yards). DOE has cunai led low- level 
waste treatml!n t since 1991 while \\.·ait ing for updated safety documl!ntation and an em'ironml! ntal 
impac t assessment for the \Vaste Experimental Reduction Fac ility. The INEL stores low- le ve l waste 
awai ling treatment on asphalt or concrete pads at the \Vaste Experimental Reduction Fac ility and in 
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radioactive waste storage containers at the generating fac ili ties. The projected 1995 baseline for Jow-
lev.1 W"Sle general ion is 4.270 cubic melers (5.585 cubic yards) annuall y (EG&G 1993). 
4.14.5 Hazardous Waste 
DOE colleCIS hazardous waste generaled al Ihe INEL and slores il lemporarily al Ihe Hazardous 
Waste Slorage Faci lily before shipping il off Ihe si le. The Hazardous Wasle Slorage Faci lily has 
adequale slorage capacilY [approx imalely 64 cubic melers (84 cubic yards)] 10 manage Ihe quanlil ies of 
hazardous waste generated at the INEL. The site recycles. reuses. or reprocesses such waste if 
possible. and might repl ace some hazardous substances with nonhazardous substances. 
4.14.6 IndustriaVCommercial Solid Waste 
DOE disposes of Ihe induslrial and commercial solid waSle generaled al Ihe sile in Ihe INEL 
Landfill Complex al Ihe Central Facililies Area. The Landfill Complex has approx imalely 
9 10.000 square melers (225 acres) of land available fo r solid wasle d isposal , including Ihe remaining 
area al Landfi ll III. which is currenlly in use. The eSlimaled capacilY of Ihe INEL Landfi ll Complex 
will be suffic ienl 10 dispose of INEL waSle for 30 10 50 years: however, capaci lY of Ihe current 
excavalions wi ll be filled by 1998. DOE has proposed expanding Ihe excavalion. Volume 2 of Ihis 
EIS describes Ihe landfill expansion projec t. The induSlrial and commercial solid wasle landfill 
currently in use is in a 48.000-square-meler (\ 2·acre) gravel pil area nonh of Disposal Area II. DOE 
does not expect to store solid waste intended for disposal. Waste segregation occurs at each INEL 
faci lity so recyclable materials do not enter the solid waste stream. The average annual volume of 
waste disposed al Ihe Cenlral Faci lil ies Area landfi ll from 1988 Ihrough 1992 was approximalely 
52.000 cubic melers (68.000 cubic yards) (also Ihe projecled 1995 baseline) (EG&G 1993). 
4.14.7 Hazardous Materials 
The INEL 1993 chemical in venlory lisls 774 hazardous chemicals. The number and Ihe 10lal 
weight of hazardous chemicals used on the site and at individual facilit ies change daily in response to 
use. The annual Superfund Amendmenls and Reaulhorizalion ACI repon s for Ihe INEL fac ililies 
include year-to-year inventories. 
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5. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES 
5,1 Overview 
This chapter discusses the potential environmental consequences for each spent nuclear fuel 
management ahemalive described in Chapler 3. The U.S. Depanmenl of Energy (DOE) used Ihe 
environmental consequence analyses of nonnaval spent nuclear fuel management from Volume 2 as 
input for this chapter; however. DOE mnde necessary adjustments to accommodate the differences 
belween Volume I and Volume 2 ahemalives. In add ilion. DOE adjusled Ihe 10-year planning 
horizon for Volume 2 alternatives to 40 years for Volume 1. 
As described in Chapler I. Ihis chapler analyzes only nonnaval DOE aClions: however. 
Section 5. 16, "Cumulat ive Impacts and Impacts from Connected or Similar Actions," includes impacts 
from the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program and non naval DOE impacts lhat are cumulative. The 
Appendix B restriction of analysis to non naval ac tions resuhs in Alternative 2 (options 2a, 2b, and 2c) 
becoming a single alternative . 
Chapter 5 addresses potent ial impacts from construction and nonnal operations for each element 
of Ihe affecled envi ronmenl described in Chapler 4. In addilion, il provides pOlenlial consequences 
from accidents and several types of summary infonnation. In cases where the consequence analysis 
does not result in a distinction among the alternatives, this chapter describes lhe consequences without 
division by aitemalive 10 avoid needless repelilion. Tables 3-4 through 3·6 in Seclion 3.2 summarize 
and compare the potential impacts associated wi th each alternative. 
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5.2 Land Use 
Alternati ves I. 2. 4b(2). and 5a [No Action. Decent rJlization. Regionalization by Geography 
(Elsev.'here). and Central ization at other DOE sites] would have the least impact on land usc, affeC Ting 
0.8 ac re (0.003 square kilometer); Alternat ives 4b( I ) [Regional ization by Geography (lNEL)] and 
5b (Centralization at the INEL) would result in the greatest changes. impacti ng nearly 3 1 ac res 
(0.12 square kilometer). 
Overall environmental impacts on land use by any of the a lternatives would be small because 
DOE would build new fac ilit ies in developed areas that it has a lready dedicated to industrial use and 
that previous activi ties have disturbed. Under all the alternatives. proposed act ivi ties would be 
consistent with the existing land use plans discussed in Section 4.2 and would be similar to uses in 
exisling developed areas on the site. None of the proposed act ivities would involve land outside the 
INEL boundaries. and no effects on surrounding land uses or local land use plans should occur. 
No onsile land use restrict ions due to Nalive American treaty rights would exist for any of the 
alternatives described in this EIS . Potential impac ts on Native American and other cultural resources 
are discussed in Sec tion 5.4 (Cultural Resources) and in Appendix L (Environmental Justice). 
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5.3 Socioeconomics 
This section desc ribes the potential effects of the spent nuclear fue l alternatives on the 
socioeconomic resources of the region of innuence described in Section 4 .3. Tables 5.3- 1 and 5.3-2 
list proposed changes in the INEL-re lated workforce and population. Figure 5.3- 1 shows these 
proposed changes. 
5.3.1 Methodology 
This sec tion addresses socioeconomic impacts in terms of both direc t and secondary employment 
and population effects. Direct effects are changes in INEL employment that DOE expects to occur 
under each alternative and include construction and operations phase impact". Secondary effects 
include indirect and induced impacts. Indirect effects are impacts to regional businesses and 
employment resulting from changes in DOE regional purchases or nonpayro ll expenditures. Induced 
effects are impacts to regional businesses and employment that result from changes in payroll spending 
by affected INEL employees. The total economic impact to the region is the sum of direct and 
secondary effects. 
The bases for the estimated direci impacls in this section are project summary data Ihat DOE 
developed in cooperation wi th INEL comractors. Employment impacts represent actual changes in 
INEL staffing; they do not include changes in staffing due to a reassignment of the existing INEL 
workforce. The projected decline in base line INEL ac tivi ty is not part of any alternative and therefore. 
a comprehensive analys is of potencial impac ts was not included. Projected declines in baseline site 
employment are presented in Figure 5.3- 1 in order to provide the reader with a framework. for 
evaluating potential employment and population impacts. This assessment used RIMS II to estimate 
total employment impacts with multipliers that the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis developed 
specifically for the INEL region of innuence. A comprehensive discussion of the methodology is 
provided in Appendix F- I of Vo lume 2. Cumulative impacts on socioeconomic resources in the 
region are discussed in Section 5.16. 
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Table 5.3-1. ESlimated changes in employment and populat ion for Alternatives 3. 4a. 4b(l) and 5b. 
1995 - 200·1.' 
Factor 
Direct employment 
Secondary 
cmpJoymcn! 
TOIa! employme nt 
change 
Ch:mgc in R01~ 
labor force (Cj() 
Change in ROI 
employmcni (CH ) 
Population ch:mgc 
Change in ROI 
popu lation l '7c ) 
1995 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1996 1997 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
1998 1999 
250 
352 
602 
0.0 0.5 
0.0 0.6 
2.027 
0.0 0.8 
a. Sources: Johnson ( 1995); USBEA (1993); USBe ( 1992). 
b. ROI = region of innuence. 
2000 200 1 ZOO2 200.1 
250 .175 375 375 
352 528 52~ 528 
602 903 903 903 
0.5 0.8 0.8 0.8 
0.6 0.8 o.~ 0.8 
2.027 3.040 3.040 3.040 
0.8 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Table 5.3-2. Estimated changes in employment and population for Alternat ives 4b(2) and 5a. 
1995 - 2004. 
Factor 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Direct employment 50 50 
Secondary 70 70 
employment 
TOia l employment 120 120 
change 
Change in ROI' 0.1 0. 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
labor fo rce ( 9(- ) 
Change in ROI l'. l 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
employment (% ) 
Population change 405 405 
Change in ROI 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
population (%) 
a . Sources : Johnson ( 1995); USBEA ( 1993); US Be (1992). 
b. ROI = region of innuence. 
5.3.2 Alternalives 1 and 2 - No Aclion and Decenlralizalion 
200J 
375 
528 
903 
0.7 
0.8 
3.().l0 
1.1 
200J 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Activit ies associated wi th Alte rnatives 1 and 2 would not result in any additi onal construction or 
operations jobs at the INEL: therefore. implementation of ei ther of these alternatives would have no 
impact on socioeconomic resources in the region of influence. 
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5.3.3 Alternalives 3, 4a, 4b(1), and 5b - 199211993 Planning Basis, Regionalization by Fuel Type, 
Regionalizalion by Geography (INEL), and Centralizalion at the INEL 
5.3.3.1 Construction. As listed in Table 5.3- 1. construction employment under these 
alternat ives would peak during the period from 200 1 to 2004 with approximate ly 375 additional di rect 
jobs per year. When added to the estimated 528 indirec t jobs. the total employment impact in the 
region would be an addition of approximately 903 jobs. Employment would decline to zero by 2008. 
Based on historic data. approximately 97 percent of the new employees who would fi ll these jobs 
would live in the seven-county region of inn uence. As listed in Table 5.3-1. if all new jobs (903) 
were filled by in-migrants to the region. there would be a D.S-percent increase in the regional labor 
force and in regional employment during the peak years. These changes would be minimal and would 
have no adverse impacts on socioeconomic resources in the region. In fac t, although the 
implementation of any of these alternatives would result in an increase over projected employment 
levels. as shown ;n Figure 5.3-1. there would be an overall decline in employment from projected 
1995 levels. 
Assuming each new employee represented one household and 3.47 persons per household. there 
would be a corresponding increase in regional populalion levels of 1.1 percent (approximately 
3.000 people). Given this minor change in population. DOE expects potential impacts on the demand 
for community resources and services such as housing. schools. police. health care, and fire protection 
to be negligible. 
5.3.3.2 Operations. Activities associated with Alternatives 3. 4a. 4b( I) , and 5b would not 
require any additional operations jobs at the INEL. Therefore. the implementation of either of these 
alternatives would have no impact on socioeconomic resoU\:es in the region of influence. 
5.3.4 Allernatives 4b(2) and 5a - Regionalizalion by Geography (Elsewhere) and Centralizalion al Other 
DOE Siles 
5.3.4.1 Construction. As IiSled in Table 5.3-2. construct ion employment under these 
alternatives would peak during Ihe period from 1995 to 1996 wi th approximately 50 additional direct 
jobs per year. When added to the eSlimaled 70 indirect jobs. the total employment impact in the 
region would be approxi mate ly 120 jobs. Employment after 1996 would drop to zero. 
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B",ed on historic data. approximate ly 97 percent of the new employees who would fill Ih ese jobs 
would li v\! in thl! s\!\"cn-county region of influence. As listed in Table 5.3-2. jf all new jC'bs ( 120) 
wen: filled by in-migrants (0 the region. there wou ld be a O.I -percent increase in the regional labor 
force and in regional employment 11!\'cls during the peak years. These changes would be minimal and 
would have! no adverse impacis on socioeconomic re sources in Ihe region . In fact although the 
implementation of any of these allemati ves would be an increase over projected employmenl levels 
from 1995 10 1996. as shown in Figure 5.3-1. there would be an overall decline in employment from 
projected 1995 levels. 
Assuming each new employee represented one household and 3.47 persons per household. the re 
wou ld be a corresponding increase in regional popu lation levels of 0.2 percent (approximately 
400 people). Gi ven this minor change in population. DOE expects potential impacts on the demand 
for community re sources and services such as housing. schools. police. health care. and fire protection 
to be negligible . 
5_3.4_2 Operations. Activities associated with Alternatives 4b(2) and 5a wou ld not result in 
any addilional operations jobs al the INEL. Therefore. the implementation of either of these 
alternatives would have no impact on socioeconomic resources in the region of influence . 
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5.4 Cultural Resources 
This section summarizes the pOIcntiai il11p<.lcls of spem nuclear fud management ac tiv ities on 
cultural resources at the INEL site. 
This assessment evaluated both direct and indirect impacts due to the proposed alternatives. Al 
the INEL. direct impacts to archaeological resources usually would be those associated with ground 
disturbance from conslruction ac ti vities. Direct impacts to exist ing histo ric structures cou ld resu lt from 
demolition. modification. deterioration. isolation from or alte ration of the character of the property's 
selling: o r in troduction of visual. audible. or atmospheric e le ments out of character or that alter the 
property's seuing. In addition. indirect impaCls to archaeological resources could occur due to an 
overall increase in ac tivity at the INEL. which cou ld bring a larger workforce closer to significant 
sites. Direct impacts to traditional resources could occur through land disturbance. vandalism. or 
changes to the environmental setlings of traditional use and sacred areas. Impacts cou ld resu lt from 
pollution. noise. and contamination that could affect the traditional hunting and gathering areas or the 
visual or audib le settings of sacred areas. 
The potential for adverse impacts on cu ltural resources would be" the least under Alte rnatives I, 
2, 4b(2), and Sa. which would disturb approximate ly 0,8 acres (0,003 square kilometer) , Impac ts 
would be minor because surveys of the area to be disturbed found no e ligible cultural resources 
(Reed et aL 1986; DOE 1993a), 
The potential for adverse impacts on cultural resources would be si milar under Alternatives 3. 4a. 
4b( I), and 5b with the g reatest potential under Alte rnatives 4b( I ) and 5b [Regionalization by 
Geography (INEL) and Centralizat ion at the INELI. which would in volve the disturbance of nearly 31 
ac res (0. J 2 square kilometer). Again. impacts would be minimal because surveys of the previously 
disturbed area found no eligible cultural resources (Reed et aL 1986). Under these alternatives, 
proposed modifications at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant facilities could adversely affect 
historica lly significant st ructures and could require consultation with the Idaho State Historic 
Preservation Office (Braun et aL 1993), 
The Shoshone· Bannock Tribes are also concerned with the potential impact to important Native 
American resources from changes in the visua l sening. no ise. ai r qua lity. or water quality. Because 
ac ti vities associated with spent nuclear fue l management wou!d take place within existing fac ility areas 
currently engaged in similar ac ti vities. DOE does not expect any impacts to important Native 
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American resources from alteration of the visual setting or noise associated with implementation of 
any of the alte!matives. There could be temporary. minor impacts on air quality from fugiti ve dust 
associated with construct ion activi ties. Emissions of radionuclides to the ai r under normal operations 
1V0uid be minor and would be well below applicable standards and guidel ines. Under normal 
operating conditions. radioactive discharges to the soil or directiy to the aquifer wou ld not occur. 
DOE would minimize the potential for direct and indirect adverse impacts on trad itional use 
resources from pollution. noise. and contamination through compliance with app licable local. state . and 
Federal laws and regulations. Impact avoidance and other mitigation measures for cultu ra l resources 
are described in Section 5,20.2. 
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5.5 Aesthetic and Scenic Resources 
None of the alternatives for spent nuclear fuel man <!gement at the INEL would have adverse 
consequences on scenic resources or aesthetics because DOE would confine the proposed projects to 
c1evcloped areas. Although the construction of the proposed faciliti es would produce fu giti ve dust that 
cou ld temporarily affect visibility. the INEL would follow standard construction practices 1O minimize 
hoth erosion and dust generation. Facility operations under each alternative would not produce 
emi~s:ons to the atmosphere that would impact visibility. 
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5.6 Geology 
This sect ion discusses the potential effects of the spent nuclear fue l management alternatives on 
geologic resources at the INEL site. 
Proposed INEL spent nuclear fuel management activities would only have minor localized 
impacts on the geology of the site for all the alte rnatives. Direct impacts to geologic resources at the 
site would be associated with the disturbance or extraction of surface deposi ts to construct new 
facilities. These impacts could include excavations into the soil and rock of the site. soil mounding 
and banking. and the eXlraction of aggregate materia ls from gravel and borrow pits on the site. 
Table 5.6·1 li sts estimated extractions of aggregate from site gravel pits for all INEL spent nuclear 
fuel, environmental restorat ion, and waste management projects. These values serve to bound the 
spent nuclear fuel project usage. 
A secondary impact to geological resources from construction activities would be the potential 
for increa~1.. 1 soil erosion. DOE would minimize any potential soil erosion by the use of Best 
Management Practices designed to control stonnwater runoff and slope stability. 
Table 5.6-1. Estimated INEL gravellborrow use (cubic meters)." 
._ ----
Alternative Estimated GravellBorrov¥ Ll\ _ 
I. No Action 158.000 
2. Decentralization 158.000 
3. 199211993 Planning Basis 392.000 
4a. Regionalization by Fuel Type 392.000 
4b( l ) Regionalizalion by Geography (INEL) 1.772.000 
4b(2) Regionalization by Geography (Elsewhere) 296.000 
Sa. Centralizalion at other DOE Sites 296.000 
5b. Centralization at the INEL 1.772.000 
a. Source: EG&G ( 1994). 
b. To conven cubic meters to cubic yards. multiply by 1.31. 
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5.7 Air Quality and Related Consequences 
This seclion describes Ihe pOlenlial non radiological and radiological impacls 10 air qualily 
associated with each alternative. The (enn "baseline concentrations" is defi ned as the sum of the 
concentrations resulting from potential emissions from current operations and those resulting from 
planned upgrades or modificalions Ihal DOE would conslrucl or operale prior 10 any of Ihe proposed 
aClions described in Ihis EIS. Addilional informalion is provided in Seclion 5.7 and Appendix F·) of 
Volume 2. 
5.7.1 Alternative 1 • No Action 
5.7.1.1 Nonradiological Air Quality. Conslruclion aClivilies associaled wilh Ihis ahernalive 
would be limited to upgrading an existing facility . Potential impacts to air qual ity from construction 
activit i s would include fugitive dust and exhaust emissions from suppon equipment. DOE assessed 
Ihe impacls from conslruclion using Ihe EPA Fugilive Dusl Model (FDM) (Winges 1992). The 
modeling resuhs showed Ihal Ihe expecled conslruclion-relaled air qualily impacls should be lemporary 
and highly localized. 
Minimal spent nuclear fue l activities would occur under this alternative. Therefore. DOE expects 
that the ambient concentrations levels from normal operations would be similar to those from baseline. 
Table 4 .7- I liSlS nonradioaclive emissions from normal operalions. Tables 5.7- I and 5 .7-2 lisl Ihe 
maximum potential concentrations for the proposed alternatives; they a re all below applicable 
standards and guidelines. Ambient concentrations from Alternative I activities will be :::'elow 
applicable slandards and guidelines. 
5.7.1.2 Radiological Air Quality. No radiological impacls 10 Ihe environmenl would resuh 
from construction activities, 
No addilional facilili es Ihal would be in operalion for Ihis allernalive would produce radionuclide 
emiss ions. Therefore. fo r nonnal operat ion~. doses to the maximally exposed individual. the 
populalion. and workers would be equi valenl 10 baseline doses. as lisled in Table 5.7-3 . Table 5.7-4 
lists assoc iated emiss ion rates. 
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Table 5.7·1. Maximum impacts to nonradiologicai air quality from spent nuclear fuel - crite ria 
pollutanls.Jb 
Maximum Baseline plus 
Applicable baseline maximum 
A\'craging standard I.:oncentrat iun altcmati\'c' Pcn:cnt of 
Pollutant time (~glmJ) (~glmJ) (~glmJ) standard 
Carbon monoxide l-hr 40.000 610 610 1.5 
8-hr 10.000 280 280 2.8 
Ni troge n dioxide Annual 100 4 4 4 
Lead Quarterly J.5 0.001 0.001 <0.1 
Particu late mailer (PM In) 24-hr 150 80 80 53 
Annual 50 5 10 
Sulfur dioxidc 3-hr 1.300 580 580 45 
24-hr 365 140 140 38 
Annual 80 6 7.5 
a. Source: Section 5.7 of Volume 2 of thi s EIS and Belanger et al. (1995). 
b. Listed concentrations arc the maximum of those calculated at the INEL site boundary. public access roads 
inside the INEL site boundary. and the Craters of the Moon Wilderness Area. 
c. The listcd concentrations are the maximums for any of the proposed ahcmatives. 
Table 5.7-2. Maximum impacts to nonradioiogical air quality from spent nuclear fuel - toxic air 
pollutants.3.b 
Maximum Impact from 
Applicable baseline maximum 
Avcraging standard concentration ahemative' Percent of 
Pollutant time (~glm3) (~g1m3) (~g1mJ) standard'" 
Ammonia Annual 1.8x lo' 6.0><10° 1.8xlOo 
Bcnzcne Annual 1.2xto·' 2.9xlO·' 2.3xI0·' 19 
Formaldchyde Annual 7.7xI0·' 1.2x I0·' 4.4x I0·' 57 
Methyl isobutyl ketonc Annual 2.lx lO' (e) 2.6x 1O' 
Hydrofluoric acid Annual 2.5x I0' (e) 1.8x 10·2 <0.1 
Tributylphosphate Annual 2.5xI0' (e) 6.lxlO·' 0.2 
a. Sourcc : Section 5.7 of Volume 2 of thi s EIS and Rau !)ep (1995). 
b. Listed concentrations are the maximum of those calculated at the INEL si te boundary. public acccss roads 
inside the INEL site boundary. and the Craters of the Moon Wilderness Area. 
c. The li sted concentrations are thc ma:<.i mums for any of the proposed alternat i\'es. plus ncw or modified 
sources expectcd to become operational after May I . 1994. 
d. In accordance with State of Idaho regulations for toxic air pollutants. the percent of standard is calculatcd 
based on concentrations· . ' ing from the alternati ves and from new or modificd sources that have become 
operational since May I. . .. . 
e . Baseline concentrat ions for thcsc pollutants wc rc not analyzed because the ir emissions were below screen ing 
Icvels. 
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Table 5.7-3. Annual dose increments by alternative in comparison to the baseline ." 
Max imally 
INEl worker exposed individual Population 
Alternative (millirem ) (millirem ) (person-rem)~ 
Baseline 4.3x1OOc 5.6xlO-2 3.4x I0-1 
I. No Action 3.3x 10-1 3.5xlO·) 1.0x10-1 
2. Decentralization 3.3x1O-l 3.5x 10-) 1.0x I 0-1 
3. 199211993 3.3xlO-J 8.0xI0-3 1.9xlO-1 
Planning Basis< 
4a. Regionali zation by Fuel Type 3.3xI0-·1 8.0xI0-J 1.9x10-1 
4b( I). Regionalization by Geography 4.2x I0-3 4.8xlO-2 3.9xI0-1 
(INEl)J 
4b(2). Regionalization by Geography 7.0xI0·s 3.9xIO-J 8.3xlO-2 
(Elsewhere) 
Sa. Centralization at Other DOE 7.0xI0-5 3.9xIO-3 8.3xlO-2 
Sites 
5b. Centralization at the INEl 4.2xlO-3 4.8xIO-2 3.9xI0- 1 
a. Source: Section 5.7 of Volume 2 of this EIS. 
b. Population dose is calculated based on the projected population in 2000 or 20 I 0 whichever is higher. 
c_ Baseline worker dose includes the maximum projected operation of the portable water treatment unit at the 
Power Burst Facility area. However. the operation would be temporary (I to 2 years) and is not 
representative of a permanent increase in the baseline. If this faci lity were not included. the baseline dose to 
the worker would be about 0.2 millirem per year. 
d. Alternative 4b( I) doses are slightly less than Alternative 5b doses . 
5.7.2 Alternative 2 • Decentralization 
5.7.2.1 Nonradi%gica/ Air Quality. Potential impacts to air quality from construction 
activities would include fugitive dust and exhaust emissions from support equipment. The modeling 
assessment showed that the expected construction-related air quality impacts should be temporary and 
highly localized. 
Emissions resulting from normal operations under this al ternative wou d include baseline 
emissions and those resulting from the startup of the proposed facilities. Emiss ion rates associated 
with startup would be less than I percent of those from nonnal operations. Tables 5.7-1 and 5.7-2 li st 
the maximum concentrations predicted for the proposed alternatives. Ambient concentrations from 
Alternative 2 ac tivities would be below applicable standards and guide lines. 
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< Table 5.7-4. Radionuclide emissions by alternative for spent nuclear fuel projects.a 0 
r 
c Radionuclides and Emission Rates (Ci/yr) 
s: 
m Assn<i at~d H ·~I Xc-U I rnI Sr-901 1- 129/ Cs- 134 
ProJ~< t and Lo<ati on Altematlw C- I-l Co-60 Kr-1I5 Xe- 133 Y-<JO Sb-125 1-131 Cs-D7 Plutonium AII1-24 I Other.; 
>-
." TAN Ponl Fuel Transfer PruJ~ct I. 2. _' . 4a 
." 
m a. Drying operations <lb( I ). 5b l) . 6xI O~ 2 .9x I 0· ~ 3.4x 10- ~ 6.6xI0'" 2.2x IIr· 
z n. Storage operations 3.9xI 0" 52 
>< (Test Ar~a Nonh) 
c:l Additional In<re:L~ed Rack Capa<!t)' 3. 4a. -In( 1 ). 5n 20xI0" 1.2x 10" ~ . 8xl()· 7 1.0x10'" UxIO" 3. lxIO·· 
(Idaho ChelllkaJ Pru<e. sing Planl) 
Dry Fuels Storage FaclillY .1 . <la. 4b( I). 1.8xlU' 1.9x lit· 1.8x 10-' 2.2xI 0·\ 4.2xlO·\ 6.8xI0·' 2.6xI0·' 1.9x 10" 
(Idaho ChclI1kal Processing Plant) -lb(2) . 5a. 5b 
Fon SI. Vrain Spent Fuel Storage .1. 4a. -lb( I). 5b 5.6xI0·· 1.8x IO·h 2.4xI0·' 5.6x H)'1 2.4xI0·
' 
(Idaho Chemical Proces ing Plant) 
Increa-,cd Rack Capacity ~. 4a. 4b( I). 5b 2.0x1O" \.2)(10" 3.8xI0·' 1.0)(10-· I.3xIO·· 3. lx\O'· 
(Idaho Chemical Processing Planl) 
EBR-I\ Blanket Treatment (Argonne ~ . 4a. 4b( I). 5b 1.6xl02 4.9x 10.1 5.1x10 ' 
National Laboralory - West) 
~ Ele<tromctallurgical Process .1 . 4a. 4b( I). 8.4xl02 1.4x10· Uxlo2 
-...J DemonstrJtion Project (Argonne 4b(2). 5a. 5b 
1- Nalional Laboratory - West) 
Spent Fuel Processing Facility 4b(1).5b ] . lxlO·' 1.9x I O·h 5.0x1OS 5.8x IO-~ 1.6xlO' 4.4xI0-1 1.8x10· ' 7.7xI0-.1 2. lxlO-1 
a Source: Appendix F·] of Volume 2 of this EIS. 
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5.7.2.2 Radiological Air Quality. No radiological impac.s '0 .he environmen. would resuil 
from construction ac ti vities. 
Emissions resuhing from nannal operations under this alternative would include the base line 
emissions and those resulting from the startup of the proposed fac ilities. Table 5.7·4 lists emi ssion 
ra.es for .he SpeOl nuclear fue l ailerna.ives. including Decenlraliza.ion. Table 5.7-3 lis.s .he resuiling 
doses to the maximally exposed individual. the population. and workers. These values are small in 
comparison to the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants dose limit of 10 millirem 
per year. the dose limit received from background sources of 351 millirem per year. and the 
popula.ion dose from background sources of 40.000 person-rem. 
5.7.3 Alternative 3 - 199211993 Planning Basis 
5.7.3.1 Nonradiological Air Quality. Po.eOlial impac.s '0 air quali.y from cons.ruc.ion 
activities would include fugitive dust and exhaust emissions from support equipment. The modeling 
assessment showed that expected construction-related air quality impacts should be temporary and 
highly localized. 
Emissions resulting from nonnal operations under this alternative would include baseline 
emissions and those resulting from the proposed facilities. Emission rates associated with startup 
would be less .han I percen. of .hose from normal opera.ions. Tables 5.7-1 and 5.7-2 lis •• he 
maximum potential concentrations for the proposed alternatives. Ambient concentrations from 
Alternative 3 activit ies would be below applicable standards and guidelines. 
5.7.3.2 Radiological Air Quality. No radiological impac.s '0 .he environmen. would resuil 
from construction activities. 
Emissions result ing from nonnal operations under this alternative would include baseline 
emissions and .hose resull ing from .he S!anup of .he proposed facili.ies. Table 5.7-4 IiSlS emission 
ra.es for .he spen. nuclear fue l ailerna.ives. Table 5.7-3 liSlS .he resuiling doses '0 .he maximally 
exposed indi vidual. the populat ion, and workers. These values are small in comparison to the National 
Emission S.andards for Hazardous Air PoliulanlS dose limi. of 10 millirem per year . • he dose limi. 
received from background sources of 35 1 millirem per year. and the population dose from background 
sources of 40.000 person- rem. 
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5.7.4 Alternative 4a - Regionalization by Fuel Type 
5.7.4.1 Nonradiological Air Quality. Po.on.ial impaclS '0 air quali.y from conSlruc.ion 
<.Ic ti vities would include fu git ive dust and e ;<.haust emi ssions from support equipment. The modeling 
<.Issessment shov . :ed that the expected construction-related air quality impac ts should be temporary and 
highly localized . 
Emissions resulting from normal operation under this alternative would include baseline 
emissions and those resuhing from the startup of the proposed facilities. Emission mtes associated 
wi.h s.anup would be less .han I percen. of .hose from normal opera.ions. Tables 5.7- 1 and 5.7-2 liS! 
the max imum poten tial concentrations for the proposed alternatives. Ambient concentrations from 
Alternative 4 activities would be below applicable standards and guide lines. 
5.7.4.2 Radiological Air Quality. No radiological impaclS '0 .he environ men. would resull 
from construction activities. 
Emissions resuhing from nonnal operation under this alternative would include baseline 
emissions and those resulting from the proposed facilities. Table 5.7-4 lists emission rates for spent 
nuclear fuel alternatives including Regionalization . Table 5.7-3 lists the resulting doses to the 
max imally exposed individual. the population. and workers. These values are small in comparison to 
the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutanls dose limit of 10 milli rem per year. the 
dose limit received from background sources of 351 millirem per year, and the population dose from 
background sources of "'0.000 person-rem. 
5.7.5 Alternative 4b{l) - Regionalization by Geography (INEL) 
5.7.5.1 Nonradiological Air Quality. Po.en.ial impac.s '0 air quali.y from cons.ruc.ion 
ac tivi ties would inc lude fu gitive dust and exhaust emissions from support equipment. The modeling 
assessment showed that the expec ted con!iot ruction-related air quality impacts should be temporary and 
hi ghly localized . 
Emissions resulting from normal operation under this alternati ve would include baseline 
emissions and those result ing from the start up of the proposed fac il iti es. Emission rates associated 
wi.h slanup would be less .han I percen. of .hose from normal opera.ions. Tables 5.7- 1 and 5.7-2 liS! 
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the maximum pot~ nt ia l CQnc~ntraI1Qn.!' from th~ propo~~d ahc:rna ll \,\.'s . Ambient con~c: nt ration s from 
Ah~mati\'t.' -I b~ I ) ac ll vi ll t.', \\ Quld ~ Ix-Io\\ <.Ipplll"<.Ibk ,tandard, and gU ldd mc.;, . 
5.7.5.2 Radiological Air Quality. No r.dlologt<al Impact> 10 the en'" lTonment would ,". ult 
from const ruction <.Ic t i \"ltl t.·~ . 
Emissions resulting fro m nonna l operation under th iS alternative: would include baSt! linc: 
e missions and those result ing from the propo!'Cd facilities. Tabl ~ 5.7-4 lists associated emission ra tes 
for spent nuc lear fue l altemati,"es including Regionalization by Geography (INEL). Table 5.7·3 lists 
resuhing doses to the maximally exposed individua l. the po pu1<Jtion. and workers. These v<.l lues are 
5m<.lll in comparison to the National Emission St<.lr.dards for Hazardous Ai r Pollutants dose li mit of 10 
milli rem per year. the dose limit received from background sources of 35 1 mill irem per year. and the 
population dose from background sources of 40.000 person-rem. 
5.7.6 Alternative 4b(2) - Regionalization by Geography (Elsewhere) 
5.7.6.1 Nonradiological Air Quality. Potential impacts to air quality from construction 
activi ties would include fugiti ve dust and exhaust emissions from support equipment. The mode ling 
assessment showed that the expected construction-re lated ai r quality impacts should be temporary and 
highly localized. 
Emissions resulting from nonnal operation under this alternative would include base line 
emissions and those resulting from the startup of the proposed faci lities. Emission rates associated 
with stanup would be iess than I percent of those from normal operations. Tables 5.7- 1 and 5.7-2 list 
the maximum potential concentrations from the proposed alternat ives. Ambient concentrations from 
Alternative ~b(2) ac tiv ities would be below applicable standards and guide lines. 
5.7.6.2 Radiological Air Quality. No rad iological impac ts to the environment would result 
from construl.:tion activi ties. 
Emissions resulting from normal operation under this alte rnative would include bJseline 
e:nissions and those resulting from the proposed faci liti es. Table 5.7-4 lists assoc iated emission ratcs 
for spent nuclear fuel alternatives includ ing Regionalization by Geography (Elsewhere ). Table 5.7-3 
lists resulting doses to the ma.,imally exposed individual. the population. and workers. These values 
are small in comparison to the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants dose limit of 
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10 millirem per y~<l r . the dost: limit received from background sources of 351 millirem pc! r year. <.Ind 
thl.' popu l<.lt ion dost: from background sources of -10.000 person- rem. 
5.7.7 Alternative 5a - Centralization at Other DOE Sites 
5.7.7.1 Nonradiological Air Quality. Potent ia l impacts to air quality from construction 
ac tivities would include fugitive dust <.Ind I!xhaust emissions from support equipment. The mode ling. 
i.lss~ssment showed that the expected construction-relatl!d air quality impacts should be temporary and 
highly locali zed. 
Emissions resulti ng from normal operation unde r this alternative would include I:>aselinc 
emissions and those i:!sult ing from the startup of the proposed facil ities. Emission rates assoc iated 
wi th stanup would be less than I percent of those from normal operations. Tables 5.7- 1 and 5.7-2 list 
the maximum potent ial concentrations from the proposed alternatives. Ambient concentrations from 
Allemative Sa ac tivi ties would be below applicable standards and guidel ines. 
5.7.7.2 Radiological Air Quality. No mdiological impac ts to the environment would result 
from construction activities. 
Emissions result ing from normal operation under th is alte rnative would include base line 
emissions and those resulting from the proposed fac ili ties. Table 5.7-4 lists associated emission rates 
for spent nuclear fue l alternatives including Centralization at other DOE sites. Table 5.7-3 lists 
resul ting doses to the maximally exposed individual. the populat ion. and worke rs. These values are 
small in comparison to the N<.I tional Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants dose limit of 10 
millirem per year. the dose limit received from background sources of 35 I millirem per year. and the 
population dose from background sources of 40.000 person- rem. 
5.7.8 Alternative 5b - Centralization at the INEL 
5.7.B.1 Nonradiological Air Quality. Potential impacts to ai r qual ity from construction 
ac ti vit ies would include fu giti ve dust and exhaust emissions from support equipment. Tht:! modeling 
assessment showed that the expected construction-related ai r quality impacts should be! temporary and 
highly localized . 
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Emissions resulting from normal operation under thi s alternative would include base line 
emissions and those resulting from the proposed facilities. Emission rates associated with the startup 
of the proposed facilitie ' would be kss than I pe rce:! nt of those from normal operations. Tables 5.7-1 
and 5.7-2 list the maximum potential concentrations from the proposed alternatives. Ambient 
concentrations from Alternati ve 5b activities would be below applicable:! standards and guideline:! ·. 
5.7.8.2 Radiological Air Quality. No radiological impacts to the environment would result 
from construction activities. 
Emi ' sions resulting from normal operation und·: r this alternative would include base line 
emissions and tho e resulting from startup of the proposed facilities. Table 5.7-4 Ii IS aSf::lciated 
emis ion rates for spent nuclear fuel alternatives including Centralization at the INEL. Table 5.7-3 
lists re ulting doses to the maximally exposed individual, the population. and workers . These values 
are small in comparison to the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants dose limit of 
10 millirem per year. the dose limit received from background source of 351 millirem per year. and 
the population dose from background sources of 40.000 person-rem. 
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5.8 Water Resources and Related Consequences 
Thi s section discusses potential environ mental consequences to waler resources under the five 
spent nuclear fu el management alternatives. DOE evaluated eac h alternati ve wi th respect to it s 
impacts on water quality (both surface and subsurface water). water usc. and human health . 
Any liquid efnuents from faci li ties proposed for the spent nuclear fuel alternat ives would be in 
tanks or lined evaporation basins. Under norma l operating conditions. radioactive discharges to the 
soil or directly to the aquifer would not occur. Creed (1994) presen'ts spent nuclear fuel water quality 
data for the analysis of the potential impacts resulting from a hypothetical leak of 20 liters (5 gallons) 
per day from secondary containment around the SNF storage pools during operations. Arnett (1994) 
addresses the effects that this leak could have on the quality of subsurface water resources. 
Preliminary results indicate that there wi ll be no contaminants above maxi mum contaminant levels at 
the INEL boundary result ing from the postulated operational leak. Some storage pools have had 
leakage in the past. However. based on the bouncing accident scenario for high·level waste lank 
fai lure. leakage during the implementation of the selected spent nuclear fuel management alternative 
would cause negligible impacts to water resources (Bowman 1994). Nor.e of Ihe proposed ahernal ives 
for the management of spent nlJc lear fuel would result in any renewed discharges to infihration ponds. 
Section 5. 15 discusses potential releases of hazardous or radioactive liquids as a result of accidents. 
With respect to waler usage, Alternative 4b( I) [Regionalization by Geography (INEL)] and 
Alternative 5b (Centralizalion al Ihe INEL) would consume the largest volume of water·- 1.5 mi ll ion 
cubic meters (400 millio., gallons) over 40 years. The greatest water consumption rate for these 
alternati ves would be 50.000 cubic meters ( 13 million gallons) per year (Hendrickson 1995). This 
incremental usage would represent approxi mately a 0.7 percent increase over Ihe total average 
withdrawal rate at the INEL of 7.4 million cubic meters ( 1.9 bi ll ion gallons) per year. The INEL's 
consumptive use water right is 43 million cubic meters ( 11.4 bill icon gallons) per year. Therefore, 
Altemalives 4b( I) and 5b would have negligibie impact on the quantity of water in the Eastern Snake 
Ri ver Plain Aquifer. 
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5.9 Ecology 
DOE t:xpec.: ts that construction impacts. which would include the loss of some wildlife habi tat 
due 10 land c learing and fac ililY development. would be greatest under Alternative 4b( I) 
IRcgionalization by Geography (INEL») and Alternati ve 5b (Centralization at the INEL). Because this 
construction activity wou ld take place either within the boundaries of heavily developed areas or 
adjacent to those areas. it would have minimal impact on ecological resources. However. construction 
ac ti vities could provide opportunities for the spread of exotic plant species (e .g .. cheatgrass and 
Russian th istle). 
There would be no construction impacts to wetlands. which would be excluded from 
development. and impacts to threatened and endangered species would be unlikely. given the location 
(previously·developed areas) and the maximum size [approximately 3 1 acres (0.125 square 
kilomete rs)] of the affected area. Construcl ion acti vities at the INEL probably would not affect e ither 
of the endangered species identified in Section 4.9.3 (the bald eagle and peregrine fa lcon). Both of 
these birds of prey are associated wi th riparian areas, wetlands. and larger bodies of water (e.g .. 
reservoirs) and inhabil dry upland areas only temporarily when migrating (National Geographic 
Society 1987). Disturbance to other sensitive (but not Federally- listed) species Identified in 
Section 4 .9.3 (e.g., Ihe burrowing owl. non hem goshawk. ferruginous hawk, Swainson' s hawk. 
gyrfalcon. Townsend's western big-eared bat. and pygmy rabbit) would be possible bUI unlikely. given 
the scale of the planned construction. Any impacts would be negligible and shon lived. lasting only 
as long as the construction activities. 
Representative impacts from operations would include the disturbance and displacement of 
animals (such as the pronghorn) caused by the movement and noise of pcrson.,el. equipment. and 
vehicles. Such impacls would be greatest under Alternative 4b( I) [Regional ization by Geography 
(!NEL)] and Altemali ve 5b (Centralization at !NEL), which wou ld involve a generally higher level of 
operational ac tivity: however. these impacts would be mi no:, under all the proposed alternati ves. 
5.9· 1 VOL ~t E I. APPENDIX B 
lJ3q 
5.10 Noise 
As discussed in Section 4.1 D, noises generated on the INEL do not travel off the site at levels 
that affect the general population. Therefore. INEL noise impacts for each alternative would be 
limited 10 those resulting from the transportation of personnel and materials to and from the site that 
would affect nearhy communities. and fro m onsile sources that could affect wi ldlife near those sources. 
Transportation noises would be a function of the size of the workforce (e.g., an increased 
workforce would result in increased employee traffic and corresponding increases in deli veries by 
truck and rai l: a decreased workforce would resu lt in decreased employee traffic and corresponding 
decreases in deliveries). This analysis of traffic noise considered railroad noise and noise from major 
roadways that provide access to the INEL. DOE does not expect the number of freight trains per day 
in the region and through the site to change as a result of any of the alternatives. Rail shipments of 
spent nuclear fuel, regardless of the alternative. would be a small fraction of the rai l traffic on the 
BlackfooHo-Arco Branch of the Union Pacific System line that crosses the INEL. The vehicles that 
transport employees and personnel on roads would be the principal source of community noise impacts 
near the INEL. 
This analys is used the day-night average sound level to assess community noise, as suggested by 
the EPA (EPA 1974, 1982) and the Federal Interagency Commiuee on Noise (FICON 1992). The 
analysis based its estimate of the change in day-night average sound level from the baseline noise level 
for each al ternati ve on projected changes in employment and traffic levels. The analysis also 
considers the combination of construction and operation employment. The baseline noise level is 
comparable to that for the r :v-Action alternati ve. Section 4.10 discusses levels representative of the 
No-Action alternati ve. The traffic noise analys is considered U.S. Highway 20, which employees use 
to access the INEL from Idaho Falls. Changes in noise level below 3 decibels probably would not 
resu lt in a change in community reac tion (FICON 1992). 
The new employment assoc iated with each alternative is a small percentage of the total onsile 
workforce . The max imum new employ ment of about 375 INEL onsite jobs would occur with 
Alternatives 3. 4a, 4b( I). and 5b during the peak construction period beginning in 2001 (see 
Section 5.3. Socioeconomics). No new operations employment is projected for any of the alternatives 
except Alternatives 4b( I) and 5b for which there would be 25 new jobs beginni ng in 2007. The 
cumulative on site workforce under each alternati ve would be greatest in 1995 and would decrease 
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thereafter. The peak cumulative onsi le workforce for Alternatives 4b(2) and 5a would increase in 
1995 by less than I percent compared to the No-Action baseline. There would be a corresponding 
increase in private vehicle and truck trips to the site. The day-night sound level (DNL) at 15 meters 
(50 feet) from the roads that provide access to the INEL probably would increase by less than 
I decibel. The peak cumulative onsi te workforce for Alternative 2 in 1995 would be the same as that 
for the No· Action baseline . 
For any of the alternatives. truck activity would consist of a few trips per day to and from the 
site carrying spent nuclear fuel. This increase in truck trips would not result in a perceptible increase 
in traffic noise levels along the routes to the INEL. The day-night average sound level along U.S . 
Highway 20 and other access routes probably would decrease slightly as a result of the anticipated 
overall decrease in employment levels at the INEL. DOE expects no change in the community 
reaction to noise along this route and other access routes. No mitigation efforts would be required . 
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5.11 Traffic and Transportation 
5.11.1 Introduc!::~ 
Spent nuclear fuel management activities involve the transportation of spent nuclear fuel inside 
the boundaries of the INEL (onsite) and on highways and rail systems outside the boundaries of the 
INEL (offsite). This section summarizes the methods of analysis used to determine the environmental 
consequences of onsile transportation of non naval spent nuclear fuel under normal cond itions 
(incident· free) and of transportation acc idents. The impacts include doses and health effects. 
Appendices D and I of Volume I address consequences of shipments to or from the lNEL that involve 
other DOE sites and spent nuclear fuel·re lated locations. 
5.11 .2 Methodology 
5.11.2.1 Incident-Free Transportation. Radiological impacts were determined for two 
groups of people during normal incident-free transportation: (I) crewmen (drivers) and (2) members 
of the public. Members of the public are persons sharing the transport link (on·link). On·link doses 
were determined for onsile shipments because members of the public have access to the majority of 
the roads on the INEL. Radiological impacts were calculated using the RADTRAN 4 (Neuhauser and 
Kanipe 1992) and RISKIND (Yuan et al. 1993) computer codes. 
The magnitude of the incident-free dose depends mainly on the Transport Index of the shipment 
and the on-link vehicle densities. The Transport Index is defined as the dose rate at I meter 
(3.28 feet) from the surface of a radioac tive package: it is measured in millirem per hour. Spent 
nuclear fuel was assigned a dose rate of 14 millirem per hour at 1 meter from (he shipping container. 
This dose rate yielded a dose rate of 10 millirem per hour at 2 meters (6.56 feet) from the edge of the 
transport vehicle. which is the regulatory limit for an exclusive use vehicle (see Madsen et al. 1986). 
Radiological doses were convened to cancer fatalities using risk conversion factors of 
5.0 x 10·' fat al cancer per person-rem for members of the public and 4 .0 x I O~ fatal cancers per 
person-rem for workers. These risk conversion factors are from Publication 60 of the International 
Commission on Radiological Protect ion (lCRP 1991). 
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Because the onsite transportation of spent nuclear fuel at the INEL is considered rural. no 
inc ident - fr~e nonradiological risk (from exhaust emissions and dust resuspension) was calculated . 
5.11.2.2 Accidents. The doses of the maximum reasonably foreseeable on si te spent nuclear 
fucl transportation accident were calculated using the RISKIND computer code. Doses were analyzed 
for generic rural and suburban population densities. assuming 6 persons per square kilometer for rural 
areas and 719 persons per square kilometer for suburban areas. Areas within 80 kilometers (50 miles) 
of IN EL have population densities between rural and suburban but are closer to the generic rural 
population density. Doses were also assessed under both neutral and stable atmospheric conditions. 
Radiation doses calculated were used to estimate the potential for fatal cancers in the exposed 
population using risk factors developed by the International Commission on Radiological Protection 
(lCRP 1991 ). 
The probability of the maximum reasonably foreseeable onsite spent nuclear fuel transportation 
accident was estimated taking into account spent nuclear fuel handling procedures within the Advanced 
Test Reactor facility as well as factors related to transportation of the spent nuclear fuel. For this 
accident to occur. errors must occur in loading the wrong spent nuclear fuel into the shipping cask. 
radiation surveys of the loaded cask fail to detect abnormally high radiation levels. the transport 
vehicle must breakdown or ro llover during the short trans it between the Advanced Test Reactor and 
the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. and operators fail to ensure that adequate cooling water is 
maintained inside the cask. The estimated probability of this accident is no greater than once in a 
million years. 
The ri sk of the onsile spent nuclear fuel transportation accident was estimated by multiplying the 
accident doses by the accident probability. taking into account the probability of the atmospheric 
condit ions used. The resulting risk value gives a bounding estimate of the annual probability of fatal 
cancers occurring in the local populalion due 10 onsite spent nuclear fuel transponation accidents. 
5.11 .3 Onsile Spent Nuclear Fuel Shipments 
For each spent nuclear fuel management alternative. a small number of onsile DOE spent nuclear 
fuel shipments would be likely each year as a result of continuing reactor operations at the Advanced 
Test Reactor and the Experimental Breeder Reactor-n . The alternatives would not affect the operation 
of these two facilities. thus the shipments between these facilities and the Idaho Chemical Processing 
Plant. integrated over 40 years. would be the same for each spenl nuclear fuel management alternative. 
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Spent nuclear fue l shi pments to the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant from four locations on the 
INEL (inc luding the Test Reactor Area. Argonne National Laboratory-West. Test Area North. and 
Power Burst Faci li ty) were evaluated. The number of shipments would not change wi th alternati ves 
because DOE plans to ship all spent nuclear fuel to the Idaho Chemical Process ing Plant. Alternat ives 
that would ship spent nuclear fuel off the site under Regionalization [Alternatives 4a. 4b( I) and 4b(2)] 
and Centralizat ion (A ltemtives 5a and 5b) would ship it fi rst to the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant 
for canning or other stabilization prior to shipment. DOE estimated the total projected number of 
shipments over 40 years of operation ( 1995-2035) from each fac ility from either historic records or 
current inventories. DOE based the projected number of shipments for Test Reactor Area and 
Argonne National Laboratory-West to the Idaho Chemical Process ing Plant on historic reco rds for 
1987 through 1992. and the doses reflect shipments for 1995 through 2035. The projected number of 
shipments from Test Area North would include Three Mile Island cani sters. Loss of Fluid Test fue l. 
special case commercial fuel. and non-fue l-bearing components stored in the Test Area North pool. 
The projected number of shipments from the Power Burs t Fac ility includes all spent nuclear fuel stored 
at that fac ility. 
Onsite shipments would include those that originated and ended on the INEL site. Shipments 
that originate or te rminate at non-INEL faci lities are offsite shipments. Appendixes 0 and I describe 
the consequences of naval and DOE offsite spent fue l shipments. respectively. Movements o f spent 
nuclear fuel inside (INEL) fac ility fences (e.g .. from the CPP-603 Underwater Storage Facility to the 
Fuel Storage Area) are operational transfers. not onsile shipme nts: there fore. th is section does nol 
consider such shipments. 
5.11 .4 Incidenl-Free Impacts 
The occupational and general population collective doses from on site spent nuclear fuel 
shipments and the resulting incidence of latent cancer fatali ties were calculated. The results are the 
same regardless of alternative. Occupational radiat ion exposure wou ld potentially be 3.4 person-rem, 
resulting in 0 .0014 latent cancer fatalities. General populat ion exposure would potentially be 0.088 
person-rem. resulting in 0.000044 latent cancer fata li ties. 
In addition to collecti ve radiat IOn exposure. the maximally exposed individual doses due to INEL 
onsite SN F shipments were calcu lated for a driver (occupational exposure). a person fo llowing a single 
shipment. and a person standing beside the road as a single shipment passes by (general member of 
the public). The calculated dose to a dri ver would be J.7 rem. assuming that person drove all 
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shipments over 40 years. The calculated maximally exposed individual dose to a person following a 
s ing le shipment covering the longest distance from Test Area North to the Idaho Chemical Process ing 
Plant would be 0 .(' 15 millirem. and to a person exposed to passing shipment at a distance of I meter 
(3.28 feet). the dose wou ld be 0.00 14 miJlirem (Maheras 1995). 
Traffic impacts for the spent nuclear fuel shipments were estimated from data in He ise lmann 
(1994). The maximum number of spent nuclear fuel shipments of 69 1 per year would occur wi th 
Alternati ve Sb. Centralization at the INEL. A maximum 23-percent increase in traffic vo lume per day 
would occur with this alternati ve. based on the estimates of the number of trips required for the 
transport of construction equipment. material, spent nuclear fue l. other wastes. and workers to and 
from the INEL. Even if thi s average daily traffic volume were to occur for 1 hour. the maximum 
traffic volume would increase to 145 vehicles per hour for US 20. US 26. Routes 33 and 22: this 
would not change the base line level of service, which is designated as "free flow." 
5.11 .5 Accident Impacts 
An ons ite spent nuclear fuel transportation acc ident involving the inadvertent shipment o f a short-
cooled fuel element from the Advanced Test Reactor to the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant was 
considered to be the maximum reasonably foreseeable accident. The melted spent nuclear fuel has 
potential to relocate into a critical configuration. However. the probabil ity of a criticality accident is 
much less than I x 10"' per year and would be considered to be not reasonably foreseeable. Table 
5 11 - 1 lists the calculated maximall y exposed individual dose and collective dose to general population 
in the maximally impacted sector and corresponding ri sk of fatal cancers. The dose to the maximally 
exposed individual is considered an occupational exposure. 
As listed in Table 5. 11-1 . the total number of fata l cancers expected in the suburban population 
affected by the transportation for neutral and stable meteorological conditions would be II and 85. 
respective ly. For the neutral case. this would represent a O.O I-percent increase from the number of 
fatal cancers that would be likely from normal incidence in the affected population. For the stable 
case. this would represent a O.20-percent increase from the number of fata l cancers that would be 
likely from normal incidence in the affected population . 
The total number of fatal cancers expected in the rura l population affected by the transpol1ation 
for neutral and stable meteorological conditions would be 0.75 and 6.0. respectively. For the neutral 
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Table 5.11·1. Impacts from maximum reasonably foreseeable spent nuc lear fuel transportation accident on INEL a (using generic rural and suburban 
population densities) . 
Population Accident Offsite Risk of 
density frequencyd Dose to MEle population dose fatal cancer 
categorl Meteorologl (events/yr) (rem) (person-rem) per ye~ 
Rural Neutral I .OxIO-6 7.6xlOl 1.5x I OJ 7.5xlO-7 
(7.5xlO- l) 
Rural Stable 1.0x10-7 2.5x102 1.2x 104 6.0xIO-7 
(6.0xlOo) 
Suburban Neutral 1.0xlO·6 7.6x101 2. lx 104 I.lxIO-S 
(1.IxlOl) 
Suburban Stable 1.0xlO-7 2.5x102 1.7 x 105 8.5xlO-6 
(8.5xIOI) 
a. Source: Enyeart (1994). 
b. Results are for generic rural and suburban population densities . The generic rural population density has an average population of 6 
persons per square kilometer; the generic suburban population density has an average population of 719 persons per square kilometer. For 
comparison. the sector with the highest population density within 80 kilometers (50 miles) is due east of the Idaho Chemical Processing 
Plant and Test Reactor Area at the INEL with an average population density of 53 personsfkm2. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
Neutral meteorology is characterized by Stability Class D. 4 meters-per-second wind speed. and occuring approximately 50 percent of the 
time. Stable meteorology is characterized by Stability Class F. I meter-per-second wind speed. and occuring approximately 5 percent of 
the time. 
Accident frequency includes both the event frequency and the frequency of the meteorology. The frequency of stable meteorology is 
approximately one-tenth the frequency of neutral meteorology. 
Maximally exposed individual located at the point of maximum exposure to the airborne release approximately 160 to 390 meters (525 to 
1.280 feet) downwind. depending on meteorology . For onsite accidents the maximally exposed individual is assumed to be an lNEL 
worker. 
Fatal cancer risk = dose times accident frequency times (lCRP 60 risk factor for fatal cancers). The ICRP 60 risk factor is 5.0 x 10-4 fatal 
cancer per rem for public. 4.0 x 10-4 fatal cancer per rem for workers. For doses of 20 rem or more. the ICRP 60 conversion factor is 
doubled. Numbers in parentheses indicate the total number of fatal cancers in the population if the accident occurs. The maximally 
exposed individual dose is considered an occupational exposure. 
Glse. this wou ld represent a 0.09-percent increase from the number of fatal cancers that would be 
likely from nonnal incidences in the affec ted population. For the stable case. this would represent a 
1.7-pt'rcent incre<lse from thl.! number of fata l C<lnccrs that would be like ly from nomlal incidence in 
the affected population . 
The estimated maximum nonradiological occupational and general population traffic fatalities 
over 40 years due to any of the spent nuclear fuel management alternatives would be 7. 1 x 10'" and 
2.5 x IO.J • respecti vely. These est imated fatalities were based on fata lity ri sk factors for spent fuel 
shipmenlS (Cashwell el. al 1986). 
5.11.6 Onsi1e Mitigative and Preventative Measures 
All onsile shipmenls would be in compliance wilh DOE ID Direclive 5480.3. "Hazardous 
Materials Packaging and Transportation Safety Requirements." These requiremenls provide assurance 
that . under normal conditions. the INEL would meet as-Iow-as-reasonably-achievable conditions. 
reasonably foreseeable accident situations (those with a probability of occurrence greater than I x 10'''/ 
per year) would not result in a loss of shielding or containment or a criticality. and an unintentional 
release of radioactive ma .. \~ rial would generate a timely response. 
DOE would approve Ihe Iype packages used for onsile shipments or would oblain a Nuclear 
Regulalory Commission or DOE cenificale of compliance. If Ihe Type B onsile package did nOI have 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission or DOE certification. the user of the package would have to eSlablish 
how administrative controls and s ite-miligating circumstances would ensure that the package would 
maintain containment and shie lding integrity . The administrative and emergency response 
considerations would provide sufficient control so that accidents wou ld not result in loss of 
containment or shielding. in criticality. or in an uncontrolled release of radioactive material that would 
creale a hazard 10 Ihe heahh and safely of Ihe public or workers. 
In the event of an accident. each DOE site has an established emergency management program. 
This program incorporates act ivi ties associa ted with emergency planning. preparedness. and response. 
Participating government agencies with plans that are interrelated with the INEL Emergency Plan for 
AClion include Ihe Slale of Idaho. Bingham ConnlY. Bonneville CounlY. Buue CounlY. Clark CounlY. 
Jefferson Counly . Ihe Bureau of Indian Affairs. and Fon Hall Indian Reservalio,. When an 
emergency condition exists at a facili ty. the Emergency Action Director is responsible for recognitio •.. 
classification. notification. and protecti ve action recommendations. At INEL emergency preparedness 
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resources include fire protection. radiological and hazardous chemical material response. emergency 
conlrol cenler. Ihe INEL Warning Communication Cenler. Ihe INEL Sile Emergency Operalional 
Center. and medical facili ties. 
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5.12 Occupational and Public Health and Safety 
This s~c ti on prest:nts DOE' s estimah:s o f (h I.: health !!freels from spc:nt nuclear fuc l-n:latcd 
aClIvitic:s ilt the INEL for the followi ng human rel..'eptor groups: 
Invo lved \Vorkcrs - worke rs al the faei liti t'!' involved with spent nuc lt:ar fue l a lternatives. 
including existi ng workers and new hires for se lected a hemat ive 
Maximally Exposed Indiv idua l (MEl) . person res iding at the INEL s ite boundary 
Po pulation - the general o ffs ite population in the INEL region 
Construction Worker - labor force associated with construction activities 
Nonconstruction \Vorker - DOE labor force assoc iated with non construe lion activities 
Radiological. chemical. and industrial safety hazards we re cons idered in the estimates. 
5.12.1 Radiological Exposure and Heallh Effecls 
The measure of impact used fo r evaluation of pOiential rad iation exposures is ri sk of fatal 
cancers. \Vorker and maximally exposed individual effec ts are repon ed as individual radiation dose 
(in re m) and the estimated lifetime probability of fatal cancer. Population effects are repon ed as 
collect ive radiallon dose (in person-rem) and the estimated number of fata l cancers in the affected 
population. Tables 5. 12- 1. 5. 12-2. 5. 12-3. and 5. 12·\ summarize the radiological health effects 
calculations fo r each ahe mative. 
Activities that workers would perform unde r each of the a lternatives would be s imilar to those 
curre ntly performed at the INEL. Therefore. the potential hazards encountered in the workplace wou ld 
be simi lar to those that currently exist a t the INEL. Funher. DOE would mitigate the,e haza rd , with 
occupational and radio logical safety programs operat ing under the same regula tory standards and limits 
that currently apply at the INEL. For these reasons. DOE anticipa tes that the average radi ,,,ion dose 
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Table 5.12-1. Annual occupational radiation exposure and e mployment summary .a 
I '1'J1I1 99J 
No Ao.:llon Ikco.:ntr.t.lil:llion Planning B:a:sis 
II) C!I (3) 
Num~r \)f Work ... rs 
lannuala\· ... rag ... 
o \.:r y<3rs 1995 · 
1()O.J )' 200 
WorkcrColl<ct,,·c 
Do~J 
tpa'Son·r.:mlY<3I'1 0.017 0.0 17 5 . ..1 
3 Sourc<: Johnson t 1(95). 
RcglOn:tit lation 
by Fu...·1 Type 
th)" 
200 
5 4 
Co.:nlrahlat tOn 
at Ottkr DOE C ... ntr.t.h / at lon :11 
S" ... S 1~31 tho.: I{'I;EL (~bI 
to "JO 
0.17 54 
b. Ahem:ttl\· ... ..lIX I ). R"'glon:til z.:t tion by G ... ography (INELI. \'a lu ... s an: the same as thoS!! for Ahcrn ::!.I i\·< ~b. Altematiw..lbt1 ). 
R"'gion:tiIZ:t llon by G<ography tE1sewhl:r.:l. values are the S31Tl(' as th~ for Altcm:tl1\'c ~ :t. 
ThiS I().)'car 3\'C'ra~e yidds consc .... ·3u\'d y high c mplo)'rno:nt : tho.: ..lO-year 3\'<rag< would ~ low<r but dal3 do not UISI. 
83SC'd on thermolununc:scenc< dosirno:uy ~ords . 
Table 5.12-2. Annual nonoccupalional radiation exposure summary . 
199211993 Rcgion:ti il3tion CentraliZ31ion 
No ACllon Dcccnlr:tii1.3lion Pl.1Oning B:a:s is by Fod Type al Other DOE C<ntrahZ3l 10n 3t 
II ) m (3) (43)" Sites (Sa) the INEL (Sb) 
MEl Dose 
t mn:mfy.:an ] .5)( 10'" 35)( 10' ) 8.Ox I0"·' 8.0x I0·} 3.9)(10·) .J.b IO·: 
Popul3l1on 
Dose' 
(penon-
~mlye3t) I.Ox IO·1 1.0xlO·t 1.9)( 10.1 1.9)(10.1 8.3)(10': 3.9)(10-1 
3, Population dose is C:ticul3tcd based on the projected population 10 2000. 
b Altcm:llI \·c..lbt I I, RcglOn:tiizatjon by Geography ( INEL). \·:tiues are the S~ as those for Altern:tt i ...... 5b. Ahcmati\'< Jb(2 ). 
Region:tillation by G ... ography tEtscwhC'rd . \'alues 3I"C' the samC':t5 lhose (or Ahem3ti \'C Sa. 
Table 5.12-3. Annual fatal cancer incidence and probability summary from radiological exposure.3 
199211993 Rcgion:ti il3tion CeOlraliz3Iion Central izallon 
1"0 ACllon Dccenlrahz31ion Planning Basis by Fuel 31 Other OOE at the INEL 
( t ) (1 ) (;\) Typc(..la )" Sit<s (Sa) (5b) 
Worker 
probablhty I )(IO' ~ 1)( 10·' ) )( 10" ' 1)( 10'$ 1)(10·' Ix IO'! 
1IK:ld ... nce 1)( 10' Ix IO,$ 1)(10"' 2x I0· ' 1)(10 ..... 2)(10' ) 
Ma.'IOIm:tily 
e;l;pos<d mcm~r 
of the pubhc 
pr0b3blht y 1)(I O'~ 2)( 10.9 ..lx 10"9 ..lxI 0·9 2)( 10.9 ~xlO' ~ 
Popul3tlon 
InCidence 5)( 10·' 5)( 10' Ix IO ..... Ix 10"'" ..l)(IO'! 2x 10 ..... 
:1 RI~k bClon for the worker (..lxlO ..... probablhty of ()("cum:ncc per r.:m) or orrsltc ~pulallOn 15x lO-l proOOblhl), of lXcumncc per ~ml 
I""C'commended by tho: Int<m:lllon:u ComnmslOn on R:tdlologlc:tl Prolccuon 11CRP 199 11 
b Altcrnall\ c Jb( I ). Regionai llallon by Geograph) (INEl). \·.3I Ut:s arc the same:lS those (or Altcm.3t l\'e 5b Al!cm.3II \'C ..lb(1 ). 
Reglonahz:tlton by Geograrhy (EIs.:whcre l. \·:t lu ... ~ :1TC' the S:tllM: .3$ those for Altcmatu'c 5a 
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Table 5.12-4. 40-year fata l cance r incidence summary from radi ological exposure.a 
19921199J Ccntr:lhl:ll ion at 
No AChon Dcccnlr.l112:lI1on Planning Rcgion:tl iz:ll ion by Othc-r DOE Ccntrn ll zalion at 
tI, 12, 8:J.515 (3) Fuel Type (43) Sih:S (Sa l the INEL t5bJ 
Workcrs 
incidence .. h Il O..! ·"'d O..l 8)( 10 : 8)( I O' ~ 4x I0" 8)(10': 
Popul:Jllon 
Incidence: 2)( 10" 2x lUJ .he IO·' .. h e 10" - 2)(10' ) 8)(10.1 
3. Ahcma!m: 4b11). Regionali7..3 l1on by Geography (INEL), valuc:s an: the san1C as those for Allem:ui\'c 5b. Alternative 4b(2). 
Reglonal il';lIion by Geogr.lphy (Elsewhere). values arc the same as those for Ahemalj\'C 5a. 
and the number of reponable cases of injury and illness would be proponional to the number of 
workers at the INEL under each alternative . 
Table 5.12-1 lists involved worker doses based on an historic annual average dose of 27 mrem 
dClennined from therrr.oluminescent dosimeter data of workers involved in various INEL radio logical 
work over the period 1987 to 1991 (see Appendix F of Volume 2). As mentioned above. the hazards 
associated with spent nuclear fue l activities are the same as the hazards associated with other INEL 
activities. Table 5.12-2 lists the exposure summaries for the maximally exposed individual and offsite 
population. based on radioactive emissions from normal operations and those resulting from startup of 
proposed facilities for the various alternatives. Note that population collective dose is higher than 
worker collective dose only under alternatives I and 2. For the alternatives, there is only I SNF 
worker averaged over 40 years. The nonoccupational popu lation has more people to be exposed. 
When the worker population increases under Alternatives 3, 4, and 5, the worker dose becomes highe r 
than the population dose . Section 5.7 presents the exposore information . Dose calculations are based 
on air emissions only, and not water pathways because none of the alternatives would involve the 
discharge of pollutants to surface waters or to the subsurface . Section 5.8 summarizes water quality. 
Table 5. 12-) semmarizes the fatal cancer inc idence and probability for workers. maximally 
exposed indi viduals. and the offsite population based on the risk factors consistent with those 
recommended by the Inte rnational Commission on Radiological Protection (lCRP 1991). For all 
ahernatives. the probability of developing fatal cancer for any individual would be low. with the 
maximum value of 1 x 10.5 for the in volved worker. The calculated incidence of fatal cancer for the 
total number of workers for each ahernative and the offsite population would be less than I . 
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Table 5. 12-4 summarizes the 40-year projection of fat al cancer incidence associated with the 
worker and offsite populations. The highest involved worker and offs ite population inc idence. 0.1 and 
0.01. respectively. would be associated with Ahemative 5b. 
Radiation doses associated with construction activities would be as low as reasonably achievable 
and no greater than 2 rem per year to any worker. Historical offsite doses a5~0ciated with the INEL 
are summarized in the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Histoncal Dose Evaluation (DOE 1991). 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is conducting a mort: comprehensive reconstruction of 
doses from INEL operations. 
5.12.2 Nonradiological Exposure and Health Eflecls 
The air quality data listed in Tables 5.7-1 and 5.7-2 were used to evaluate health impacts 
assoc13ted with potential exposure to two compound c1assel', criteria pollutant and toxic. Table 5.7-1 
lists fi ve pollutant criteria and Table 5.7-2 lists six tox ic air pollutant compounds. The toxic 
compounds were classified as noncarcinogens or carcinogens. consistent with EPA designations 
published in the Integrated Risk Infonnation SySlem (IRIS) data base . However. the IRIS data base 
does not include sufficient data to perfonn a quantitative inhalation cancer ri sk assessment. 
Nonradiological health effect s (hazard indices) for the INEL worker or maximally exposed 
indi vidual were estimated by summing the ratios of the appropriate pollutant concentrations and the ir 
applicable standards presented in Table 5.7- 1 and Table 5.7-2. Table 5.7-1 presents criteria pollutant 
concentrations at public access roads, which are the maximum of those calcu lated at the INEL site 
boundary. public access roads inside the INEL site boundary. and the Craters of the Moon Wilderness 
Area. The hazard index for the five criteria pollutants is less than I (0.2) for the workers or the 
max imally exposed indi vidual. based on concentrations for the longes t averaging times presen~:rl,.in 
Table 5.7-1 . Table 5.7-2 presents tox ic air pollutant concentrations at the public access roads. which 
are the max imum when compared with concentrations at the INEL s ite boundary and the Craters of the 
Moon Wilderness Area. The hazard index for the tox ic air pollutants is also less than I (0.8) for the 
workers or the maximally exposed indi vidual. based on concentrations with annual averag ing time 
consideration. Accordingly. health effects are unlike ly for e ither the criteria p\..- !Iutants or the toxic air 
pollut a nt ~ from spent nuclear fue l-re lated activities. The hazard index is not a stat istical probability; 
therefore. it cannot be interpreted as such. 
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5.1 2.3 Industrial Safety 
This seclion describes Ihe following measures of impaci fo r workplace hazards: ( I) IOlal 
reportable injuries and illness and (2) falalilies in Ihe work force. This analysis cons idered injury and 
fatalilY rates for construction workers onlY since the alternatives do not result in incremental changes 
in operations employment. Table 5.12-5 lists the maximum annual number of projected injuries and 
illnesses and fatalities for construction workers by alternatives based on the maximum employment 
levels for any year belween 1995-2035. 
Table 5.12-5. Annual industrial safelY heahh effecls incidence summary.'·b 
Con$l1\Ktlon ... orun 
InJuryfil1nc.n 
F;lI.:alJly 
No 
AC'~on 
I I) 
19921 1993 Region;lii l:llion 
Decentr.1liz:nion Pl:lllning Basis by Fud Type 
(2) (3) {4at 
2J 
<1 
2J 
<1 
Centralization :ll 
otner DOE Sites Cenlr:lh l l iion al 
(5a) the INEL (Sb l 
<1 " <1 
:L 1988·11)92 3vcrngcs (or OCCup3lion31 injuryli ltness 3nd (3131 ily r.lIes (or DOE and conl r:1Clor employees. 
b. Sources: DOE (I99Jb) and ~clion 5.3 of this 3Jlpc'ndix . 
c. Ahcm:llh·c 4b(1) v:l lucs:lre the same 3S lhose ror Ahem:lli \·c Sb. Altem:lli\'c 4b(2) \·:t!ues:lre the Jl,l1TlC:IS those (or Ahem:llivo! 5:1. 
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5.13 Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Services 
This section discusses the potential impacts from spent nuclear fuel management on utilities and 
energy at the INEL. It considers the consumption of water, electrical energy, fossil-based fuel s. and 
was tewater discharge at the INEL site. 
5.13.1 Construction 
Table 5.13-1 summarizes estimates of annual requirements for electricity. water, wastewater. and 
diesel fuel for construction ac tivit ies associated with each allemative and compares them to projected 
1995 use levels fur these resources. In general, the smallest increase in the demand for site services 
would resuh from Ahemalives 4b(2) and 5a [Regionalizalion by Geography (Elsewhere) and 
Centralizalion al Olher DOE Siles] and Ihe largeS! increase would be associaled wilh Ahemalives 
4b(l) and 5b [k 'g ionalizalion by Geography «NEL) and Centraiizalion al (NELl . 
Table 5.13-1. Estimated increase in annual electricity. water. wastewater treatment. and fue l 
requirements for construction activities associated with each alternative. 
Projected 
1995 usage 
wlo 
Service Alternative 
Elecnici ty (MWH1 per year) 208.000 
W:lIer (millions of lite rs per year)b 6.450 
San itary wastewater (millions of 540 
liters per year) 
Diesel fuel (liters per year) 5.8JO.OOO 
a. MWH - megawal1 hours. 
b. To convert liters to gall ons. multipl y by 0.264. 
Source: Hendrickson (1995). 
Alternatives 
I and 2 
71 
No increase 
No increase 
6.400 
Esti mated additional demand 
construction 
Ahernatives Alternatives Alternatives 
3 and 4a 4b(l) and 5b 4b(2) and 5a 
150 2.100 10 
2.1 2.2 0.5 
1.5 4.5 0 .5 
8.500 14.000 1.500 
Under Ahemal ives 4b(l) and 5b. Ihe eSl imaled annual increases in ulililY and energy usage rales 
rrom construction ac ti vi ties would be 2. 100 megawatt-hours of electricity. 2.2 million liters 
(580.000 gallons) of waler. 4 .5 million lilers ( 1.200.000 ga llons) of waSiewaler discharge. and 
14.000 lilers (3.700 gallons) of diesel fuel. These changes represent modeSi inc reases ranging from 
near zero percent to 1.0 percent above projected 1995 usage levels and are well within current system 
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capabilities and usage limits (see Section 4. 13). The other alternatives would result in smaller 
increases in energy usage and would have no adverse impact on utility services at the )NEL. 
5.13.2 Operalions 
Table 5.13-2 summarizes estimates of annual requirements for electricity. water. wastewater. and 
fuel for operations ac tivi ties associated with each alternative and compares them to project 1995 INEL 
usage of these resources. In general. the smallest increase in the demand for site services would result 
from Alternatives I and 2 (No-Action and Decentralization) and the largest would be associated with 
Alternatives 4b( I) and 5b [Regionalizat ion by Geography (lNEL) and Centralization at INELJ. 
Table 5.13-2. Estimated increase in annual electrici ty. water. wastewater treatment. and fuel 
requi rerr.ents for operations activi ties associated with each alternative. 
Estimated additional demand 
Projected operation 
1995 usage 
w/o Alternatives Alternatives Alternatives Aliernalives 
Service Alternative I and 2 3 and 4a 4b(1) and 5b 4b(2) and 5a 
Electricity (MWW per year) 208.000 180 2.200 11 .000 2.000 
Water (millions or liters per year)b 6.450 No increase No increase 48 No increase 
Sanitary wastewater (millions or 540 No increase No increase 0.3 No increase 
liters per year)' 
Fue l oil (liters per year) 11.100.000 28.000 330.000 1.1 00.000 300.000 
a. MWH _ megawatt hours. 
b. To convert liters to gallons. multiply by 0.264. .. . 
c. Some industrial wastewater. such as steam condens:ue. is also discharged to evaporation ponds and injectIOn wells. 
Sources: Hendri ckson (1995). 
Under Alternati ves 4b( I) and 5b. the estimated annual increases in utility and energy usage rates 
from operations act ivi ties would be 11 .000 megawatt-hours of e lectricity. 48 mill ion liters (13 million 
ga llons) of water. 0.3 million liters (79.000 ga llons) of waSlewater. and 1.100,000 liters 
(290.000 gallons) of fuel oil. These changes represent modest increases ranging from near zero 
percent to 10 percent and are we ll within current system capabilities and usage limits (see 
Seclion 4.13). The other ahematives wou ld result in smaller increases in energy usage and wou ld 
have no adverse impact on utility services at the )NEL. 
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5.14 Materials and Waste Management 
This section discusses the impacts to the management of materials and wastes at the INEL site 
and Idaho Falls fac ilities as a resuh of the implementation of the spent nuclear fuel management 
alternatives. Ahematives 4b(I). and 5b. both wi th Ihe spenl fuel processing option. each eSlablish the 
upper bou nd of potential impacts on projected rates of generation. treatment. storage. and disposal 
inventories of materials and wastes. Table 5.14-1 and 5.14-2 summarize waste generation projections 
for each a lternative. The tables present average generating rates over the life cycle of each alte rnative 
and maximum annual increments over peak generation periods. 
5.14.1 Alternative 1 - No Action 
Under the No Action Altemalive, 9 cubic meters of induslrial solid waste would be generated 
during construction of the Alternate Fuel Storage Facility for Ihe TAN Pool Fuel Transfer Project at 
Ihe Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. At the completion of this project in 1998. there would be 
485 cubic meters of non-fuel solid low-level waste consisting of Three Mile Island hardware and 
metals that would be removed and dispositioned in a separate project. These impacts apply also 10 the 
description of impac ts for the other spent nuclear fuel management alternatives with the exception of 
Alternatives 4b(2) and 5a. The non-fuel solid low-level waste is already existing: therefore. it is not 
included in Table 5.14- 1 as an increase in low-level waste generation. 
5.14.2 Altemalive 2 - Decentralization 
In general. the character of the impacts to materials and waSle management would be similar to 
those under the No Action Ahemative. 
5.14.3 Altemalive 3 - 199211993 Planning Basis 
Industria l sol id waste would be generated from construction and operation of the various SNF 
projects under Alte rnative 3. This nonradioac ti ve waste would be disposed of in the Central Faci lit ies 
Area landfi ll. Landfi ll space is nonrestrictive for industrial solid waste disposal. Construction phase 
activities wou ld generate a cumulative total of 620 cubic meters of industrial and commercial solid 
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Table 5.14-1. Average annual waste generation projections for se lected SNF management alternatives at INEL.a 
Aver.lgc annual incremenl over 1995 baseline 
Ahcmalive 
No AClion (Ahcmalive I) and Decenlralizalion 
(A hemali vc 2) 
199211993 Planning Basis 
(Ahcmalive 3) and Regionalizalion by Fuel 
Type (Ahemali vc 4a) 
Rcgionali7alion by Geography (INEL) 
(Ahemali vc 4b( I» and Cenlralizalion al INEL 
(Ahcmalive 5b) 
Regionali7.alion by Geography (Elsewhere) 
IAllemalive 4b(2)1 and Cenlralizalion at Olher 
DOE Siles (Ahemalive 5a) 
a. Source: Appendix C of Volume 2 of this EIS. 
Wasle Iype 
Induslrial 
Indu. lrial 
Low-Lcvclb.c 
High-Level 
Mi.~ed Low-Levcl 
Transuranic 
Industrial 
Low-Levelb.c 
High-Level 
Mi~cd Low-Le\el 
Trans Ur.ln ic 
Induslrial 
Low-Level 
High-Level 
Mi~cd Low-Level 
Transuranic 
Phase 
Construclion 
Construclion 
Opemlion 
ConslrUclion 
Oper.llion 
Oper.llion 
Operalion 
Operation 
Conslruclion 
Opcralion 
ConslrUclion 
Opcralion 
Operation 
Oper.llion 
Oper.llion 
ConslrUclion 
Oper.llion 
Oper.llion 
Oper.llion 
Opcralion 
Operation 
Pcriod Increase Annual r.lle 
(years) (percenl) (cubic meIer.; per year) 
1995-1996 0.02 9 
1995-2005 0. 1 62 
1996-2035 1.2 600 
1995-1999 8.6 370 
1996-2035 4.6 200 
1996-2024 0.1 3 
1996-2024 <0.1 <I 
1996-2024 530 32 
1995-2008 0.6 290 
1996-2035 5.0 2.600 
1995-1999 8.6 370 
1996-2035 9.6 410 
1996-2035 15.7 120 
1996-2024 <0.1 <I 
1996-2024 530 32 
1995-1996 <0.1 50 
1996-2024 0.4 210 
1996-2024 1.9 83 
1996-2024 0.1 3 
1996-2024 <0.1 <I 
1996-2024 530 32 
b. Low-level waste from TAN Pool Fuel Transfer Project to be removed and dispositioned in a separate project not included for any alternatives. 
c. Low-level waste generated from disposi tioning and decontamination of fuel racks not included in any alternatives. 
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Table 5.14-2. Peak waste generation highlights for selected SNF management alternatives at INEL.a 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
Ailcmativc 
No AClion (Ailcmalivc I) and Dc.:cntralization 
(Ailemative 2) 
199211993 Plannmg Basis 
(Ailcmative 3) and Rcgionalizalion by Fucl 
Type (Ailcmalive 4a) 
Rcgional i7.ation by Geography (INEL) 
(Ailemative 4b( I)] and Centralizalion at INEL 
(Ailemaliv.: 5h) 
Regionalization by Geography (Elsewhere) 
(Ailcmalivc 4b(2)] and Cenlralization al Other 
DOE Sites (Ailemative 5a) 
Source: AppendIx C of Volume 2 of Ihis EIS. 
Waste type 
Industrial 
Industrial 
Low . L..:vd~·'· 
High·Level 
Mixed Low·Level 
Transuranic 
Industrial 
Low·Levclh .• · 
High·Level 
Mixed Low·Level 
Transuranic 
Industrial 
Low·Level 
High·Level 
Mixed Low·Level 
Transuranic 
Phase 
Construction 
Construction 
Operation 
C onst ruct ion 
Operation 
Concum:nt Activity~ 
Operation 
Operation 
Operation 
Construction 
Operation 
Construction 
Operalton 
Concum:nt Activityd 
Operation 
Operation 
Operation 
Construction 
Operation 
Operation 
Operation 
Operation 
Operation 
Maximum increment over 1995 baseline 
Period Increase Annual rate 
(years) (pc .. ""n!) (cubic meters per year) 
1995·1996 0.02 9 
1995· 1996 0 .4 220 
2005·2021 1.6 810 
1995· 1997 13.4 570 
2005·2024 6.1 260 
1996·1 997 14.2 610 
1997·1998 0.2 6 
1997·1998 <0.1 <I 
1997· 1998 600 36 
1999·2006 0.9 450 
2008·2021 6.8 3.500 
1995·1997 13.4 570 
2008·2024 13.3 570 
1996· 1997 14.2 610 
2005·2024 21.1 160 
1997·1998 <0.1 <I 
1997· 1998 600 36 
1995·1996 <0.1 50 
1996·2024 0 .4 210 
1996·2010 3.1 130 
1996·2024 0. 1 3 
1996·2024 <0.1 <I 
1996·2024 530 32 
Low·level wasle from TAN Pool Fuel Transfer Project to be removed and disposilioned in a separale project nOI included for any alternalives. 
Low-level waste generaled from dispositioning and decontamination of fuel racks nol included in any alternatives. 
Conslruclion and operations occurring simultaneously. 
wash! . Thl! Fuel Receiving. Canning. Characterization. and Shipping Facility will gener.lte the most 
indus"ial wa<le of any of Ihe project<. 490 cubic melers per year from 2005 Ihrough 2035. 
In addi lion. Ihe Fuel Receiving. Canning. Characlerizalion. and Shipping Facilily will generale 
220 cubic meters per year of lo\\'- Ievcl was te during the same period. The Dry Stor:.tge Fac ility would 
genaale an addilional 5 cubic melers of low-leve l wasle annually from 2005 Ihrough 2035 . Includ ing 
liquid low-level wasle. Ihe Increased Rack Capacily and Addilional Increased Rack Capacily projecls 
would increase generation rates by 570 cubic meters annually during construction from 1995 through 
1997. Low-level wasle would decrease 10 approximalely 160 cubic melers per year from 1997 Ihrough 
1999 wi lh Ihe complelion of Ihe Increased Rack Capacily projec!. Liquid low-level wasle would be 
disposed in exisling liquid wasle processing syslems al Ihe Idaho Chemical Processing Plan!. Solid 
radioactive was tes would be packaged and disposed of at the Radioactive Waste Management 
Complex. or incineraled al Ihe Wasle Experimenlal Reduclion FacililY. whichever is appropriale. 
Low-level wasle from reracking fuel racks for Ihe Increased Rack Capaci lY Projecl wi ll be 
decontaminated and disposilioned by a licensed commercial vendor. 
Experimental Breeder Reaclor-II Blankel Trealmenl will generale 7 cubic melers of low-le vel 
wasle for I year from 1997 10 1998. 
The slorage of low-level wasle for incineration is not considered to be restrictive between 1995 
Ihrough 2005. However. beyond 2005. low-level wasle slorage capac lly may become slrained. Use of 
commercial fac ilities to incinerate the backlog of low-level waste is under consideration in order to 
reduce or prevent the accumulation of low-level waste. but no finn commitment or contract has yet 
been eSlablished (EG&G 1993a). 
The Radioaclive Wasle Managemenl Complex appears 10 have adequale disposal capacilY for 
low- level wasle belween 1995 and 2005. However. beyond 2005. addilional capacilY may be required. 
Exce» capacilY would be provided wilh Ihe developmenl of Ihe proposed Low-Level WaslelMixed 
Low- Level Wasle Disposal Facilily (EG&G 1993a). 
The Eleclromelallurgical Process Demonslralion Projecl will generale high-level. mixed low-
le\el. low-level. tr.losuranic. and industria l wastes from the demonstration and testing of new spent 
fue l managemenl process." from 1996 Ihrough 2024. 
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Experimenlal Breeder Reaclor-II Blankel Trealmenl will a lso generale high-level. mixed low-
Il!vd . and transuranic wastes, 
High-k vel wasle wou ld be immobilized afler 2005. and may evenlually be lransponed 10 a 
Federal high-level wasle and spent nuclear fuel reposilory for disposal. Transuranic waSle meeling 
wasle acceplanco crileria 10 be developed could be shipped 10 a pOlenlial Federal reposilory for 
disposal should one be selecled (EG&G 1993a). 
5.14.4 Alternative 4a - Regionalization by Fuel Type 
In general. the character of the impacts to materials and waste management would be similar 10 
those under Alternative 3. 
5.1 4.5 Alternative 4b(ll - Regionalization by Geography (INELl 
The char.lc ter and intensity of impacts on waste management activities at the INEL are similar to 
Ihose under Ahemalives 3 and 4a for some of Ihe SNF managemenl projecls including Ihe TAN Pool 
Fuel Transfer Projecl al Ihe tdaho Chemical Processing Plan!: Ihe Increased Rack Capacily and 
Addilional Increased Rack Capacily projecls: Ihe Experimenlat Breeder Reaclor-II Blanket Trealmenl 
facililY: and Ihe Eleclromclallurgical Process Demonslralion Projec!. Under Ahemalive 4b(t). Ihe 1')' 
Fuel Slorage Faci lily is expanded and Fuel Receiving. Canning/Characlerizalion. and Shipping Facilily 
waste streams decrease relat ive to Alternatives 3 and 4a: however. the net effect of these differences 
on industrial/commercial solid waste generation and low-level waste generation for both construction 
and operation resuhs in waste generation rates similar to those under Alternatives 3 and 4a. 
The increase in average and peak general ion rales over Ahemalives 3 and 4a (Tables 5. 14- 1 and 
5.14-2) is due 10 Ihe Spent Fue l Processing 0Plion included under Ahernalive 4b( I). which accounlS 
for the relati ve increase in generation rates over Alternatives 3 and 43. Fuel processing would be done 
in order to stabi lize the spent nuclear fuel and remove ri sks associated with storage and disposal. and 
to manage the resultant high-level was te in a cost-effective manner. If th is alternative were pursued 
aggressively. the generated high-level waste residual resulting from segregaring fi ss ile material from 
the spent nuc lear fuel may require additional high-level waste tankage. This increase in capacity 
wou ld be covered by Ihe High-Level Tank Farm New Tanks projecl desc ri bed in Volume 2 of Ihe EIS. 
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Capacity discu ions for industriaUcommercial solid waste and low-level waste under 
Alternative 3 apply to Alternative 4b( I) . 
I 5.14.6 Alternative 4b(2) - Regionalization by Geography (Elsewhere) 
Construction pha e activities would generate a cumulative total of 50 cubic meters of industrial 
and commercial solid waste. Overall, waste generation would be lower than all of the SNF 
management alternatives, with the exceptions of the No Action and Decentralization Alternatives. 
5.14.7 Alternative Sa - Centralization at Other DOE Sites 
In general, the character of the impacts to materials and waste management would be imilar to 
those under Alternative 4b(2). 
5.14.8 Alternative 5b - Centralization at the INEL 
In general. the character of the impacts to materials and waste management would be similar to 
those under Alternative 4b( I). 
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5.15 Accidents 
5.15.1 Introduction 
Ac tivit ies associated wi th the transportat ion. receipt. handl ing. slabih l at ion. and storage of spent 
nuclear fue l at the INEL in volve substantial quant ities of radioactive materials and limited quantities of 
toxic chemicals. Under certain ci rcumstances. the potential ex ists for acc idents in volving these 
mate ri als to occur. which would result in exposure to INEL worke rs or membe rs of the public. or 
contamination of the surrounding environment. Accidents can be categorized as follows: 
Abnormal events such as minor spills 
Design-basis events. which a facility is designed to withstand 
Beyond-design-basis events, which a facility is not des igned to wi thstand (but whose 
consequences it may neverthe less mitigate) 
This section summari zes postulated radiological and toxic material accL lents in each accident 
category and describes thei r estimated consequences to workers. members of the public. and the 
environment. The scope of this sec tion is limited to accidents wi thin facilities: transportatic n 
accidents between facilities are addressed in Section 5.11. {Further information on the accidents 
summarized in this section. as well as information on other "lower consequence" accidents analyzed. is 
provided in Siaughterbeck et al. (1995»). 
An acc ident is a series of unexpected or undesirable "initiating" events that lead to a re lease of 
radioac tive or toxic mate rials within a facilit y or to the environment. This analysis defines initiating 
events that can lead to a spent nuclear fuel · related facili ty accident in three broad categories: external 
initiators. internal initialOrs. and natural phenomena init iators. External init iators (e.g .. ai rcraft crashes. 
and nearby ex plosions or toxic material releases) originate outside the facility and can affect the abili ty 
of the fac il ity to maintain confinement of radioactive o r hazardous material. Internal initiators 
originate within a fac ility (e .g .. equipme nt failure s or human error) and are usually the result of fac ility 
operation. Sabotage and terrori st acti vities (i .e .. intentional human initiators) might be e ither external 
or in te rna l ini tiators. Natural phenomena initiators include weather· re lated (e.g .. floods and tornadoes) 
and seismic events. Th is analysis de fines initiato rs in terms of e vents that cause, directly or indirectly. 
5. 15- 1 VOLUME I. APPENDIX B 
!uJ, 
il rt' k<Jsc of radioactive o r h ~zil rdou s materials within a fac ility or to the environme nt by fai lure or 
by pa~s of confinclllcnt. 
TJblc~ 5.15. 1 through 5.15·4 ~uml11ari ze the radio logical results of thc ilnalyses described in this 
scc tion. Section 5 .15.2 summarizes historic acc idents at the INEL associilted with spent nuclcar 
fuel-reliltcd act ivi ties. Scction 5.15.3 describes the methodology used to identify and evaluilte potential 
rildio logical acc idcnts ilssociated with spent nuclear fuel receipt. handling. storage. <Jnd intra-arcil 
transportation activiti es. Sections 5. 15.4 and 5. 15 .5 evaluate thr.: postulated maximum reasonably 
fo reseeable radiological and toxic material ilccidents. respec ti vely. 
5.15.2 Historic Perspective 
Many of the ilctions proposed under the different spent nuclear fuel management alternatives 
considered in this EIS are continuations or vari .,tions of past practices at the INEL. DOE has analyzed 
consequences to the public from hi"toric INEL accidents in detail and has determined them to be low 
(DOE 1991). 
Consequences of acc idents can involve fatalities, injuries. or illness. Fatalities can be p-ompt 
(immediate ). such as in construction acC:dents. or latent (delayed). such as cancer caused by radiation 
exposure. While public comments received in scoping meetings for th is EIS included many concerns 
about potential accidents at the INEL, the historic record demonstrates that DOE facilities . including 
the INEL. have a very good safety record. particularly in comparison to commercial industries 
(e.g .. agriculture and construction). Figure 5. 15-1 shows the rate of worker fatalities at the INEL and 
o ther DOE sites (DOE 1993b) compared to national-average rates that the National Safety Counci l 
compiled over a IO-year period for various industry groups (NSC 1993) and State of Idaho average 
rates (Hendri x 1994). While past accident occurrence rates are not necessarily indicat ive of future 
rates. the historic record renects the DOE emphasis on safe operations. 
The re have been no prompt fatalities and no known laten t fatalities to members of the public 
from accidental releases of radioacti ve or hazardous materials associated with spent nuclear fue l 
management activities in the 40-year history of INEL faci lities. although some accidents associated 
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Table S.IS-I. Summary of radiological accidents for worker located 100 mete rs downwind from the point of release. 
Alternative 3 A Iternat i ve 4a> Alternative Sa I\lternative Sb 
Acciuent Alternative I Alternative 2 199211993 Regionalization Centralization Centralization at 
Descri ptiun Attrihute No Action Dcccntrali73tion Planning Bas is hy Fucl Type at Othe r Sites the INEL 
I. Fuel hanuling aC~ldent. fucl C(1I1SeljUCnces' (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) 
pin breach. venting of nohlc Adjusted annual 1.0x 10'! 1.2x10 ! 3. lxlO I 4.8xI0·1 8.6xlO·2 2.0xI0·' 
gases and iodine at HFEF" frequency 
Adjusted point (d) (d) Cd) (d) (d) (d) 
estimate of ri sk' 
2. Uncontrolled chain re:.ction Conseljuences" 3.9x1O s 3.9xlO·) 3.9xI0·s 3.9x I0·s 3.9xI0· ~ 3.9x I0· ~ 
(criticality) at ICPP' Adjusted annua l 1.0xlO l l.OxIO·' 1.0xI0·) 1.0x 10·l l.Ox I 0') 1.0x I0·' 
frequency 
Adjusted point 4.0xIO·· 4 .0xI0·K 4.0xI0·R 4.0xI0·K 4.0x I0·K 4.0xI0·· 
e timate of ri sk' 
3. Fuel melting of small Consequences' 2.SxI0'" 2.5xI0'" 2.5xI0'" 2.5xI0'" 2 .5xI0" 2.5xI0'" 
number of assemblies at Adjusted annual 1.0xI0·s 1.0x10·s 1.0x 10's 1.0x 10'\ 1.0xIO·s 1.0xI0·s 
HFEF resu lting from frequency 
~ seismic event and cell breach 
VI 
Adjusted point 2.5xI0·· 2 .5xI0·· 2.5xI0·· 2.5xI0·9 2.5xlO·· 2.5x 10" 
, 
estimate of ri sk' w 
4. M:nerial release from HFEF Consequences' 1.8x I 0') 1.8xI0·) 1.8x I 0') 1.8xI0·) 1.8xJO·) 1.8x I 0') 
resulting from aircraft crash Adjusted annual 1.0x 10·7J 1.0x 10.7, I .OxI0·7• I.OxI0·7, 1.0x I 0 .7, 1.0x I 0 .7• 
and ensuing fire frequency 
Adjusted point 1.8xI0·1O 1.8x I 0.10 l.8x 10.10 1.8x I 0.10 1.8x 10.10 1.8x 10.10 
estimate of ri sk' 
5. [n.ldvenent nuclear cri ticality Consequences' (h) (h) (h) (h) (h) 3.6xI0·J 
at [CPpf CPP-666 during Adjusted annual (h) (h) (h) (h) (h) l.OxIO·) 
processing frequenC) 
< Adjusted point (h) (h) (h) (h) (h) 3.6x 10'· 0 
c-
esti mate of ri ~ , 
c 6 . Hydrogen explosion in [CPpf Consequences' (h) (h) (h) (h) (h) (d) :s:: 
m CPP-666 dissolver Adjusted annual (h) (h) (h) (h) (h) (d) 
:-
}> frequency 
" Adjusted point (h) (h) (h) (h) (h) (d) 
" m Z estimate of risk' Q 
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Table S.lS-1. (continued). 
7. 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
g. 
h. 
Alternmive J Alternative 4a' Alternative Sa Alternative 5b 
Accident Alternative I Alternative 2 199211993 Regionalization Centralization Centralization at 
Description Attribute No Action Decentralization Planning Basis by Fuel Type at Other Sites the INEL 
Inadvertent dissolution of Consequencesc (h) (h) (h) (h) (h) (d) 
30-day cooled fuel at ICPpf Adjusted annual (h) (h) (h) (h) (h) (d) 
CPP-666 frequency 
Adjusted point (h) (h) (h) (h) (h) (d) 
estimate of risk' 
The radiological accident results for Alternative 4b( I). "Regionalization by Geography (INEL)." are conservatively assumed to be the same as those presented for 
Alternative 5b, as discussed in Section 5.15.4.4. The radiological accident results for Alternative 4b(2). "Regionalization by Geography (Elsewhere)," are identical to those 
presented for Alternative Sa, as discussed in Section 5.15.4.4. 
HFEF = Hot Fuel Examination Facility. 
Consequences are presented in terms of latent fatal cancers based on conservative (95 percentile) meteorological conditions. Consequences are calculated by multiplying the 
estimated exposure (i .e .. dose) by an International Commission on Radiological Protection conversion factor of 4.0 x 10'" cancer per rem for an adult worker (or 8.0 x 10'" 
cancer per rem if the estimated exposure is greater than 20 rem). 
The safety analysis report utilized for this accident analysis does not provide this information because it was developed prior to DOE Order 5480.23 requiring this information. 
As demonstrated by the dose to the maximally exposed individual. consequences to the public from Accident I could be less than the conse"Jences from Accidents 2 through 
4. However. given the high frequency for Accident I compared to Accidents 2 through 4. the risk could actually be greater than for Accidents 2 through 4. 
This attri hute is equal to consequences x frequency (events per year). The information is based on conservative (95 percentile) meteorological conditions. 
ICPP = Idaho Chemical Processi ng Plant. 
Thi~ frequency is a qualitative bounding estimate for a potent- II aircraft crash, as di scussed in Section 5.15.6.4. 
Resu ming processi ng at the I EL under this alternative is n considered. 
Table 5.15-2. Summary of radiological accidents for individual located at the nearest point of public access within the site boundary. 
Alternative 3 Alternative 4a' Alternative 5a Alternative 5b 
At"Cident Alternative I Alternative 2 199211 993 Regionalization Centralization Centralization at 
Descript ion Allrihute No Action Decentralization Pl anning Basis by Fuel Type at Other Sites the INEL 
I. Fuel handling accident. fuel Consequences' (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) 
pin breach. venting of nohle Adjusted annual 1.0xI0·) 1.2 x I 0.1 3. lxIO·/ 4.8xI0·1 8.6xI0·1 2.0xI0·' 
gases and iodine at HFEP frequency 
Adjusted point (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) 
estimate of ri sk' 
2. ncontrolled chain reaction Consequences" 7.0xI0·' 7.0xI0·' 7.0x I 0.1 7.0x I 0" 7.0xI0·' 7.0xI0·' 
(criticality) at ICPr' Adjusted annual 1.0xI0·) LOxIO" LOxIO') LOxIO" 1.0xI0·) LOx I 0" 
frequency 
Adjusted point 7.0x I 0"'0 7.0x I 0.111 7.0xI0"'o 7.0xI0·1U 7.0xI0·H' 7.0xI0·1U 
estimate of ri sk' 
3. Fuel melting of small Consequences< 3.3x I 0'" 3.3xI0·· 3.3xI0·· 3.3x 10" 3.3xI0'" 3.3xI0·· 
numhcr of assemblies at Adjusted annual !.OxIO·s LOxIO" 1.0xI0·j 1.0xI0·j LOxIO's 1.0xI0·j 
HFEF resulting from frequency VI seismic event and cell breach 
VI Adjusted point 3.3xI0·' 3.3xI0·' 3.3xI0·' 3.3xI0·' 3.3xI0·' 3.3xlO·' 
I estimate of ri sk' 
'..11 
4. Material release from HFEF Consequencc.s< L6x I 0'" 1.6xI0·· L6x I 0'" 1.6xI0·· 1.6xlO·· 1.6xI0·· 
resulting from aircraft crash Adjusted annual LOx I 0'" LOx I 0·7e 1.0x I O" ~ 1.0x 10"& LOxIO"e LOx 10'" 
and ensuing fire frequency 
Adjusted point L6xI0'" L6xlO'" L6xIO'" L6xI0'" L6x I 0'" L6xI0'" 
estimate of risk' 
5. Inadvertent nuclear criticality Consequences< (h) (h) (h) (h) (h) 2.5xlO·$ 
ICPP' CPP-666 during Adjusted annual (h) (h) (h) (h) (h) 1.0xI0·) 
processing frequency 
< Adjusted point (h) (h) (h) (h) (h) 2.5xI0·· 0 estimate of ri sk' r 
c: 6. Hydrogen explosion in ICPr' Consequences< (h) (h) (h) (h) (h) (d) s:: 
m CPP-666 dissolver Adjusted annual (h) (h) (h) (h) (h) (d) 
:.- frequency 
." (h) ." Adjusted point (h) (h) (h) (h) (d) m 
z estimate of risk' 
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Table 5.15-2. (continued). 
7. 
a. 
h. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
g. 
h. 
Allernative J Alternative 4a' Alternative Sa Allernative 5h 
Accident Alternative I Alternative 2 199211993 Regionalization Centralization Centralization at 
Description Attribute Nu Action Decentralization Planning Basis by Fuel Type at Other Sites the INEL 
Inadvertent d issolut ion of Consequences' (h) (h) (h) (h) (h) (d) 
3~-day cooled fuel at ICppl AdjuSh:d annual (h) (h) (h) (h) (h) (d) 
CPP-666 frequency 
Adjusted point (h ) (h) (h) (h) (h) (d) 
estimate of risk' 
The radio logical accident results fo r Allernative 4b( I). "Regionalization by Geography (INEL)."· are conservatively assumed to be the same as those presented for 
Allernative 5b. as discussed in Sectiun 5. 15.4.4. The radiological accident results fur Allernative 4h(2). "Regionalization by Geography (Elsewhere)."' are identical to those 
presented fo r Alternative Sa. as discussed in Section 5.15.4.4. 
HFEF = Hot Fue l Examination Faci lit) . 
Consequences are presented in terms of latent fata l cancers based on conservati ve (95 percentile) meteorological conditiuns . Consequences a re calculated by multiplYing the 
estimated ex posure (i .e .. dose) by an International Commission on Radiological Protection conversion faclOr of 5.0 x 10'" cancer per person-rem for the offsite populatIOn 
(or 1.0 x 10') cancer per rem if the estimated population exposure is greater than 20 rem for any individual member of the public). 
The safety ana lysi report utilized for this accident analysis docs not provide this information because it was developed prior to DOE Order 5480.23 requiring this information. 
As demonstrated by the dose to the maximally exposed individual. consequences to the public from this accident could be less than the consequences from Accidents 2 through 
4. However. gi en the high frequency for thi s accident compared to Accidents 2 through 4. the risk could actua lly be greate r than for Accidents 2 through 4 . 
This attrihute is equal to consequences x frequency (events per year). The informat ion is based on conservative (95 percentile) meteorological conditions. 
ICPP = Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. 
Thi s frequency is a qualitative bounding estimate for a potential aircraft crash. as discussed in Section 5 .15.6.4. 
Resuming proce si ng at the INEL under th is allernative is not considered. 
Table 5.15-3. Summary of radiological accidents for maximally exposed hypothetical individual located at the nearest site boundary . 
Alternative 3 Alternative 43' Alternative 5a Alternative 5b 
Ac<.:ident Alternative I Alternative 2 199211993 Regionalization Centralization Centralization at 
Description Attribute No Action Decentral izatiun Planning Basis by Fuel Type at Other Sites the INEL 
I. Fuel ham.ll ing accident. fucl Cunsequences' I.OxIO " LOxIO " LOxIO " LOxIO ' 1.0x 10-· LOx 10'· 
pin breach. venting of nohle Adj usted annual LOxIO : L2x 10-: 3. lxI0 : ·UlxIO-: 8_6x1Ol 2.0xI0-1 
gases and iodin.: at HFEF" frequency 
Adjusted point LOx I 0-' J.2xIO · 3_1 x 10 ' .t8x IO-K 8_6xI0" 2.0xI0-7 
estimate of risk" 
2_ Uncontrolled chain reaction Consequences' 5.0xI0-7 5_0xI0-7 5.0xI0-7 5_0xI0-7 5_0xI0-7 5.0xlO-1 
(cri ticality) at ICPr" Adjusted annual I_OxIO-l LOx I O·l 1.0xI0-) LOx 10-' LOx IO-l I_Ox IO·J 
frequency 
Adjusted point 5_0xlO 10 5.0x 10-10 5_0xlO-10 5.0xI0-,n 5.0xI0-1O 5_0x10 HI 
estimate of riskJ 
3_ Fucl melting uf small Consequence " 2_5xI0·l 2.5xIO-) 2.5x 10' 2_5xlO-J 2.5xI0-J 2.5x I0-' 
number of assemblies at Adjusted annual LOx 10·l 1.0xIO-s l.Ox IO-l 1.0x10-s 1.0x I0-s LOx 10-s 
HFEF resulting from frequency 
VI seismic event and cell hreach 
Adjusted point 2.5xI0-K 2_5xI0-K 2_5xI0·8 2_5x I 0-' 2.5x 10-8 2_5x I ()-. 
V. 
I estimate of riskJ 
-.J 
4 - ~,iatenal release from HFEF Consequences' 2.5xI0-l 2.5xI0-J 2.5xJQ-J 2_5xI0-J 2.5x I0·J 2.5xlO-J 
resulting from aircraft crash Adjusted annual 1.0x 10'u LOx 10-71 LOx 10-71 LOx 10-71 1.0xlO-7I l.Ox 10·n 
and ensuing tire frequency 
Adjusted point 2.5xI0·'O 2.5xJQ-'O 2.5x 10-10 2.5xJQ-1O 2.5xlO-'O 2_5x 10-10 
estimate of ri skJ 
5_ Inadvertent nuclear criticality Consequences' (g) (g) (g) (g) (g) L4x IO-s 
ICPr" CPP·666 during Adjusted annual (g) (g) (g) (g) (g) LOx 10-) 
proces ing frequency 
< Adjusted point (g) (g) (g) (g) (g) L4xI0-~ 0 esti mate of ri skJ 
I 
!: 6. lIydrogen explo ion in [CPr" Consequences' (g) (g) (g) (g) (g) 3.2xJQ-l 
r.1 CPP·666 dissolver Adjusted annual (g) (g) (g) (g) (g) 1.0x1O·s 
-
> frequency 
"C Adjusted point (g) (g) (g) (g) (g) 3_2xlO-1l "C 
m 
estimate of riskJ Z 
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7. 
a. 
b. 
C. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
g. 
Alternative 3 Alternative .la' Alternative 5a Alternative 5b 
Accident Alternative I Alternative 2 199:!J 1993 RegionaliLation Centralization Centralilation at 
Desniption Attribute No A,tion Decentralilation Planning Basis by Fuel Type at Other Sites the INEL 
Inadvertent di s~olution of Consequences' ( g) (g) (g) (g) (g) I.5x IO· ~ 
30-day cooled fuel :ll ICPP< Adjusted annua l (g ) (g) (g) (g) (g) 1.0xI0·' 
CPP-1)66 frequency 
Adjusted point (g ) (g ) (g) (g ) (g ) I.5x 10.11 
estimate of ri skd 
The radiological at'cident results fo r Alternative 4bfl). "RegionalizJ tion by Geography (INEL). " are conservatively assumed to be the same as those presented for 
Alternati"e 5b. as discussed in Section 5. 15.4.4. The radiologica l accident results for Alternative .lb(2). "Regionalization by Geography (Elsewhere)." are identical to those 
presented for Alternative 5a. as discussed in Section 5. 15.4 . .l. 
HFEF = Hot Fuel Examination F3cility. 
Conseljuences are presented in terms of latent fatal cancers based on cunservative (95 percentile) meteorological condit.ions. Consequences arc calculated by multipl ying the 
estimated e~posure (i .e .. dose) by an International Commission on Radiologica l Protection conversion factor of 5.0 x 10" cancer per person-rem for the offsite population 
(or 1.0 x 10 ' can,er per rem if the estimated population e~posure is greater than :20 rem for any individual member of the public). 
This is equal to consequences x frequen('Y (events per year) . The information is based on conservative (95 percentile) meteorological conditions. 
ICPP = Idaho Chcmil.:al Processing Plant. 
This freljuency is a qualitative hounding estimat.; fo r a potential aircraft era h. as di scussed in Section 5.15.6.4. 
Resuming proces~ing at the INEL under this alternative is not considered. 
/~q 
Table 5.15-4. Summary of radiological accidents for offsi te population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) from the point of release. 
Alternative J Alternative 4a' Alternative 5a Alternative 5b 
AlTidl'll1 Alternati ve I Alternative 2 1992/1993 Regionalizatinn Centralization Centralization at 
Desl:riptil1n Attrinute u Action Decentralization Planning Basis hy Fuel Type at Other Sites the INEL 
I. fuel h~ndling alTidcllt. fuel Consequences' (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) 
pin nreach. vcnting of nohle f\djusted annual I.Ox IO' I.2x 10.1 J . lxI 0·2 4.8x I0·2 8.6x I0·2 2.0xI0·' !!a~cs and iodine at HFEP frequcncy 
Adjusted point (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) 
cstimate of ri sk' 
.., 
nwntrnlled chai n reaction Cllnsequences< :1 .0xI0'" 3.0x I0'" :1 .0xI0'" :1 .0xI0'" 3.0xI0'" J .Ox IO'" 
(criticality ) at ICPP' Adjusted annual LOx 10" LOx 10" LOx 10' 1.0x I0·) LOx I 0') LOx 10') 
frequency 
Adjusted point 3.0x10 I :1 .0xI0·7 3.0xI0·7 3.0xI0·7 J .OxI0·7 3.0xI0·7 
estimate of risk' 
J . fuel melting of small Consequences' 7.0xI0" 7.0x1Oo 7.0x1Oo 7.0x1Oo 7.0x1Oo 7.0x1Oo 
numher nf asse mblies at Adjusted annual LOx I O·~ LOxlO' ~ 1.0xI0·s LOxIO's LOxlO' ~ LOx 10's 
HFEF resulting from frequency 
~ seismic event and cell hreach 
VI Adjusted point 7.0xI0's 7.0xI0·s 7.0x lO's 7.0xI0·s 7.0xlO·s 7.0xI0·s 
-0 estimate of risk' 
.1. Materi al release from HFEF Consequences' LOx 10° LOx 10° LOxlOo LOx 10° LOxlOo LOxl Oo 
re ulting from ai rcraft crash Adjusted annual LOx 10.7, LOx 10.7, LOx 10.7, LOx I 0.7& I.OxI0·7, 1.0x 10.7, 
and ensuing fi~e frequency 
Adjusted point LOx 10.7 1.0x 10.7 I.OxI0·7 LOx I 0.7 LOx10·7 LOx 10.7 
estimate of ri k' 
5. Inadvenent nuclear criticality Cons'!quences' (h) (h) (h) (h) (h) 2.8xI0·) 
ICPP' CPP-666 dunng Adju ted annual (h) (h) (h) (h) (h) 1.0x I0·) 
procc~sing frequency 
< Adjusted point (h) (h) (h) (h) (h) 2.8xI0·
6 
0 
r-
estimate of ri sk' 
!: 6. Hydrogen explosion in ICPpf Consequences' (h) (h) (h) (h) (h) 4. l xI 0'" 
m CPP-666 di olver Adjusted annual (h) (h) (h) (h) (h) LOx 10's 
> frequency 
" Adjusted point (h) (h) (h) (h) (h) 4. lxI0 · 
" m z esti mate of ri sk' 
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Table 5.15-4. (continued). 
7. 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
g. 
h. 
Ahernat ive 3 Alternative 4a' Alternative Sa Alternative 5b 
Accident Alternative I Alternative 2 199211993 Regionalization Centrali7.ation Centrali7.ation at 
De cription Attrihute No Action Decentrali zation Plann ing Sa'I' by Fuel Type at Other Sites the INEL 
Inadvertent di ssolution of Consequences' (h) (h) (h) (h) (h) 1.5x1O·1 
30-day cooled fuel at ICPp f Adjusted annual (h) (h) (h) (h) (h) 1.0x10·6 
CPP-666 frequency 
Adjusted point (h) (h) (h) (h) (h) 1.5x JO.8 
estimate of ri k' 
The rad io logical accident results for Alternative 4b(l). "Regionalization by Geography (INEL)." arc conservatively assumed to be the same as those presented for 
Alternati ve 5b. as di scussed in Section 5. 15.4.4. The radiological accident results for Alternative 4b(2) . "Regiona li7.ation by Geography (Elsewhere)." are identical to those 
presented for Ahernative Sa. as di scussed in Section 5. 15.4.4. 
II FEF = Hot Fue l Examination Faci lity . 
Consequences are presented in terms of latent fat al cancers based on conservative (95 percentile) meteorological conditions. Consequences are calculated by muhiplying the 
estimated exposu re ( i.e .. dose) by an International Commission on Radio logical Protection conversion factor of 5.0 x JO-I cancer per person-rem for the offsite population 
(o r 1.0 x 10') cancer per rem if the estimated population exposure is greater than 20 rem for any individual member of the public). 
The safe ty analysis report utilized for this accident analysis docs not provide this information because it was developed prior to DOE Order 5480.23 requiring th is information. 
As demon trated by the dose to the maxi mally exposed individual. consequences to the public from this accident could be less than the consequences from Accidents 2 through 
4. However. given the high frequency for thi s accident compared to Accidents 2 through 4. the ri sk could actually be greater than for Accidents 2 through 4. 
This attribute is equal to consequences x frequency (events per year). The information is based on conservative (95 percenti le) meteorological conditions. 
ICPP = Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. 
This frequency is a qualitative bounding estimate for a potential ai rcraft c rash. as discussed in Section 5 .15.6 .4. 
Re uming proce sing at the INEL under thi s alte rnative is not considered. 
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Figure 5.J5·1 . Comparison of fata lity rates among workers in various industry groups. 
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with spent nuclear fuel management activities have occurred. In 1958. filters in the Idaho Chemical 
Processing Plant CPP·601 Fuel Element Cutting Facility failed during deconlamination operations. An 
estimated 100 curies of part iculate radioactivity were re leased over an area of approximately 200 acres 
(0 .809 square kilometers) in the vicinity of the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. Approximately 
39 curies became airborne. resulting in an estimated dose of 0.11 millirem to a hypothet ical offsite 
individual located at the nearest site boundary (DOE 1991 ). 
Th ree inadvertent nuclear chain reactions (i .e .. nuclear criticalilies) occurred al the Idaho 
Chemical Processing Plant in 1959. 1961. and 1978 . The 1959 critical ity occurred in a process waste 
and cell fl oor drain collec tion tank. Avai lable evidence indicates that the critical solution resulted 
from an accidental transfer of concentrated uranyl nitrate solution to the waste collection tank through 
a line normally used to transfer decontaminating solutions to the waste tank . The est imated airborne 
re lease from this incident was 3.700 curies. and the estimated dose to the maximally exposed 
hypothet ical individual located at the nearest site boundary was 1.1 millirem (DOE 1991). The 1961 
and 1978 nuclear criticali ties resulted from spent nuclear fuel dissolution and reprocessing act ivi ties. 
Estimated releases to the environment as a result of these accidents were 120 curies and 620 curies for 
the 196 1 and 1978 accidents. respectively. and the calculated radiation doses at the nearest site 
boundary were less than 0.1 millirem for both releases (DOE 1991). 
The INEL Fluorinel and Storage (FAST) facility (CPP·666). which historically performed spent 
nuclear fuel-re lated reprocessing acti vi ties. is currently shut down. Activities are under way to place 
this facility in a pennanent shutdown mode. Restart of this facility and the potential for an inadvertent 
nuc lear crit icality resulting from operating chis faci lity are considered in Sections 5.15.4.4 and 5.15.4.5 
[Alternatives 4b(1) and 5b. respectively]. Because DOE has no current plans to resume spent nuclear 
fu el reprocessing ac tivities at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. events similar to the three historic 
nuclear crit icalit ies discussed above will be unlikely in future INEl spent nuclear fuel -related 
acti vilies. Addit ional information regarding the historical accidents summarized above is provided in 
Siaughterbeck et al. ( 1995). 
In the sile 's 40·year history. three prompt fata lities of INEL workers have occurred by acc idents 
involving radiation exposure. In 196 1. a steam explosion resulting from an unplanned nuclear 
criticality in an experimental reactor (Stationary Low-Power Reactor No. I) killed these workers. who 
were manually moving reactor control elements. The estimated dose from this accident to a 
hypolhetical individual localed at the nearest site boundary was approximately 3 millirem (DOE 1991). 
All the acc idents discussed above have caused contamination that has led to secondary impacts. such 
VOl. ME I. APPE:-.lOIX B 5.15· 12 
118 
as the contamination of facility equipment and land inside the si te boundary. and have required 
cleanup. 
Twenty workers at the Argonne National Laboratory-West facilit y area were injured in early 
1994 when. in an accident in volving toxic mate ri al exposure. approximately 9 kilograms (20 pounds) 
of chlorine gas used to treat potable (i.e .. drinking) water were accidently re leased to the environment. 
Although an investigation into this incident by the DOE was still ongoing at the time this analysis was 
performed. the accident is presumed to have occurred while a vendor was removing and replacing a 
nearly empty chlorine cylinder. A maintenance employee ass isting in the activity apparently 
disconnected the nearly empty in-service chlorine gas cylinder from the potable water system with the 
cylinder valve in the open position, resulting in the remaining tank contents being discharged to the 
environment. As a result of the accidental release, 20 workers were sent to a local hospital. Eighteen 
workers reponed for treatment of minor respiratory distress, one worker reponed symptoms of more 
serious respiratory problems. and one worker reponed back injuries as a result of falling while 
responding to the accident. (ANL 1994 and DOE I 994b). 
5.15.3 Methodology lor Determining the Maximum Reasonably Foreseeable Radiological Accidents 
5.15.3.1 Selection of Spent Nuclear Fuel Facilities and Operations Requiring 
Accident Analyses. The accident analyses performed to suppon this EIS considered all INEL 
non reactor nuclear fac ilities that support spent nuclear fuel-related activities with the exception of 
those at the Naval Reactors Facility (NRF) area. Appendix D of this EIS discusses each of the spent 
nuclear fuel management alternatives and postulated accident scenarios associated w ith the Naval 
Reactors Facility and other naval spent nuclear fuel faci lit ies. 
DOE Order 5480.23 (DOE 1992a) defines nonreactor nuclear faci lities as those activities or 
operat ions that involve radioactive or fi ssionable materials in such fonn and quantity that a nuc lear 
hazard potentially exists to the workers or the general public. This analys is considered spent nuclear 
fuel facilities designed and constructed as direct suppon to reactor faci lities (e.g., Advanced Test 
Reactor Stouge Canal. which stores spent nuclear fuel and irradiated fuels) as nonreac tor spent nuclear 
fue l facilities. 
DOE manages spent nuclear fuel at the following INEL facility areas: Idaho Chemical 
Processing Plant. Naval Reactors Facility. Test Reactor Area. Auxi liary Reactor AreaIPower Burst 
Facility. Argonne Nat ional Laboratory·West. and Test Area Nonh. For funher information regard ing 
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the activities conducted in these areas. refer to Chapter 2. After identifying all the nonreactor nuclear 
faci li ties within these facility areas that stabilize. handle. or store spent nuclear fuel. this analys is 
ranked the faci lities accord ing to potential hazards using preexisting facility "hazard class ifications." 
DOE Order 5480.23 requires contractors operating nonreactor nuclear facilitie s to perform a hazard 
classificat ion of a facility to assess the consequences of an unmitigated release of radioactive or 
hazardous material in one of the following categories l : 
~. The hazard analysis shows the potential for significant offsi te consequences. 
The hazard analysis shows the potential for significant onsite consequences. 
The hazard analysis shows the potential for only significant localized 
consequences. 
The classification of nonreactor nuclear facilitie s in one of these three categories was in 
accordance with DOE Standard DOE·STD·1027·92 (DOE 1992b). This standard provides guidance 
for the hazard categorization of nuclear facilities based on facility inventories of radionuclides and the 
potential for those radionuclides to affec t workers or the public if released to the environment. 
This analysis used these categories as a screening threshold to identify those facilities of interest 
(i.e .. those spent nuclear fuel-related facilities with sufficient quantit ies of radionuclides to present the 
potenti al for significant impacts to workers or the public if released to the environment). The analysis 
excluded (screened out) Category 3 (low hazard) facilities if they present possible worker 
consequences enveloped by postulated accidents at Category 2 faci lities. Facilit ies with a hazard 
classification of 2 or greater (or Category 3 facilities that were not screened out) were evaluated 
further. as discussed in the next section . 
5.15.3.2 Determination of Maximum Reasonably Foreseeable Radiological 
Accidents. After determining spent nuclear fuel·related faci lit ies with sufficient quantities of 
radionuclidcs to present radio logical consequences to workers or the public (as discussed in 
These categories were fonnedy labeled "high." "moderate." and "low" in accordance wi th DOE 
Order 5481.18 (DOE 1987). which has been superseded by DOE Order 5480.23 for nonreac tor nuclear 
far.ilitics. 
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Section 5.15.3. 1). the analysis generated potential accident scenarios for each of these INEL facilities 
by perfonning the following activities: 
Reviewi ng histone spent nuclear fuel-related accidents that have occurred during the 40-year 
history of the INEL. 
Reviewing existing accident analyses and safety analysis repons for spent nuclear 
fuel-related activities and facilities . 
Identifyir.g potential internal. external. and natural phenomena events that could initiate 
spent nuclear fuel-related accidents other than those previously analyzed. 
Perfonning additional accident analyses for those accidents considered to present the greatest 
consequences to workers or the public. as necessary. 
The analysis considered internal and external initiators associated with a wide range of activities 
(e.g .. research and development and construction or modification of facilities) not necessarily covered 
in existing safety analyses. For example. potential radiological accident scenarios initiated by 
construction activities associated with constructing new spent nuclear fuel-related facilities or 
modifying existing spent nuclear fuel-related facilities (as proposed under the various ahematives) 
were postulated. Typically . events involved in the construction of new spent nuclear fuel-related 
facilities would act as external initiators to existing faci lities. while events involved in modifying 
existing spent nuclear fuel facilities would act as internal initiators . Examples of construction or 
industrial-type events that could initiate a radiological accident included fires. confinement impacts or 
puncture events. equipment failure, and human error. 
Additional considerations used to detennine potential internal and external initialors that could 
lead to spent nuclear fuel-related radiological accidents included vulnerabilities associated with 
handling. stabilizing. and storing severely degraded spent nuclear fuel and equipment. For example. in 
Novembfr 1993. DOE issued a report (DOE 1993c) discussing vulnerabilities associated with various 
spent nuclear fue l-related facilities across the DOE complex. The report identified one INEL facility. 
the CPP-603 Underwater Fuel Storage Facility. as requiring immediate management attention to avoid 
unnecessary increases in worker exposures. cleanup costs. and postulated accident frequenc ies. 
Activities have begun to stabi lize spent nuclear fuel inventories in the CPP-603 facility and relocate 
them to another facility (CPP-666); these activi ties will continue for several years after the scheduled 
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1995 Record of Decision for this EIS. Therefore. the analysis considered postulated accident scenarios 
assoc iated with stabilizing and relocating CPP-603 spent nuclear fuel inventories to be potential 
accident initiators in developing the radiological accidenls summarized in this EIS. Examples of 
accident scenarios considered as a result of degraded spent nuclear fuel or facility equipment included 
inadvertent nuclear criticalities. physical damage of spent nuclear fuel and spent nuclear fuel facilities. 
and radionuclide releases resulting from handling and stabilizing degraded spent nuclear fuel. For 
postulated accident scenarios at facilitie s other than the CPP-603 Underwater Fuel Storage Facility. the 
analysis also considered the potential for long-term degradation of facility structures. equipment. and 
spent nuclear fue l inventories that could lead lO an increased probability for radiological accidents. 
To compare the various possible spent nuclear fuel-related accident scenarios and to identify 
those maximum reasonably foreseeable accidents that present the greatest consequences to workers and 
the public. the analysis divided each postulated spent nuclear fuel-related accident into the appropriate 
frequency category (abnonnal events. design-basis accidents2• or beyond-design-basis accidents). 
according to its estimated frequency of occurrence. Table 5. 15-5 lists the frequency ranges associated 
with the abnormal event. design-basis accident. and beyond-design-basis accident categories discussed 
in Section 5.15.1. 
The estimated frequency of each postulated accident was based on an identification of the 
physical basis for the accident and the events required for the accident to occur. Because many of the 
postulated accidents or Iheir conslituent events (initiators or precursors) have rarely or never occurred. 
frequency data based on historic experience were not available. Therefore, in many instances. it was 
necessary to develop a frequency estimate on the basis of events for which experience existed and 
engineering judgment. More than 40 sources of frequency data for the accident events postulated were 
reviewed. including analyses and reports prepared for the DOE. U.S . Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC). Electric Power Research Institute. and private industry. [For further information regarding the 
development of estimated accident frequencies. refer to Slaughterbeck et al. (1995).] 
After the divis ion of the postulaled spent nuclear fuel-related accidents into the frequency ranges 
defined in Table 5.15-5. the analysis identified the postulated nonprocessing-related accident within 
each frequency range determined to present the maximum offsite consequences as a maximum 
For faci lities where design-basis accident analyses were unavailable. evaluation bas is acc ident scenarios 
(postulated accident scenarios used where documented design bas is accident analyses do not exist) were 
considered in accordance with DOE-DP·STD-3005-YR (DOE 1994a). 
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Table 5.15-5. Accident frequency categories. 
Frequency Category 
Abnonnal events 
Design-basis accidents 
8 eyond-design-basis accidents 
Accident Frequency Range 
(accidents per year) 
frequency ~ I x I 0-) per year 
I x I 0" per year> frequency :i! I x I 0" per year 
IxIO" per year > frequencY:i! Ix10·7 per year 
reasonably foreseeable radiological accident to be further analyzed for this EIS. Potential 
nonprocessing-reialed accident scenarios were chosen as maximum reasonably foreseeab le accidents 
because of the shutdown status of the INEL facility (CPP-666) that historically processed spent nuclear 
fuel. However. because existing inventories of spent nuclear fuel at the INEL would substantially 
increase under Alternatives 4b(l) and 5b [Regionalization by Geography (INEL) and Centralization at 
the INEL. respectively) . there could be a need to resume processing operations to stabilize degraded 
spent nuclear fuel operations and assure adequate storage space for spent nuclear fue l received from 
other si tes.) Therefore. in addition to the maximum reasonably foreseeable nonprocessing-related 
accident scenarios. this analysis considers the three postulated processing-related accidents that present 
the maximum offsile consequences as additional maximum reasonably foreseeable accidents under 
Alternatives 4b( I) and 5b. 
In addition. a postulated inadvertent nuclear criticality accident at the CPP-603 Underwater 
Storage Facility was considered for further analysis because significant vulnerabilities associated with 
its spent nuclear fuel inventories have been identified (DOE 1993b) and postulated criticality accidents 
have been addressed in vi rtually a ll non reactor DOE EISs and safety analysis reports where the 
accidents are reasonably foreseeable because of public concerns regarding their potential. As a result. 
the seven radiological acc idents summarized in Section 5.15.4 were determined to be the maximum 
reasonably foreseeable radiological accidents (i.e .. greatest consequences). Further discussion and 
analysis information for each of these accidents. as well as other accidents analyzed. is provided in 
Siaughterbeck et al. (1995). Appendix D identifies maximum reasonably foreseeable accidents 
associated with transporting, receiving. handling, and slOring naval spent nuclear fuel at the INEL. 
The postulated accidents summarized in this section considered with the INEL facilities analyzed in 
Process ing wou ld be perfonned in the Fluorinel and Storage (FASn facility (CPP·666) and a new facility to be 
constructed. the Fuel Process ing Restorati on (FPR) lacility (CPP·69 I ). Process ing would consist of dissolving 
spent nuclear fuel to immobi li ze radionuclides for final waste lIisposal. 
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Appendix D provide a basis for characterizing the potential ri sks and consequences associated with 
managing spent nuclear fuel at the INEL over the next 40 years. 
I Seismic events were the only identified common-cause initiators with the potential to initiate 
I radioactive material releases ~o the environment at more than one spent nuclear fuel-related facility at 
I the INEL. However. a seismic event resulting in significant damage and radioactive releases from 
I facilities in more than one faci lity area (e.g., Idaho Chemical Processing Plant and Test Area North) is 
I considered beyond reasonably foreseeable (frequency less than one in ten million years). because of 
I the physical distance and isolation between facility areas. In accordance with DOE guidance (DOE 
I 1994a). a seismic event initiat ing multiple-facility releases in more than one facility area on the site 
I was screened from funher consideration because of its extremely low frequency of occurrence. 
I 
I Analyses were perfonned that evaluated the potential consequences and risks associated with 
I multiple-facility re leases within a single INEL facility area resulling from a severe seismic event 
I (Slaughterbeck et al. 1995). For example. within a 500-meter radius in the Idaho Chemical Processing 
I Plant facility area. there are several spent nuclear fuel facilities. the primary facilities being the CPP-
I 749 dry storage facilities and the CPP-666 and CPP-603 underwater fuel storage facilities. An 
I analysis was performed (Slaughterbeck et al. 1995) to determine whether simultaneous releases from 
I these facilitie s could result from a seVEre seismic event. Because the CPP-666 and CPP-749 facilities 
I were designed and qualified 10 withstand a severe seismic event. they are not expected to contribute to 
I the consequences and risks resulting from a severe seismic event impacting Ihe Idaho Chemical 
I Processing Plant. However. because of known structural deficiencies and vulnerabilities with the spent 
I nuclear fuel at the CPP-603 facility. the CPP·603 faci lity is expected to be significantly damaged 
I following a severe seismic event. resulting in one or more criticalities and the leakage of contaminated 
I basin water to the surrounding environment. While the consequences from these simultaneous 
I multiple-release mechanisms (one or more criticalities and waler drainage) would be greater than the 
I single criticality analyzed for CPP-603 facility (Section 5.15.3.3.2), the consequences and risk of such 
I releases are expected to be bounded by the other accidents analyzed in the EIS--primarily. a seismic 
I event that causes fuel melting at the Argonne National Laboratory-West Hot Fuel Exami nation Facility 
I (highest consequence accident). and a fuel handling accident in the same facility (highest risk accident. 
I where risk = consequence x frequenc y). Similar a"alyses (DOE 1993a) for the Test Area North and 
I Argonne National Laboratory-West also demonstrate that potential multiple-faci lity re leases or 
I multiple-release mechanisms from a single faci lity resulting from a severe seismic event would also be 
I bounded by accidents postulated for the Hot Fuel Examination Facility. Based on this conclusion and 
I the accident selection methodology described 5. 15.3. 1. the consequences and risks associated with 
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multiple-faci lity rt!lt!a~t!s were screened from funher consideration since they do not represent the 
bounding accident scenarios wi thin the frequency categories ddined in Table 5. 15-5. 
In addi tion. the scrt!t!ning methodology did not specifically include potential accident scenarios 
associated with operating: new spent nuclear fuel handling and storage facilities proposed under the 
various altemativt!s considert!d in this EIS becaust! postulated accident scenarios for existing faci lities 
would bound the consequences associated with potential accidt!nts at new fucilities. This assumption 
is appropriate for two primary reasons. Fi rst. the missions of new spent nuclear fue l faciliti es would 
be similar to the missions of ex isting spent nuclear fuel-related DOE facilities. which implies that 
DOE would consider the same types of accident scenarios for the new facilities it considered for the 
existing facilities . Second. DOE would design and build new facilities that would incorporate modern 
preventive and mitigative fearJres to reduce the frequency and potential consequences associated wi th 
postulated accidents. 
To compare the conseqL!ences of the same accident scenario at an identical hypothetical facility 
constructed at each DOE site included in this EIS (based on local geological and meteorological 
conditions). Appendix D summarizes postulated accident scenarios for a new Expended Core Facility 
at Oak Ridge. Hanford Site. Savannah River Site. or Nevada Test Si te. 
To determine the radiological and toxicological consequences presented throughout Section 5. 15 
associated with the postulated accidents and with spent nuc!ear fuel-related ac tivi ties. the analysis used 
the following definitions: 
Worker. An individual 100 meters (328 feet) downwind of the facility location where the 
release occurs.~ 
Neares t Public Access. The nearest poi nt of public access to the location where the release 
occurs. sometimes inside the site boundary . 
4 The worker is defined as the individual located at 100 meters because reliable safety analyses quantifying the 
Impacts (e.g .. dose and health crfec ts) to workers at distances less than 100 (i .e .. "close-in" worke rs) meters 
from an accidental release of radionuclides are unavailable. The crfects on and risks to workers closer in 
than 100 meters arc recognized and discussed in Section 5.15.3.3. Each of the maximum reasonably 
foreseeable accidents considered in this E[S. particularly the design-basis and beyond.design-basis accidents. 
contains some risk o( ... worker injury or death at distances closer than )00 meters. 
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Maximall v Expo~ed Offsitc Individual. A hypothetical resident at the site boundary nearest 
to the facility where the rekast! occurs. 
Offsite Population. The I.: ollec tive total of individuals wit hin an SO-kilometer (50-mile) 
radius of the INEL. 
Environmt!nt. The area outward from 100 meters (328 feell downwind of the facility where 
the release occurs. 
5.15.3.3 Impact of Accidents on Close-In Workers. An evaluation has been made on the 
radiological impact 10 clo~e- in workers from the selt!cted accident scenarios. Injuries or fatalitie s that 
might occur due to an external event. such as a severe seismic disturbance or airplane crash into the 
structure. are not considered in thi s evaluation since they are not attributable to direct radiological 
consequences. Seven accident scenarios for nonprocessing- related and processing-related activities are 
considered maximum reasonably foreseeable accidents. 
5.15.3.3.1 Mechanical Handling Accident at the Argonne National Laboratory 
West Hot Fuel Examination Facility - This accident is assumed to resu lt in fuel pin breach and 
venting of noble gases and iodine. No fatalities to workers are expected from this event. However. a 
substantial iodine dose to the thyroid could cause radiation-i nduced hypothyroidism or a similar 
disorder. 
5.15.3.3.2 Criticality Accident at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant-
CPP·603 - This event is an unplanned nuclear criticali ty associated with underwater spent nuclear 
fuel storage at the CPP-603 fac ility. Based on shieldi ng provided by the pool water. it is likely that 
no fatalities would occur. To the extent water is expelled due to the energy of the event. closl!-in 
workers could receive substantial radiat ion exposure. Worker presence in the area above the pool or 
very close to the edge of the pool is not routine. The impact of the event would like ly be isolated to 
nearby equipment operators if the criticality were initialed by a handling error. 
5.15.3.3.3 Seismic Event Leading to Fuel Melt at the Argonne National 
Laboratory West Hot Fuel Examination Facility - A se ismic event is postu lated to result in a 
breech of the main ce ll used for examination of the fud. which is assumed to lead to a failure of the 
fuel cooling system. It is likely that the rt! lease of rad ioacti ve materials from fuel melting would occur 
VOLC~IE I. APPESDIX B 5.15-20 
/ 8' / 
slowly enough to allow evacuation of all workers before any appreciable exposure. Therefore. no 
radiation· induced fata lities would be expected. 
5.15.3.3.4 Airplane Crash and Fire at Argonne National Laboratory West Hot 
Fuel Examination Facility - An airplane crash and subsequent fire sustained by airpl ane fuel 
cou ld resule in a major breach of the confinement barriers aild could lead to a substantia l atmospheric 
release of radionuclides. Workers unaffected by the airplane crash or fire would not be expected to 
remain in the area long enough to receive substantia l radiation exposure. It is assumed the buoyancy 
of the radioactive material due to the fire would mitigate the direct radiological impacls to close-in 
workers. substantially reducing the likelihood of radiation induced worker fatalities. 
5.15.3.3.5 Criticality Accident During Processing at the Idaho Chemical 
Processing Plant - CPP-666 - This is the fi rst of three evaluated accidents that cou ld occur only 
if processing were resumed at the Fluorinel and Storage Facility (FAST). Three inadvertent nuclear 
criticalities have occurred in INEL processing facilities and none has resulted in worker fatalities. In 
each event. radioactive material was released to the atmosphere and close-in workers received direct 
exposure. If processing were resumed. the techniques and controls implemented to prevent recurrence 
of processing-related criticali ties would be employed again . Due to the cell wall shielding provided by 
concrete walls that are several feet thick. it is expected that no workers would receive substantial 
radiation exposure. 
5.15.3.3.6 Hydrogen Explosion at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant - A 
hydrogen explosion in the dissolver off-gas system of the Flourinel and Storage (FAST) Facility would 
result in re lease of radioacti ve material to the fac ility. If workers were near the dissolver off·gas 
system. they could receive substan tial radiation exposure from the explosion. No fa talities would be 
expected. but radiation· induced health detriments could occur. 
5.15.3.3.7 Dissolution of Short-Cooled Fuel at the Idaho Chemical Processing 
Plant - An ex plosion in the di ssolver tank could occur if fuel that has not cooled for at least 30 days 
was inadvertently shippe to the dissolver at the Flourinel and Storage Facility (FAST). This energetic 
event would li ke ly breac h the disso lver off gas system and could breach the dissolver tank. Workers 
in lhe areas closely associated with the dissolver tank cou ld rece ive substantial radiation exposure. but 
it is like ly that no radiat ion-induced fatali ties would occur. 
5. 15-21 VOLUME 1. APPENDtX B 
5.15.3.4 Analysis of Radiological Accident Consequences. The quantities of 
radioactive materials and the ways these materials interact with human beings arc important factors in 
detennining health effect s. The ways in which radioactive mate rials reach human b~ings. thei r 
absorption and retent ion in the body . and the resu lt ing health effects have ~en studied in great detail. 
The International Commission on Radiological Protection (lCRP) has made spec ific recommendations 
for quantifying these health effects (lCRP 199 1). This organization is the recognized body for 
establishing standards for the protect ion of workers and the public from the effects of radiation 
exposure. Health effects can be classi fied into two categories: prompt (also referred to as acute) and 
latent. Prompt health effects are those experienced immediately after exposure and include damage to 
the body up to and including death . Latent health effect s are those experienced some time after 
ex posure and include cancers and hereditary symptoms. An INEL·developed computer code. 
Radiological Safety Analysis Computer Program-5 (RSAC-5). estimates potential radiation doses to 
maximally exposed individuals or population groups from accidental releases of mdionuclides. This 
code. which is customized to specific INEL conditions. uses well-established and generally accepted 
scientific engineering principles as the basis for its various calculational steps. The code is based on 
guidance provided in NRC Guide 1.145 (N RC 1983) and has been validated to comply \V ith accepted 
standards for such soft\Vare. (For a de tailed descript ion of RSAC-5. refer to Siaughterbeck et al. 
(l995) .J 
The RSAC-5 code detennined estimated consequences to the worker. an individual assumed to 
be stranded at the neares t point of public access. the maximally exposed hypothetical individual at the 
nearest site boundary. and the offsitc popu lation within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the radiological 
accidents postulated under Alternative I. No Action. Postulated frequencies and consequences 
analyzed under Alternati ve I are based on ( I) the approximate amount of spent nuc lear fuel currentl y 
at the INEL (measured in Metric Tons Heavy Metal (MTHM )J. (2) the estimated increases in 
in ventories resulting from spent nuclear fuel generated by operating INEL reactors (i.e .. fuel recently 
removed from a reactor that has not had sufficient time to cool). and (3) the estimated number of fuel 
hand ling acth·ities assoc iated wi th stabilizing or re locat ing spent fuel inventories inside the INEL si te 
boundary. Although the four nonprocessi ng·rdated maximum reasonably foresce:lble rad iological 
accidem scenarios identified for Alternati ve 1 are also considered under Alternatives 2 through 5. 
proposed changes in INEL spent nuclear fue l inventories and the number of fuel handling activities 
assoc iated wi th these changes could affect the estimated frequ encies and consequences expected for 
Alte rnat ives 2 through 5. Therefore. to reasonably es timatt: the frequencies and consequl..nces 
assoc iated with activ ities proposed under Alternatives 2 through 5. the frequencies and consequences 
for the accidents presented under Alternative require appropriate "adjustment" or "scaling." 
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To be conservat ive. the analys is assumed that the increase in the annual frequency of mechanical 
handling accidents wou ld be equal to the estimated inc rease in the annual number of handling events 
proposed under Alternatives 2 through 5. However. the consequences assoc iated wi th a mechanical 
handling accident wou ld not vary wi th a change in the number of hand ling events because the amount 
of materia l involved in each event would not change. To dete rmine potent ial changes in .mnual 
mechanical handling accident freq uencies between the different spent nuclear fue l management 
a lternat ives. the analysis based ils estimates of the annual number of fue l handling events under each 
alternati ve on spent fuel shipment rates anticipaled for the next 40 years. as discussed in Appendix I. 
Estimates of long-term (40-year) and short-term (5-year) shipments at the INEl were considered in 
determining the annual shipment rates for each a lternative. The basis for the number of long-term 
shipments include spent nuclear fuel the INEL will continue to receive from operating reactors such as 
DOE. Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. university. and research reactors. Short-term shipments 
consist of shipments thal would be required to relocate existing spent fuel inventories between sites 
under the various alternatives. Table 5.15-6 summarizes the estimated annual shipment rate to and 
from the INEL under each alternati ve. and within lNEL site boundaries. The estimates provided in 
Table 5.15-6 consider bOlh onsile and offsi le shipmenls. 
Table 5.15-6. Determination of accident frequency adjustment factors for Alternatives 2 through 5 
based on estimated number of annual spent nuclear fuel shipments under eac h alternative .;a 
Adjustment Factor 
ESlimaled Shipmenl (shipmenl 
Alternat ive Rale (per year)' ralelbaseline) 
I. No Action 4 1 Baseline 
2. Decentralizat ion 50 1.2 
3. 1992/ 1993 Planning Basis 128 3. 1 
4a. Regionalizalion by Fuel Type 195 4.8 
4b(l ) Regionalizalion by Geography (INEL) 824 20.0 
4b(2) Regionalizalion by Geography 35 1 8.6 
(Elsewhere) 
5a. Cenlral izal ion al Olher DOE Siles 351 8.6 
5b. Cenlralizalion al Ihe INEL 824 20.0 
3 . Data presented for the es timated annual shipment rate is based on information tabulated in 
Appendi x I. The annual shipment rale for the No-Act ion Alternative (base line) is derived from 
Table 3 of Wichmann 1994 . 
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Based on the number of annual shipments estimated for Alternatives 2 through 5. as listed in 
Table 5. 15-6. the analysis calculated multiplication factors by dividing the estimated shipment rates 
under Altemali ves 2 Ihrough 5 by Ihe baseline (Altemalive I) shipmenl rale. To delermine Ihe 
es timated frequency for the maximum reasonably foreseeable mechanical handling accidents under 
each alternative. Ihe frequency idenlified for Altemalive I was mulliplied by Ihe appropriale 
adjustment factor. The same approach determined estimated frequencies for Accident I (fuel pin 
breach and noble gases and iodine release from the Hot Fuel Examination Facility) under 
Altemal ives 2 Ihrough 5. For Accidenl 2 (inadvertent crilicalilY in Ihe CPP-603 Underwaler Fuel 
Slorage Facility resu lting from a handling accidenl associaled wilh degraded spenl nuclear fuel) . Ihe 
estimated frequency considered under Alternative I (I x 10') event per year) is based on the number of 
handling activi ties associated with relocation of the CPP-603 spent nuclear fuel inventories to the 
CPP-666 faci lilY. Because proposed changes in INEL invenlories under Ihe differenl allemalives 
would nOI affecl handling evenls associaled wilh relocaling spenl fuel from Ihe CPP-603 facililY 10 Ihe 
CPP-666 faci lily. Ihe eSli maled frequency for Ihis mechanical handling evenl would nOI change. As a 
result of this approach and the fact that 3 of the 4 accident scenarios that present the greatest 
consequences are not handling accidents. Accident I is the only accident requiring "adjustment" for 
each alternative. 
Variable source-lerm-sensi tive acc idents would have consequences that depended on the amount of 
spent nuclear fue l in storage . One example is the accidental drainage of a spent fuel storage canal that 
results in the release of corrosion products in the canal to the environment. The larger the spent fuel 
inventory in the canal. the larger the release of corrosion products to the envi ronment resulting from 
draining the canal. (Drainage of a water canal completely fill ed with spent nuclear fue l was 
considered in the detenninat ion of the maximum reasonably foreseeable accidents and was determined 
to present lower consequences than other acc ident scenarios analyzed.) Variable source-tcnn sensi tive 
accidents depend only on spent nuclear fue l invenwries and do not require adjustment of thei r 
estimated frequencies of occurrence . Because none of the postu lated acc idents summarized under 
Alternative I is source- term sensitive (e.g .. spent nuclear fuel inventories in the Hot Fuel Examination 
Faci lity are not likely to increase). adjustment of the estimated consequences calculated under 
Alternati ve I is not required for Altem3ti ves 2 through 5. 
5.15.4 Impacts from Postulated Maximum Reasonably Foreseeable Radiological Accidents 
Section 5.15.4. 1 summarizes impacts (e.g .. exposures and health effect s) from the four 
nonprocess ing-related maximum reasonably foreseeable radiological acc idents pos tulated under 
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Alternative I (No Action). Sections 5.15.4.4.2.1 th rough 5.15.4.5.2 describe changes in these 
poslulah:d ;.Jccidenl impacts resulting from changes in spent nuclear fuel in ventori es and handling 
aC livi lit!s under the ot her alternat ives. Sections 5.15.4.4.2.1 and 5.15.4.5.2 also summarize impacts 
from three add it ional maximum reasonably foreseeable accidents associated with resumption of 
processing activi ties at the INEL. Section 5. 15.6 provides more information about the assumptions 
and analyses pc:rfonnl!d for each of the radiological accidents discussed under each a lternati ve. 
5.15.4.1 Alternative 1: No Action. Based on the quantity of spent nuclear fu el at the INEL 
(excluding naval fuel at Naval Reactors Facility . which is analyzed in Appendix D). its storage 
configuration (wet versus dry). the amounr of time the spent fuel has been allowed to cool. and 
consideration of various internal. external. and natural phenomena initiators (as discussed in 
Section 5.15.3). the postulated accidents listed in Table 5. 15-7 would have the greatest radiological 
consequences within the abnonnal event. design-basis accident. and beyond-de sign-accident categories 
under this alternative. For each accident. Table 5.15-7 also lists estimated accident frequencies: 
radiation exposures to the offsite population within 80 kilometers (50 miles). a member of the public 
stranded at the nearest point of public access inside the INEL site boundary. a hypothetical max imally 
exposed indi vidual (MEl) at the nearest site boundary. and a worker: point estimates of the annualized 
ri sk of the maximally exposed individual contrac ting a fatal cancer during hislher lifetime as a result 
of the radiation exposure: and point estimates of ri sk of the expected number of fatal cancers 
(annualized and total) in the offs ile population. The es timates of the consequences and ri sk to the 
offsite population are based on conservative (95 percentile) and average (50 percentile) meteorological 
conditions5. The estimates of the consequences and ri sk to the max imally exposed individual are 
based on conservative (95 percentile) meteoro logical condit ions. The postulated accidents listed in 
Table 5.15-7. in conjunction with the maximum reasonably foreseeable spent nuclear fuel acc idents 
ident ifi ed for the INEL Naval Reactors Fac ility in Appendix D. characterize the potentia l consequences 
and risks associated with the proposed spent fuel management ac tivi ties at the INEL under this 
a lte rna ~i ve . 
Atmospheric transport of radionuclides from the postu lated acc idents could result in some 
secondary impacts. such as contamination of the environment or impacts to national defense. To 
Conscrv~lIve (95 percentile) metcorologlcal conditions arc de fined as the mctcorologit:a l conditions that. for a 
given relcase . the concentration at a fixed receptor locat ion will not be cxceedcd 95 pcrce nt of the time. 
Average (50 pe rcenti le) meteorologica l condit ions are defined as the mcteorologica l conditions that. for a 
given rclcasc. lhe concentration at a fi ltcd receptor location wi ll not be exceeded 50 percent o f the time. 
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Table 5.15·7. Impacts from selected maximum reasonably foreseeable radiological accidents-
Alternative I. No Action (50 and 95 percentile meteorological conditions). 
Point eS lim:lI~S of risk of follal cancc:rs 
N.::msl Orrs ilc 
(per year) 
Frequc:ncy Worker Public Dos< •• PopuloUion MEt orrsile Popul:lIion 
Access" (C\'l,~ nI S pcr Do",' MEl' Dose (95% ) 
Accident year) (rem) (rem) (rem) (person·rem) 95%" SO',(, 9S'> 
I. fucl h:mdling 
accident. fuel pin 
brtach. "cntmg of t .Ol( t O· ~ to to 2.0x IO·} <0 1.0)(10" to to 
noble g ;lS(:S and 
iodme 31 HFEP" 
2. Inad\'cncnl criticality 6.5x I0·¥ 3.0x IO·7 
in lep?' CPP·60J 10xI0') 9 .7x I O· ~ 1.4xlO·} 1.0x I0·) 5.9)(10.1 5.0KIO·10 (6.SxlO.fItl 0 .0)(10 .... ) .. 
SIOl'3gc (3e lll1y" 
J . Fucl melting of small 
number of assemblies 4 . .5_10-' 7.OxIO·' 
31 HFEFrc5utiing t 0)( 10" 6.2xlO·' 6.5)(10.1 5.0x lrl t.4x lo' 2.5K I0·· (<I.SK tO·l)d (7 .Oxl oO)" 
from scismic c\'cnl 
and cell breach 
4. Mau: rial rclc:~ from J .6x I0" ' 1.0)(10.1 
HFEF result ing from I.OxI O· 7(1I 4.6)(1 00 3.2)(10" 5.0)( 100 2.Oxlo' 2.5xlO·10 (3.6x J()"I )d ( I.OxI cf)d 
:!;rcraf. crash 3nd 
cnsuin, fire 
a. A worke r is de fined as a worker located 100 meters (328 feet ) from the point of release. 
h. Public individual assumed to be stranded at the nearest point of public access inside the si te boundary. 
c. MEI::= Maltimally eltposed hypothetical offsite individual. located at the ncarest site boundary. 
d. Maximally cxposed individual and offsite population fatal cancer risk ::= dose x accident frequency x 
5.0 x 10 ..... fatal cancer pcr rem (lCRP·60 conversion factor) if dose is less than 20 rem. for doses 20 rem or 
more the ICRP·60 convers ion factor is doubled. or 1.0 x 10-3• Numbers in parentheses indicate the total 
number of fatal cancers in the population if the accident occurred . 
e . HFEF - HOI Fuel Eumination Facility. 
f. The safe ty analysis report utili zed for this accident analys is docs not provide this information because it was 
deve loped prior to DOE Order 5480.23 requiring thi s infonnation. As demonstrated by the dosc to the 
maltimall y eltposed indi vidua l. consequences to the public from this acc ident could be less than the 
consequences from Accidents 2 through 4. 
g. ICPP::= Idaho Chemical Process ing Plant . 
h. Although three nuclear criticalities assoc iated wi th spent nuclear fuel reprocess ing activities have occurred at 
the INEL du ring its 40-year operating history . the estimatcd frequency for an inadvertent criticality is nut 
based on hi storic reprocess ing data because reprocessing is not considered under this alternati ve . Nominal 
frequency estimates vary from 1.0 x 10-1 (CPP-666 underwater storage facility) to 1.0 x 10') (CPP-603 
underwater storage fac ility) event per year. 
Th is frequency is a qualitati ve bounding estimate for a potential airc raft crash. as discussed in 
Sec ti on 5. 15.6.4. 
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prevent these radionuclides from increasing any potential safety concerns. DOE would initiate cleanup 
activities if an accident occurred, and no irreversible environmental impacts would be likely. 
Table 5.15-8 summarizes postulated secondary impacts resulting from the postulated radiological 
accidents li sted in Table 5. I 5-7 . 
This analysis takes limited credit for emergency response actions in determining the consequences 
listed in Table 5.15-7. DOE would initiate INEL emergency response programs, as appropriate, 
following the occurrence of an accident to prevent or mitigate potential consequences. These 
emergency response programs, implemented in accordance with 5500-DOE series Orders, typically 
involve emergency planning, emergency preparedness, and emergency response actions. Each 
emergency response plan utilizes resources specifically dedicated to assist a facility in emergency 
management. These resources include but are not limited to the following: 
INEL Warning Communications Center 
INEL Fire Department 
Facility Emergency Command Centers 
DOE Emergency Operations Centers 
County and State Emergency Command Centers 
Medical, health physics, and industrial hygiene specialists 
Protective clothing and equipment (respirators, breathing air supplies, etc.) 
Periodic training exercises and drills within and between the organizations involved in 
implementing the response plans 
5.15.4.2 Alternative 2: Decentralization. Adjustments in estimated accident frequencies 
and point estimates of nsk presented for Alternative 1 would be related to (I) the receipt , handling, 
and storage activities associated with the additional spent nuclear fuel inventories; and (2) the increase 
in overall spent nuclear fuel-related storage, relocation, and handling activities not allowed under 
Alternative I . Because no changes in the accident consequences estimated for Alternative I are likely 
to occur under this alternative from increased fuel inventories (i .e., the same amount of radioactive 
material would accidentally be released to th t>nv 'ro mr" as discussed in Sect ion 5.15.3.3), no 
changes are like ly in the postulated secondary impacts li sted in Table 5- I 5-8 . Table 5. 15-9 
summari zes the four postulated accidents with the g reatest radiological impacts under thi s alternative. 
5 .15-27 VOLUME I. APPEND IX B 
IfY 
Table 5.15-8. Estimated secondary impacts resulting from the maximum reasonably foreseeable accidents postulated under Alternative I, No 
< 
Action. assuming conservative (95 percentile) meteorologicai conditions . 
0 En vironmental or SOC Ial Impact~ 
r Ralllological (A~suming 88 millirem per Yl'lJ' limit with 24·hour-per·day expo~urc)' 
3: Accid~nt Biotic Water Economic Nat i.:>nal Environmental Endangered Land Treaty Rights & m Summary Resources Resources Impact. Dd~nse Contamination Species Use Tribal Resource~ 
:> I. Fuel handling limited adverse limited adverse Limited economic No effect~ o n Local No impacts No change in land No irrever. ible 
" 
" 
accident. fud dfec!. expected to effects expected to impacL~ expected . national defense contamination ex ptected to usc or irreversible impacts to Native m 
z pin breach. \'c gclalion or surface water o r Any cleanup expected. requiring cleanup endangered or impacts expected. Americans or 
~ venting of wildlife . groundwater. required would be expected around threatened species. public lands 
X 
noble {!a",,~ and locali/.cd and site accident . expected. 
0::: 
Illdine at could be 
I'I FE~ IIx 10 : acco mplished with 
per year) existing workforce 
and equipment. 
2. Uncontrolled Li mited ad verse Limited adverse No economic No effects on Local No impacts No change in land No irreversible 
chain reaction effccts expected to effects expected to impacts expected. national defense contamination exptected to use or irreversible impacts to Native 
(criticality) at vegetation or surface water or Any cleanup expected. requiring cleanup endangered or impacl~ expected. American or 
ICP!'" (I x 10' ) wildlife. groundwater. required would be expected around threatened species. public lands 
per year) localized and site accident. expected. 
could be 
accomplished with 
~ existing workforce 
VI 
and equipment. 
N 3. Fuel mt!lting of Limited adverse Limited adverse Potential No effects on Local No impacts Potential for Potential for 
00 small number effects expected to effecl~ expected to interdiction of natio:lal de feme contamination explected to I year of temporary 
of assemblies at vegetation or surface water or affected expected. requiring cleanup endangered or agricultural land restricted access 
HFEF resulting wildlife. groundwater. agricultural e~pected around threatened species . withdrawal of up to affected public 
from seismic produCl~ on site accident. to 10.000 acresd land (less than 
event and cell nearby lands . (on and off the 10.000 acres).d 
breach (Ix 10·$ Local cleanup in INEL site). 
per year) the vicinity of 
HFEF. 
4 . Material release Limited adverse Limited adverse Potential No effects on Local No impacts Potential for Potential for 
from HFEF effecl~ expected to effecl~ expected to inte rdiction of national defense contamination exptected to I year of temporary 
resulting from vegetation or surface water o r affected expected. requiring cleanup endangered or agricultural restricted access 
aircraft crash wildlife. groundwater. agricultural expected around threatened species. withdrawal of up to affected public 
and ensuing Ptoducl~ on site accident. to 10.000 acresd land (less than 
fire (lxI0·7 per nearby lands. (on and off the 10.000 acres)d 
year) Local cleanup in INEL site). 
the vicinity of 
HFEF. 
a. Postulated secondary ImpaCl~ based on I O·microrem-per-hour e~posure (88 millirem per year with 24-hour-per·day exposure) from ground contamination resulting from radionuclide deposition 
from the plume. This approach in estimated secondary impacts is conservative because DOE Order 5400.5 s tates that the public dose limit for exposure to residual contamination and natural 
background radiation is 100 millirem per year. 
b. HFEF = Hot Fucl Examination Facility. 
c . ICPP = Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. 
d . To convert acres to square Idlometers. multiply by 0 .004. 
Table 5.15-9. Impacls from seleCled maximum reasonably foreseeable accidenls - Ahemalive 2. 
Decentralization (50 and 95 percentile meleorological condilions). 
Offsile AdjuSII!d poml ~s l i lll ::lIcS o f ris k o f b l::!.l 
POpu!31ion cancers !pcr year) 
Adjusted Nearest Dos< 
Frcqucm.:ya Worker Public Do§(: 10 (95%) MEl orrsile Population 
(C\'CnI5 per Do,,' Acccssc MEld (person- 95~,c 50'> 95~ Accident year) ( rem) (rem) (rem) rem) 
I. Fuel hand ling acciden!. 
fuel pin breach. 1.2)( 10': Cg) Cg) 2 .0x I O· ~ Cg) 1 . 2x I O· ~ Cg) Cg) 
venting of nobk gasc:s (1.2) 
:and iodine 31 HFEP 
2. In OKh-Cr1enlcrilicality 6.5x IO·Q J .Ox lrr' 
in ICPph CPP·603 1.0)(10' ) 9.7)d O·: 1:4)(10' ) 1.0)(10') 5.9)( 10" 5.0)(10,10 (6 . 5 )( I O·I> I~ (3.0)( 10-4)( 
51or.lge facility' (1 .0 )1 
3. Fuel mehing of sm.:1ll 
number of 3Sscmblies 4.5)( 10.7 7.0x l <rS 
:It HFEF resulting from I.Ox IO·s 6 .2)(10,1 6.5)( 10,1 5.0x lrP 1.4)(104 2.5)( 1041 (4 .5x IO·=t (7.0xl cPlc 
seismic evem and cell ( 1.0) 
bl't3Ch 
.. M::lIeri:l1 rele:l5e from 
HFEF res ulling from I .OxlO·11 1<1 4 .6x l rfJ 3.2xlO·1 5.0xl cfl 2.0x103 2.5 xlO·1O 3.6x I0·' 1.0x 10·7 
:lircrnfl crash and (1 .0) (3 .6xlO· I )( ( l .Oxl fiJt 
ensuing fire 
a. Numbers in parentheses indicale muhiplication factor used to scale or adjust estimated acc ident frequencies 
under Alternative I . as descri bed in Section 5.15.3.3. 
b. A worker is defined as a worker located 100 meters (328 feet) from the point of release. 
c. Public individual assumed to be stranded at the nearest point of public access inside the site boundary. 
d. MEl = Maximally exposed hypothetical offsite individual located at the nearest site boundary. 
e. Maximally exposed individual and offsite popUlation fatal cancer risk = dose x acc idenl frequency x 
5.0 x 10-4 fatal cancer per rem (ICRP-60 conve rsion faclor) if dose is less than 20 rem. For doses of 20 rem 
or more. Ihe ICRP-60 conversion factor is doubled. or 1.0 x 10-3. Numbers in parenlheses indicalC tOial 
number of fatal cancers in the population if the accident occurs. 
L HFEF = Hot Fuel Examination Faci lity. 
g. The safety analys is report utilized for Ihis accident analysis docs not prov ide this informalion because it was 
developed prior to DOE Order 5480.23 requiring this infonnalion. As demonstrated by Ihe dose to the 
max imall y exposed individual. consequences to the public from this accident could be less than the 
consequences from Acc idents 2 through 4. 
h. JCPP = Idaho Chemical Processing Plant 
i. Although three nuclear criticalilies associaled with spent nuclear fuel reprocessing activities have occurrcd at 
the INEL during its 40-year operating history. the estimated frequency for an inadvertenl criticality is not 
based on historic reprocess ing data since reprocessing is not considered undcr this altern alive. Nominal 
frequency estimates vary from 1.0 x 10'" (CPP-666 underwater storage facility) to 1.0 x 10,3 (CPP-603 
underwater storage fac il ity) events per year. 
j . Refer to Sec tions 5. 15.3.3 and 5.15.6.2 for detai ls on why this frequency was not adjusled unde r this 
alternative. 
k. This frequency is a qualilative bounding estimate for a polential ai rcraft crash. as discussed in 
Section 5.15.6.4. 
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5.15.4.3 Alternative 3: 199211993 Planning Basis. Under Ih is altemalive, Ihe INEL could 
receive the fo llowing spent nuclear fuel : 
Spent nuclear fuel from domestic DOE and university reactors and foreign research test 
reactors 
All Training Reactor Isolopics General Alomics (TRIGA) spent nuclear fuel from foreign 
and Hanford reactors 
Fort SI. Vrain spenl nuclear fue l from Public Service Company of Colorado 
Special case commercial pressurized water reactor and boiling water reactor spent nuclear 
fuel from West Valley, New York 
Naval spenl nuclear fuel from sites such as the Norfolk or Pugel Sound Naval Shipyard. 
Adjustments in estimated accident frequencies and point estimates of risk presented for 
Ahemative I would be related to (I) Ihe receipl. handling, and storage aC livities associated wilh Ihe 
additional spent nuclear fuel inventories; and (2) .he increase in overall spent fue l-related s(orage. 
relocation, and handling ac tivities not allowed under Alternative I. Because no changes in the 
accident consequences estimated fo r Alternative 1 are like ly to occur under this alte rnative from 
increased fuel inventories (i.e .• the same amount of radioactive material would accidentally be released 
to Ihe environment as discussed in Section 5. 15.3.3), no changes are likely in Ihe postulated secondary 
impacls lisled in Table 5.15-8. Table 5.15-10 summarizes Ihe postulated accidents wilh the greatest 
radiological impacts under this alternative. 
5.15.4.4 Alternative 4: Regionalization. Under Ihis ahemal ive, Ihere are Iwo primary 
Regionalizalion ahematives: ( I ) Ahemalive 4a (Regionalization by Fuel Type). where exisling and 
spent nuclear fuel inventories will be distributed be tween the DOE sites based primarily o n the 
simi larilY of fuel Iypes. ahhough DOE would also consider transportal ion distances. available 
stabilization capabilities. available storage capac ities. or a combination of these facto rs; or 
(7.) Ahemalive 4b (Regionalizalion by Geography). where exisling and new spenl nuclear fuel 
inventories in the western region of the country will be centra li zed at a s ing le western s ite. and 
existi ng and new spent nuclear fuel inventories in the eastern reg ion of the count ry will be centralized 
at a s ingle eastern site. 
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Table 5.15-10. Impacts from selected maximum reasonably foreseeable accidents - Alternative 3. 
Planning BaSIS (50 and 95 percentIle meteorological conditions). 
I. Fuel handling 
ac:cilknl . (ud pin 
Adjuslcd 
Frequcnc)'~ 
(c\'cnls pc:r 
)' I.'at) 
Worker 
Do,,' 
(rem) 
NcarcSI 
Public 
Access( 
(rem) 
Dose: 10 
MEl" 
\rl!m) 
b~,h. ,'coling of ] . ho:l 0': (8) (g) ~ .O)( I ()"~ 
noble g :J.S('S and (].II 
lodmcalH~ 
2. In3(h'cncnl critical i,), I.OxI O·' 9.7)( 10': l.-1xI O·) I.OxlU1 
in ICPph CPP·603 ( 1.0 )1 
SI0f'3gc (x ilily' 
3. Fuel mdling of small 
number of assemblies 
al HFEF resulling 1.0xI0·' 6.2)( 10" 6.5.10,1 5.0xloO 
from sasmic c\'cnl (1 .0) 
and cell b~:.ch 
~ . ~bleri :d release (rom 
HFEF resuhing from I.OxIO,7,k, 4.6xld' 3.2xIO·1 5.0>e1d' 
:r.ircr.lh cr:ash and ( 1.0) 
ensuinl fire 
O((Sih: 
Popul :uion 
Dose (95% ) 
(pcr50n .~m) 
Ie) 
1.4)(10' 
2.0.10" 
Adjusted poin! estimates of risk of r;nal 
cancers (pcr year) 
MEl O(fsilc Popul:lIion 
S()<,l- 95'K 
5.OxI O· IO 6.5)(10·\1 3.Ox IO·7 
(6.5x IO.f<t (3.OxIO-"t 
4.5x l ()" ' 7.0)(10" 
2.5)(10.8 (4.SxlO'!t (7 .0xI00)( 
2.5xlO· l0 3.6)(10"' I.OxIO·' 
(J.6x lO·1)t (I.OxId't 
a. Numbers in p~entheses indicate muhiplication factor used to scale or adjust estimated accident frequencies 
under Alternative I. as described in Section 5.15.3.3. 
b. A w~r~er ~s.defined as a worker located 100 meters (328 feet) from Ihe point of release 
c. Pubh~ IRdlv~dua) assumed to be slta~ded at ~he .ne~~st point of public access inside the 'site boundary. 
d. MEl. _ Maximally e~po~.d hypothetical offsJte mdlvldual located at the nearest site boundary. 
e. Maximal!; exposed indiVidual and offsite population fatal cancer risk = dose x accident frequency x 
5.0 x 10 fatal cancer per re~ (ICRP-60 conversion factor) if dose is less than 20 rem. For doses of 20 rem 
or more. the ICRP-60 c~nverslOn fact~r is. doubled. or 1.0 x 10-3. Numbers in parentheses indicate total 
number of falal cancers In the populauon If the accident occurs. 
f. HFEF = Hot Fuel E"amination Facility. 
g. The safely a~al ys is repon utilized for this acc ident analysis does not provide this infonnation beca sc ., 
deve.loped pnor 10 ~~ ? rder 5480.23 requiring this infonnation. As demonstrated by the dose t: th: was 
maximally exposed Indl: ldual. consequences to the public from this acc ident could be less than the 
con~quences from Accldent.s 2 through 4. However. given the high frequency for this accident com ared to 
ACCidents 2 through. 4. the nsk could actually be greater than for Accidents 2 through 4 p ~ . Jepp = Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. . 
I . ~hOUgh thre.e n~c1ear cril icalilies .assoc:iated wilh spenl nuclear fuel reprocessing activit ies have occurred at 
lNEL ~unn~ Its 40-yea~ operaun~ history. the estimated frequency for an inadvenent criticality is not 
~ased on h lst~nc reprocessing dala since reprocessing is not considered under Ihis ahernative Nominal 
requency estimates v~ from 1.0 x 10-' (CPP-666 underwater storage fac ililY) to 1.0 x 10-) ·(CPP-603 
. underwaler storage faclllly) events per year. 
1- Refer to Sections 5.15.3.3 and 5.15.6.2 for details on why this frequency was not adiusted under th ' 
alte rnauve. ~ IS 
k. This. frequency is a qualilali ve bounding estimate for a potential ai rcraft crash. as discussed in 
Secllon 5.15.6.4. 
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5.15.4.4.1 Alternative 4a _ Regionalization By Fuel Type - Adjustments in the estimated 
accident frequencies and point estimates of ri sk presented for Alternative I would be related to (I) the 
rece ipt. handling. and storage activities associat'!d with the additional spent nuclear fuel inventories: 
and (2) the increase in overall spent nuclear fue l-re lated storage. re location. and handl ing activities not 
allowed under Alternative 1. Because no changes in the accident consequences estimated for 
Ahernati \ ' I are likely to occur under this alte rnative from increased fuel inventories (i.e .• the same 
amount of radioactive material would accidentally be released to the environment as discussed in 
Section 5.15.3.3). no changes are likely in the postulated secondary impacts listed in Table 5.15-S. 
Table 5. 15- 11 summarizes the postulated accidents with the greatest radiological impacts under this 
alternative. 
5.15.4.4.2 Alternative 4b - Regionalization by Geography - Under this alternative. spent 
nuc lear fuel inventories in the western region of the country would be centralized at either the INEL. 
Hanford Site. or Nevada Test Site. Alternative 4b( I ) considers regionalization at the INEL. 
Alternative 4b(2) considers regionalization at the Hanford Site or Nevada Test Site. 
5.15.4.4.2.1 Alternative 4b(1) - Regionalization by Geography (/NEL) - Under 
this alte rnative. existing and ne I spent nuclear fuel inventories in the western region of the country 
would be centralized at the INEL. Fuel stabilization would be perfonned in the Auorinel and Storage 
(FAST) facility (CPP-666) and a new facility to be constructed. the Fuel Processing Restoration 
facility (CPP-6S I). to dissolve spent nuclear fuel and stabi lize (i .e .. immobilize) radionuclides. 
Because the volume of spent nuclear fuel considered under this alternative is only slightly lower than. 
that considered under Alternati ve 5b. adjustments in the estimated acc ident frequencies and point 
estimates of ri sk for the four accidents presented under Alternative I were conservatively considered 
equivalent to the adjustments required under Alternative 5b (i .e .. centralization of all the DOE. Naval 
Nuclear Propulsion Program. univers ity. and research reactor spent nuclear fuel in the country at the 
INEL). Adjustments in the estimated acc ident frequencies and point estimates of ri sk for the four 
accidents presented under Alternati ve I would be related to ( I) the receipt. handling. and storage 
ac tivities associated with the additional spent nuclear fuel inventories: and (2) the increase in overall 
spent nuclear fue l-related storagc. relocation. and handling activities not allowed under Alternative 1. 
Because no changes in the accident consequences estimated for Alte rnative I are likely to occur under 
this alte rnati ve from increased fu el in vcntories (i.e .. the same amount of radioactive material would 
acc identally be released to the environment as discussed in Sec tion 5.15.3.3). no changes are likely in 
the postulated secondary impacts li sted in Table 5. 15-S. 
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Table 5.15-11. Impacts from elected maximum reasonably foreseeable accidents - Alternative 4a. 
Regionalization by Fuel Type (50 and 95 percentile meteorological conditions). 
AdJuSl~d point estimates of mk of fJtal 
AdJu ted Nearest Ofbte c:mc~rs (pt:r YC:ll') 
Frequenc}' Workcr Public Do, e to Popubtlon MEl Offsite Popubtion Dosc~ Acc~ s( ~lEI~ Dosc (95'7< ) (c \ent ~r 
ACCIlknt YC:ll') (rem) (rem ) (rem) (p~rson · rcm) 95c:t( 50<7( 95q. 
Fucl handling 
aCCident. fud pin 
brca h. ventong of -I x 10': (g) (g) 2.0x IC)' -' (g) -I . 8xI0' ~ (g) (g) 
noblc gases :md (-I . ) 
lodin~ at HFE~ 
1. Inadvencnt 6 .5xIO·Q J .Ox I0·7 
criticality in ICPpI' 1.0xI0'} 9 .7xI0': l.-IxIO" I OxIO'! 5.9xlO·1 5.0xI0' 1O (6.5x I O" { (3 .0xI0--')' 
CPP·603 tor.lge (I.O~ 
facility ' 
J . Fuel I11<!lting of 
sma ll number of -I.5xI O·' 7 .0x I0' ~ 
assemblie at HFEF 1.0x10·s 6 .2xI0·1 6.5x 10.1 5.0x1Oo l.-IxlOJ 2.5x I0·i (4 .5x I 0':)< (7 .0xI0°)' 
rc ulling from (1 .0) 
seismic event and 
cell breach 
-I. Mat~ria l re lease 
from HFEF resulting I.OxlO" tkl 4 .6xloO 3.1xIO·1 5.0xIO() 2.0x lo-' 2 .5xIO·1O 3.6xIO· I Ox IO" 
from :li rcr.lft Cr.lsh (1,Oj (3 .6xIO· I ), ( 1.0x IOo)< 
:md ensuing fire 
a. Numbers in parentheses indicate multiplication factor used to scale or adjust estimated accident frequencies 
under Alternative I, as described in Section 5. 15.3 .3. 
b. A worker is defined as a worker located 100 meters (328 feet) from the point of release. 
c. Public individual assumed to be stranded at the nearest point of public access inside the site boundary . 
d. MEl = Maximally exposed hypothetical offsi te individual located at the nearest site boundary. 
e. Maximally exposed individual and offsite population fatal cancer risk = dose x accident frequency x 
5.0 x 10-4 fatal cancer per rem (ICRP-60 conversion factor ) if dose is less than 20 rem. For doses of 20 rem 
r more. the ICRP-60 conversion factor is doubled. or 1.0 x 10.3. umbers in parentheses indicate total 
number of fatal cancers in the population if the accident occurs. 
f. HFEF = Hot Fuel Examination Faci lity . 
g. The safety analy is report utilized for this acc ident analy is doe not provide this information becau 'e it was 
developed prior to DOE Order 5480.23 requiring thi information. As demonstrated by the do e to the 
maximally exposed individual. consequences to the public from this accident could be Ie s than the 
consequences from Accidents 2 through 4. However. give n the hi gh frequency for this accident compared to 
Accidents 2 through 4. the risk could actually be greater than for Accidents 2 through -l . 
h. ICPP = Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. 
I. Although three nuclear criticalities associated with spent nuclear fuel reprocessi ng ac ti vitie have occ urred at 
the INEL during it 40-year operating history. the estimated frequency for an inadvertent criticality i not 
based on historic reproce sing data since reprocessi ng is not considered under thi ' alternative . ominal 
frequency estimates vary from 1.0 x 10-4 (C PP-666 underwater storage facility ) to 1.0 x 10.3 (CPP-603 
underwater torage facility ) event per year. 
j . Refer to Section 5. 15.3.3 and 5.15 .6.2 for detail on why thi s frequem:y wa - not adjusted under thi ' 
alternative. 
k. Thi frequency i a qualitative boundi ng estimate for a potential aircraft crash. a di cussed in 
Section 5. 15.6.4. 
VOLCME I. ,\PPE:\D\X B 
IqL/ 
Because the option exists to restart processing activities. th ree additional processing- related 
max imum rea~onabl y foreseeable acc idents are con ~ide red under this altemmive (as discussed in 
Seclion 5. 15.3.2). Since Ihe amount of radioaclive maleria l Ihal would accidenta ll y be re leased 10 Ihe 
environment from these accidents is expected to be lower than in Accidents 3 and 4 (i.c .. small fuel 
me lt and aircraft crash at the Hot Fuel Examination Facility. respective ly). potential secondary impacts 
assoc iah:d with these additiona l processing- related accidents wou ld be less severe than those presented 
for the nonprocessing- related acc idents in Table 5.15-8. 
Table 5.15-12 summarizes the postulated accidents with the greatest radiological impacts unde r thi s 
alternative . 
5.15.4.4.2.2 Alternative 4b(2) • Regionalization by Geography (Elsewhere) - Under Ihis 
alternative. ex isting and new spent nuclear fue l inventories in the w-estern region of the country would 
be centralized at either the Hanford Site or Nevada Test Site. Similar to Alternative Sa. which 
considers centrali7.ation of existing INEL spent nuclear fue l inventories at another DOE site. the 
inventory of spenl nuclear fu el al Ihe INEL wou ld be reduced subslanl ia lly so Ihal Ihe only spenl 
nuclear fu el at the INEL would consist of fresh fuel generated from operating INEL reactors that had 
not cooled sufficiently for relocation to the regionalized or centralized site . Therefore. this alternative 
considers Ihe same amount of material considered under Alternative I until the regionalized site could 
accept existing inventories of INEL spent nuclear fuel and freshly generated spent nuclear fuel that has 
sufficiently cooled . 
Table 5.15-1 3 summarizes the postulated accidents with the greatest radiological impacts under this 
alternative. 
5.15.4.5 Alternative 5: Centralization. Under Ihis altemalive. DOE would coliecl all 
cu rrenl and fUlure spenl nuc lear fue l invenlories from bOlh DOE and Ihe Naval Nuclear Propulsion 
Program al one sile. For Ihe INEL. Ihere are IwO possibililies: ( I ) Altemalive 5a. in which mosl 
spent fuel invcntories and ac ti vi ties would lake place at the Hanford Site. Savannah Ri ver Site. Nevada 
Te!-t Si te. or Oak Ridge Reservation : or (2) Alternati ve 5b. in which all spent fu el inventories and 
aCllVHIt:S wou ld be ccnt ralized at the INEL. 
5.15.4.5.1 Alternative 5a: Centralization at Other DOE Si tes - This altemalive 
would con!'ider approx imate ly the same amount of material con!'idered under Alternative I unti l the 
centralized ~ite cou ld 3L..:epl existing INEL spent nuclear fue l inventories and freshly generated spent 
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Table 5. 15-12. Impacls from se leCled maximum reasonably foreseeable accidenls - Alternalive 4b(I}. 
Rogionali za lion by Geography (lNEL) (50 and 95 percenli le meleorological condilions). 
Offsite Adjusted point eSlimates of risk of fatal 
Population cancers (per year) 
Adjusted Nearest Dose 
Frequency' Wor~er Public Dose to (95'ir) MEl Offsi te Population 
levents per Dose~ Access" MEl" (person-
An:ldent year) (rem) (rem) (rem) rem) 95c::i~ 50% 95% 
I. Fue l handling 
aCl·lJenl.fuei pin 20x 10·1 I,) I,) 2.0x I0·-' I" 2.0x I 0.7 I,) I,) 
breach. \'eming of 120.0) 
noble gases and 
iodi ne al HFEFI 
In:ld\'enent cril lcaJilY LOx 10 .. 1 9.7xI 0·: I Ax I O' ~ LOx 10') 5.9xlO· 1 5.0x lO·1O 6.5x I0·9 3 Ox 10.7 
10 ICPpI' CPP·60_~ ti M (6.5x I 0·b)~ (3 .Ox I O-' )~ 
slOrage facilit y' 
J . Fuel melting. of small 
number of assc mblies 1 .0x I 0·~ 6.;: xI0·1 6.5x I0·1 5.0x lff I AxlO~ 2.5x I 0.11 4.5xlO·7 7.0xI 0·' 
at HFEF resulting ( 1.0) (4 .5xlO·~ )~ (7 .0xl cf)~ 
from scismic cvent 
:lnd cellbreach 
" 
Materialrele~from 
HFEF resulting from 1.0xlO·T1 kl .J.6x lff 3.2xI 0-1 5.0xl ff 2.0x1OJ 2.5xlO·1O 3.6xlO-B 1.0x 10·7 
aircraft trash and 11.0 ) (J.6xlO-l)e (1.0x l lf>~ 
ensuing fire 
S. Inadvenent nuclear 
criticality ICPpI' 1.0x I0·) 9.lxlO" .J .9)( 1 0· ~ 2_8x I O·~ 5.6xI0·0 1.4)(10.1 3. lxI 0·" 2.8>1:10'/\ 
CPP-666 during 0 (3. lxlO·) (2 .8xlO·') 
processing! 
6. Hydrogen in ICPph 1.0x I0·' 1m) 1m) 6.3x I0-' 8.hcI0·1 3.2xlO·11 1m) 4 I X 10-9 
C PP-666 dissoln= r (4. l x I0") 
7. Inadvenent 
dissolution of 30·day I Ox 10·/1 1m) 1m) 3 .0x I 0·~ 2 .9x I 0~ 1 I.5x IO·1I 1m) I.5xI O-· 
cooled fuel at ICPpI' ( 1.5x I0-s) 
CPP-666 
a. Numbers in parentheses indicate multiplication fact or used to scale or adjust estimated 3Ccid<::nl frequen cies under Altern ... ive I. as 
described in Section 5. 15.3.3 
b. A worker IS lk fi ned as a worker located 100 meters (328 feet) from the point of release. 
c. Public indi\'idual assumed to be stranded at the neareSI point of public access inside lhe site boundary. 
d. MEl = i\-t:U:imally exposed hypotllctical orrsi te individual located at the nearest sile bou ndary . 
c. Maximally e:cpoSt!tl individual and offsile popu lation fatal cancer risk = dose x accident frequency x 5.0 x 104 fatal cancer per rem 
(lCRP-60 convers'on faClor) if do~ is less Ihan 10 rem. For doses of 20 rem or more. the IC RP·60 con\'ersion factor is doubled. or 
J 0 x 10" . Numbers in parentheses indicate total number o f falal c:lncers in the population if the acc ident occurs. 
1. HFEF = Hot Fuel Examination Facility. 
g. The safety analySIS report ut ilized for th is accident analysis docs not provide this infonnation because it was den' loped prior to DOE 
Order 5.180.23 rcqulnng this infomlation. As demonstrated by the dose 10 the ma., imally exposed individual. consequences to lhe public 
from Accident I could be less than the consequences from Accident s 2 through 4. Howe\·er. given the high frequency fo r Accidcnt I 
compared 10 Accidents 2 Ihrough 4. the risk cou ld actually be greater than for Accidents 2 Ihrough 4. 
h. JCPP = Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. 
A.lthough three nuclear criltcalilies asSOCiated with spent nuclear fuel reprocessing aclivilics ha\'e occum:d during the .JO-year oper.lting 
hIstory of CPP-666. the estimated frequency for an Inadvertent cn ticality in thiS faci lity is based on existing spent nuclear condillons and 
furl \·ulnernbi ht ies. Nominal estimates \ '31)' from 1.0 x 10-' (C PP-666 under.l.ater slornge faci lity) to 1.0 x 10.1 (CPP·603 under.\·a ter 
slorage facilit y) e\'cnts per year 
J Refer to Sections 5 IS.3.J and 5.156.2 for detaib on ~'hy this frequency was not adjusted under this alternat ive. 
k. ThIS frequency IS a qual l1at l\'e boundmg eSlimate for a potenll3l au craft cra~h . as discusSt J In Secllon 5 15.6 .1. 
The Idaho Chem;c31 Processing PI 31l t has e .~pcrienC('d three inadvertent nuci(.1r cn ticalilles during its operating hislery. the las t one 
1.1 years ago. This frequency IS b3."cd on modem f:le llll Y condllions and safcg'J:lIds th3t e .~ist at CPP.666 
m. The s3fclY analYSIS repon ullhled fe r Ihis 3Ccldent dOC's not pro\'lde thiS mfoml;;:ion because II was de\'t= loped pnor to DOE 
Orde r 5.180.13 rc=qu1n ng thiS ,"fonnall" n Howcwr. a compan son of thc= dat3 prese nted for thiS aCC Ident to the other 3ccltlents proVIdes 
a relati\'e measure of the impacts to this receptor. 
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Table 5.15-13. Impacts from selected maximum reasonably foreseeable acc idents - Alternative 4b(2). 
Regionalization by Geography (Elsewhere) (50 and 95 percenti le meteorological conditions). 
AdJuSh:d polnl cSlimah':s o f n sk of fat al 
Adjusted Ne:uesl Offsile cancers (per year ) 
Frequency~ Worker Public Dose to Popul::ulOn MEl Ofrsilc Papul 'll ion 
Dosc~ Accessc ME~ (c=venls per Dose (95%) 
ACCident YC3t) (rem) (rem) (rem) (person-n,"m) 95'N~ 501ft 95% 
I. Fue::! handling 
accldcnl. fu eJ pin 8.6)( 10.1 (g) (g) 2 .0 )(I O·~ fg) 8.6)(10' (g) (g ) 
breach. \'cnlmg of (86) 
noble gases and 
Iodine :11 HFEF 
, Inadvc nenl cnl ic3.l il ), LOx 10') 97)(10,1 1.4xlO,J 1.0x I0·} 5.9xlO" 5.0xlO' lU 6 .5x l O·~ 3.0xI0·; 
in Je pph CPP·603 11 .01 (6.5)( 10"'1' (J.OxIO .... ,c 
SIOr.lgc faCI lity' 
3. Fuel ~lIi ng of smal l 
number of ;lS!iC: mblies 1.0)(10,5 6.2x1O-l 6.5)( 10-1 5.0x lcP 1.4xl0"' 2.5)CJO·~ 4.5)( 10.7 7.0x IO·5 
at HFEF rcsull ing ( 1.0) (4.5x I O·~t O.Ox lcPt 
from scismic c\'cnl 
and cell bre3ch 
4 M:lIeri31 rele:lSC from 
2.0x lo3 2.5x IO· 1O 3 .6x I 0·~ 1.0x 10·7 HFEF result ing from I OxIO·7Ik l 4.6x lrP 3.2xlO-1 5.0xl cP 
aircraft crash 3nd ( 1 0) (3 .6xlO·l)t ( I.Ox lci)t 
ensuing fire 
a. Numbers in parentheses ind icate multipl icat ion faclOr used 10 sca le or adjusl estimated acc ident frequencies 
under Ahernative l. as described in Secti on 5.15.3.3. 
b. A worker is defined as a worker located 100 meters (328 feet) from the po inl of re lease. 
c. Public ind ividual assumed to be stranded at the nearest point of publ ic access inside the s ite boundary . 
d . MEl = Maltima ll y eltposed hypothetica l offsite ind ividual located at the nearest s ite boundary. 
e. Mu imall y eltposed ind ividual and offsite population fat al cancer ri sk = dose x acc ident frequency x 
5.0 x 10..1 fatal cancer per re m (lCRP·60 conversion faclo r) if dose is less than 20 rem. For doses of 20 rem 
or more. the ICRp·60 conversion factor is doub led. or 1.0 x J 0-]. Numbers in parentheses indicate total 
number of fala l cancers in the population if the accident occurs. 
HFEF = HOI Fuel Eltamination Faci li ty_ 
g. The safe ty analysis re pon utili zed for thi s acc iden t analysis docs not provide this infonnation because it was 
developed prior 10 DOE Order 5480.23 requiring thi s infonnation. As demonstrated by the dose 10 the 
maltimally exposed individual. consequences 10 the public from thi s acc ide nt could be less than Ihe 
conseque nces from Acciden ls 2 Ihrough 4. However. g iven the higt"a frequency for this accident compared to 
Accidents 2 th rough 4. the risk could actuall y be greate r Ihan for Accidents 2 through 4. 
h. Je pp ::; Idaho Chemical Process ing Plant. 
i. Although three nuclear critica lities associaled with spent nuclear fuel reprocessing ac tiviti es have occurred at 
Ihe INEL during ils 40·year operating history. the es timated frequency for an inadve rtent criticality is not 
based on hi storic reprocess ing data s ince reprocess ing is not considered under thi s alternative. Nominal 
frequency estimates vary from 1.0 )( 10 .... (CPP·666 underwater sto rage fac il ity) to 1.0 x 10-] (CPP·603 
unde rwale r s torage facili ty) e'-'ents per year. 
J. Refer to Sect ions 5. 15.3.3 and 5. 15.6 .2 for details on why thi s frequency was not adjusted unde r thi s 
ahemallve. 
k. This frequcncy is a qua l1l3tivc bounding cSlimale fo r a po ten tia l aircraft crash. as di scusscd in 
SeC- lion 5. 15.6.4. 
VOLOtE I. APPE~DtX B 5.15-36 
fuel that had cooled suffic iently. On demonstration of the centralized site' s capability to receive INEL 
spent nuclear fuel. the in ventory of spent fue l at the INEL would be reduced substantially so that the 
only spent nuclear fuel at the INEL wou ld consist of fresh fue l generated from operating INEL 
reactors that had not cooled suffiCiently for relocation to the cent ralized site . 
Adjustments in estimated accident frequencies and point estimates of risk presented for 
Alternati ve I would be related to (I) the receipt. handling. and storage activities associated with the 
addi tional spent nuclear fuel inventories: and (2) the increase in overall spent fuel-related storage. 
relocation. and handling ac tivities not allowed under Allemative I. Because no changes in the 
accident consequences estimated for Alternative I are likely to occur under this alternative from 
increased fuel inventories (i .e .. the same amount of radioactive material would accidentally be released 
to the environment as discussed in Section 5.15.3.3). no changes are likely in the postulated secondary 
impacts presented in Table 5.15-8. Table 5.15-14 summarizes the postulated accidents with the 
greatest radiological impacts under these alternatives. 
5.15.4.5.2 Alternative 5b: Centralization at the !NEL - Adjustments in estimated 
accident frequencie s and point estimates of risk presented for Alternative 1 would be re lated to ( I) the 
receipt . handling. and storage ac tivities associated with the additional spent nuclear fuel inventories: 
and (2) the increase in overa ll spent nuclear fuel-related storage. relocation. and handling ac tivities not 
a llowed under Alternative I . Because no changes in the accident consequences estimated for 
Alternative I are likely to occur under this ahernative from increased fuel inventories (i.e .• the same 
amount of radioactive material would accidentally be released to the environment as discussed in 
Section 5.15.3.3). no changes are likely in the postulated secondary impacts presented in Table 5.15-8. 
Table 5. 15-15 summarizes the postu lated acc idents with the greatest radiological impacts under this 
ahernati ve. 
Because the option ex ists to restart processing a,: tivities. th ree additional processing-related 
maximum reasonably foreseeable accidents are considered under this altemalive (as discussed in 
Secti on 5.15.3.2). Si nce the amount of radioact ive material that would acc identall y be re leased to the 
environment from these accidents is expected to be lower than Accidents 3 and 4 ( i.e .. small fuel melt 
and ai rcraft crash at the Hot Fuel Examination Facil ity. respecti ve ly). potential secondary impacts 
assoc iated wi th these additional processing-related accidents would be less Sl!vc re than those presented 
for the non processing-related accidents in Table 5.15-8. 
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Table 5.15- 14. Impacts from selected max imum reasonably foreseeable accidents - Alternative 5a. 
Centralization at Other DOE Sites (50 and 95 percentile meteorological conditions). 
Adjusted po in! cSlimalcs o f risk o f falal 
Adjusted Ne:tn:st orrsite c:meers Ipcr yl':lrl 
Frequency' Worker Public Dose to Population 1\·fEI orrS!!!! Popul:lIion 
(1;!\'c nl.S pt!f Do.,' Accessc MEl" Dose (95%) 
AccuSenl y e:1J ) (rem) (r( m) (rem) (person-n:m) 95%(- SOc;;. .5., 
I. Fucl handling 
accident fuel pin 8.6)( 10': C,) C,) 2.0xlO·) C, ) 8.6)(10" C, ) C, ) 
breach. "coting of (8.6) 
nobk g~s and 
iodine :11 HFEP 
, In:uh'cncnl crili t 3.li lY 1.0xIO·1 9.7)( 10': 1.4)(10.3 1.0x I0·) 5.9)(10"' 5.0x I0·1O 6.Sx] 0"'" 3,OxlO-7 
in ICPpI' CPP-603 ' I.O ~ (6.Sx IO·I\)t (3.0X I O..4 )t 
SIOr:lgc faci lity' 
J Fuel melting o f small 
number of assemblies I.OxI O·S 6.2)(10" 6.5)( 10.1 5.0xloO I Ax lu' 2.5)( 10.1 4.5)( 10.7 7.0x IO·5 
31 HFEF r( sull ing ( 1.0) (4.5x\O·2t (7 .0x lrf)t 
from scismic cvcnl 
and ccll bl"C'3ch 
'. Maleri311"C'lcase from 
HFEF resulting from I .Ox IO·7!k ! 4.6x 100 3.2xlO·1 5.0x 100 2.0x l03 2.5xlOoiO 3.6x I0·· LOx 10.7 
3ircr.lfl crash 3nd O .OJ {3 .6x IO·l t ( 1.0x IOo)C 
cnsuing firc 
a. Numbers in parentheses ind icale multiplication factor used to scale or adj ust estimated acc ident frequencies 
under Alternative I . as desc ribed in Section 5. 15.3.3. 
b. A worker is defined as a worker located 100 meters (328 feet) from the point of release . 
c . Public indi vidual assumed to be stranded at the nearest point of public access inside Ihe si le boundary. 
d. MEt = Maximally exposed hYPOl heli cal offsi te individual located at the nearest si te boundary . 
e. Max imall y exposed indiv idual and offsite population falal cancer ri sk:;;: dose x accident frequency x 
5.0 x 10'" falal cancer per rem (lCRP-60 conversion factor ) if dose is less than 20 rem. For doses of 20 rem 
or more. Ihe ICRP-60 conversion fac tor is doubled. or 1.0 x 10.3 Numbers in parenlheses indicate tOlal 
number of falal cancers in the population if the accident occurs. 
HFEF = Hot Fuel Examinalion Facility . 
g. The safety analysis report utili zed for this accident analysis does not provide this infonnation because it was 
developed prior to DOE Order 5480.23 requ iri ng this infonnation . As demonstrated by the dose 10 the 
maxi mall y exposed ind ividual. consequences to Ihe public from thi s acc ident could be less than the 
consequences from Accidenls 2 through 4. However. given the high frequency for thi s accident compared to 
Accide nts 2 through 4. the ri sk could actuall y be greate r Ihan for Accidents 2 Ihrough 4. 
h. IC PP = Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. 
Although Ihree nuclear critica lities assoc iated with spent nuclear fuel reproces~ing act ivities. ~av~ oc~uTTed al 
the INEL during ils 40-year operating history. the estimaled frequency for an In ~dve rtcnt ~nl l call1Y !.s not 
based on his toric reproceSSing data since reprocessing is no t considered under Ih ls alternative. Nominal 
frequency estimates vary from 1.0 x 10"" (CPP-666 underwater slorage faci lity) to 1.0 x 10'] (CPP-603 
underwate r storage fac ili ty) evenlS pe r year. 
J. Re fer 10 Sections 5. 15.3.3 and 5. 15.6.2 for details on why thi s frequency was not adjus ted under this 
all ern alive . 
k. Th is frequency is a qualitati ve bound ing esti mate for a potential aircraft crash. as di scussed in 
Sec lion 5. 15.6.4. 
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Table 5.15-15. Impacts from selected maximum reasonably foreseeable accidents - Alte rnati ve 5b. 
Centralization at the INEL (50 and 95 percenti le meteorological condit ions). 
Offsile Adjusted point estim:lles o f risk of fa[al 
Po pul:lIion can~-t'rs (per ye.ll') 
Adjus[ ... d NeaICSI Dose 
Fr ... qu ... m:y· Worke r Public Dose [0 t9~'N- ) MEC Offsilc Popul 'llion 
le\· ... nls pcr Dose~ Acccss~ MEl" (person. 
A":":ld..:nl ),e3r) Itelll) fr ... m) (r ... m) <em , 95%~ SO% 95~ 
t. Fuel handling 
accldl·nl. fu el pin C~ ) 
br ... ach. \'cnling of ~ .0)(1O· 1 (~) CO, 2.0x IO·_1 C, ) 2.0xlO·' C,) 
noble ga.~C$ and CWO) 
IOdme :1I HFEP 
, Inad \'C rlcnl 6 .5x I0·Q 3.0xIO·1 
cnt lcalil ), in ICPph 1 0)(10 .. 1 9.7x I0·: l.-lxlO·J 1.0xlO·3 5.9x I0·\ 5 .0x I0· \0 (6.5xI0·"'c 13 .0x I0 .... ' ( 
s[uraEc fa cl1ilY' II .M 
J. Fuel melling o f 
s mall number o f 4.5x I0·7 7.0xlO·' 
asscmbli ... s al HFEF I .O)(IO· ~ 6.2xI0·1 6.5x I0·1 5 .0x ld J L-l)(I O~ 2.5xlO·· (4.5x I0·: ,c (7 .0x l<flf 
n:suhmg from (WI 
seismic l!\'Cnl and 
cdl bn:ach 
,. Maleri31rele3.S1: 
from HFEF rcsulung 1.0xlO·M ! 
-l.6x l rf' .1.2)(10.1 5 .Ox loO 2.0x I 0 .1 2.5xlO- 1O 3.6xIO·· I.Ox IO·7 
from 3i rcr.lft c rash 11 .0 1 
and ensuing iiI\' 
IJ.6xlO·l )c (1.0xl oO)C 
S. In3<! \'Cn ... nl nud ... .lI' 
critin!ily ICPpI' 1.0x I 0· ~ 9. lx lOoO 4.9xlO·: 2.8x I O· ~ 5.6xlO-O 1.4 xtO·1 ] . 1 x 10'" 2.8x1O·" 
CPP-666 dunng (3. l xI0·) , (2 .8x I O·~ ) 
procCSSlngl 
6 Hydrogen In ICPpII 1.0xI 0·' Cm, Cm ) 6.3xI0 .... 8.1x10·1 3.2xI0·ll Cm' 4. l xI O·<I 
CPP·666 disso lver (4. l x I0 .... ' 
7 In:llh enent 
dissolullon o f ]O- t Ox IO'" 1m) Cm, 3 .0x I0·: 2.9)(1 0- 1 1.5xlO·1I Cm) I . ~x IO· ~ 
d3y coolcd fuel al (1 .5)( 10 ': ) 
ICPpII CPP·666 
3. Numbers In p.lI'cn[hcscs indicale muluplication faclo r used 10 scaJe or 3dJuSI cSllm:ued accidenl frequcncies under AII ... mall\·c I . :L~ 
descnbcd m Seclion 5. 15 . .1..1. 
b. A work ... r is defined a~ 3 worke r local..:d 100 mele rs (328 fecI) from the po,nt o f I\'lca.'iC. 
c . Public indmdu31 assumed to be slr.lnded :11 the l1C.lI'eSI poinl of public acccss inSide the s u ... bound3ry. 
d . MEl = M:LlI. imally c ll poscd hypothelical o ffslI ... Indi Vidual localcd al the I'IC3J'CSI Sli t! bound3l)' 
e . ~'I :u imal ly ellposed indi\'idual 3nd offsllc popul3110n f'llal cancc r risk = dose x 3cc ldcnl frequcn cy x 5 0 x 10 .... fat3l canccr per I\'In 
IICRP·6(J conversion faclor) if dose 15 less [h3n 20 rem. For doses o f 20 rem or mo l"C' . the IC Rp·60 conversion faclor IS douhlcd. or 
1.0 x IO.J_ Numbers in p.lI'cn[ lk'ses indlc:lIe 10lal number o f fal 31 cancers In Ilk! popul3l1on If The 3ccldenl occurs. 
f. HFEF = HOI Fuel E:«:lmin:uion Facllil Y 
g. TIk! sa fel Y an31ysis tcpon utilizcd for Ihis accid ... nt 3n3ly~is does nOI pro\'ide thiS In fomlauon beC3u~ il was de \'c1o ped prior 10 DOE 
Orde rs n:-quiring this infonnalion. As demonSlraled by the doSt.' 10 Ilk! ma.'t lmally ex posed Individual . consequenccs 10 lhe public from 
Ihis 3Ccidenl could be Jess th:ln lhe consequenccs from Accldenls :1 Through.l Ho ..... e\' ... r. g lvcn lhe hig h frequcncy fo r IhlS 3cc ldcnt 
comp.l/'Cd 10 Accide nts 2 through -l. the risk could aclu311y hi.' greah: r th3n fo r Acc ldenls 2 Ihrough 4 
h. ICPP = Idaho Clk!mlcal Processing Plan!. 
i. Although Ihree nucle.ll' crilicail ires a.~soc l all!d wllh ~PCnl nu.::ie:1r fucl repro..:csslng actu 'lIIes have occurred dun ng lhe .lO-~e3r op.."r.ltl ng 
history o f C PP·666. the csm nalcd fn:quency fo r an 1n3d\'enenl cnIl( 311 1)' In IhlS b Clhl )' IS ro.<ocd on ellsll ng spent nucl ... :1r cond ll lOns and 
fucl \' ulner.lbilil ies Nominal eSllnl31eS \ '31)' from l O x 10 .... ,CPP·66ft undcNal ... r ~Ior.lg ... fac lli ly) 10 l O x 10.1 (CPP.bO.' undeN a, ... r 
SIOr.lgc facilily ) eWniS per year. 
j . Refer 10 Seclions ~ 15 . .1 .3 3nd S 15 6.2 for del;u ls o n why Ih l ~ rr~'quenC) .... 3~ noc 3d)usled under Ih ls 31t ... mall \·c . 
k. This frequency is a qua lilali\'e bounding eSlimat ... for a pol ... ntl31 31reraft c ra.~h . as dl\cu\<ocd In Sec llon 5 I ~ 6 .l 
I The Idaho Chernic31 PrlJ1.'cssmg PI3n1 has I.' lI pcn ... ncl-d Ih l'l:l! lnad \'Cn ... nl nuctl.' .lI' cnllcall tle\ durmg II ~ opcraTlng hl ~ l ol')' . IhI! las\ one 
14 years ago. Thl.s fre(IUc ncy IS oo.sed on mode m fac lill y \'o ndl ' ron~ and ~a f ... gu3rds Ihal l.' 'tISi al CPP.666 
m. The sa fcty 3nalysls repon ulih led for Ihls aCCld ... nt doc~ not proVide Ihl ~ Infom lallon becauSe.' II wa.\ de \'clopcd pn ot 10 DOE 
Order 5480.lJ tl'"<lulring thiS In(onnatlon. HO .... c \·l!r. a comp:ln \on of the dala p~.scnl ... d fur Ihl ~ accldenl 10 the o llk! r 3l·c ld ... nb pru\'ide~ a 
I\' lall\'c measure o f thc Imp,]cts to thiS ~c(plor 
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5.15.5 Impacts from Postulated Maximum Reasonably Foreseeable Toxic Material Accidents 
Like radioactive materials. (oxic materials (e .g .• chemicals) are involved in a variety of 
operations. including spent nuclear fue l-related activities. at the INEL. As a result of these operations 
and activities. the potentia l exists for re leases of tox ic materials to the environment from the same 
types of init iators considered in detennining the radiological acc ident scenarios discussed in 
Sec tion 5.15.4 . This section summarizes analyses of poslulated accident scenarios associated with 
spent nuclear fuel ac tiv ities that could result in the release of toxic materials from the ir confinements. 
5.15.5.1 Identification of Toxic Chemicals at the INEL. The fac ilities at the INEL use 
many types and quant ities of chemically toxic materials. To determine the spent fuel-related chemicals 
that exist in sufficient quantities to present health effects to workers or the offsite population. DOE 
performed an initial screening of the chemical inventories at the INEL. This screening consisted of 
ident ifying those hazardous chemicals at the INEL listed in the Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthori zation Act of 1986 (SARA) 3 12 Report for 1992 (Priestly 1992) that ( I) exist in bulk 
quantities [assumed to be greater than 227 kilograms (500 pounds)] ; or (2) exceed reportable quantities 
[usually 0.45 kilogram ( I pound») on the EPA Title III List of Lists (EPA 1990). which includes 
hazardous chemicals defined in the fo llowing: 
SARA Sect ion 302. Extremely Hazardous Substances (40 CFR Part 355. Appendixes A and 
B. List of Extremely Hazardous Substances and Their Threshold Planning Quant ities) 
(C FR 1993) 
Comprehensive Environmental Response. Compensation. and Liability Act Hazardous 
Substances (40 CFR Part 302. Table 302.4. Lists of Hazardous Substances and Reportable 
Quant it ies) (CFR 1992a) 
SA RA Section 3 13. Toxic Chemicals (CFR 1992b) 
Federal Register list of 100 extremely hazardous chemicals (FR 1994 ) 
5.15.5.2 Selection of Spent Nuclear Fuel-Related Toxic Chemicals Requiring 
Accident Analysis. As indicated by the screening methodology discussed above. toxic chemical 
inventories a re located th roughout INEL fac ilities in varying quantities and are involved in nearly all 
operat ions and ac tivi ties performed by INEL facili ties. inc luding spent nuclear fue l-re lated activit ies. 
VOL t.: :-'1E I. ,\PPENDIX B 5. 15-40 
The screening identified no toxic chemicals assoc iated with the dry storage of spent nuclear fuel. 
Except for processing-rc lah: d a..: tiv ities that could be pe rformed under the Regionalization and 
Central ization at INEL alternatives [i .e .. Alte rnatives 4b( I ) and 5b. respec ti ve ly). the screening 
identified acti vit it!s associated with the underwater storage of spent nuc lear fue l (e.g .. mainta ining 
water chemistry) as the only spent nuclear-fuc l related acti vities that might utili ze tox ic chemicals in 
suffic ient quant ities to present a potential for health e ffec ts to worke rs or the offsite populat ion. or 
potential contamination of the environment . For Alternatives 4b(2) and 5a. in which DOE would 
re locate IN EL spent nuclear fuel inventories and related activities to other DOE sites. the existing toxic 
chemical inventories at the INEL would be expected to slightly decrease . For Ahernatives 4b(l) and 
5b. in which the INEL could potentially resume processing activities. a substantial inc rease in existing 
chemical inventories. primarily hydronuoric ac id and anhydrous ammonia. would be expected. No 
substantia l changes in existing spent nuc lear fu el-re lated toxic chemical inventories would be expected 
under Alternatives I. 2. or 3. 
To demonstrate how the consequences of the same acc ident at an identical hypothetical facilit y 
constructed at the Hanford Site or the Savannah River Site under this a lternative would compare to the 
INEL (based on local geological and meteorological conditions). Appendix D summarizes postulated 
accident scenarios for a new Expended Core Fac ility that DOE could construct at any of the sites 
considered in this EIS . 
To d~term i ne potential accident scenarios associated with handl ing or storing toxic chemicals at 
the various spent nuclear fue l-related fac ili ties. DOE performed an extensive review of ex isting safe ty 
analyses and walkdowns of various faci lities. This review identifl~d two nonproce~~ ing- re l ated tox ic 
chemicals at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant - nitric ac id and c hlorine - as requiring furthe r 
evaluation to determine potent ial health effec ts to workers and the offsite population. Additionally. 
two toxic chemicals that would be required to suppon the resumption of processing ac ti vities at the 
Idaho Che mical Processing Plant - hydron uoric ac id and a nhydrous ammonia - were identified as 
requ iring fu rthe r evaluation.' Although spent fue l-re lated fac il ities at the Idaho Chemical Processing 
Plan t use seve ra l other toxic chemicals (e .g .. oxalic ac id ). the quan tities of these chemicals are not 
suffic ient to present an impact to worke rs or the environment from accidenta l re leases to the 
6 Although bulk quant ities of nitri e acid would be required to pcrfonn process ing activi ties that could he 
resumed under Alte rn ~!.I i ve s 4b( I} and 5b. the consequences of processing- related accidents involvi ng nitric 
acid would be bounded by the hydronuoric acid and anhydrous acc idents ana lyzed in Sec tions 5.15.5.3.3 and 
5.15.5.3.4. respeclively. Therefore. thi s analysis focuses on a potential nitric acid accide nt resulting from the 
nonprocessing spent nuclear fuel· relatcd activi ties considered unde r the other altcrnatives. 
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environment. (For postulated accident scenarios involving Naval spent nuclear fuel-related activities at 
the INEL. refer to Appendix D.l 
Because DOE determined that it needed to evaluate postulated toxic chemical accidents at the 
Idaho Chemical Processing Plant as pan of this EIS. it did not consider postulated toxic chemical 
accidents at the Advanced Test Reactor Storage Canal and the lIot Fuel Examination Facility that 
cou ld be involved in spent fuel-related activities' for funher evaluation in this EIS for the following 
reasons: 
In general. quantities of spent nuclear fuel-related chemicals at the Idaho Chemical 
Processing Plant are substantially greater than those at the Advanced Test Reactor Storage 
Canal and Hot Fuel Examination Facility. 
The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant is located approximately 1.000 meters (1.094 yards) 
closer to the nearest site boundary than the Advanced Test Reactor. 
Based on a review of safety documentation for the Test Area North spent nuclear fuel underwater 
storage facility and discussions with facility personnel. DOE determined that none of the toxic 
chemicals identified in the screening (Section 5.15.5. 1) is related to spent fuel handling or storage 
activi ties. 
5.15.5.3 Toxic Chemical Accident Analysis. For chemically toxic materials. several 
government agencies recommend quantifying health effects that cause shon-term effects as threshold 
values of concentrations in air or water. The long-term heahh consequences of human exposure to 
toxic materials are not as well understood as the long-term health consequences related to radiation 
exposure . Thus. the potential health effects for exposures to toxic chemicals are more subjective than 
those for radioacti ve materials. Factors such as receptor locat ions. terrai n. meteorological conditions. 
release conditions. and characteristics of chemical inventories are required parameters for 
determinations of ai rborne concentrations of toxic chemicals at various distances from a postulated 
point of release. 
The scope of thiS analysis has been restricted to the Ad vanced Test Reactor fuel slOrage canal. Everything 
inside the reactor ga!Hight boundary and associated with reactor operations has been excluded from 
consideralJon because reaclOr operations are not related to the spent nuclear fuel activities considered in this 
EIS. 
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EPICoder\l \Vas used to estimate airborne concentrations resulting from spent nuclear fuel-related 
toxic chemical r. k Js.s at the INEL. [For a detailed description of EPICode"'. refer to Siaughterbeck 
et a l. ( 1995).) 
To detennine the potential health effects from accidental releases of toxic chemicals. this analysis 
compar<d the concentrations determined by EPICode '" against Emergency Response Planning 
Guideline values. where avai lable. These values. which are spec ific for each substance. are related to 
three general severity levels: 
Exposure to concentrations greater than Emergency Response Planning Guideline-I values 
for a period of time greater than I hour results in an unacceptable likelihood that a person 
wou ld experience mild transient adverse health effects. or perception of a clearly defined 
objectionable odor. 
Exposure to concentrations greater than Emergency Response Planning Guide line-2 values 
for a period of time greater than I hour results in an unacceptable likelihood that a person 
would experience or develop irreversible or other serious heahh effects. or symptoms that 
could impair one's ability to take protective action . 
Exposure to concentrations greater than Emergency Response Planning Guideline-3 values 
for a period of time greater than I hour results in an unacceptable likelihood that a person 
would experience or develop life-t hreate~ing health effects. 
If there were no Emergency Response Planning Guideline values for a toxic substance. the 
analys is substituted other chemical toxicity values. as follows: 
Threshold limit va lues/time-weighted average va lues (ACGIH 1988) substituted for 
Emergency Response Planning Guideline-I . This is the time-weighted average concentration 
for a normal 8-hour workday and a 40-hour workweek to which nearly all workers could be 
repeatedly exposed. day after day. without adverse effect. 
Level of concern values (equal to 0.1 of the immediately dangerolls to life or health va lues -
see below) substituted for Emergency Response Planning Guideline-2. The level of concern 
value is the concentration of a hazardous substance in the air above which there might be 
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!Ocrious irreversible health effects or death as a result of a single exposure for a relatively 
short period of time. 
Immediately dangerous to life or health values are substituted for Emergency Response 
Planning Guideline-3. The immediately dangerous to life or health value is the maximum 
concentration from which a person could escape within 30 minutes without a respirator and 
wi thout experiencing any impairment of escape or irreversible side effects (NIOSH 1990). 
As stated in the above section. four toxic chemicals - chlorine. nitric acid. hydrofluoric acid. 
and anhydrous ammonia - at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant were identified as requiring further 
evaluation to estimate potential health effects to workers and the public. The following sections 
summarize the ana!yses performed for these chemicals. 
5.15.5.3.1 Accidental Chlorine Release - Chlorine. while not directly associated with 
spent nuclear fuel -re lated activities at the INEL. is used to treat drinking water supplies at the various 
spent fuel facilities. Therefore. an analysis of a postu lated acc idental chlorine release at the Idaho 
Chemical Processi ng Plant was performed to determine potential impacts on workers operating the 
spent fuel -related facilities. 
At the Idaho Chemical Processing Plane. chlorine is contained in two pressurized bottles 
[65 atmospheres at 20°C (68°F»). a 68-kilogram (ISO-pound) bottle and a 55-kilogram 
(\ 20-pound) bottle. totaling 123 kilograms (270 pounds). To be conservative. DOE assumed that a 
breac h of the drain line causes an instantaneous release of the total inventory of both tanks. The 
highest chlorine concentrations at the receptor locations would result from the largest release over the 
shortest time period . Therefore. the release duration was assumed to be approxi mately 5 minutes. 
An accidental chlorine release from one of the chlorine tanks could be initiated by one of several 
events. such as a handii ng even!. piping or valve rupture. or human error. Because the two tanks are 
physically separated. an accidental simultaneous release from both tanks would require a common 
initiator such as a delivery acc ident . a common maintenance failure. or a natural phenomena event 
(e .g .. seismic) that damaged or punctured both tanks. The frequency of an accidental release from one 
pressurized tank is \.0 x 10" event per year (EPNFEMNDOT 1987). A common cause failure 
result ing in the release of chlori ne from two separated tanks is assumed to be no greater than 5 percent 
of the time given for the fi rst tank fai lure. Therefore. the estimated frequency of an accidental release 
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from boch tanks is 5.0 x IO·t. events per year (wi th no credit taken for pressure vessel management and 
training). 
Table 5.15- 16 summarizes the concentrat ions of the subject chlorine release at the following 
receptor locations: a facility worker. a member of the public stranded at the nearest point of public 
access inside the INEL boundary. and a maximally exposed hypothetical member of the public located 
at the nearest site boundary . As listed in Table 5. 15- 10. the peak chlorine concentrations for facility 
workers co"ld result in life-threatening health effects (i .e .. Emergency Response Planning Guideline-3 
values are exceeded) for both conservative (95 percentile) and average (SO percentile) meteorological 
conditions. 
Table 5.15· 16. Summary of chemical concer.trations for postulated nonprocessing-related accidental 
releases at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant under Alternatives I through 5. 
Chcmical Concenlfations 
(milligra ms per cubic mcter)1 
9S'ff Meteorologyb SOtK Metcorology' 
Chlorine Nitric Acide Chlorinc Nitric Acicf 
ERPG· td = 3 ( t ) TWA = 5.2 (2) ER~ (t) n VA = 5.2 (2) 
ERPG·2 = 9 (3) LDC = 25.5 (t o) ERPG·2 = 9 (3) LDC = ·!5.5 (to) 
Receptor Location ERPG·3 = 60 (20) tDLH = 255 ( t 00) ERPG·3 = 60 (20) tOLH = 255 ( tOO) 
'- Worker located at 84.000 250 t .620 33 
100 meters (325 feel). (28.000) (95) (540) (13 ) 
2. Nearest point of publi c 
access where a member )9.5 0.32 1.89 0.OJ9 
of the public is (6.5) (0. t2) (0.63) 1O.0 t9) 
assumed stranded at the 
time of the release.r 
l . ~-1ax imall y exposed 
hypothet ical individual 4.2 0.12 0.42 0.Ot6 
located ill the nearest I )A ) (0.OJ7) (0. )4) 10.(06) 
site boundary .' 
3 . Num bers in parentheses renec t concenlrations in parts per million. 
b. The 95 percentile mcteorology is bascd on Class F (unfavorable) meteorOlogical conditions with 0.5 meier per 
second ( 1.1 miles per hour) wind speed for receptors located within 2 ki lometers ( 1.2 miles) of the release 
and 2 meters per second (4.5 miles per hour) for receptors beyond 2 kilomelCrs of the rdease. 
c. The 50 percentile meteorology is based on Class 0 (ly pical) meteorological condit ions with ·-'.5 meters per 
second ( 10 miles per hour) wind speed for all receptors. 
d. ERPG = Emergency Response Planning Guidelines. 
e. Because Emergency Response Plan ning Guidel ine values are not ava ilable for nitri c ac id. timc-wcighted 
ave rage values are substituted for ERPG· I values. level of concern values are substituted for ERPG·2 values. 
and immediately dangerous to life or health va lues arc substituted for Emergency Response Planni ng 
Guideline-3 va lues. Refe r to Section 5.15.5.3 ror further in fomlation regard ing the use of these va lues. 
The nearest point of public access from this postulated release is 5.870 meters (6.4 19 yards). 
g. The ncarest silc boundary is located at 14.000 me ters (15.310 yards ). 
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Peak chlorine concentrations estimated at the nearest point of public access can excc!ed the 
Emergency Response Planning. Guideline-2 value assuming 95 percenti le meteorological conditions. as 
listed in Table 5. 15- 10. Symptoms assoc iated with exposure to these concentrations could inc lude 
burning of the eyes. nose. and throat. coughing. choking. and possibly skin burns. 
As listed in Table 5.15- 16. the estimated peak averaged chlorine concentration at the nearest site 
boundary would be above Ihe Emergency Response Planning Guideline-I va lue for 95 percenlile 
meteorolog ical conditions. However. due to the nature of the release. this concentration probably 
would not last for more than a few minutes. Therefore. it would be likely that individuals at this 
distance wou ld experience no more than mild transient adverse health effects. 
This analysis look limited credit for emergency response actions following a chlorine release in 
calculating the concentrat ions listed in Table 5.15- 16. To mitigate the consequences of a chlorine 
release to the environment. the same emergency response programs and actions described for 
radio logical accidenl scenarios (Seclion 5. 15.4. 1) would be iniliated following Ihe release. Therefore. 
actual health effects experienced by persons inside the site bOl!Odary would realistically be less than 
Ihe values listed in Table 5. 15-16. 
Because the estimated airborne concentration of chlorine at 100 meters (328 feet) substantially 
exceeds Ihe guidel ines listed in Table 5. 15-16. workers could be fatall y injured or could rece ive 
long- term or permanent health effects. Potent ia l secondary impacts associated with the chlorine 
acc ident scenario would involve economic impac ts such as workers' compensation. medical bills. and 
potential lawsuit . No other secondary impacts. such as impacts on national defense or biotic 
resources. \\'e re idenr ified. 
5.15.5.3.2 Accidental Nitric Acid Release - Nitric acid is used at va rious spenl 
nuclear fue l-re lated storage facili ties for maintaining the chemistry of the water used in underwater 
storage facilit ies.' Based on the toxic chemical screening discussed in Section 5.15.5. 1. review of 
ex isting safety analyses. walkdowns of spent nuclear fuel -re lated facilities. and interviews with INEL 
8 Although bulk quant ities of nitri c acid would be required to perfo"" processing activi ties that could be 
resumed unde r Ahematives Jb( I) and 5b. the consequences of process ing. re lated acc ide nts involvi ng nitric 
ac id 1,I, ould be bounded by the hydrofluoric ac id and anhydrous accidents analyzed in Sections 5.15.5.3.3 and 
515.5.3.-1 . respecti ve ly. Therefore . thiS analysis focuses on a potential nitric acid acc ident resulting from the 
non·proccssmg spent nuclear fucl· related activities considered under the othe r alternat ives. 
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pcr!'onne l. DOE dete rmined that the potential exists for an accidental release of nitric acid from one of 
two 1.1 35 liters (Joo-ga llon) storage tanks used to support sp.:nt nuclear fue l-re lated water treatment 
a..: ti vities at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. Because one of the tanks is usually empty. the two 
lanks have scparale \'a lves. and Ihey are phys ica lly separaled. DOE could nOl idenlify a reasonably 
likely initiator that could cause an accidental simultaneous re lease from both tanks. 
The quantity of nitric ac id assumed available for release from a sing le in itia tor would be 
( 1.1 35 lilers) 300 gallons. The following assumplions were made for Ihis analysis: 
An init iating eVent causes severe structural damage (e.g .. large puncture) to one of the tanks. 
The entire inventory of nitric acid is released into the conta inment wall surrounding the 
storage tank . 
The area of Ihe conlainmenl wall is approx imale ly 28 square melers (300 square feel ). 
The lOlal re lease of nilric ac id [i .e .. 1.135 lilers (300 galions)! evaporales inlo Ihe 
atmosphere before the implementation of emergency response procedures can recover the 
nit ric acid. 
Table 5. 15-16 summarizes the concentrations of the nitric ac id re lease at the fo llowing receptor 
locations for both conservati ve (95 percentile) and average (50 percentile) meteorological conditions: 
a fac ility worker. a member of the publ ic stranded at the nearest po int of public access inside the 
INEL boundary. and a max imally exposed hYPolhelica l member of Ihe public 0 1 Ihe neareS( sile 
boundary. The estimated frequency for this event is 1 x IO·j events per year. 
This analysis took limited c redit for emergency response actions followi ng a nitric ac id re lease in 
calculating the concentrat ions listed in Table 5. 15- 16. To mitigate the consequences of a release to the 
environment. the same emergency response programs and actions described for radiological accident 
scenarios (Seclion 5. 15.4 .1) would be inilimed fo llowing a nil ri c ac id re lease. The refore. aClual health 
effeclS experienced by persons inside Ihe sile boundary would real istica lly be less Ihan Ihe values 
listed in Table 5. 15- 16. 
Other than limited economic secondary impacts. no other secondary impacts would be like lv if 
this accident occurred. . 
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5.15.5.3.3 Accidental Hydrofluoric Acid Release - To resume spent nuclear fuel 
proces~ing act i \'i tic! ~ at th e: Fluorinc:1 and Storage (FAST) facility (C PP·666). which is currently 
shutdown and being placc:d in a pennanent shutdown mode. bulk quantities of hydrofluoric ac id would 
be required to support the: dissolution process. A hydrofluoric ac id storage tank wi th an operating 
capacity of approxi mately 30.283 liters (8.000 gallons) is located in the Idaho Chemical Processing 
Plant facility area to suppon processing ac tivities. although only 11.356 liters (3 .000 gallons) of 
hydrofluoric acid remain in the tank. and efforts arc currently underway to remove the remaining 
hydrofluoric acid in the tank from the INEL si te. 
Table 5.15- 11 summarizes the potential impacts upon a maximally exposed hypothetically offsite 
indi vidual located at the nearest site boundary [14.000 meters ( 15.3 10 yards)1 resuhing from a 
potential hydrofluoric acid release at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant assuming 95 percentile 
meteorological conditions. Siaughterbeck et al. (1995) provides funher details and discussion 
regarding this postulated accident scenario. Although Siaughterbeck et al. (1995) presents impacts to 
only the maximally exposed offsite hypothetical individual resulting from this postulated accident for 
95 percentile! meteorological conditions. a comparison of the airborne concentration of hydrofluoric 
acid at 14.000 meters ( 15.3 10 yards) to the airborne concentrations from other postulated chemical 
accident scenarios (as presented in Table 5.15-16) at the same receptor distance provides meaningful 
perspective on the significance of this acc ident. 
Table 5.15-17. Summary of chemical concentrations for postulated processing·related accidental 
releases at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant under Alternatives 4b( I) and 5b. 
Receptor Location 
Maximally exposed hypothetical individual 
located at the nearest boundaryd 
Chemical Concentrations 
(milligrams per cubic meter)' 
95% Meteorology" 
Hydrofluoric Acid 
ERPG- I' = 4 (5) 
ERPG-2 = 17 (20) 
ERPG-3 = 43 (50) 
0.078 
(0.09) 
Anhydrous Ammonia 
ERPG-I = 17 (25) 
ERPG-2 = 136 (200) 
ERPG-3 = 680 ( 1000) 
82 
( 120.6) 
a. Numbers in parentheses rencel concentrations in pans per million . . . . . 
b. The 95 percentile meteorology is based on Class F (unfavorable) meteorologIcal condtttons wuh 
0.5 meter pe r second ( I.I miles per hour) wind speed for receptors located wtthln 2 kIlometers 
( 1.2 miles) of the release and 2 meters per second (4.5 miles per hour) for receptors beyond 
2 kilometers of the release. 
c. ERPG = Emergency Response Planning Guidelines. 
d. The nearest site bou ndary is located at 14.000 meters (15.310 yards). 
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The estimated frequency for this event is I x 10·' events per year. It should be noted that this 
potential acc ident applies only to Alternatives 4b( I) and 5b. and is in addi tion to the potential chlorine 
and nitric acid release acc idents described in Secti ons 5.15.5.3.1 and 5.15.5 .3.2. respectively. 
This analysis took limited credit for emergency response actions following a hydrofluoric acid 
release in calculating the concenlrations listed in Table 5.15- t 7. To mitigate the consequences of a 
release to the environment. the same emergency response programs and actions described for 
radiological acc ident scenarios (Section 5.15.4.1) would be initiated following a hydrofluoric acid 
release. Therefore, ac tual health effects experienced by persons inside the site boundary would 
realistically be less than the values listed in Table 5.15- 17. 
Other than limited economic secondary impacts, no other secondary impacts would be likely if 
this accident occurred. 
5.15.5.3.4 Accidental Anhydrous Ammonia Release - To resume spent nuclear 
fuel processing act ivities at the Fluorinel and Storage (FAST) facility (CPP-666), bulk quantities of 
anhydrous ammonia would be requi red to suppon operation of the NO,-Abatement Facility 
(CPP-1670), a facility that would be constructed to treat ai rborne effluents from the INEL processing 
faci lities before being released to the environment. 
The NO,-Abatement Facility would be expected to utilize two anhydrous ammonia tanks. each 
with a storage capacity of 68.000 liters (18,000 gallons). Table 5.15-17 summarizes the potential 
impacts upon the maximally exposed hypothetical offsite individual located at the nearest site 
boundary [14.000 meters ( 15,310 yards)] resulting from a shon-term release of the contents of both 
storage tanks [i.e., 136,000 liters (36,000 gallons)] at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant assuming 
95 percentile meteorological conditions. Siaughterbeck et al. (1995) provides funher details and 
discussion regarding this postulated accident scenario. Although Siaughterbeck et al. (1995) presents 
only impacts to the maximally exposed offsite hypothetical individual resulting from this postulated 
accident for 95 percentile meteorological conditions. a comparison of the airborne concentration of 
anhydrous ammonia at 14,000 meters ( 15,310 yards) to the ai rborne concentrations from other 
postulated chemical accident scenarios (as presented in Table 5.15-16) at the same distance provides 
meaningful perspective on the significancf' of this accident. 
The est imated frequency for this event is 5 x 10·' events per year. The basis for this estimated 
frequency is identical to that described for an accidental chlorine release from two separate tanks. as 
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described in Section 5. 15.5.3. 1. It should be noted that this potential accident app lies only to 
Alternati\'es ""b( 1) and 5b. llnd is in <1ddition to the potent ial ch lorine and nitric acid release accidents 
d<scribed in Sections 5. 15.5.3. 1 and 5.15.5.3.2. respectively. 
This analysis lOok limited credit for emergency response actions follow ing an anhydrous 
ammonia release in calculating the concentrations listed in Table 5.15- 17. To mitigate the 
consequences of a release to the environment. the same emergency response programs and actions 
described for radiological accident scenarios (Section 5.15.4. 1) would be initiated followi ng a 
hydrofluoric acid release . Therefore. actual health effects experienced by persons inside the site 
boundary would realistically be less than the values listed in Table 5.15- 17. 
Other than limited economic secondary impacts. no other secondary impacts would be likely if 
th is accident occurred. 
5.15.6 Maximum Reasonably Foreseeable Radiological Accident Scenario Oescri .,ons 
The purpose of thi s section is to summarize the different accident scenarios identified in 
Section 5.15.4. The Facility Safety Report for the Argonne National Laboratory-West Hot Fuel 
Examination Facility (ANL 1975) contains further details and discussions for Accident I, discussed 
below. Siaughterbeck et al. (1995) provides further details. discussions. and references for Accidents 2 
through 7. discussed below. Additional discussions and references regarding the processing-related 
accidents summarized in this section are also provided in a study performed to determine the potential 
impacts spent nuclear fuel processing-related accidents could have on the siting of a new production 
reactor at the INEL (EG&G 1993b). These documents contain additional information. such as release 
fractions. source terms. and other assumptions used in the accident analyses. Appendix D desaibes 
postulated accident scenarios associated with Naval spent nuclear fuel-related faci lities and activities at 
the INEL. 
5.15.6.1 Accident 1: Fuel Pin Breach and Venting of Noble Gases and Iodine to 
the Environment from a Mechanical Handling Accident at the Argonne National 
Laboratory-West Hot Fuel Examination Facility. The accident screening methodology discussed 
in Section 5.15.3 identified a mechanical handling event at the Argonne National Laboratory-West Hot 
Fuel Examination Facility as an ini tiator to the maximum reasonably foreseeable accident within the 
abnormal event frequency range. This event wou ld result in a fuel pio breach and venting of noble 
gases and iodine to the environment. The identification of this accident as a maximum reasonably 
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foreseeable accident is based on the estimated radiological consequences to the maximally exposed 
hypothetical offsite individual at the nearest si te boundary presented in the Hot Fuel Examination 
Facil ity Safety Report (ANL 1975). Other postulated accidents associated with handling spent nuclear 
fue l in the Hot Fuel Examination Facility before the identification of the fuel pin breach accident as 
the maximum r~asonab ly foreseeab le accident included an inadvertent crit icality and a sodium fi re. A 
fuel pin breach acc ident was chosen as the maximum reasonably foreseeable accident because the 
estimated frequencies for an inadvertent criticality and a sodium fire in the facility are extremely low 
(ANL 1975). 
The analyses defined in the Facility Safety Report (ANL 1975) made the following assumptions: 
The fuel subassemblies and experimental capsules being examined in the facility were 
cooled for at least 15 days to ensure that the short-lived fission products had decayed. 
The noble gases and iodines that could be released from this accident scenario were 
immediately released. 
One hundred percent of the noble gases, 25 percent of the iodines, and I percent of 
particulates were available for escape to the atmosphere. 
The building containment structure. including the building ventilation system, and the Main 
Cell . including the argon ventilation system, remained operational following the handling 
accident. This assumption is considered appropriate because the mechanical handling 
accident scenario under considerat ion would not initiate a failure in these systems. 
(Accident 3 considers the simultaneous fail ure of all these systems in conjunction wi th the 
melting of fuel assemblies stored in the facility) . 
The Facility Safety Report (ANL 1975) contains specific information on the source terms 
associated with breaching the fuel section of a pin . Because that report does not provide an estimated 
frequency of occurrence for the subject mechanical handling accident scenario, the analysis used 
historic information and engineering judgment to determine the conservatively estimated frequency for 
th is accident of 1.0 x 10·' event per year. 
For determining the impacts from this postulated accident scenario. the nearest po int of public 
access is equivalent to the nearest site boundary. which is 5.240 meters (5.730 yards) from the point of 
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the release. Allhough the Facilily SafelY Report (AN L 1975) does not eSlimale consequences to the 
offsitc population ;-esulttng from this accident scenario. this analysis reasonably estimated that the 
exposures (i .e .. dGse) 10 the offslle population would be less than the offs itc population dose calculaled 
for AccidenlS 2 through 4 because Ihe dose to the maximally exposed hypothetical indi vidual at the 
nearest si te boundary trom thi; occident would be less than that estimaled for Accidents 2 th rough 4. 
5.15.6.2 Accident 2: Inadvertent Nuclear Chain Reaction in Wet Spent Nuclear 
Fuel Storage (1 x 10" fissions, 8-hour release) at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant 
CPP-603 Underwater Fuel Storage Facility. The accident screening methodology discussed in 
Section 5.15 .3 identified an inadvertent nuclear criticality associated with underwater spent nuclear fuel 
storage at the CPP·603 Underwater Foel Storage Facility as an acc ident requiring further evaluation. 
Other postulated accider.ts that were considered before the identification of an inadvertent crit icality 
accident as a maxi mum rea~onably foreseeable accident included pool leaks. fuel damage events. and 
loss of cooling events. This analysis selected an inadvertent nuclear criticality for evaluation in this 
EIS over the other accidents fo r (he following reasons: 
Postulated inadvertent nuclear criticality accidents have been addressed in virtually all DOE 
nonreactor EISs and safety analysis reports in which such accidents were reasonably 
foreseeable because of public concerns regarding the potential for these accidents. 
The Idaho Chemical Procc<sing Plant has experienced three inadvertent nuclear criticality 
accidents. Although none of these accidents involved a fuel storage facility. they 
demonstrate the potential and concern for such events. 
The consequences of water leakage from a pool-draining event would present lower prompt 
consequences to worke ' s than a criticality because the INEL could implement emergency 
response pl .. 1S to evacuate workers before the risk to these workers could substantially 
increase. In addition. a pool drain was considered to be an initiator to a criticality accident. 
Mechanical fuel damage events are less impacling than a nuclear chain reaction scenario 
because some degree of fuel damage is part of the criticality accident scenario and analysis. 
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Of the different Idaho Chemical Processi ng Plant facility areas that store spent nuclear fuel. the 
CPP·603 Underwater Fuel Storage Facility was selected for analysis of a criticality accident for the 
following reasons: 
CPP·603 facility storage includes most types of spent nuclear fuel stored elsewhere on the 
site . Fuel stored at reactor basins is an exception (but was considered in the detennination 
of other reasonably foreseeable accident scenarios) because of its much shorter cooling times 
after removal from a reaClor. 
CPP·603 facility spent nuclear fuel storage quantities are comparable to or exceed the spent 
nuclear fuel inventories stored elsewhere on the site. 
The CPP·603 facility is an older facility that does not contain all the preventive or 
mitigative design features found in more modem facilities. such as the CPP·666 Fuel 
Storage Area. 
The analysis selected the underwater fuel storage portion of the CPP·603 facility rather than the 
Irradiated Fuels Storage Facility portion of the CPP·603 facility because accidents involving graphite 
fuels in dry storage probably would have less severe potential consequences because they had been 
removed from reactors for a much longer period of time and. because of their design. wou ld prevent 
most of Ihe remaining fission products from being released if a crilicality accident occurred. 
In itiating events that the analysis considered possible to lead to an inadvertent nuclear criticality 
included operator error, hanger corrosion. equipment failure. an earthquake. pool drain. and an aircraft 
crash. Thr c;cenario discussed in this EIS assumes a postulated criticality scenario that could be 
initiated by human error. equipment failure. or eanhquake. Heat generated from the chain reaction 
would easily dissipate and thereby avoid fue l melting but would still cause the release of fission 
products associated with I x 10" fissions over an 8-hour period . 
Between 1945 and 1980. 40 known inadvertent crit ical ities occurred worldwide. none of which 
involved the handling or storage of spent nuclear fuel in an underwater fuel storage facilities. In 
addition. between 1975 and 1980. there were 160 nuclear power reactor fac il it ies with underwater fuel 
storage facilities worldwide. None of these facilities ever had a nuclear cri ticality associated with its 
underwater storage facilities. Therefore. it is generally assumed that the likelihood for such an event 
in a modem underwater storage faci lity is unlikely. with a frequency estimated at I x 10" event per 
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year. This esti mated frequenc y i!' supported by information in the safety analysis report for the 
CPP·666 underwater storage faci lity. which is a modem faci lity (e.g .. 1980s vin tage) at the INEL used 
to store various types of spent nuclear fuel. In the CPP·603 Underwater Fuel Storage Facil ity. 
however. where spent nuclear fue l inventories have substantially corroded or degraded (DOE 1993c). 
and where the design of the facility and its supporting equipment do not ml!et current design 
specifications. activities associated with handling and storing spent nuclear fuel present an increase in 
the likel ihood for an inadvertent nuclear criticality accident by as much as an order of magnitude . 
Therefore. th is analysis conservatively assumes thl estimated frequency for an inadvertent nuclear 
cri ticality associated with handling spent nuclear fuel in the CPP·603 Underwater Fuel Storage Facility 
to be I X 10') event per year for this analysis. 
The handl ing activities associated with stabilizing CPP-603 fac ility spent nuclear fuel inventories 
would occur under each of the five alternatives considered in this EIS. The estimated frequency for an 
inadvenent criticality at the CPP·603 faci lity is an order of magnitude larger than that of any other 
INEL facility (e.g .. I x 10') event per year). and is considered a "worst-case" frequency that bounds 
changes in estimated crit icality frequencies at other INEL fac ilities resulting from increased handling 
ac tivi ties associated wi th changes in spent nuclear fuel inventories. Therefore. using the estimated 
criticality frequency related to the CPP-603 as the estimated frequency under each alternative provides 
a conservative bound on the estimated criticality frequencies for other spent nuclear fuel-related 
handling and storage facilities . 
To determine the accident impacts from this postulated accident scenario. the analysis assumed 
the worker to be located 100 meters (328 feet) from the event . the nearest point of public access (U.S. 
Route 20/26) is 5.870 meters (6.420 yards). and the nearest site boundary is located at 14.000 meters 
( 15.3 10 yards ). 
5.15.6.3 Accident 3: Earthquake-Induced Breach and Fuel Melt at the Argonne 
National Laboratory-West Hot Fuel Examination Facility. The accident screening 
methodology discussed in Section 5.15.3 identified an eanhquake-induced breach and fuel melt at the 
Argonne National Laboratory-West Hot Fuel Examination Facility as a maximum reasonably 
foreseeable accident that wou ld present higher radiological consequences to facility workers or the 
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offsite population than oth~ r postulated accidents analyzed in the same accident frequency range. The 
postulat~d CVC nl S leading to atmospheric release of radionuclides are as follows: 
The earthquake resu lts in a peak horizontal ground acceleration of sufficient magnitude to 
cause structura l damage to the building structure and a large breach in the main cel1.9 
Coincident with the breach. a failure of the fuel subassembly cooling system occurs. 
resu lt ing in the m~lting of fresh assemblies. 
Radionuclides from the melting fuel subassemblies are released to the atmosphere. 
The estimated probability of an eanhquake in the Argonne National Laboratory-West facility area 
resulting in a peak horizontal acceleration of sufficient magnitude to damage the facility structure and 
breach the cell is I x 10" event per year. This analys is conservatively assumes the probability of 
failure of the building structure. Main Cell. and subassembly cooling to be 1.0, given that the 
eanhquake has occurred. A preliminary assessment of the seismic integrity of the Hot Fuel 
Examination Facility, as discussed in Siaughterbeck et al. (1995). indicates that , given the current state 
of analysis. significant failures could result at the Hot Fuel Examination Facility from this eanhquake. 
In determining the number of fuel assemblies that would be affected during this scenario. the 
analysis assumed that 20 fuel subassemblies would melt due to fai lure of the forced cooling in this 
accident. Although 40 storage positions are available for fuel that would require forced cooling. 
current plans do ~ot estimate the need to use more than 20 of these positions. The release duration for 
this scenario is 30 days . To prevent doses greater than 5 rem to the public from this scenario. the 
analysis assumed intervent ion by evacuation or prevention of contaminated food consumption, with the 
calculated doses renecting this assumption. 
To determine the impacts from this postulated accident scenario. the analysis assumed the worker 
to be located 100 meters (328 feet) from the event, and the nearest point of public access (U.S. 
Route 20) and the nearest site boundary at 5.240 meters (5 .730 yards). 
As discussed in Slaughterbeck et al. ( 1995), accele rations with any of several potential seismic events with a 
combined estimated frequency of 1 x 10·) per year arc beyond the design of the Hot Fuel Examination 
Facility and were dctennined to compromise the ability of the structure to mJintain confinement. Events this 
rare are beyond the requirements of DOE Order 5480.28 and DOE· tD Architectural Engineering Standards 
for Category I (high hazard) facilities. 
5. 15-55 VOLUME I. APPENDIX B 
5.15.6.4 Accident 4: Radiological Material Release from the Argonne National 
Laboratory-West Hot Fuel Examination Facility Resulting from an Aircraft Crash and 
Ensuing Fire. The accidenl screening melhodology discussed in Seclion 5. 15.3 iden!ified a 
radioacti ve mate rial re lease from the Argonne National Laboratory·Wcst HOI Fuel Examination Facility 
resuhing from an aircrafl crash as the maximum reasonably foreseeable accident in the beyond·design-
basis accident frequency range. Of externally initiated events. an aircraft c rash into the Hot Fuel 
Examination Facility is a maximum reasonably foreseeable accident because it could ( I) cause a major 
breach of confinemenl barriers. (2) involve a large ponion of Ihe malerial al risk. and (3) have a high· 
energy release mechanism (physical impacI foll owed by a suS!ained fire) . The analysis eliminaled 
other accident scenarios considered in this frequency range because they would not have sufficient 
energy sources to cause a large breach of confinement and release to the atmosphere. Although (he 
facility contains little combustible material to sustain a fire. a fire caused by aircraft fuel involved in 
the crash could increase potential consequences over other beyond.design·basis accidents. The major 
events of an aircraft crash scenario are as follows: 
A large or high-velocity aircrafl (e.g .. commercial or military) crashes direclly inlo Ihe HOI 
Fuel Examinalion FacililY · 
The impact has sufficient force to cause catastrophic failure of the building structure. breach 
of Ihe Main Cell. and loss of forced cooling 10 subassemblies in Ihe cell . 
The fuel in Ihe aircrafl is released 10 Ihe facilily and is igniled. 
The ensuing fire involves Ihe conlenlS of Ihe Main Cell. Deconlaminalion Cell. High Bay 
Area. and Hot Repair Area. resulting in atmospheric release of radionuclides. 
To delermine ai rcrafl crash probability. Ihe analysis limiled Ihis scenario 10 large or high-velocity 
jel airp lanes. High·veloc ily mililary jelS from Ihe U.S. Air Force Base al Moun13in Home in 
soulhweS!em Idaho could enler Ihe ai rspace of Ihe INEL. In addilion. large jel a ircrafl have been 
nown al low all ilUdes in landing configuralions over ponions of Ihe INEL for vonex leSlS. The 
likeli hood of a large ai rcrafl crash direclly in Ihe HOI Fuel Examinalion Facilily is remole. bul 
possible. Analyses of jel a ircrafl crashes al specific faci lilies. such as Ihe Idaho Chemical Processing 
Pl anl . have resulled in predicled frequencies on Ihe order of 1.0 x 10.7 evenl per year. Because 
specific analyses have nol dele rmined Ihe like lihood of an ai rcrafl crash inlo Ihe HOI Fuel Examinalion 
Facilily (a llhough il is expecled Ihal fewe r nighlS occur over Ihe Argonne Nalional Laboralory·WeS! 
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fac ililY area Ihan Ihe Idaho Chemical Processing Plan!). Ihe analysis conservalively assumed Ihal Ihe 
frequt!ncy for an aircraft crashing into the Hot Fuel Examination Facility is 1.0 x 10·"/ per year. 
For de termining impacts from this postulated accident scenario. the analysis assumed the worker 
was localed 100 melers from Ihe even!: and Ihe neareS! poinl of public access (U .S. Roule 20) and Ihe 
neareSl sile boundary were bOlh al 5.240 mele rs (5.730 yards) . 
5.15.6.5 Accident 5: Inadvertent Nuclear Chain Reaction During Spent Nuclear 
Fuel Processing (1 x 10" fissions) at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant CPP-666 
Fluorinel and Storage (FAST) Facility. The accidenl screening melhodology discussed in 
Seclion 5.15.3 iden!ified an inadvenen! nuclear crilicali lY resulling from spenl nuclear fuel 
reprocessing in Ihe CPP-666 Ruorinel and SlOrage Facilily as a maximum reasonably foreseeable 
processing acciden!. Allhough Ihe CPP-666 Ruorinel and Slorage Facilily. which hiS!orically 
reprocessed spent nuclear fuel to recover fi ssionable radionuclides (e.g .• uranium·235). is currently 
shutdown. there may be a need to resume processing operations to dissolve spent nuclear fuel and to 
stabilize the radionucl ides in a waste form . Therefore. while the potential for this accident does not 
currently exist. the potential would exist if processing-related activities are resumed under 
Allemalives 4b( I ) and Sb (Regionalizalion and Cenlralizalion al Ihe INEL. respeclive ly). 
Initiating events (hat the analysis considered possible to lead to an inadvertent nuclear criticality 
during processing included human error. equipment failure . an eanhquake. an aircraft crash. excessive 
fi ss ionable radionuclides in the spent nuclear fuel being processed. and reduced neutron poison 
concentrations. Consistent with the inadvertent criticality scenario associated with underwater storage 
of spenl nuclear fuel described in Seclion 5.15 .6 .2. Ihe fiss ion yield associaled wilh Ihis crilica lilY was 
assumed to be I x 1019 fiss ions. Funher infonnation and references regarding this postulated accident 
scenario are provided in Siaughlerbeck el al. ( 1995) and EG&G ( 1993b). 
As discussed in Section 5.15.2, three inadvertent nuclear criticalities have occurred in INEL 
processing facililies during Ihe 40-year hiS!ory of Ihe INEL. The laS! of Ihese crilicalilies occurred 
14 years ago. As a result of these accidents. administrative conerols and fac ility modifications were 
implemented to reduce the potential for inadvertent nuclear criticality accidents resulting from 
processing- re lated activ it ies. If the decision is made to resume processing operations. these same 
controls would be utilized. Therefore. the est imated frequency for a potential inadvenent nuclear 
criticality is assumed to be I X 10·) events per year. which is consistent with assumptions made 
5 .15-57 VOLUME 1. APPENDIX B 
regarding the potential for an inadvertent criticality resulting from underwater storage and handling of 
severely degraded spenl nuclear fuel (as discussed in Sec lion 5.15.6.2). 
Limited credit was taken for mitigative features. such as emergency response programs. in 
detennining worker and public exposures resulting from this postulated accident scenario. However. 
credil was laken for shielding walls placed in Ihe facililY 10 reduce pOlenlial personnel exposures 
resulting from an inadvertent nuclear criticality. 
To detennine the accident impacts from this postulated accident scenario. the analysis assumed 
Ihe worker 10 be localed 100 melers (328 feel) from Ihe evenl. Ihe nearesl poinl of public access 
(U.S .. Roule 20/26) is 5.870 melers (6,420 yards). and Ihe neareSI sile boundary is localed al 
14.000 melers (15.3\0 yards). 
5.15.6.6 Accident 6: Radionuclide Release During Spent Nuclear Fuel Processing 
at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant CPP-666 Fluorinel and Storage (FAST) Facility 
Resulting from a Hydrogen Explosion in the Dissolver Off-Gas System. The accidenl 
screening melhodology discussed in Seclion 5.15 .3 identified a hydrogen explosion in Ihe CPP·666 
Fluorinel and Slorage Fac ililY dissolver off-gas system as a maximum reason.bly foreseeable 
processing accident. Despile CPP·666·s currenl shuldown slalUS. Ihere may be a need 10 resume 
processing operation to dissolve spenl nuclear fuel and slabilize Ihe radionuclides in a wasle form. 
Therefore. while Ihe potential for Ihis accidenl does nol currently exisl. Ihe pOlenlia. would exist if 
processing. related activities are resumed under Altemalives 4b(l) and 5b (Regionalizalion and 
Centralization al Ihe INEL. respect ively). 
Initiating evenls Ihal the analysis considered possible 10 lead to a hydrogen explosion in Ihe 
dissolver off-gas system included human error. equipmenl failure. and an earthquake. Further 
information and references regarding Ihis poslulaled accidenl scenario are provided in Siaughterbeck 
et al. (1995) and EG&G (I 993b). 
Limited credit was taken for mitigative features. ~uch as emergency response programs. in 
delermining worker and publ ic exposures resulting from this postulaled accidenl scenario. To 
determine Ihe accidenl impacts from this postulated accidenl scenario. Ihe analysis assumed Ihe worker 
10 be located 100 meters (328 feet) from Ihe evenl. Ihe nearesl poinl of public access (U.S .. 
Route 20126) is 5.870 melers (6,420 yards). and Ihe neareSI sile boundary is localed at 14.000 melers 
( 15.31 ° yards). 
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5.15.6.7 Accident 7: Radionuclide Release During Spent Nuclear Fuel Processing 
at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant CPP-666 Fluorinel and Storage (FAST) Facility 
Resulting from the Inadvertent Dissolution of 30-Day Cooled Spent Nuclear Fuel. The 
accid~nt screening ml! thodology di!\cussed in Section 5.15.3 identified a radionuclide release resulting 
from Ihe inadvenent di ssolul ion of ,O-day cooled spenl nuclear fuel in the CPP-666 Fluorinel and 
Storage Faci lity as a maximum reasonabl y foreseeable accident. There may be a need to resume 
processing operalion al CPP-666 10 dissolve spent nuclear fuel and stabi lize Ihe radionuclides in a 
waste fonn . Therefore. while the potent ial for th is accident does nOI currenlly exist. the potential 
would exist if processing-related ac ti vities are resumed under Ahematives 4b( I ) and 5b 
(Regionalization and Cenlralizalion al Ihe INEL. respeclively). 
Upon removal from a nuclear reactor. spent nuclear fuel is placed in an underwater storage canal 
(e.g .. Advanced Test Reaclor Storage Canal in the Test Reactor Area) to allow Ihe fuel temperalure to 
cool and shon -lived radionuc1ides 10 decay. Inadvenent processing of spent nuclear fuellhal has nOI 
had Ihe opponunilY 10 sufficienlly cool presenls Ihe pOlential for accidents during dissolution of Ihe 
fuel. Examples of accidents Ihal could pOlentially occur are explosions in the dissolver lank and an 
inadvertent criticality. An explosion resulting from inadvertent dissolving spent nuclear fuel that has 
nOI sufficienlly cooled (i.e .. 30-day cooled fuel) is considered for this analysis since an inadvenent 
criticali lY is already considered (as discussed in Section 5.15.6.6). 
The potential initiat ing event considered for this accident involves several operator errors that 
result in Ihe wrong spenl nuclear fuel assemblies being dissolved. First. fuel cooled 30 or fewer days 
would have to be shipped to and received by the Fluorinel and Storage Facility. Second. operalors al 
Ihe CPP-666 Fluorinel and Slorage Faci lily wou ld have to inadvenently dissolve Ihe 30-day (or fewer) 
cooled fuel. Based on Ihe individual probability of Ihese events. and the probabil ity Ihal Ihe dissolved 
fuel would accidentally release radionuclides to the environment. the estimated frequency for this event 
is I x 10.6 events per year. Further infonnation and references regarding this postulated accident 
scenario are provided in Siaughterbeck el al. (1995) and EG&G ( 1993b). 
Limited credit was taken for mitigati ve features, such as emergency .esponse programs. in 
detennining worker and public exposures result ing from this postulated accident scenario. To 
determine the accident impacts from this postulated accident scenario. the analysis assumed the worker 
10 be localed 100 meters (328 feel) from Ihe event. the neareSI poinl of public access (U .S .. 
Roule 20/26 ) is 5.870 melers (6,420 yards). and Ihe nearesl sile boundary is localed al 14.000 melers 
(15.31 ° yards). 
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5.16 Cumulative Impacts and Impacts from 
Connected or Similar Actions 
The INEL already contains major DOE facilities unrelated to spent nuclear fuel that would 
continue to operate throughout the life of the spent nuclear fuel management program. The activities 
associated with these existing facilities produce environmental consequences that this EIS has included 
in the baseline environmental conditions (Chapter 4) against which it has assessed the consequences of 
the spent nuclear fuel alternatives. In addi!ion, the cumulative impacts assessed in this section include 
other past. present. and reasonably foreseeable future actions that DOE expects to occur at the INEL, 
such as spent nuclear fuel management, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program activities, environmental 
restoration and waste management activities, as well as any known offsite projects conducted by 
government agencies, businesses, or individuals. Onsite projects include decontamination and 
decommissioning, repair, and upgrades of existing facilities . Offsite projects include residential and 
commercial development, and changes in manufacturing plants. 
Consistent with the DOE sliding scale approach and the programmatic aspects of this EIS, 
cumulative impacts are discussed commensurate with the degree of impact. Therefore, not every area 
of analysis from Chapter 5 is represented in this section. DOE used infonnation and analyses from 
Volume 2 of this EIS as input for this section. Section S.15 of Volume 2 provides a more detai led 
discussion of cumulative impacts. 
Tables 5.16-\ and 5. \6-2 list the cumulative impacts identified for each alternative. DOE made 
necessary adjustments to accommodate the differences between Volume I and Volume 2 alternatives. 
Cumulative impacts from Alternatives 3 and 4a are nominally the same, as are cumulative impacts 
from Alternatives I and 2, 5a and 4b(2), and Sb and 4b( I) . 
5.16.1 Land Use 
Implementation of any of the alternatives would contribute to the cumulative loss of land with 
open- pace land use . However, the cumulative amount of land that would no longer be open space or 
available for other land uses would be mall compared to the size of INEL or regional land uses. As 
di cussed in Section 5.2. Land U e, the maximum land disturbance, 31 acres (0.12 square kilometer) 
would occur under Alternative 4b(1) [Regionalization by Geography (INEL)] and 5b (Centralization at 
INEL). While exact maximum figures are not avai lable, over 200 acres (0.81 square kilometer) of 
vacant land in nearby communities are cheduled for development. Projects that would potentially 
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Table 5.16-1. Nonhealth-related cumulative impacts. 
m Dlsc iplinefUnit of I (No Ac tion) and 
2 (Decentrali zation) mea.<ure 
Sa (Centralization at 
3 (199211993 Planning Other Sitc~) and 5b (Centralization at 
Ba~is ) and 4b(2) (Rc gionalizati on by INEL) and 
4a ( Regionali7~~ti on by Geography 4b( I) (Regionalization by 
Comments Fucl Type) (EI~ewhe rc») Geography (IN EL») 
>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------~~----------------------------
-0 
-0 
m 
Z 
o 
X 
Land u~eJamount of land 
nOl available for o ther 
US\! 
Small compared to 
regional land usc. 
Smal l compared to regional 
land uses 
Smal l compared to regional 
land uses 
Small compared to rcgional 
land uses 
o:l Socioeconomics/change Overall decrea.<c of 
4.800 
Overall decrease of 2.300 Overall decrease of 4.400 Overall decrea.<e of 1.400 Under all alternatives. additional 
jobs created would be more than 
offset by decrea.<c from other 
actions 
in number of total jobs 
Cultural 
resources/minimum 
number of potentially 
hi. to ric 
structures/archaeological 
sites di.turbed' 
Air resourcesb 
6 structures and 0 
sites 
Below applicable 
standards 
70 structures and 22 sites 
Below applicable standards 
II structures and 0 sites 
Below applic Ie standards 
70 structures and 22 . ites 
Below applicable standards 
Under all alternatives. the 
potential for reduction of the 
number of cultural resources 
exists 
~ 
0-N Waste management/waste High·kve ld 12.100 ml 12.500 ml 17.000 ml 12.100 ml These volumes reflect existing 
volume total pending 
disposition Transuranic· 
Mixccllow· 
level 
Low-level· 
H:l.7..ardousf 
Commercial 
and industrial· 
67.000 ml 73.000 ml 
17.000 ml 17.000 mJ 
46.000 mJ 72.000 mJ 
12.000 m3 12.000 mJ 
540.000 ml 590.000 ml 
and newly generated wastes 
67.000 ml 87.000mJ pending disposition under each 
alternative 
17.000 ml 167.000 mJ 
47.000 ml 840.000 ml 
12.000 mJ 12.000 mJ 
550.000 ml 590.000 mJ 
a. Numbers for archaeological sites potentially impacted would be expected to increase as cultural resource surveys are conducted for projects on acreage previously unsurveyed. 
b. Sec! Table 5. 16·2 for cumulative health ri sks related to air emissions. 
c. Ocnved in Freund (1994). Monon ~n '.! H(' ndrickson (1995). 
d High· level wa.<te includes both liquid and calcine fonn< . Liquid high-level was.e totals do not include processing. which would increase these reponed totals by some degree. Nu mbers represent total volume 
of all high-level waste stored onsite. 
c. Numbers do not include existing dispositioned wa.<te stored or buried onsite . 
Numbers represent tOlai volume stored onsite . 
~ 
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Table 5.16-2. Health-related cumulative impacts. 
RadIologIca l' Pathway 
Puhllc Atmoshpcric 
Groundwatcr 
Biotic 
Atmospheric 
Occupational 
exposures 
Public Atmospheric 
(Carcinoge ns) 
Atmospheric 
(Noncarcinogens)c 
Type of 
Impact 
E.-timat.:d 
excc.-s fatal 
cancers 
E,timatcd 
excess fatal 
cancers 
~ timated 
excess fatal 
cancers 
E,timated 
excess fatal 
canccrs 
E"imatcd 
cxcess fatal 
cancers 
Estimated 
lifetime 
cancers 
Estimated 
a:lverse 
health 
effects 
I (No Action) and 
2 (Decentrali zation) 
<I 
<I 
<I 
Negligible 
<I 
o 
3 ( 199211993 5a (CentraliL3tion at 
Planning Ba.<is) Other Sites) and 
and 4b(2) !Reg:onalizatiun by 
4a (Regionalization Geography 
by Fucl Type) (ElsewhercJl 
<I <! 
<I <I 
<I <I 
Negligible Negligible 
o o 
5b (Centralization at 
INEL) and 
4b(l) IRegionalization by 
Geography ((NEL)! 
<I 
<I 
<I 
Negligible 
<I 
o 
Comments 
This pathway would involve 
harvesting game animals 
and vegetation that can 
a.,similate radioactivity 
onsite. 
Overal l cancers expected to 
be less than baseline 
because fewer employees 
under all alternatives. 
< o 
r 
c 
s: 
m 
~ 
Table 5.16-2. (continued). 
Radiological' Pathway 
Atmosphcnc 
(Carci nugens) 
Atmospheric 
( oncarcinogenst 
Routine workplace 
safet y hazards 
Type o f 
Impact 
Estimated 
lifetime 
cance r 
Estimatcd 
advcr.;c 
health 
cffccts 
E.<timated 
fatalities 
I ( o ACllon) and 
2 (Dccentrali zallon) 
<I 
0 
3 
3 (ll)l)~ 1 l)9) 5a (CenlrJIWlllUn at 
Plannlll~ Aa.<,,) Other Site ,) and 
and -tb(2) (ReglOnahzallon by 
-Ia (Reglonali zation Geogra phy 
by Fuel Type ) (Elsewhere ») 
<I <I 
0 0 
3 3 
c- a. Approximate numbers. Sec Volume 2. Section 5. 12 and Volume 2. Appendix F for detailed discussion and analyses . 
.i:. b . E.' timatcd ex.:e s fatal cancer.; calculated fro m dosimeter lT1Casurements. 
5b (Centralization at 
I Ell and 
4b( I) (Rcgionalization by 
Gcography (INEL)( 
<I 
0 
3 
Commen" 
Estimates differ only 
s lightly between alternati ves 
due to change< in number uf 
workers. Total wurkplace 
safety hazards are fewer 
than tho<e encountered by 
the average worker in 
private industry . 
dislUrb prev iously disturbed land are scheduled to take place on about 270 acres ( 1.0 square kilometer) 
at the INEL. An addit ional 1.060 acres (4.3 square ki lometers) of open space INEL land may also be 
disturbed by potential projects. 
5.162 Socioeconomics 
Any of the spent fuel management alternatives would cause minimal cumulati ve impacts on 
socioeconomic resources of the INEL region when combined with known onsile or offsite projects. 
The implementation of any of the ahematives would create temporary additional employment during 
construction: the upper bound of potential impact would occur under Ahematives 3. 4a. 4b( I). and 5b. 
In the long term. the expected future decrease in employment at the INEL would more than offset this 
increase. as well as any increases from known offsite projects. Therefore. the cumulative effect on 
employment would be an overall decrease. Potential population declines associated with the 
cumulative effect on regional employment are estimated to represent less than 2 percent of the total 
regional population. It is unl ikely that a change in population of this size would generate any notable 
long-term adverse impacts to housing. community services, or public finance in the region. 
5.16.3 Cultural Resources 
The types of cumulative impacts on cultural resources are the same for all alternatives. Each of 
the alternatives. when combined with associated onsite and offsite activit ies. could potentially impact 
cuhural resources. However. surveying. record ing. and stabilizing archeological and historic sites and 
structures at the INEL would increase scientific knowledge of the region's cultural resources. although 
stabilizing resources may adversely affect their significance to Native American groups. The 
unchecked deterioration of both structures and historic documents on nuclear facilities at the lNEL 
could have a long-term adverse impact on these resources. Long-term effects may also occur to 
traditional resources that may not be mitigated through scientific studies. Cumulative impacts 
associated with Alternatives 3 and 4a (see 199211993 Planning Basis and Regionalization by Fuel 
Type) and Alternatives 5b and 4b( l ) [Cent ralization at INEL and Regionalization by Geography 
(INEL) ) have the greatest potential for impacts. Alternatives I and 2 (No Action and Decentralization) 
would have the least potenll. 1 for impacts. 
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5.16.4 Air Quality 
For radiological emissions. all cumulative impacts at onsile and offsite locations are well below 
opplicable standards and are a small fraction of the dose received from natural background sources. 
The highest dose to a max imally exposed member of the publ ic would be caused by Ahematives 4b(l) 
and 5b and would be about 0.05 millirem per year. When added to the projected dose from other 
INEL proposed projects of approx imately 0.7 millirem per year and the maximum baseline dose of 
0.05 mill irem per year. this dose would be well below the National Emissions Standards for Hazardous 
Air Pollutants limit of 10 millirem per year (CFR 1992c). The National Council on Radiation 
Protection and Measurements has identified a dose rate below I millirem per year as negligible (NCRP 
1987). 
Cumulative nonradiological impacts were analyzed in terms of concentrations of criteria and 
toxic ai r pollutants in ambient air. At si te boundary locations. the highest potent ial concentrations of 
criteria pollutants remain well below applicable National Ambient Air Qual ity Standard. (CFR 199 1). 
Concentrations at public road locations with in the INEL boundary could increase significantly from 
current levels. but would remain well below applicable standards. 
5.16.5 Occupational and Public Health and Salety 
Work activities and the exposure to radiological and chemical hazards under each of the 
alternatives would be similar to those at present. Therefore, average radiation dose. exposure to toxic 
chemicals. and associated heahh effects would be related to the number of site workers under each 
alternati ve. Because the cumulative impacts of any alternative would be a decrease in the number of 
workers. the cumulative impact of any alternative on occupational health would be a decrease in 
health effects to the levels listed in Table 5.16-2. The incidence of expected health effects would be 
similar for all alternatives because the relative d ifference in employment effects (and therefore the 
effects on the health of those employed) is very small. While air emissions present the onl y calculable 
pathway for public radiation exposure due to spent nuclear fuel management. groundwater and biotic 
pathways are included in Table 5. 16-2 due to Volume 2 analyses of environmental restoration and 
waste management activities. 
Occupational health data concern ing historic accidents are incomplete and not readily avai lable. 
Though historical records of accidents at the INEL are available. occupational doses were not always 
known and reponed. Worker dose data are currently bei ng collected and analyzed under a National 
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Insti tute of Occupational Safety and Health program. Historical offsite doses associated with the IN~ L 
are summarized in the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Historical Dose Evaluation (DOE 199 1,. 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is conducting a more comprehensive reconstruction of 
doses from INEL operations. An assessment of the cumulati ve impacts of accidents at the Site to the 
health of INEL workers is not available at this time. 
Cumulative transponation impacts are addressed in Volume I. Appendix I. 
5.16.6 Materials and Waste Management 
The total volumes of waste existing and projected to be generated or shipped to the INEL from 
spent nuclear fuel management, 35 well as known onsile and offsite projecls over a to-year period, are 
presented by waste stream for each alternative in Table 5.16-1. The storage of low-level waste for 
incineration is not considered to be restrictive between 1995 and 2005 ; however. beyond 2005 
additional capacity may be required. Although spent nuclear fuel management would not cause 
permitted storage capacity to exceed its limits without available treatment or disposal under the No 
Action and Decentralization Alternatives. it is anticipated that the permitted storage capacity for mixed 
low-level waste will be exceeded during the fi rst year of a IO-year timeframe. All other alternatives 
include facility construction for storage of. or shipping of. mixed low-level waste; therefore. storage 
capacity is accounted for. 
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5.17 Adverse Environmental Effects That Cannot Be Avoided 
The construction and operation of any of the alternatives at the INEL could result in adverse 
impacis to the environment . Changes in project design and other measures would avoid or otherwise 
mitigate most of these impacts to minimal levels. This section identifies only adverse impacts that 
mitigation could not reduce to minimal levels or avoid altogether. 
Under each alternative. the cont inued deterioration of structures with historic preservation 
potential and historic documents on nuclear facilities could have a long-term adverse impact on these 
resources at the INEL. However. DOE would avoid potentially adverse impacts by preserving the 
historic value of the propeny through appropriate research. or by conducting limited rehabilitation on 
these structures. This impact is discussed in Section 5.4. 
As discussed in Section 5.2. the maximum loss of habitat would involve the conversion to 
industrial use of about 31 acres (0.12 square kilometers) of previously disturbed habitat that is of low 
quality and limited use to wildlife; conversion would occur under Alternatives 4b(l ) and 5b. 
The amount of radiation exposure from normal operation of the spent nuclear fuel faciliti es 
would be a small fraction of the existing natural background at the INEL and would be well below 
applicable regulatory standards. In all Calies. the number of estimated additional cancers is a small 
fraction of I per year of site operation through 2035. This effect is discussed in Section 5. 12. 
With Ihe exception of the unavoidable temporary increase in noise due to construction ac tivities. 
any impact of noise from activities under any of the alternati ves would be minor and highly unlikely. 
An unavoidable adverse impact of the proposed activities with any of the alternatives would be 
an accident either at the involved faci lit ies or during the transportation of construct ion materials or 
dismantled components. Accidents are discussed in Section 5.15: transportation is discussed in 
Section 5.11. 
Spent nuclear fuel management supports the continuation of beneficial activ ities such as 
radiophannaceutical and other research. An unavoidable adverse impact of the No-Action Alternative 
would be a reduction in the support of such act ivi ties. 
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As discussed in Section 5.14, the increased generation of industrial solid waste that would occur 
under all al ternatives is an unavoidable adverse impact. However. the amount generated under each 
alternative would be a very small percentage increase from the projected 1995 baseline levels. 
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5.18 Relationship Between 
Short-Term Use of the Environment and the 
Maintenance and Enhancement of Long-Term Productivity 
Under all alternatives. shon-term use of the environment is generally associated with resource 
demands for spent nuclear fuel management aClivities. Resources demands also include those required 
for upgrade. constructicn. and operation of facilities. These shon-term demands and uses provide a 
foundation and direction for the long-term productivity of INEl; they also have an effect on the 
success of future INEl missi0ns. A brief discussion of the influence proposed actions would have on 
the long-term productivity of the INEl follows . The INEl missions. including spent nuclear fuel. are 
discussed in Section 2. 1. 
The No-Action Alternative would provide few long-term benefits and would not allow 
DOE-Idaho Operations Office to fulfill its missions regarding the disposition and management of spent 
nuclear fuel. The activities proposed in this alternative would not suppon future proposals for disposal 
technology development. Funher. the No-Action Alternative could bring enforcement actions because 
it would not meet all the requirements of exist ing DOE regulatory commitments such as those outlined 
in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. 
To a varying degree. Alternatives 2. 3. and 4(a) wou ld provide more flexibility than other 
alternatives for fulfilling existing or future missions and actions at I!liEL. Near- and long-term ac tions 
under these ahernatives ensure compliance with regulatory requirements and protection of the 
environment. Funhennore, these alternatives would provide a diverse decisionmaking plaiform for 
future aC lions concerning disposition of DOE spent nuclear fuel. Faci lities constructed and 
technologies developed under these alternatives could be used for a wide range of ac ti vities such as 
interim treatment and storage or preparation and packaging for transponation offsite . 
The approach that would be taken for spent nuclear fuel under Alternatives 4b(2) and 5a coulJ 
confine and hinder long-term productivi ty at INEL. Efforts would focus on shipment of spent nuclear 
fuel to other locations. No emphasis wou ld be placed on solving particu lar spent nuclear fuel disposal 
problems or increasing the understanding of how cenain spent nuclear fue ls react over time. 
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Alternatives -Ib( I ) and 5b would direct INEL's future mission and development primarily toward 
large-scale canning and characterization. storage. and disposal of all INEL and DOE regional or 
complex-wide spent nuclear fuel. These alternatives could limit INEL's nexibility in redirecting or 
enhancing future INEL-specific missions. 
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5.19 Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitment of Resources 
The irreversible and irretrievable commitment of natural and manmadt! resources resulting from 
the construction and operation of facilities re lated to the spent nuclear fue l a lternatives would involve 
materials and ft!sources that could not be recovered or n:cycled or that would be consumed or reduced 
to unrecoverable forms . Some of these commitments would be irretrievable because of the nature of 
the commitment or the cost of reclamation. For example . the construction and opemtion of spent 
nuclear fuel faci lities at the INEL would consume irretrievable amounts of electrical en~rgy. fuel. 
concrete. steel. aluminum. copper. plastics. lumber. sand. gravel. groundwater. and miscellaneous 
chemicals. 
Alternatives 4b( I) and 5b are each estimated to require approximately 11.000 megawatt-hours per 
year of electricity. 1.100.000 liters (290.000 gallons) per year of fuel oil. and 48 million liters 
( 13 million gallons) per year of water above the projected baseline (1995) usage of these resources 
(see Section 5.13). These changes would represent a modest increase of 5.3 percent. 9.9 percent. and 
0.7 percent respectively, and are well within current system capabilities and usage limits. All other 
alternatives would place smaller demands on these resources. commensurate with the level of 
construction and operation activities proposed. 
Alternatives 4b(l) and 5b would also commit 31 acres (0.12 square kilometer) of previously 
disturbed land to industrial use; the conversion of this acreage would result in the commitment of poor 
quality wildlife habitat and natural resource services. Alternatives 4b( l ) and 5b would involve the 
greatest irretrievable consumption of other resources. such as construction materials and operating 
supplies. However. this demand would not constitute a permanent drain on local resources or involve 
any material that is in short 'iupply in the region. 
Other commitments would be irreversible because the construction or operation of facili ties 
related to the spent nuclear fue l alternatives would consume the resource. Proposed act ivities would 
also require an expenditure of labor that would be irretrievable. 
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5.20 Potential Mitigation Measures 
Th is section summarizes measures that DOE would use to avoid or reduce impacts to the 
environment caused by spent nuclear fuel management activit ies at the INEL. The potential mitigation 
measures for each aspect of the affected environment described below are the same under each 
alternative. Section 5.7 of Volume I discusses other generalized measures DOE could use. 
5.20.1 Pollution Prevention 
DOE is commiued to comply with Executive Order 12856. Federal Compliance with Right-to-
Know Laws and P"lIulion Prevention Requirements: Executive Order 12873, Federal Acquisition, 
Recycling and Waste Prevention ; and applicable DOE Orders and guidance documents in planning and 
implementing pollution prevention at the INEl. The DOE views source reduction as the first priority 
in its pollution prevention program. followed by an increased emphasis on recycling. Waste treatment 
and disposal are considered only when prevention or recycling is not possible or practical. 
5.20.2 Cultural Resources 
The lack of detailed spec ifications associated with the proposed construction at the INEl under 
various alternati yes precludes identifying specific project impacts and potential mitigation measures for 
panicular structures and facilities. Basic compliance under cultural resource law involves five steps 
that would be essentially the same under all alternatives. These steps are (a) identification and 
evaluation of resources in danger of impact, (b) assessment of effects to these resources in consultation 
wi th the State Historic Preservation Office and representatives of the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes. 
(c) development of plans and documents to minimize any adverse effects. (d) consultation with the 
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation and tribal representatives as to the appropriateness of 
mitigation measures. and (e) implementation of potential mitigation measures. Therefore, if a cultural 
resource survey has not been performed i:l an area planned for ground disturbance under one of the 
proposed alternatives. consultat ion would be initiated with the Idaho State Historic Preservation Office 
and the survey would be conducted prior to any disturbance. If cultural resources were discovered. 
they would be evaluated according to National Register criteria. Wherever possible . important 
resou rces would be left undisturbed. If the impacts are determined to be adverse and it is not feas ible 
to leave the resource undisturbed, then measures would be initiated to reduce impacts. All mitigation 
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plans wou ld be developed in consultation with the State Historic Preservation Office and the Advisory 
Council on Historic Preservation and would conform to appropriate standards and guidelines 
established for historic preservation activities by the Secretary of the Interior. 
Some act ions may affect areas of religious. cultural. or hisloric value to Native Americans. DOE 
has implemented a Working Agreement (DOE 1 992d) to ensure communiCation with the Shoshone-
Bannock Tribe. especially relating to the treatment of archeological sites during excavation. as 
mandated by the Archeological Resources Protection Act (ARPA 1979); the protection of human 
remains. as required under the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA 
1990): and the free exercise of religion as protected by the American Indian Religious Freedom Act 
(AIRFA 1978). In keeping with DOE Native American policy (DOE 1990). DOE Order t230.2 (DOE 
I 992c). and procedures to be defined in the final Cultural Resources Management Plan for the INEl. 
DOE would conduct Native American consultation during the planning and implementation of all 
proposed alternatives. Procedures for dealing with the inadvertent discovery of human remains would 
be consistent with the Native American Graves Protec tion and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA 1990). If 
human remains are discovered. DOE will notify all tribes that have expressed an interest in the 
repatriation of graves as required under NAGPRA. including the Shoshone-Bannock. Shoshone. Painte. 
and the Northwestern band of the Shoshone Nation . These tribes will then have an opportunity to 
claim the remains and associated artifacts in accordance wilh the requirements of NAGPRA . 
Procedures for the repatriation of "cultural items" in accordance with NAGPRA will be described in a 
curation agreement that will be finalized by June t 996. 
In addi tion to consultation. other measures would mitigate potential adverse effects to Native 
American Resources. in particu lar effects to air. water, plants. animals. and visual setting. These 
measures include avoidar.ce of sensitive areas. placement of facilities within existing areas of 
construction. revegetation with native plants of areas with ground disturbance. monitoring of plants 
and animals within hunting and gathering areas for radiological contamination. reducing noise and 
night lights outside of existing facilities . monitoring tanks. ponds and runoff for contaminants. 
minimizing ground disturbance. use of dust suppressers during construction. and use of filters and 
other air pollutant control equipment to reduce air contaminants. 
5.20.3 Traffic and Transportation 
All on site shipments of spent nuclear fuel would be in compliance with ID Directive 5480.3. 
"Hazardous Materials Packaging and Transportation Safety Requirements. It These requirements 
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provide assurance that. under normal condit ions. the INEL would meet as-Iow-as-reasonably-
achievable conditions. reasonably foreseeable acc ide nt s ituations (those wi th probability of occurrence 
greater than Ix IO·1 per year) wou ld not resuh in a loss of shie lding or containment or a criticality. and 
an un intentional release of radioactive material would result in a time ly response. 
DOE would approve the type packages used for on site shipments or would obtain a Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission or DOE certificate of compliance. If the onsite package did not have Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission or DOE certification. the user of the package would have to establish how 
admi ni strative controls or other potential mit igating measures would ensure thal the package would 
maintain containment and shielding integrity. The administrative and emergency response 
considerations wou ld provide sufficient control so that accidents would not result in loss of 
containme nt or shielding. in criticali ty. or in an uncontrolled release of radioacti ve materia l that would 
create a hazard to the health and safety of the public or workers. Accident mitigation is described 
below. 
5.20.4 Accidents 
The DOE would ini tiate INEI emergency response programs. as appropriate. following the 
occurrence of an accident to prevent or mitigate consequences. These emergency response programs. 
implemented in accordance wi th 5500-DOE series Orders. typica lly involve emergency planning. 
emergency preparedness. and emergency response actions. Panicipating government agenc ies with 
plans that are interrelated with the INEL Emergency Plan f r Action include the State of Idaho. 
Bingham County. Bonnevi lle County. Bune County. Clark County. Jefferson County. the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs. and Fon Hall Indian Reservation. When an emergency condition exists at a fac ility, 
the Emergency Action Director is responsible for recognition. classification. notificat io . . md protective 
action recommendations. Each emergency response plan utilizes resources specifically dedicated to 
assist a faci lity in emergency management. These resources include but are not limited to the 
following : 
iNEL Warni ng Commun icat ions Center 
INEL Fire Department 
Facility Emergency Command Center< 
DOE Emorgency Operations Centers 
County and State Emergency Command Centers 
Medical. health physics. and industria l hygiene specialists 
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Protective clothing and equipment (respirators. breath ing air supplies. etc.) 
Periodic training exercises and drills wi thin and between the organizations involved in 
implementing the re ' ponse plans 
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